1962: The War That Wasn't

by Shiv Kunal Verma

lot of post-war venom has been directed at Menon for his role and style of functioning, but Menon was simply doing what Nehru wanted him to do, as was the case with Kaul. Nehru’s interest in Kaul’s career and his subsequent rise to the top had begun as far back as 1947; from being considered a ‘failed officer’, he was posted to the United States as the military attaché after which he returned to India and became Nehru’s key man in Kashmir. The Menon-Thimayya clash eventually took place when the army chief put his foot down when Kaul was to be placed in Army HQ on promotion as the QMG. Thimayya could not have been more categorical in his official assessment of Kaul, yet it was Thimayya who paid the price for his loyalty to his country and his prime minister. Nehru, despite his stature and reputation, showed that he was not above playing petty politics and with Menon as a cat’s paw, he contrived to not only sideline Thimayya, but used him and the Indian Army as a smokescreen to get himself out of the Aksai Chin highway mess. If that was inexcusable, how should we regard the prime minister’s statement in Parliament the day after he had unilaterally announced the army’s taking over of NEFA, that Thimayya was petulant, then begin focusing on the need to maintain civil supremacy over the military.