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July 26 - August 1, 2025
In June 1961—a month after Alan Shepard had become the first American in space—then NASA Administrator James Webb introduced Jerrie Cobb at a banquet.
Having their cake and eating it too.
- Cobb passed many tests, yet NASA was embarassed by the publicity stunt efforts.
- Cobb appointment led to female interest, yet all the applicants ended up being the same white, test pilots.
P73. WH pressure delivered Cpt. Dwight, first black man after pentagon was pressured for a year.
"We can break him" - Chuck Yeagar.
"Kennedy wants a colored in space."
He was flushed out, assigned blackwater job.
P77. Dwight claims he was trated unfairly due to race.
The first AA male to make it, didnt make headlines because he crashed.
Six months after their new astronaut recruitment drive had begun, NASA chiefs in Houston and Washington, DC, received initial reports on the first wave of applications. They were alarmed to discover that their plan to remake the astronaut corps in the image of a diverse America had failed among the very groups they had hoped to reach. Of the 870 applications the agency had received to date, only 93 were from women, and just 30—as far as they could ascertain—were from minorities; of these, not a single one was considered outstanding.
P78. July 76', laxed mission SPC reqs, set off frenzy of new applicants, but none panned out in the diversity initiative.
83. All out blitz to meet minorities where they are, among them Ron McNair.
84. McNair gifted as a kid, had doubts in undergrad, convinced to stay and apply at MIT.
87. "If being black meant he had to work harder than his white peers to prove himself, then that is what he would do and without compliant"
92. NASA was seeking well rounded individials while looking for diversity. Resnik was jewish, Onizuka asian, 6 women, 3 black men.
94. The new astronauts house hunted, even as Carter considered shutting the Shuttle program.
Branded as "The Fucking New Guys" the old timers had little confidence they would stay. Even played the old Apollo capsule burn up tape.
Eventually Frosch would ask Carter for two separate bailouts, almost half a billion dollars in total, and only the intervention of Defense Secretary Harold Brown dissuaded the President from axing the shuttle altogether.
101. A call back to earlier, "we made a deal with the devil" Carter would use this to barter during the arms reduction treaty.
102. In response, USSR greenlights Buran, remember a model was done by 78, concept by Max Faget in 69.
107. By no means was training easy for women, followed by press to expose any sign of weakness. The new guys became like family.
Each of the samples he’d glued to the T-38s had been torn off the aircraft in flight, disintegrating somewhere in the sky over Texas. Moser knew immediately that there was no way the tiles would survive the journey to space.
115. These tiles are such a boondoggle, had to be individually manufctured, set by hand, and started disintegrating in first tests.
116. New guys immediately upgraded to get them working on shuttle procedures for young-crippen.
119. "Get this thing in space or we're gonna lose the program"
121. Carter facing many crisis, shuttle also a target, why no remote launch capability?
123. Reagan, ready to launch.
In the months since Columbia had at last been mated to its rocket boosters and fuel tank and rolled out to the launchpad at Cape Canaveral, the press and public had come to regard the project with renewed awe, the years of doubt and recrimination about the Aluminum Dumbo suddenly forgotten.
128. Pres and press, once rolled out held shuttle with renewed enthusiasm. Resnik asked about romance in space, "too cute to be an astronaut"-Tom Brokaw.
132. Parts of launch could break and sheer rocket, including tiles, no way to repair in space.
136. NRO saves the day, no serious damage to tiles.
140. Mission sucess was coming back alive.
141. New NASA admin aims high towards a space economy.
143. Post flight inspection shows damged O-Rings, foreshadowing.
At first, the handful of Black astronauts often stuck together—finding that race offered a stronger bond than professional background—and socialized with other Black families in the local community:
146. At first they stuck together, some fraternized and Adultered.
149. Not all involved in culture. Resnik was lean and self-assred, Sally Ride an uncompromising feminist. Resnik was a "man's kind of woman."
