people.
if the matter of free will is disconcefting or scary, i tgink its for tge same reason that death is. And this, i tgink is because we have an urge to keep what is familiar, whether its territory, culture, a gangrenous limb or our very lives. death is the loss of something familiar, in fact of everytging which is famikiar.
so too the question of free will considers we dont have it. At first blush this is uncomfy bec it appears to be the loss of this familiar thing, very uncomfy inasmuch as its a very intimate quality.
but tgis discomfort Arises from misonception; chsnging how you think of an object doesnt change the object. So sehatever this quality of free will was yesterday is exactly the same as today even though you read this book. Considering it to be a determined pricess arising from optimal rankings of options by your brain doesnt steal from you what you had yesterday.
tgis fallacy is akin to the easily lauggable predicament of uneducated people at the time that the modern calendar was integrated for use; it changed the present date to a later one i tgink three days later if memory serves and the uneducated folk thought those tgree dys were stolen from theur life. Just like its cler to us that time wsnt stolen but only relabled so too our intimate and familiar quality hasnt been stolen only relabled.
