Marching Orders: The Untold Story of How the American Breaking of the Japanese Secret Codes Led to the Defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan

by Bruce Lee

As currently planned, operations will bring us “on to the Rhine at the essential crossing places between Nijmegen and Wesel.” Several other factors are to be considered in carrying out these proposals. Crossing the Rhine on the narrow front of Nijmegen–Wesel is risky. The river and areas on both sides are flooded during the spring. Then there is the extent that subsidiary attacks by Allied forces “can be relied upon to divert enemy forces from the sector of our main attack.” Because of these variants, Eisenhower makes it obvious that no plan can be crystallized at this time “but must await the development of the situation in Europe as a whole and on this front in particular.” Eisenhower also says his plan “is predicated on deploying thirty-five divisions north of the Ruhr.” He emphasizes “there will not be two main attacks,” and the locations for subsidiary supports “is under constant study.” In conclusion, Eisenhower declares there “is no difference among any of us about the necessity for having a concentrated force in the north when crossing the Rhine is attempted. My plans call for the availability of all the forces that can possibly be sustained. The point we must consider is what must be our own general situation when we are ready to undertake