The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy

by Adam Tooze

Much to its frustration, the Wehrmacht, instead of being allocated huge additional quantities of steel, found itself with a steel quota no larger than that purchased through normal channels a year earlier.92 In effect, procurement and military construction was frozen at the rate already reached in 1936. This was significant by any standard, but in light of the goals set by Fromm, the implications were nevertheless serious. To meet the target, approved in December 1936, of creating a wartime army of 3.6 million men by 1940, the army had requested 270,500 tons of steel per month. The actual monthly allocation as of February 1937 was only 195,000 tons.93 As a result, Fromm’s department estimated that army ammunition stocks would not reach their intended levels before the autumn of 1942. The system of fortifications included in the 1936 Plan would not be completed until 1948.94