An Introduction to Indian Philosophy

by Satischandra Chatterjee

the highest end of life, i.e., liberation, can be attained only through a right knowledge of reality. But a true knowledge of reality presupposes an understanding of what knowledge is, what the sources of knowledge are, how true knowledge is distinguished from wrong knowledge and so forth. In other words, a theory of reality or metaphysics presupposes a theory of knowledge or epistemology. Hence the realism of the Nyāya is based on the theory of knowledge which is the logical foundation of all philosophy. Thus we see that the Nyāya is a system of philosophy, which may be justly characterised as logical realism.

These are (i) pratyakṣ, perception; (ii) anumāna, inference; (iii) upamāna, comparison; and (iv) śabda, testimony.

Knowledge is broadly divided into anubhava or presentative cognition and smṛti or memory, i.e., representative cognition. Each of the two can be valid (yathārtha) or non-valid (ayathārtha). Valid presentative knowledge is called pramā. It is divided into perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Non-valid presentative knowledge (apramā) is divided into doubt (saṁśaya), error (bhrama or viparyyaya) and hypothetical argument (tarka). Thus valid presentative knowledge (pramā) is a definite or certain (asandigdha), faithful or unerring (yathārtha), and non-reproductive experience (anubhava) of the object.

Though memory is not pramā, asit is non-presentative or a mere reproduction of past knowledge, it may also be valid or non-valid, according as it is a reproduction of some previous valid or non-valid presentative knowledge.

tarka. It is not pramā or valid presentative knowledge, because to argue like this is not to know the fire, but to confirm your previous inference of fire from smoke. That there is fire, you know by inference. To argue that if there is no fire there cannot be smoke, is not to know the fire as a real fact either by way of perception or by that of inference.

Knowledge is true when it agrees with or corresponds to the nature of its object, otherwise it becomes false.

(tadvati tatprak

(tadabhāvavati tatprak

the test of its truth or falsity consists in inference from the success or failure of our practical activities in relation to its object (pravṛttisāmarthya or pravṛttivisaṁvāda). True knowledge leads to successful practical activity, while false knowledge ends in failure and disappointment.

Indian thinkers are more critical than dogmatic in this respect, and make a thorough examination of perception in almost the same way as Western logicians discuss the problem of inference.

Naiyāyikas define perception as a definite cognition which is produced by sense-object contact and is true or unerring.

What, however, is really common to, and distinctive of, all perceptions is a feeling of 'directness' or 'immediacy' of] the knowledge given by them. We are said to perceive an object, if and when we know it directly, i.e., without taking the help of previous knowledge or any reasoning process (jñānā-kara

(sākṣāt prat

laukika or ordinary and alaukika or extraordinary perceptions. This distinction depends on the way in which the senses come in contact with their objects. We have laukika perception when there is the usual sense-contact with objects present to sense. In alaukika perception, however, the object is such as is not ordinarily present to sense, but is conveyed to sense through an unusal medium.

Perception, again is of two kinds, namely, external (bāhya) and internal (mānasa). The former is due to the external senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. The latter is brought about by the mind's contact with psychical states and processes.

six kinds of laukika or ordinary perceptions, viz., the visual (cākṣuṣa) auditory (śrautra), tactual (spārśana), gustatory (rāsana), olfactory (ghrāṇaja), and the internal or mental (mānasa) perception, Alaukika or extraordinary perception ...

there are six organs of knowledge. Of these, five are external and one is internal. The five external senses are the organs of smell (ghrāṇa) taste (rasanā), sight (cakṣuḥ), touch (tvak), and hearing (śrotra). These perceive respectively the physical qualities of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. They are physical in nature and each of them is constituted by that very same physical element whose qualities are sensed by it. This seems to be suggested by the fact that in many cases we use the same name for both the sense organ and the physical quality sensed by it. It is probably based on the principle that only like can perceive like. Mind (manas) is the internal organ which perceives such qualities of the soul as desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), striving or willing (prayatna), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha) and cognition. It is not made of the material elements (bhūtas) like the external senses. It is not limited to the knowledge of any particular class of things or qualities but functions as a central and common organ in all kinds of knowledge. The Nyāya view of mind as an 'internal sense' (antarindriya) is accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhyas, the Mīmāṁsakas and others. But some Vedāntins criticise and reject the Nyāya view of mind as an 'inner sense'.

s

the perception of the universal (sāmānya), is called sāmānya-lakṣaṇa perception

j

Western psychologists, Wundt, Ward and Stout explain such perceptions by 'complication',13

a process by which sensations or perceptions of different senses become so closely associated as to become integral parts of a single perception.

