The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower

by Michael Pillsbury

If the contrast between the Warring States mind-set and a traditional American view of the world can be distilled into a single, fundamental difference, it is this: Americans tend to believe that relations with other countries ebb and flow between periods of competition and cooperation; Beijing’s assumption is that the U.S. government has a long-standing policy of hostility and deception toward the Chinese government. If this difference were merely a matter of Chinese misunderstanding due to ignorance, then it would be possible and indeed prudent for the United States to eliminate, or at least reduce, this misperception. Unfortunately, that’s not the case. Chinese leaders’ distrust of the United States is largely based on deeply held cultural axioms that underlie nearly all Chinese strategic decisions. Their distrust of the United States is therefore unlikely to change.

Kissinger highlights an important aspect of shi by warning that China characterizes its relationship with the United States as one of combative coexistence: “Americans to this day often treat the opening to China as ushering in a static condition of friendship. But the Chinese leaders were brought up on the concept of shi—the art of understanding matters in flux.… In Chinese writings, the hallowed words of the American vocabulary of a legal international order are rarely to be found. What was sought, rather, was a world in which China could find security and progress through a kind of combative coexistence, in which readiness to fight was given equal pride of place to the concept of coexistence” (italics mine).24

During Kissinger’s subsequent trip to Beijing, in October, Zhou placed the Soviet Union on a list of six key issues on the substantive agenda, although he listed it last. After the Chinese declared that they were not opposed to improvements in American-Soviet relations, Kissinger concluded that they were displaying bravado and concealing their fear of the Soviet threat.19 Kissinger warned Zhou of Moscow’s “desire to free itself in Europe so it can concentrate on other areas.”20 “Other areas” meant the People’s Republic of China. But there were glimpses even then that the Chinese saw the United States not as an ally but as an obstacle. Referring to the United States, Zhou offered a hint of how the Chinese really felt about their new prospective friend. “America is the ba,” Zhou told Kissinger’s interpreter, Ambassador Ji Zhaozhu of China’s Foreign Ministry, repeating a term that would be frequently used by Chairman Mao and his successor, Deng Xiaoping. U.S. government officials who understand Mandarin—a small but growing group—have long known that many Chinese and English terms cannot be fully translated between the two languages. Choices must often be made by the interpreters about what each side really means. Kissinger’s translator told Kissinger that Zhou’s statement meant, “America is the leader.” This seemed to be an innocuous remark, and when taken in the context of the Cold War even a compliment. But that is not what the word ba means in Mandarin—at least that is not...

Some years later, I had the privilege of talking to Ambassador Ji Chaozhu. He omitted any discussion of how he translated the concept of ba to Kissinger in his otherwise chatty memoir The Man on Mao’s Right, which provides a rare insider’s account of how China’s Foreign Ministry viewed the opening to the United States.

This played well with Kissinger, who told Nixon “with the exception of the UK, the PRC might well be the closest to us in its global perceptions.”36 There seemed to be little suspicion of China’s strategy.

I asked the Chinese whether they thought it would be excessively provocative to take two additional steps: Should we supply and encourage Afghan rebels to conduct commando sabotage raids inside the Soviet Union (which had never been done during the Cold War)? And should we agree to the request to provide the Afghans with long-range sniper rifles, night-vision goggles, and maps with the locations of high-ranking Soviet officials serving in Afghanistan in support of what amounted to a targeted assassination program? My colleagues had been certain that the Chinese would draw the line at such actions. I had read enough Chinese history to guess that they would agree, but even I was taken aback at the ruthlessness of Beijing’s ambition to bring down the Soviets when they answered affirmatively to the two questions.