Why Bharat Matters

by S. Jaishankar

Whether drawing strength from its heritage and culture or approaching challenges with the optimism of democracy and technology, this is certainly a New India, indeed an India that is able to define its own interests, articulate its own positions, find its own solutions and advance its own model. In short, this is an India that is more Bharat.

SJ wsrites well. Ihad not thought about Bharat like this.

International relations for the last quarter of the century have been dominated by five phenomena: globalization, rebalancing, multipolarity, impact of technology and the games that nations have always played.

Taking the initiative to enable the permanent membership of the African Union (AU) was notable in itself and helpful in strengthening the larger narrative.

The Ramayana, which is the earlier one, has purity of thought and nobility of conduct as its central message. In contrast, the Mahabharata is much more a chronicle of human frailty and pursuance of ambition.

And it is that our daily life is increasingly influenced by what happens elsewhere, be they problems or solutions.

Surprisingly, improvements in governance, applications of technology and progress on long-festering issues can be depicted as detrimental to freedom. Even prominent institutions indulge in disinformation in pursuit of a cause.

The real debate is not whether we should be an open or a protected economy. It is whether we are an employment-centric and capability-driven one or just a profit-obsessed society content to be a market.

We have, in the last few years, steadily built up the image of a first responder, pharmacy of the world, a reservoir of talent, climate action leader, development partner and cultural powerhouse.

democratically elected representatives, they cannot expect to be unchallenged, especially when they have such visible stakes in the preferred outcomes.

Who??

However, the enormity of the Ukraine crisis obviously radically transformed the security outlook of individual states, as also of the collective. It fast-forwarded strategic globalism, as Europe itself chose to define the impact and responses in that framework. The challenge nevertheless remains that a continent, which fervently believed in ‘change through trade’ and was supremely clinical about its interests, now seeks the world’s support and understanding. That it has cushioned itself from some of the sharper pains while advocating hard options for those much poorer makes this exercise much more difficult. This was most evident in regard to energy imports from Russia, though it also extends to other aspects of commerce.

Whatever happens, the truth is that international relations continue to grapple unsatisfactorily with the problem of reconciling sharply divergent cultures in a more tightly integrated world.

Behavioural aspects have also played their part. Stresses induced narrower definitions of self-interest and departures from collective endeavours. Few practised what they preached; some even stopped preaching altogether. Inadvertently, insights emerged on the interplay of culture, interests and values. Pluralistic societies remained more engaged with the world and solidarity was stronger between them. And those who saw the world also as a workplace, rather than just a marketplace, had a deeper interest in remaining connected.

however, are not with just individual nations. India’s relationship with the West as a whole needs an objective evaluation. In many ways, this group is a natural partner because its members share the attributes of a pluralistic society, democratic polity and market economy. Yet, this very commonness can also create its own frictions. The continuing hegemonism visible in many quarters in the West leads to an excessive advocacy of their particular practices and convictions. Often, it is lost on them that others have different traditions, practices and yardsticks, and that the West itself would not necessarily come out well if they were evaluated objectively and publicly. Moreover, these attitudes do not stop at advocacy and extend to promoting an actionable agenda as well.

As we now move into a capable and confident era, it is important that our outlook is determined more by our interests and less by our insecurities.

Instead, Nehru’s decision in 1955 was to declare that India was not in a hurry to enter the Security Council at that time, even though it ought to be there. The first step, instead, was for China to take its rightful place. After that, the question of India could be considered separately. And no surprise, far from reciprocating Nehru’s ‘China First’ policy, we are still waiting for that country to express support for our own similar ambitions!

Through shaping narratives and argumentation, it seeks to both legitimize and de-legitimize.

Indeed, motivating beliefs are often backed by a flow of accompanying resources to make them more actionable. It is, therefore, a naïve polity that does not monitor external transactions and when required, regulate them.

Once the mindset of weaponization sets in, almost nothing is safe. It can be directing or withholding the flow of tourists, the supply of raw materials and components or exercising the power of a large vendor or customer. When the market economy is subjugated to non-market goals, we then realize how the normal has added to fragility.

Ironically, when strategy demands, even espousers of free-market virtues are prepared to give their principles a short shrift.

