The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945

by Richard Overy

There is little doubt that the PWE greatly exaggerated the political effects likely to be derived from a combination of propaganda and judicious bombing. Like the optimistic assessments of imminent social crisis in Germany in 1940 or 1941, every straw of information was eagerly clutched at. Violations of air-raid precautions were particularly highlighted. It was reported that seventeen Dutchmen had been heavily fined in the summer of 1941 for staying out on the street during a raid singing “Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?” News from Denmark suggested that 20,672 prosecutions for blackout irregularities had been pursued in 1941.24 British political warfare assumed that the working class would be the most likely to challenge the occupiers because they were by definition supposed to be antifascist. Directives to the BBC European Service in early 1942 asked broadcasters to “take absolutely for granted the workmen in enslaved countries are unhesitatingly behind our bombing policy, and will do all they can to help it.”25 Bombing was supposed to suggest that liberation was close behind it and to encourage hatred of the German enemy. The leaflet campaign was deliberately designed to reflect this two-pronged argument. In the spring of 1941 messages to Belgium were to be divided into “Hope—45%,” “Hatred—40%,” “Self-interest—10%,” and “Self-respect—5%.” Propaganda aimed at the Netherlands had “Certainty of Allied Victory” top of the list, with 35 percent. In between the leaflets, t...