Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

by Fredrik Logevall

Taylor sent Rusk another mission report, which he hoped would be a “basic document in our coming discussions.” The cable, labeled top secret, is surely one of the most remarkable ever written by an American envoy in Vietnam: We must accept the fact that an effective government, much beyond the capacity of that which has existed over the past several months, is unlikely to survive. We now have a better feel for the quality of our ally and for what we can expect from him in terms of ability to govern. Only the emergence of an exceptional leader could improve the situation and no George Washington is in sight. Consequently we can and must anticipate for the future an instrument of government which will have definite limits of performance. At the very worst, it will continue to seek a broadened consensus involving and attempting to encompass all or most of the minority elements with political aspirations until it approaches a sort of popular front. This amalgam, if it takes form, may be expected in due course to become susceptible to an accommodation with the Liberation Front. At best, the emerging governmental structure might be capable of maintaining a holding operation against the Viet Cong. This level of effort could, with good luck and strenuous American efforts, be expanded to produce certain limited pacification successes. … But the willingness and ability of such a government to exert itself or to attempt to execute an all-out National Pacification Plan would be margin...