Discourses, Fragments, Handbook

by Epictetus

A distinctive and fundamental feature of Stoic ethics is the idea that all human beings are constitutively capable of carrying out two kinds of ethical development, one relating to the progressive understanding of categories of value, the other to forms of relationship. In the first kind, human beings move from instinctive attraction to natural goods, such as health, to ‘selecting’ between such things in a rational way. Finally, if they progress properly, they will come to understand that what matters, ultimately, is not obtaining these natural goods but doing so in the right way, that is, in a way that expresses the qualities fundamental to a good human life, or the virtues. At this point, anything other than virtue comes to seem ‘a matter of indifference’, though it is also natural for us to find some things, such as health or property, ‘preferable’, rather than ‘dispreferable’.19

But as things are, although we have it in our power to apply ourselves to one thing alone, and devote ourselves to that, we choose instead to apply ourselves to many things, and attach ourselves to many, to our body, and our possessions, and our brother, and friend, and child, and slave. [15] And so, being attached in this way to any number of things, we’re weighed down by them and dragged down. [16] That is why, if the weather prevents us from sailing, we sit there in a state of anxiety, constantly peering around. ‘What wind is this?’ The North Wind. And what does it matter to us and to him? ‘When will the West Wind blow?’ When it so chooses, my good friend, or rather, when Aeolus chooses; for God hasn’t appointed you to be controller of the winds, he has appointed Aeolus. [17] What are we to do, then? To make the best of what lies within our power, and deal with everything else as it comes. ‘How does it come, then?’ As God wills.

1.2 How one may preserve one’s proper character in everything

‘Go!’; [13] and when Florus asked him, ‘Then why aren’t you going yourself?’, he replied, ‘Because I’ve never even considered it.’ [14] For as soon as anyone begins to consider such questions, assessing and comparing the values of external things, he comes near to being one of those people who have lost all sense of their proper character.

How is it, replied Epictetus, that when a lion attacks, the bull alone is aware of its own might, and hurls itself forward on behalf of the entire herd? Isn’t it clear that the possession of such power is accompanied at the same time by an awareness of that power?

And in our case too, if someone possesses such power, he won’t fail to be aware of it. [32] And yet a bull doesn’t become a bull all at once, any more than a man acquires nobility of mind all at once; no, he must undergo hard winter training, and so make himself ready, rather than hurl himself without proper thought into what is inappropriate for him.

Come now, show me what progress you’re making in this regard. Suppose I were talking with an athlete and said, Show me your shoulders, and he were to reply, ‘Look at my jumping-weights.’* That’s quite enough of you and your weights! What I want to see is what you’ve achieved by use of those jumping-weights. [14] ‘Take the treatise On Motivation and see how thoroughly I’ve read it.’ That’s not what I’m seeking to know, slave, but how you’re exercising your motives to act and not to act, and how you’re managing your desires and aversions, and how you’re approaching all of this, and how you’re applying yourself to it, and preparing for it, and whether in harmony with nature or out of harmony with it.

But if he has directed his efforts to what is contained in books, and that is what he toils away at, and it was for that that he has travelled abroad, I would ask him to return home at once and no longer neglect his affairs there, [23] because he has made his journey for no purpose; no, what is truly worthwhile is to study how to rid one’s life of distress and lamentation, and of cries of ‘Ah, what sorrow is mine!’ and ‘Poor wretch that I am!’, and of misfortune and adversity; [24] and to learn what death, banishment, prison, and hemlock really are, so that one may be able to say in prison like Socrates, ‘My dear Crito,* if it pleases the gods that this should come about, so be it!’, rather than, ‘Alas, poor old man that I am, this is what was kept in store for my grey hairs!’

For what else is tragedy than the portrayal in tragic verse of the sufferings of men who have attached high value to external things? [27] If one has to be deceived into learning that external things that lie outside the sphere of choice are nothing to us, I for my part would willingly undergo such deception, if it would enable me to live a life of undisturbed serenity from that time onward;

If someone, says Epictetus, refuses to accept what is patently obvious, it is not easy to find arguments to use against him that could cause him to change his mind. [2] And the reason for this lies neither in his own strength, nor in the weakness of the one who is trying to instruct him; but the fact is that when someone who has been driven into a corner turns to stone, how can one hope to deal with him any further through argument?

Not accepting other arguments and being „blind“ to ones faults isn‘t as bad as to acknowledging them but doing nothing about it, since the former implies that one still might learn.

‘Yes, but my nose is running.’ Then what do you have hands for, you slave? Isn’t it to be able to wipe your nose?

