The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan

by Matt Pottinger

The hard political fact is that while the Tsai administration did an admirable job of increasing defense-spending levels from US$11 billion in 2018 to US$19 billion in 2023 (special defense budgets included), Taiwan will need to spend even more to get its defenses where they need to be. That Taiwan already spends 22 percent of its national budget on defense means its elected leaders must be prepared to make difficult changes to existing fiscal and tax policies.43

This is yet another benefit of creating a local defense force. By training in the communities they will defend, they will stand as tangible proof that Taiwan can protect itself and that taxpayer money is being put to use in ways that can help Taiwan in times of war and peace.

This has been the experience of the Estonian Defense League. With sixteen thousand members, it is larger than Estonia’s entire active-duty military. Yet because every member is an unpaid volunteer, the Estonian government has to spend money only on training and gear.44

But to reiterate: the single biggest obstacle to rapid transformation emanates from within the MND itself.

This chapter looks at China’s kinetic options for subjugating Taiwan, up to and including a full-spectrum invasion. It argues that although there are several ways that Beijing might try to coerce Taiwan, the Taiwanese military must focus overwhelmingly on the invasion threat. Taiwan must be prepared to endure a full-scale embargo and bombardment for at least two months, while resisting invasion.

When “Gray Zone” Turns Black In recent years, China’s gray-zone activities against Taiwan have included everything from luring away Taiwan’s diplomatic partners and imposing targeted economic sanctions to blackmailing Taiwanese political candidates and pumping biased or false information into Taiwan’s public discourse. They have also involved nonlethal actions by China’s navy, air force, rocket forces, and coast guard designed to cultivate a sense of futility within Taiwan’s population.

Beijing’s gray-zone actions have so far failed to reverse Taiwan’s widespread and growing disenchantment with the idea of a political union with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

To put it bluntly: Beijing’s strategy to “win without fighting” is still fighting for a win.

the military domain, Beijing has responded to perceived political slights by launching missiles and aircraft, as it did in 1995–96 to protest the Taiwanese president’s trip to the United States and in 2020 and 2022 when senior US officials visited Taipei.

Taiwan already stations its coast guard on the two South China Sea (SCS) features it holds, with only minimal military support personnel. Rather than naval forces, Taiwan should use its coast guard and National Airborne Service Corps (Taiwan’s civil aviation search and rescue agency) for routine resupply to the South China Sea islands and maritime patrols in international waters.

Acknowledging that the PLA enjoys strategic overmatch on the high seas, Taiwan can help set its narrative by employing more “white hull” ships, such as coast guard cutters, instead of military “gray hulls.”

The Taiwan Coast Guard should issue warnings approaching 24 nm and judge the target’s nature and intent. Inside of 12 nm, military forces should respond if Taiwan witnesses actions that go beyond innocent passage, as defined by international law.

If Beijing intentionally provokes in Taiwan’s sovereign seas, Taipei cannot afford to back down. The same is true for interlopers in the air, with the caveat that Taiwan may need to scramble fighters when approaching aircraft reach 40 nm, depending on the flight profile and type of aircraft.

Taiwan must also take care to avoid overreacting.

For the offshore islands (Taiwan-held islands along the coast of mainland China), Taiwan’s territorial rights do not extend 12 nm. Instead, Taiwanese forces should target direct overflight of the territory itself, as they eventually did with small drones in the summer of 2022.

If the political objective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is to show measurable progress toward unification, provoking an altercation on or over the high seas may not suffice. Beijing could instead choose to take over Taiwan-held territory by seizing one or more of the outer islands along the mainland coast or in the SCS.

Washington’s Taiwan Relations Act does not cover the outer islands, and a PLA operation to seize one would probably be over in a matter of days, if not hours, given the PLA’s capability overmatch. Pratas Reef, with no native population or other claimants, is a top candidate. China could also seize one or more of the offshore islands.

Taiwan must avoid a Crimea-like uncontested takeover at all costs, both to demonstrate its resolve and to oblige China to use lethal force. Actively resisting an island grab will send an unambiguous signal to the rest of the world: China is a violent revisionist power and Taiwan is willing to fight for itself.

However, even thousands of guided missiles are unlikely to compel capitulation. Short of using atomic weapons, virtually no bombing campaign in history has compelled a population to concede.

Given the inadequacies of all other options (including those discussed in the next chapter), the PRC’s most likely path to victory may therefore be a full-scale invasion to rapidly assume control of Taiwan by force.

The 823 Artillery Battle A PLA blockade coupled with lethal territorial bombardment of Taiwan is most likely a precursor to an amphibious operation. Taiwan experienced an analogous attack during the 823 Artillery Battle, a more than three-month battle named for its starting date of August 23, 1958 (the event is also known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis).

