The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944

by Ian W. Toll

The fanaticism of the Japanese was unnerving, but it prompted them, again and again, to fight in tactically idiotic ways.

Aviation and medical authorities were coming to accept that “pilot fatigue” was a real and unavoidable syndrome that must be countered by rotating squadrons out of the theater every four to six weeks. Aviators pushed past the limit became listless, haggard, and hollow-eyed; they lost weight rapidly even if well fed; they crashed more often, or made navigation errors and got lost; their reflexes slowed and their aggressiveness diminished.

Japanese servicemen returning from the South Pacific were confounded by the elation they found at home. No one in Tokyo seemed to grasp how precarious Japan’s position had become.

Replacement pilots emerging from Japan’s wartime training pipeline lacked the skill or confidence to carry on the air war effectively.

Words are not deeds, and there is no reason to believe that Halsey, given the opportunity, would actually order a city sacked, a population neutered, or a prisoner degraded and abused in defiance of the Geneva Convention.

The Japanese had won a tactical and strategic victory in this “Battle of Vella Lavella.” It was to be their last sea victory of the war.

The South Pacific had become a meat grinder for Japanese airpower.

Since the Japanese navy did not concede the inevitability of combat fatigue, neither pilots nor staff officers were ever rotated out of the theater:

Union leftists, veterans of the labor struggles of the 1930s, insisted that the war was a conspiracy to enrich politicians and fill the coffers of their capitalist benefactors.

When the Flying Fish managed to transmit the signal by sonar, the Cogswell signaled, “Sorry, are you damaged?” Flying Fish: “I don’t think so.” Cogswell: “Come on up.” Flying Fish : “Go to hell. We’ll wait until you’re gone.

Morton’s tactics had turned a new page. They would be studied by all of his colleagues in the submarine service. Hereafter, their performance was to be measured against his.

Impoverished in natural resources, Japan’s economy and war-making potential were perilously dependent on imported iron ore, bauxite, rubber, copper, zinc, and especially oil. Japanese

With fewer than 2 percent of all naval personnel, the submariners could claim credit for more than half of all Japanese ships sunk during the war, and 60 percent of the aggregate tonnage.

Admiral Spruance, when interviewed by historians after the war, often remarked that strategy and tactics never approached the importance of logistics in the transpacific campaign.

His report to General Julian Smith would enter Marine Corps lore: “Casualties many; percentage of dead not known; combat efficiency: We are winning.

If the Americans had not made those mistakes at Tarawa, they would have made them in the Marshalls, suffering proportionally higher casualties in the latter as a result.