Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

by Eric Schlosser

The first principle was incompatibility: there had to be a unique arming signal that couldn’t be sent by a short circuit or a stray wire. The second principle was isolation: the firing set and the detonators had to be protected behind a physical barrier that would exclude fire, electricity, and electromagnetic energy, that couldn’t be easily breached, and that would allow only the unique arming signal to enter it. The third principle was inoperability: the firing set had to contain a part that would predictably and irreversibly fail in an abnormal environment. That part was called a “weak link.” The hardened barrier was called a “strong link,” and combined with a unique arming signal, they promised a level of nuclear weapon safety that would meet or exceed Walske’s one-in-a-million standard.