The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy

by Adam Tooze

The raw material shortages that had restricted armaments production in 1937 and 1939 meant that Germany had gone to war without adequate stocks of equipment. Thomas’s prediction of an ammunition crisis was immediately confirmed.15 In only a few weeks of operations, the Luftwaffe had seriously depleted its stock of bombs. Monthly consumption in Poland exceeded production in September 1939 by a factor of 7.16 For lack of training, the infantry had not performed to the high standards expected of the German army.17 There had been incidents of panic amongst the third-string reserve formations that made up a large part of the wartime strength. And even the much vaunted new Panzer divisions had shown alarming weaknesses. The rate of attrition amongst their motley collection of vehicles had been high. In less than a month of fighting a quarter of the initial force of tanks had either been knocked out or broken down.18 The antiquated Mark I and Mark II tanks, with which most of the Panzer divisions were still equipped, were clearly inadequate for an attack in the West. In France waited the fearsome