The Prince

by Niccolò Machiavelli

This came about from nothing other than his excessive compassion, which gave his soldiers more licence than is suitable to military discipline.

that since men love at their own pleasure and fear at the pleasure of the prince, the wise prince should build his foundation upon that which is his own, not upon that which belongs to others: only he must seek to avoid being hated,

and in the end they have surpassed those who laid their foundations upon sincerity.

Therefore, you must know that there are two modes of fighting: one in accordance with the laws, the other with force.* The first is proper to man, the second to beasts. But because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second: therefore, a prince must know how to make good use of the natures of both the beast and the man.

Since, then, a prince must know how to make use of the nature of the beast, he should choose from among the beasts the fox and the lion;* for the lion cannot defend itself from traps, while the fox cannot protect itself from the wolves. It is therefore necessary to be a fox, in order to recognize the traps, and a lion, in order to frighten the wolves: those who base their behaviour only on the lion do not understand things.

A wise ruler, therefore, cannot and should not keep his word when such an observance would be to his disadvantage, and when the reasons that caused him to make a promise are removed.

If men were all good, this precept would not be good. But since men are a wicked lot and will not keep their promises to you, you ...

Men are so simple-minded and so controlled by their immediate needs that he who deceives will always find someone who will let himself be deceived.

Therefore, it is not necessary for a prince to possess all of the above-mentioned qualities, but it is very necessary for him to appear to possess them.

Furthermore, I shall dare to assert this: that having them and always observing them is harmful, but appearing to observe them is useful: for instance, to appear merciful, faithful, humane, trustworthy, religious, and to be so; but with his mind disposed in such a way that, should it become necessary not to be so, he will be able and know how to change to the opposite.

One must understand this: a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good, because in order to maintain the state he must often act against his faith, ...

And so it is necessary that he should have a mind ready to turn itself according to the way the winds of Fortune and the changing circumstances command him. And, as I said above, he should not depart from the good if it is possible to do so, bu...

Therefore, a prince must be very careful never to let anything fall from his lips that is not imbued with the five qualities mentioned above; to those seeing and hearing him, he should appear to be all mercy, all fa...

Men in general judge more by their eyes than their hands: everyone can ...

In the actions of all men, and especially of princes, where there is no tribunal to which to appeal, one must consider the final result.*

For ordinary people are always taken in by appearances and by the outcome of an event. And in the world there are only ordinary people;

As I have said, what makes him hated above all else is being rapacious and a usurper of the property and the women of his subjects. He must refrain from this.

In most cases, so long as you do not deprive them of either their honour or their property, most men live content, and you only have to contend with the ambition of the few, who can be restrained without difficulty and by many means.

What makes him despised is being considered changeable, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, and irresolute. From these qualities, a prince must guard himself as if from a reef, and he must strive to make everyone recogni...

The prince will protect himself against this danger by avoiding being either hated or despised and by keeping the people satisfied with him.

One of the most powerful remedies a prince has against conspiracies is not to be hated by the people, for whoever plans a conspiracy always believes that he will satisfy the people by killing the prince.

Anyone who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he find companions except from amongst those whom he believes to be discontented.

let me say that on the part of the conspirator there is nothing but fear, apprehension, and the terrifying thought of punishment.

I conclude, therefore, that a prince should not be too concerned about conspiracies when the people are well disposed toward him, but that when they are hostile and regard him with hatred, he must fear everything and everyone.

From this one can extract another notable observation: princes must delegate distasteful tasks to others, while pleasant ones they should keep for themselves.

Here, one must note that hatred is acquired just as much through good actions as by sorry ones. And so, as I said above, if a prince wishes to maintain the state, he is often obliged not to be good,

because his outstanding reputation always defended him from the hatred that the people might have felt for him on account of his plundering.

for he was a military man, well able to bear up under any kind of hardship, a despiser of all delicate foods and every other kind of soft living, and this made him loved by the armies.

Antoninus had shamefully put to death that centurion’s brother, and he threatened the man every day, yet he kept him as a bodyguard. This was a rash decision and, as it happened, one that brought about his downfall.

Instead, he should take from Severus those qualities that are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those that are suitable and glorious in order to conserve a state that is already established and stable.

Now, there has never been a time when a new prince disarmed his subjects. On the contrary, when he has found them unarmed, he has always armed them, because when armed those arms become yours:

But when you disarm them you begin to offend them. You show that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for lack of loyalty. And both of these opinions generate hatred against you.

Thus, many people judge that a wise prince must cunningly foster some hostile action, whenever he has the opportunity, so that in repressing it his greatness will emerge all the more.

Princes, especially those that are new, have discovered more loyalty and more utility in those men who, at the beginning of their rule, were considered suspect than in those who were trusted at first.

And thus the prince will always derive more profit from them than from those who neglect his affairs and serve him with too much self-confidence.

the prince who is more afraid of his people than of foreigners should build fortresses, but one who is more afraid of foreigners than of his people should do without them.

However, the best fortress that exists is not to be hated by the people. Although you may have fortresses, they will not save you if the people hate you, for once the people have taken up arms, they never lack for foreigners who will assist them.

And I shall reproach any prince who, trusting in fortresses, considers the hatred of the people to be of little importance.

First, he acted while things were peaceful and when he had no fear of opposition.

above all, a prince should strive in all of his actions to achieve the reputation of a great man of outstanding intelligence.

A prince is also respected when he is a true friend and a true enemy: that is, when he declares himself to be on the side of one prince against another, without reserve. Such a policy will always be more useful than remaining neutral,

Because whoever wins does not want reluctant allies who would not assist him in times of adversity; whoever loses will not give you refuge, since you were unwilling to run the risk of sharing his fortune.

The counsel these men give you about not entering the war is indeed contrary to your interests: without respect and dignity, you will be the prey of the victors’].

It will always happen that he who is not your friend will request your neutrality, and he who is your friend will ask you to disclose your intentions by taking up arms.

In order to avoid present dangers, irresolute princes follow the neutral path most of the time, and most ...

Men are never so dishonest that they will repress an ally with such a flagrant display of ingratitude.

Here it is to be noted that a prince must avoid ever joining forces with one more powerful than himself to injure others, unless necessity compels you, as was mentioned above. For if you win you remain his prisoner, and princes should avoid being left at the discretion of others as much as possible.

for we find this to be in the order of things: that whenever we try to avoid one disadvantage, we run into another. Prudence consists in knowing how to recognize the nature of disadvantages, and how to choose the least sorry one as good.

No one should be afraid to increase his property for fear that it will be taken away from him, while no one should shrink from undertaking any business through fear of taxes.

The first thing one does to evaluate a ruler’s prudence is to look at the men he has around him.