1962: The War That Wasn't

by Shiv Kunal Verma

This plan was flawed right from the very outset. Hoshiar Singh should have known that the Chinese were highly unlikely to present a static target especially south of the Tawang/Mago Chu, where they themselves were infiltrating on the flanks, hoping to draw the Indians out of their prepared defences. Also, somebody in the chain of command should have realized that combining troops from the Sikh and Sikh LI units was a recipe for disaster. Despite Sikhism’s tenets forbidding casteism, the reality on the ground was quite different, especially during the mid-twentieth century. The two Sikh LI units were Mazhabi or low-caste Sikhs. In their villages, they lived in a state of virtual apartheid, dominated by middle-caste Jat Sikhs who made up the Sikh Regiment. Both these regiments of the Indian Army have time and again proven themselves to be outstanding soldiers, but to mix them up was always going to be fraught with danger. In the event, Hoshiar Singh literally blundered into the Chinese trap and the ill-fated and ill-conceived attempt would have the worst possible outcome.