Discourses, Fragments, Handbook

by Epictetus

Some people, when they hear such arguments as these, that one should be steadfast, that choice is free by nature and not subject to constraint, whereas everything else is subject to hindrance and constraint, and in bondage and subject to others, imagine that they must always adhere unswervingly to every judgement that they have formed. [2] But it is necessary first of all that the judgement should be a sound one. Yes, I want the body to be strong, but with a vigour of the kind that is found in a healthy man, an athlete; [3] but if you show me that you have the vigour of a madman and boast about that, I’ll tell you, ‘Find someone to cure you, man, this isn’t vigour but just another kind of enervation.’ [4] It is something of this kind that people feel in their mind when they misinterpret these arguments. Thus, a friend of mine decided, for no proper reason, to starve himself to death. [5] I heard of this when he was already in that third day of his fast, and went and asked him what had happened. [6] ‘I’ve decided to take this course,’ he said. Yes, but all the same, what was it that moved you to do so? If your decision is justified, look, here we are at your side and ready to help you on your way; but if your decision is unreasonable, you ought to change it. [7] —‘We ought to hold to our decisions.’—What are you up to, man? Not to every decision, but to those that are justified. If you now arrive at the notion, for instance, that night has come, don’t change your opinion if...