Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

by Fredrik Logevall

Willard Matthias, an analyst with the CIA's Board of National Estimates, argued in a June 1964 internal memo (a draft of which he had completed earlier in the year) that the United States faced exceedingly poor prospects in Vietnam and should therefore consider seeking “some kind of negotiated settlement” to the conflict. “The guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight,” Matthias wrote. The Vietcong, under the direction of the Hanoi government but dependent largely on their own resources, were pressing their attack more vigorously than ever, and with greater success, while the “counterguerrilla effort” by the GVN was continuing to flounder. Matthias expressed “serious doubt that victory can be won” and argued that, at best, a “prolonged stalemate” might be achieved (and this only if the United States continued to provide massive assistance to the Saigon regime). A cover note by Sherman Kent, chairman of the board, indicated that the memo, which also dealt with other global issues, had received “general board approval.”