Marching Orders: The Untold Story of How the American Breaking of the Japanese Secret Codes Led to the Defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan

by Bruce Lee

Although it was important to “throw back or destroy the enemy in the south,” the constant buildup was in the north. There the First and Ninth Armies had priority in ammunition, replacements and new units. “Moreover, Bradley definitely limited the time available to Patton for making one more effort to achieve a victory in the Saar Valley.” Patton’s final attack was fixed for December 19, after which, regardless of results, divisions were to be transferred north. The Twenty-first Army Group was meanwhile limited to the defensive along the whole northern flank. The terrain and flooding (caused by the Germans opening the floodgates of the Roer dams) prevented offensive actions, except one in January/February between the Meuse and the Rhine as a preparation for crossing. The ultimate plans as outlined by Eisenhower are “to cross the Rhine north of the Ruhr in great force. From this we have never varied and the only difference in concepts of which I am aware involve the preliminary tasks that must be accomplished and the possible location of supporting attacks.” The plan Eisenhower outlines is divided into three phases: “(1) to defeat the enemy west of the Rhine and close the Rhine north of the Moselle; (2) to force the passage of the Rhine; (3) to advance east of the Rhine.”