The Naiyāyikas also explain illusion, e.g., of a snake in a rope, as a case of jñānalakṣaṇa perception.

yogaja

intuitive perception of all objects—past and future, hidden and infinitesimal—by one who possesses some supernatural power generated in the mind by devout meditation (yogābhyāsa). In the case of those who have attained spiritual perfection (yukta), such intuitive knowledge of all objects is constant and spontaneous. In the case of others who are on the way to perfection (yuñjāna), it requires the help of concentration as an auxiliary condition.

nirvikalpaka or the indeterminate and savikalpaka or the determinate.

pratyabhijñā or recognition.

After perception comes anumāna or inference. Anumāna (anu—after, māna—knowledge) literally means a cognition or knowledge which follows some other knowledge. Take the following illustrations: 'The hill is fiery, because it smokes and whatever smokes is fiery;' 'Devadatta is mortal, because he is a man, and all men are mortal.' In the first example, we pass from the perception of smoke in the hill to the knowledge of the existence of fire in it, on the ground of our previous knowledge of the universal relation between smoke and fire. In the second example, we know the mortality of Devadatta. which is not now perceived, from the presence of manhood in him. Thus we see that inference is a process of reasoning in which we pass from the apprehension of some mark (liṅga) to that of something else, by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the two. As Dr. B.N. Seal puts it: 'Anumāna (inference) is the process of ascertaining, not by perception or direct observation, but through the instrumentality or medium of a mark, that a thing possesses a certain character.'15

The five-membered syllogism may be thus illustrated: 1.-Ram is mortal (pratijñā); 2.-Because he is a man (hetu); 3.-All men are mortal, e.g., Socrates, Kant, Hegel (udāharaṇa); 4.-Ram also is a man (upanaya); 5.-Therefore he is mortal (nigamana). The pratijñā is the first proposition, which asserts something. The hetu is the second proposition, which states the reason for this assertion. The udāharaṇa is the universal proposition, showing the connection between the reason and the asserted fact, as supported by known instances. Upanaya is the application of the universal proposition to the present case. Nigamana is the conclusion which follows from the preceding propositions.18

According to the first classification, inference is of two kinds, namely, svārtha and par

According to another classification, we have three kinds of inference, namely, pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṛa.24

A third classification gives us the three kinds of kevalānvayi kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki inferences.27

(1) Savyabhicāra (2) Viruddha, (3) Satpratipakṣa, (4) Asiddha, (5) B

savyabhicāra or the irregular middle.

The savyabhicāra hetu or the irregular middle is found to lead to no one single conclusion, but to different opposite conclusions.

viruddha or the contradictory middle.

the viruddha or the contradictory middle is one which disproves the very proposition which it is meant to prove. This happens when the ostensible middle term, instead of proving the existence of the major, in the minor, which is intended by it, proves its non-existence therein.

The distinction between the savyabhicāra and the viruddha is that while the former only fails to prove the conclusion, the latter disproves it or proves the contradictory proposition.

satpratipakṣa or the inferentially contradicted middle.

This fallacy arises when the ostensible middle term of an inference is validly contradicted by other middle term which proves the non-existence o...

asiddha or s

bādhita or the non-inferentially contradicted middle.

So we may say that words are significant symbols. This capacity of words to mean their respective objects is called their śakti or potency, and it is said to be due to the will of God.52 That a word has a fixed and an unalterable relation to certain things only, or that this word always means this object and not others, is ultimately due to the Supreme Being who is the ground and reason of all the order and uniformity that we find in the world.

A sentence (vākya) is a combination of words having a certain meaning. Any combination of words, however, does not make a significant sentence. The construction of an intelligible sentence must conform to four conditions.

consists in the juxtaposition or proximity between the different words of a sentence.

intervals of space.

unchanging atoms of earth, water, fire and air.

Ākāśa or ether, kāla or time, and dik or space are eternal and infinite substances, each being one single whole.

The Nyāya theory of the physical world, in respect of these and other connected subjects, is the same as that of the Vaiśeṣika.

While the Nyāya accepts four independent sources of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, comparison and testimony, the Vaisesika recognises only two, viz. perception and inference, and reduces comparison and verbal testimony to perception and inference.