Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS

by Joby Warrick

In 2002, King Abdullah II had been scolded by American officials for warning that an invasion of Iraq would “open Pandora’s box,” and he was taking no pleasure in seeing his predictions coming true. Sickened by the bombings and beheadings carried out in Allah’s name, the monarch began a series of private meetings with religious scholars to talk about a way to draw a line between Islam, the ancient faith, and the hateful takfiri creed used by Zarqawi to justify the killing of those he regarded as apostates. It was no easy assignment. Unlike Shiites or Roman Catholics, Sunni Muslims lack a centralized religious hierarchy that settles theological debates. Muftis, Sunni clerics of a certain rank, can issue religious edicts called fatwas, but any two can disagree wildly on the same topic: what is a damnable sin to one scholar may be regarded as permissible or even obligatory behavior to another. Since his arrival in Iraq, Zarqawi had become a master at exploiting the contradictions in the system, surrounding himself with like-minded clerics who issued fatwas to condone suicide bombings and the killing of Muslim innocents, actions that would be regarded as anti-Islamic under almost any reasonable interpretation of Koranic texts.