The Numbers Game: Why Everything You Know About Soccer Is Wrong

by Chris Anderson

There are two histories of soccer. One is a tale of wonderful players, of ingenuity and guile and wizardry, constantly finding new ways to improve on (what at the time looks like) perfection. It is supported by Colvin’s theory and by our FA Cup data, and it explains the great defining geniuses who have illuminated soccer’s various ages: Di Stefano, Pelé, Maradona, Zidane, Messi—all finding new horizons, new ways to improve, to take the game to the next level. And there is a second history, one of the men who did all they could to stop them. Not the defenders, but the managers, who dreamed up catenaccio and zonal marking and the sweeper system and all the rest: all of it designed to stop the virtuosos showcasing their talents. Even the tiki-taka style honed and perfected by Barcelona and adopted by Spain has been labeled a primarily defensive approach—passenaccio—because its emphasis is on starving the opposition of the ball. Players have improved as the game has matured: they run faster, they shoot harder, they dribble quicker and they pass more accurately. And as they have improved, so structures have been built to contain them. These structures—offside traps, pressing, zonal marking, triangular passing—are the reason that goal scoring has largely withered on the vine. Tactics and strategies have become more complex, cutting off the supply of goals. As individuals have stretched the limits of their own abilities, so teams have found ways to counteract them.