Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China

by Ezra F. Vogel

At the end of the year, a few scholarships were made available to help some students travel to France. Xiaoping, never particularly skilled in foreign languages, did not pass the French-language examination; his father Wenming paid for his passage.

Deng never became fluent in French. They also split into various groups to discuss why the Chinese government was so weak and how the world had become so unjust. Some of these group members would go on to become anarchists, whereas Deng and others sought to build a movement to replace the weak and cowardly Chinese government.

Mao not only complained about U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union but also about Zhou Enlai for being too soft in dealing with the United States.

When Mao heard that Zhou was seriously listening to Kissinger's proposals allowing the United States to keep a stronger relationship with Taiwan as well as with the mainland, Mao, the elemental patriot, was furious at Zhou.

Mao Passes Responsibilities to Deng, December 1973

After Kissinger's November visit, for dealing with the United States Mao turned to the person who had proved absolutely firm in standing up to the Soviet Union: Deng Xiaoping. In December 1973 Deng was directed to attend the Politburo meetings to criticize Zhou. Zhou had been like an elder brother to Deng in France, in the underground in Shanghai, and in their work in Beijing in the early 1950s.

Yet Mao had reason to hope that Deng would choose to side with him rather than with Zhou. During the rectification campaign of the 1940s, Deng had been on Mao's side while Zhou had not. Deng had bonded with Mao since being accused of leading the Mao clique in 1931, and he had been promoted in the 1950s by Mao. After 1956, when Deng had become general secretary of the party, his relations with Zhou were sometimes awkward regarding party matters: Zhou, who remained senior in rank, had to report to and ...

Several days later, Mao called a meeting of the Politburo, asking the members to make Deng a full member as well as a member of the CMC. This was the first time in history that Mao had rushed through such an appointment without having it cleared by a plenary session of the Central Committee.85 Zhou officially remained on as premier, but Deng began attending his meetings with foreign officials. Indeed, although he was still physically able seven months later to take the plane flight and possibly represent China in May 1974 at the United Nations, Mao chose Deng to attend in his stead. And after Zhou entered the hospital on June 1, 1974 for surgery, Deng began hosting the visits with foreign dignitaries.86

In New York, Deng and Kissinger met for the first time a few days after the speech. At their initial meeting, Kissinger was somewhat taken aback by Deng's direct, blunt style.

Kissinger later compared Deng's direct style with the subtle, polished, and urbane manner of Zhou Enlai. Noting Deng's unfamiliarity with some of the global issues raised in the discussion, his frequent references to Mao, and his passing questions on to Qiao Guanhua, Kissinger said that Deng seemed to be on a “training mission.” Deng's cautious manner in 1974 was to be in striking contrast to his confidence in meetings with foreigners beginning in mid-1978 after he was more experienced in meeting foreign leaders and Mao was no longer alive to receive reports of Deng's comments. Kissinger also observed that compared to Mao and Zhou, who sought to improve relations with the United States primarily for security reasons, Deng focused on domestic developments and was already thinking about what improved relations with the United States could do for China's modernization.101 Kissinger later came to have high regard for Deng's abilities in representing China.102

When Deng said that Confucius was conservative and that to emancipate people's thinking, Confucius needed to be criticized, Kissinger asked if that view had any practical relevance for contemporary individuals. Deng replied that criticism of a conservative ideology does in fact have implications for those individuals who represent those ideologies.103 The message, though indirect, was loud and clear. Deng was not assisting Zhou but replacing him.104

On Sunday, when Deng's schedule in New York allowed some free time, his staff inquired what he would like to do. Without hesitation, Deng said, “Visit Wall Street.” To Deng, Wall Street was the symbol not only of American capitalism but also of American economic might. Deng had an instinct for finding the source of real power and wanting to understand it. Although Wall Street was closed on Sundays, Deng still had his staff take him there, so at least he could get an impression of the place.105 Deng was allotted only a few dollars to spend on the trip, and his personal office director, Wang Ruilin, was sent off to buy some thirty-nine-cent toys at Woolworth's for Deng's grandchildren. Tang Minzhao, Nancy Tang's father (who was also the editor of a leftist Chinese-language newspaper in New York), with his own funds purchased for Deng a doll that could cry, suck, and pee. When Deng took it home, it was a great hit.106

On June 1, only a few weeks after Deng's speech at the United Nations in New York, Zhou Enlai entered the hospital for another operation and stopped meeting foreigners. At this point Deng met most of his foreign visitors in one of the provincial rooms in the Great Hall of the People, and they were housed in the gracious Diaoyutai guest facilities. Like Zhou, he entertained guests in a style that had caused Kissinger to comment, only half-jokingly, “I come from a country undeveloped in hospitality.”

The Americans he met included George H. W. Bush, then head of the U.S. Liaison Office in China; Senators Mike Mansfield and Henry Jackson; and a delegation of university presidents.

