Stilwell and the American Experience in China: 1911-1945

by Barbara W. Tuchman

Ever since the invention of the General Staff in the nineteenth century the paper arrangements of warfare had assumed an importance happily unknown to Caesar, Genghis Khan or Napoleon. War was now regarded by staff professionals no longer as the province of Great Captains but as an exercise in “command problems.

The Chinese appetite for matériel combined with their inability to utilize it exasperated the Westerners.

China must not think, he urged, in terms of military power she did not possess—a large air force and heavy artillery—but make use of what she had, “a large reservoir of manpower armed fairly well with rifles, machine guns and mortars.”

There was “sympathy here for the Nazis. Same type of government, same outlook, same gangsterism,” except that it was neither forceful nor efficient. Chiang “is not taking a single step forward or doing anything concrete to improve the position of China.” Like Hitler he believed himself “infallible” and worked by “intuition.” “How do you move a guy like that? How do you get his point of view?”

By keeping rivals off balance through a technique of “fear and favor,” in Stilwell’s phrase, he appeared strong and indispensable but he did not know how to make a government. Though long on experience, his mind was narrow and his education limited. His most serious handicap was the lack of competent government servants. He never allowed a really able man to reach an important post lest he become too strong. Because he made loyalty rather than ability the criterion of service he was surrounded by mediocrities.

Wow. This sounds familiadr