The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy

by Adam Tooze

To produce the wartime equipment for a force of more than 4 million men in the space of only four years, large parts of German industry would have to be retooled. New factories would need to be brought into production in the shortest possible time. And the question would have to be faced of what was to be done with this capacity, once the targets for the accelerated build-up had been met. If the plants were to be maintained at war readiness, the ordnance office would need to issue huge follow-on orders for equipment that went far beyond the peacetime needs of the armed forces. If the Reich wished to escape these costs, it would have to undertake an extremely difficult process of conversion to civilian activity. It would be surprising if this could be accomplished without serious unemployment. And even if it were successful, a conversion to civilian production would leave Germany unready to actually resupply its enormous army in the case of war. As Fromm put it: ‘Shortly after completion of the rearmament phase the Wehrmacht must be employed, otherwise there must be a reduction in demands or in the level of war readiness.’