151. After selection day, never again would all meet socially.
154. Only 2 ejection seats, but once shuttle was operational to be removed.
NASA feared public opinion if attempts to make full escape system could lead to shuttle seen as more dangerous than led to beleive.
In the absence of an escape system to rescue the astronauts during the boosters’ two-minute burn, NASA managers had to reduce the risk of such a calamity as far as possible; the rockets would simply have to work perfectly every time.
164. The rockets would simply have to work perfectly every time. Scaling up the Titan III rockets they had beleived they had built no new dangerous innovation. "a convenient delusion"
166. At ignition, the joint expanded and leaked passed the first ring. Marshall was not convinced they were safe, overruled by huntsville. "What do you know."
172. If you dont use your back-up you're wasting money- Hardy.
The Flight Readiness Review meetings were designed to hammer out this consensus upon the anvil of the scientific method, using data and engineering logic to exclude disagreement, emotion, and faulty analysis from the launch decision chain.
178. Your Arguments aren't worth shit. Complicating matters, NASA and contractors often worked side by side, somtimes in the same office.
179. Managers also considered cost, time, engineers below them had to fight for issues to be adressed.
Thiokol nozzle began to burn through in flight. NASA threatened to find new supplier, the company would be in bad shape.
The experimental plan had called, too, for the astronaut to orient himself to turn away from the shuttle when he reached the limit of his journey, and face out into the void.
189. The fears of space. A seasoned aviator, never turned his back to the lifeline.
190. Well rounded nature. McNair played sax in space. His mother, daughter of a slave "all these people shouting amd cheering for one of our own.
But McDonald found those anomalies he deemed unacceptable equally stressful: in doing so, he sometimes had to convince both his own management at Thiokol and those at NASA to scrap pieces of hardware they had previously considered completely flightworthy,
203. The adverserial role flips. Prove they aren't safe.
207. NASA finally rules seals as single point failure, yet Utah and Huntsville see it as normal problems.
213. Suicide mission in space to rescue earlier satellites lost, despite a size problem, they pushed for mission sucess. With that, recaptured the public mind. Most ambitious PR campaign about to begin.
“We’re not looking for Superman,” a NASA public affairs officer said. “We’re looking for the person who can do the best job of describing their experience on the shuttle to the most people on earth.”
221.This quote.
224. Essay Q for teachers, "Why do you want to be the first private U.S. Citizen in space, describe your teaching plan"
they were all impressed with her spirit, her eloquence, and her ideas about communicating the experience of spaceflight. Of the six women and four men—aged between thirty-three and forty-five—they chose, McAuliffe did not have the most impressive résumé, or the most elaborate idea of what she would do if she reached space.
235. This quote.
“Flight—Booster,” she said into her headset mic. “We lost another sensor. I’m tempted to inhibit limits.” The Flight Director barely hesitated; it was already too late for the shuttle to return to Earth. “Inhibit limits,” he said. In the shuttle cockpit, the commander flicked the switch to override the onboard computers, allowing the two remaining engines to burn on for nearly a minute longer than planned—and, at last, Challenger limped safely into orbit.
242. Mission only saved by human intervention, no big overview?
he told Lund he would no longer be wasting his time with any more new ideas: “Take a good look at this face,” he said, “because it’s the last time you’ll see it in your office.” Soon afterward, Thiokol’s top management picked Bob Lund for promotion to Vice President of Engineering for Wasatch Operations—chief engineer for the entire plant, and one of the most senior positions in the company.
250. Boisjoly had seen fellow engineer distraught after part he worked on caused deadly crash despite warning management of the problem. Pushover promoted. Cause for concern?
253. Freezing weather caused worst o-ring damage, how did shuttle survive.
256. Postflight debrief, "do you think this (weather) is going to happen before we fix the joint? No!" final recs made no mention of cold.
261. Now with cold weather proof and pleading for response, he notified everyone. Marshall pissed it was to be adressed, had it struk from pre-flight.