Some years after Mao's death, Deng could boldly explain that China must borrow ideas from capitalist countries, and that doing so would not threaten its sovereignty or rule by the Communist Party. But Deng had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution for being too bourgeois, and in 1975 there was not yet a consensus about opening markets and learning from capitalist countries. So he did what he could to push at the margins. He promoted an expansion of foreign technology imports. He accepted the view of fellow officials that China should not borrow money from foreigners, but the country could make “delayed payments” when foreigners sent goods or capital to China.13 In addition, Deng supported giving material incentives to workers by offering to pay not according to need, but “according to work.” Even these modest efforts to modify the old system, however, frightened some conservative officials, who continued to argue fiercely about the need to adhere strictly to the principles of Mao Zedong.

The afternoon of the day Zhou died, the Politburo met to plan arrangements for the funeral, and at 6:30 p.m., Deng, still officially vice premier, sent to Mao the draft of the announcement of Zhou's death, prepared by the Politburo, along with a message asking for his approval. Early the next morning Mao approved the draft announcement and did not object to the selection of 107 people for the funeral committee, headed by Mao, Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhu De.1 Mao even permitted Deng to present the eulogy, and Zhou was to be cremated at Babaoshan, the cemetery for revolutionary heroes.

But Mao did not attend the funeral service. Three days before the service was to be held at the Great Hall of the People, Mao scoffed to his bodyguard Wang Dongxing, “Why do I have to go to the service?” He instructed his personal assistant Zhang Yufeng to explain simply that he was unable to be there (even though, just a few weeks later, Mao was well enough to meet former president Nixon for a full hour and forty minutes).2 Mao did send a memorial wreath for Zhou, but he did not take part in any other expression of grief. During Zhou's last months, Mao had been similarly distant. By September 1975 Zhou's weight had dropped from his usual 143 pounds to a mere 88 pounds.3 Deng, Ye Jianying, and other close associates frequently visited Zhou in his hospital suite, even when Zhou was not able to talk. On January 5, Deng, Li Xiannian, and several other leaders went to be with Zhou during his final operation.

By contrast, and in spite of Mao's coolness, among the general public the announcement of Zhou's death on radios and loudspeakers precipitated a huge national expression of grief. In the public eye, Zhou had suffered from unfair treatment since 1973. The spontaneous outpouring was comparable to that in the United States in 1945 when Franklin Roosevelt died and in 1963, when Jack Kennedy was shot. The Chinese people, aware of how emaciated Zhou had appeared at the National People's Congress the year before, were not surprised, but they were frightened that no one else could defend the country against the madness that Mao and the Gang of Four had perpetrated. Some leaders who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution remained deeply upset that Zhou had been so willing to collaborate with Mao, but in the public eye, Zhou had saved them from Mao's excesses.6 Many feared what might follow now that Zhou was no longer around to defend them.

Ji Chaozhu, who often interpreted for Deng as well as for Zhou, recalled that while Deng rarely displayed any emotion, “when Deng began by saying, ‘our premier,’ his voice broke. Everyone was sobbing.”13 Deng's life had been closely intertwined with Zhou's for half a century, and both of them had suffered under Mao whom they had served with dedication for many decades. This would be Deng's last public appearance until the spring of 1977.

Immediately after the memorial ceremony, the official period of mourning was declared over. Although the bare facts of the memorial service and of Deng's eulogy were printed in the newspapers, in contrast to the usual practice when dealing with the death of a revolutionary hero, virtually nothing about Zhou's career made it into print nor was there an official estimate of the crowds that had paid homage in Tiananmen Square or along the funeral procession. Many people were upset about this glossing over of Zhou's death, not only because it failed to provide a fitting commemoration to someone they admired, but also because of what it signified—that Zhou's and Deng's enemies were in a strong political position and would pursue policies quite different from Zhou's.15 After the memorial service, Zhou's widow, Deng Yingchao, was granted her request to accompany the ashes to the airport. There workmen carried the ashes onto a plane, to be dispersed in the skies over the Chinese land to which Zhou had dedicated his life.16

Deng's Fall and the Selection of Hua Guofeng, January 1976

The Zhou Enlai memorial activities interrupted the Politburo sessions attacking Deng for only a few days. Mao, dissatisfied with Deng's two self-criticisms, had directed the day before Zhou's memorial service that both of these self-criticisms be printed and distributed to the Politburo for further consideration.17 For Deng, the meaning was ominous. At the Politburo meeting on January 20 when Deng made his third self-criticism, he again requested an opportunity to meet Mao. Jiang Qing demanded to know why, and Deng replied that he wanted to talk personally to the Chairman about the seriousness of his errors, to hear personally the Chairman's criticisms and directions, and to present some problems he had had in his work.18 Mao, however, made no exception to his usual practice of refusing to meet anyone who had become a target of his criticism. He chose not to hear from Deng in private what he could later easily retract.19

Upon hearing that he would not have a private audience with Mao, Deng composed a handwritten letter to Mao that in effect announced his resignation, and he gave it to Mao Yuanxin to deliver to Mao. He wrote, “Chairman, I beg that you approve my request to be relieved of my duties leading the daily work of the party center.20 For the past two months I have been criticized. I fear my continuing to work will weaken the efforts of the Central Committee and that I will make further errors. I will follow the decisions of the Chairman and the Central Committee.”21 The day after he received Deng's letter, Mao met wi...

