1962: The War That Wasn't

by Shiv Kunal Verma

India’s request for comprehensive aid, especially ‘immediate support to strengthen our air arm sufficiently to stem the tide of the Chinese advance’ goes into minute detail, and is prefaced by the statement: ‘We have repeatedly felt the need to use our air arm in support of our land forces but have been unable to do so because in the present state...we have no defence against retaliatory action by the Chinese.’ In this context his specific demands were for: ‘[A] minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighters’ and ‘modern radar cover [which] we don’t have’. The draft further added that USAF personnel ‘will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained’. Among other things, Nehru was pleading for twelve squadrons of Lockheed F-104 Starfighters and two squadrons of Canberra B-57 bombers. Both Palit and Lall asked Sarin why the air chief, Air Marshal Aspy Engineer, was not being consulted. Sarin said that apart from him, the foreign secretary and the prime minister, no one else knew of the letter. These two officers were clearly not qualified to answer the question and at best could make only an educated guess.