Like many of the veteran astronauts who still publicly opposed it as a hazardous publicity stunt, Resnik had little time for the Space Flight Participant Program. Not only did amateur astronauts pose a potential danger to the professionals in orbit—getting in the way, panicking if things went wrong—but they were also taking hard-won opportunities away from Mission Specialists like her:
274. Even resnik showed reservations, but seeing het gothrough training and media frenzy got her onboard.
279. McAuliffe was the real deal, asked by dems to run, sat next to pres at dinner.
282. Although intially not a NASA guy, beggs beleived in org, not star wars. Reagan wanted him out, trumped charges and replaced by deputy.
Beyond that, things looked bad: he said that a mass of frigid air behind the cold front had swept down from the Canadian arctic, and his forecast for Monday night and early Tuesday was for extreme cold. The temperature in Tampa would fall to 14 degrees Fahrenheit, 21 in Orlando; at the Cape, he predicted it would be slightly warmer, but still in the mid-twenties. This was colder even than the record-breaking weather that had bedeviled Ellison Onizuka’s mission aboard Discovery almost exactly a year earlier.
303. Remember that flight? Oh boy.
Solid Rocket Program Senior Manager Larry Wear remained troubled by the mention of low temperatures. He felt sure that the Thiokol engineers had mentioned something about the potential effect of cold weather on the boosters after a shuttle launch back in January of the previous year.
311. Someone remembered!
315. 2 hours to formulate arguments. This would be the first time in history a rocket contractor cancelled a launch.
317. But with all the publicity could NASA afford more delays? "High-tech low comedy" - Rather. "Too much of a challenge for challenger"- Quinones.
320. "Do not Launch" - Thiokol
“OK—is that it, Thiokol?” Mulloy asked. “Yes,” Bob Lund said. “Well, I have a dissenting opinion. And I’d like to tell you why.” With that, the NASA manager now brought down the full force of his personality—and
326. This quote.
328. We've Got to make a mgmt decision. Lap dog lund reverses opinion.
330. NASA maybe knowing it was dangerous wanted decision by Thiokol in writing.
332. Aldrich, who gives final approval only clued in with writing, no debate mention.
he told his managers to make it clear to NASA that Rockwell could not approve the launch. “It is not safe,” he said.
340. This quote.
345.visible freezing on rocket.
359. "I did everything possible to convince them not to fly.
360. Acting admin runs away.
367. Out of depth, NASA confiscates all tapes, offers no info, even basic.
368. "to my knowledge everyone was a go"
378. Flame from SRB, as soon as they saw, knew.
383-4. Engineer kept copy of docs for coverup fears.
388. Lovinggood lied to comm. NYT: NASA had warning of disaster risk.
“Mr. Chairman, Al McDonald from Morton Thiokol wanted to make a point.” “I wanted to say a point about the meeting,” McDonald began, his hands trembling. He described how he had been at the Cape when he received the first call from Thiokol about the cold, and asked to set up the teleconference the night before the accident; he explained how he had sat in Trailer Complex C with Larry Mulloy, and received the data by fax from the engineers in Utah. “The recommendation at that time,” he said, “was not to launch below 53 degrees Fahrenheit.” General Kutyna asked what the actual temperature at
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389. This exchange.
422. Unravelling NASA wishful thinking while engineers went unheard
Despite the months of televised hearings and exhaustive newspaper coverage, it was the first June Scobee and her family had heard about the teleconference the night before the launch, or how the NASA managers had ignored repeated warnings about the cold. “Those idiots!” twenty-two-year-old Rich Scobee said, and pounded his fist on the table.
436. This quote.
438-39. Astronauts were alive till the end.
444. Long feared once heat died down, NASA culture would return.
446. The foam chunks falling off amd hitting tiles had been deemed acceptable risk since the Young-Crippen days. Columbia was inevetable.
