The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945

by Richard Overy

The arguments over developing a target-finding force equivalent to the German Kampfgruppe 100 had begun in 1941 but were still unresolved when Harris took over. He was opposed to the idea of using the introduction of Gee as an opportunity to develop specialized units to find, identify, and illuminate a target city. Together with other senior commanders, he thought the creation of an elite corps would leave poorer-quality crews to follow behind and would sap the morale of the rest of the force. He favored keeping “lead crews” in each bomber group to find and mark the target, and was impervious to the evidence that this practice failed to produce a concentration of bombing effort. At a meeting with group commanders and the Directorate of Bomber Operations in mid-March, Harris made it clear that he entirely rejected the idea of a target force and was supported by all five group commanders.209 The argument highlighted the extent to which the individual commanders in chief and their subordinate commanders enjoyed independence from the air staff at the ministry in the way they chose to run their campaigns.