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slave,
Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed?
we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us;
for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.
for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.
the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.
concerning justice,
to speak the truth and to pay your debts—no more than this?
Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind...
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speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.
Simonides
Simonides,
really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.
guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.
we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.'
justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger.
there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?
And the government is the ruling power in each state? Certainly.
different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have p...
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Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?
no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?
Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.
you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night.
Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.
Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing? Certainly not.
the good of each art is specially confined to the art?
Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help—not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good.
but if we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.
Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?
Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?
But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? ...
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And you also said that the just will not go beyond his li...
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Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like th...
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As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:
injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship;
But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider.
Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?
And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?
How would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences,
second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?
third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?
the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.
first
justice
Seco...
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thirdly,