Taiwan should apply three relevant lessons from its own historical experience in the 823 Artillery War to deter a future PLA amphibious assault:

Forces within range of enemy surface fires must be survivable and protected. In

Forces within range of enemy surface fires must have enough supplies and munitions to outlast the enemy.

Naval and air forces must originate from outside the range of enemy surface fires.

Therefore, Taiwan’s principal defense strategy should be based on two symbiotic objectives: deny a conventional PLA landing and elicit maximum assistance from a US-led coalition.

the PRC manages to successfully establish a lodgment (such as an operational seaport or airport) in Taiwan, the likelihood of international acceptance and restraint would increase significantly. In contrast to Ukraine, without a friendly bordering nation, allies would be challenged to provide security assistance for a ground campaign in Taiwan.

The primary threats in a PLA landing operation are the amphibious ships, landing craft, air assault helicopters, and airborne delivery planes.

Taiwan should deprioritize blue-water naval targets, especially since associated costs and risks are high, and instead let the US military prosecute them using its qualitative advantages, including long-range precision strike weapons and advanced submarines.

Taiwan should target its mainland strikes against military targets that most directly support PLA landing operations.

In this era of modern weapon systems, Taiwan is essentially a single battle space. To maintain a secure rear area, Taiwanese forces must hold all of Taiwan and the Penghus by decisively repelling PLA landing forces.

Taiwan’s general officers were settled into a worldview whereby Taiwan’s military should prepare to assume control of the mainland if and when the communist regime collapses. Hence Taiwan’s reluctance to divest from power projection capabilities like tanks, attack helicopters, paratroopers, amphibious assault, and airborne early warning.

Around 2019, however, the Tsai administration finally began moving Taiwan’s defense establishment toward a force development strategy more aligned with the US vision.

Only thirty years ago, Taiwan’s GDP was more than half that of China’s. Now it is less than one-twentieth the size. This asymmetry of economic power is reflected in military power and necessitates a correspondingly asymmetric Taiwanese defense strategy.

On a related note, Taiwan’s 2022 defense spending amounted to only 1.6 percent of GDP while China’s more opaque spending added up to 3.8 percent of its much larger economy, according to US government assessments.12 Taiwan did increase defense spending to more than 2 percent for 2023 and 2024, but Taipei should spend proportionally at least as much as the United States (3.5 percent of GDP).

Taiwan’s political leadership must clearly articulate its priorities and focus the defense establishment on the core, critical mission of defending Taiwan from a PLA invasion.

The Taiwanese military also has diplomatic and disaster response support missions, but it should not allocate force development (i.e., acquisitions and training) resources specifically for midshipman cruises to the Caribbean or typhoon relief operations. These collateral missions should be accomplished using ready forces as available.

Therefore, the overwhelming preponderance of the Taiwanese military should be purpose-built for fending off a PLA assault. Meanwhile, Taiwan should use its civilian talent to create a whole-of-society homeland defense establishment.

If resources permit, Taipei should also consider maintaining a counterforce strike capability.

To suit this purpose, Taiwan already has hundreds of Hsiung Feng IIE (HF-2E) land-attack cruise missiles paired with relocatable launch vehicles.

To support such an option, Taiwan should acquire and pre-position large quantities of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) (and Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles [LRASMs]) on US bases in Guam.

In the undersea domain, China has invested in building underwater sensor networks in the waters surrounding Taiwan.14 Meanwhile, Taiwan’s submarine technology is decades behind the times. Japan has air-independent propulsion submarines. The United States, and now China, added pump-jet propulsion technology to theirs. Taiwan’s newest submarine has neither of these improvements, making it the noisiest and most vulnerable modern boat in the region, despite its exorbitant cost.

Taking a page from Ukraine, Taiwan should develop uncrewed sea drones, particularly lethal expendable ones (i.e., smart torpedoes), instead of building more manned submarines.

Taiwan must develop its own A2AD network with enough mobile short- and medium-range air and coastal defense systems to deny a PLA landing for two months.

As an example, a single counter-ballistic Patriot missile costs $4 million, which is more than the projectile it is tasked to intercept. Therefore, Taiwan should pursue a missile defense strategy that relies chiefly on mobility—fixed, high-value targets are unlikely to survive PLA strikes.

To mitigate numerical disadvantages, the Taiwanese military must utilize resilient sensors and weapons platforms and target efficiently to maximize lethality.

effects of these operations by decentralizing command and control.

To better exploit asymmetries, Taiwan should not attempt to attain air or maritime superiority, even for limited durations, as the costs and risks are exponentially higher than to simply deny the PLA the freedom to maneuver in those domains.

Taiwanese war planners should also concede that the “force protection phase” of its defense plan will not conclude until the conflict ends. For example, aircraft parked in east coast tunnel complexes will be unavailable for the duration of the fight.

Accordingly, Taiwan’s training regimen should pursue interoperability with US Marines and special forces, either of which might pre-deploy stand-in or advisory forces to Taiwan.