There is less questioning now when nations use every instrument of influence at their command to advance their interests.

Where business ends and security begins is no longer easy to distinguish.

The vehement opposition from select quarters to the change in respect of Article 370 is a case to point. But they may equally make the case for radicalism, or perhaps even extremism in a more acceptable form. We see their hand at work as well when cross-border terrorism is depicted as just a more vigorous form of post-Partition differences. In fact, the very image of nations is often moulded with an agenda in mind. Data protectionism is an argument used to trivialize digital delivery and justify data monetization. In the same vein, the concept of ‘big emitters’ seeks to evade historical responsibility. Either way, entrenched elites will monitor and resist the kind of rebalancing that gives emerging societies the confidence to define their own interests.

We must ensure a brand differentiation between two neighbours who each produce their own brand of IT graduates: one on information technology, and the other on international terrorism.

And unfortunately, that is exactly what we have seen in the past. The subsidizing of production and denial of market access in other parts of the world have made it very difficult to compete. If critical production is no longer viable, then it is not a matter of trade policy but a concern of national security. Let us be clear: India can only be consequential abroad if it has adequate capacities at home. It is not our fate to be just a market for goods or a generator of data for others. A rising India will only really advance when it is an atmanirbhar Bharat.

This domestic scenario was mirrored by an external strategy that has hardly enhanced India’s competitiveness. In the pursuit of globalization, we have been driven by short-term calculations and tactical gains. India imported to consume, trade and profit rather than to absorb, innovate and produce. The contrast with East Asia could not be starker.

Overall, Nehru’s critics felt that he harboured a sense of false internationalism that came at the cost of national interest.

On every important occasion, Mookerjee asserted that India has remained defensive and failed to expose or counteract the designs of Pakistan aimed at it. This could well be the natural thoughts of the average Indian citizen in the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai!

Among the long-held tenets of Indian foreign policy is that of non-alignment. Even though it has a particular global context, this has sought to be made into an immutable concept. That India’s capabilities now allow it to move beyond defensive options is often lost on those who treat policy debates as theological ones. But precisely because it is invoked so often, a critical viewpoint is also worth recognizing.

Masani essentially asked whether our approach had brought us to a point where we were unable to repel effectively an attack on our own territory. Related to that, he suggested that by keeping a distance from the West, we were not even able to equip our forces adequately. But more fundamentally, he was concerned that India’s capacity to recognize a dangerous neighbour had somehow got impaired. Its domestic reflection was discouraging our own people from even displaying patriotism. In effect, Masani was bringing out that non-alignment, while working in good times, was less productive in tough ones.

India can matter by just being there, as a market place, as a contested ground, a resource or a platform. Indeed, as it did during colonial times. This breeds a survival mentality that, at best, can graduate to a transactional one. But India can also matter through the power of its ideas and actions as an engine of the global economy, a hub of innovation or a democracy that delivers. That is the course of destiny, and its ambitious path requires deep determination and strong perseverance.

Societies can be relevant as a playing field for others or they can be players by themselves. The colonial era with its ruthless extractive culture presented that sharp choice in the last few centuries. You were either a victim or an assailant; there was no middle ground. However, the progress of contemporary times has provided the basis for change beyond that binary.

It, of course, was enabled by the fact that democratic traditions are deeply rooted in Indian history and culture. But this aspect was not asserted even by India in earlier years, and its modern incarnation was depicted for years as an anomaly. So much so that opinions in the West were quite comfortable recommending military rule as a better governance solution for the ‘less worthy’. Our own region provided the most telling examples in that regard, with Pakistan touted for years as a preferred partner.

Large nations, in particular, require deep strengths. If there has been a major shortcoming in India’s post-1991 performance, it has been in the inadequacy of that level of capabilities. Contentment with corporate profitability overrode any commitment to create resilient domestic supply chains. That growth was insufficiently reflected in expansion of employment spoke for itself. Reform itself was conceptualized in narrow terms to serve a limited constituency.

The sensitivity to nurturing India’s cultural footprint over the ages is now visible in focussed efforts to promote cooperation in heritage conservation. It is not just the rising metrics of power that count; it is also the accompanying cultural and intellectual resurrection that is key to global rebalancing. India matters on that account due to its unique contributions.