Well then, is it possible to flee from human society? And how could that be possible for us? Is it possible to change people, then, if we do associate with them? And who has granted me such a power? [19] What remains to be done, then; what method can we discover to apply in dealing with them? A method that will ensure that, while they for their part act as they think fit, we for our part will remain nonetheless in accord with nature. [20] But you’re weak-spirited and discontented, and if you’re alone, you call it desolation, and if you’re in the company of others, you call them cheats and robbers, and you find fault even with your parents and children, your brothers and neighbours. [21] Whereas in fact, if you’re living alone, you should call that peace and freedom, and view yourself as being like the gods; and if you find yourself in the company of a mass of people, you should call that not a mob and a source of uproar and vexation, but rather a feast and a public festival, and so accept everything with contentment. What is the punishment, then, of those who fail to accept things in that spirit? To be just as they are. [22] Is someone discontented to find himself on his own? Then let him be all alone. He is discontented with his parents? Then let him be a bad son and grieve. He is discontented with his children? Then let him be a bad father.

‘Throw him into prison.’ What sort of prison? That in which he already finds himself. For he is there against his will, and whenever someone is in any place against his will, that is a prison for him. Just as Socrates* for his part was not in prison because he was there willingly.

‘But I have right of purchase over them, and they don’t have any such right over me.’ But don’t you see to where it is that you’re directing your view? That it is to the earth, to the pit, to these miserable laws of ours, the laws of the dead,* so that you fail to have any regard for the laws of the gods?

So accordingly, one small boy with nothing more than a stick can drive a flock of sheep.

For if the greatest harm that a person can suffer is the loss of the most valuable goods, and the most valuable thing that anyone can possess is correct choice, then if someone is deprived of that, what reason is left for you to be angry with him?

After all, one can only lose what one has. ‘I’ve lost my cloak.’ Yes, because you had a cloak. ‘I’ve got a pain in my head.’ Well, you don’t have a pain in your horns, do you?

And if your slave is slow in bringing you the bandage, don’t cry out and pull a face and exclaim, ‘Everyone hates me!’ For in truth, who wouldn’t hate such a person?

Who, then, is the invincible human being? One who can be disconcerted by nothing that lies outside the sphere of choice.

But as Socrates used to say, the unexamined life* isn’t worth living.

Show her clearly that she is mistaken and she won’t follow that course; but as long as you haven’t shown it, what else can she do than follow what seems best to her? Nothing else. [9] Why should you be angry with her, then, because, poor wretch, she has gone astray on matters of the highest importance, and has changed from a human being into a viper? Shouldn’t you, if anything, take pity on her instead? And just as we pity the blind and the lame, shouldn’t we also take pity on those who have become blinded and crippled in their governing faculties?

That is why I lost my lamp,* because the thief was better than me at keeping awake. But he has paid a high price for the lamp, since in return for a lamp he has become a thief, in return for a lamp, a man of bad faith, in return for a lamp, a wild beast. That struck him as being a good bargain!

What is the fruit, then, of these teachings? Precisely what must be finest and most fitting for those who have received a true philosophical education, namely, peace of mind, fearlessness, and freedom. [22] For on these questions we should put our trust not in the crowd, who say that only free men can be educated, but rather in the philosophers, who say that none but the educated can be free.

‘One who delays his work is always wrestling with ruin.’*

On inconsistency

There are some faults that people readily admit, whereas they admit others only with reluctance. No one will admit, for instance, to being stupid or unintelligent, whereas, on the contrary, you’ll hear everyone saying, ‘If only my luck matched up to my wits!’ [2] They admit readily to timidity and say, ‘I’m inclined to be a bit nervous, I admit, but you won’t find me to be a fool.’ [3] As for lack of self-control, no one willingly admits to that, and not at all to being unjust, or envious, or meddlesome, although most people will admit that they tend to give way to pity.

‘You wish to behold the light, do you think that your father does not?’*

He well knows that if he were to punish all who abuse him, he would have nobody left to rule.

[9] It isn’t easy to convert young men to philosophy, any more than one can catch soft cheese on a hook; but those who are naturally gifted, even if one tries to turn them away, attach themselves all the more strongly to reason. [10] And so Rufus* used to turn people away most of the time, using that as a test to distinguish the gifted from the ungifted. For he used to say, ‘Just as a stone, even if you throw it into the air, will fall down to the earth by virtue of its own nature, so it is too with the gifted person: the more one tries to beat him off, the more he inclines towards the object to which his nature carries him.’