Yuanxin also reported to Mao that the three vice premiers, Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian, had requested that someone be named acting premier. (These three younger provincial leaders had been brought into the Politburo in 1973 with the expectation that they would later be leading candidates for higher positions.) Mao immediately...

To foreigners and even to the Chinese general public, Hua Guofeng was a new face, but Mao had known Hua for two decades. He first met Hua in 1955 when Hua was prefectural party secretary in Xiangtan, Hunan, Mao's home prefecture. Hua was then a strong supporter of Mao's rapid agricultural collectivization and Mao formed a positive impression of him. Over the two decades Mao had known Hua, Hua had firmly supported Mao in each political campaign and had risen in status after each one of them.

On the same day Mao told Mao Yuanxin that Hua was to be acting premier, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao arranged a meeting of the party committees at Tsinghua and Peking universities where Deng was publicly criticized by name for the first time. Chi Qun, the official at Tsinghua whom Deng's followers had criticized, took the lead in organizing more public meetings attacking Deng.23

There was a logic to Mao's timing of the public criticism of Deng and his withdrawal from public life. In 1975 the general public had accepted Deng as the leader and had approved of the job he was doing. If Hua were to be accepted as the new leader and not troubled by the presence of Deng, it would be better to remove Deng from the public scene and to take his public reputation down a notch.

On January 28, Mao formally asked Hua to be responsible for the daily work of the party center.25 And on February 2, two weeks after Deng had submitted his resignation, the party center announced to high-level party members throughout the country that Hua, with the unanimous approval of the Politburo, had been appointed acting premier.26 Meanwhile, Deng had dropped out of sight. After submitting his resignation, Deng did not return to work until the summer of 1977.27

Indeed, Hua was the kind of person Deng himself looked for when he was considering which lower-level officials to promote—he was a pragmatic problem-solver who rose step by step.

But Hua, who had not been tested in a high position, was made only acting premier: Mao still wanted to observe him before making a permanent change.

In January 1975 Mao, confident of Deng's demonstrated leadership, had given him formal titles in the military, the party, and the government. In January 1976, by contrast, Hua was not even given a position on the Standing Committee of the Politburo nor was he made a party vice chairman. Furthermore, he was not yet given any important position in the military. Mao did, however, give Hua responsibility for chairing Politburo meetings and for providing overall leadership for the daily work of the party and the government.

One of Hua's initial duties was to lead the campaign opposing the “rightist reversal of verdicts” that would criticize Deng Xiaoping's effo...

The Unsuccessful Public Campaign against Deng Even after he removed Deng from his high positions and began preparations to denounce him in public, Mao limited the attacks on Deng. In his talk on January 21, after choosing Hua Guofeng, Mao said that the differences with Deng were still contradictions among the people, which were not as serious as contradictions with the enemy, and that he would later consult again about Deng's work situation. For now, Deng's work would be reduced but he could continue to work. He would not be beaten to death. Mao had not completely given up on Deng, but he chose to proceed with the public campai...

Already on January 18, just two days before Deng sent Mao his letter of resignation, a crowd estimated at 7,000 to 8,000 officials in the national defense science sector were assembled in the Peasants Gymnasium (Xiannongtan tiyuguan) to criticize the “rightist reversal of verdicts.”

eran concentraciones en apoyo a Deng(?)

General Zhang wasn't the only one feeling ill as the political climate rapidly turned against Deng and his associates. Aside from Zhang Aiping, the other three “protective Buddhist deities” and their closest associates were also attacked—Hu Yaobang and his colleagues promoting science, Wan Li and his colleagues working on the railways, and Zhou Rongxin and his education colleagues were all subject to attack.

basicamente todos le dieron la espalda a Deng

Mao had complained to his nephew that Deng's linking of Mao's “three directives” (to resist revisionism, encourage unity and stability, and boost the national economy) had neither been cleared by the Politburo nor reported to Mao. Mao had also protested that Deng's use of the “white cat, black cat theory” (“it doesn't matter if the cat is black or white as long as it catches the mouse”) did not make any distinction between imperialism and Marxism-Leninism; it reflected bourgeois thinking. Zhang Chunqiao chimed in that Deng was a representative of the monopoly capitalist class and that he was a revisionist at home and a capitulationist abroad.

Jiang Qing was, as usual, less restrained. She called a meeting on March 2 for leaders from twelve provinces, at which she tried to escalate the seriousness of Deng's errors, calling him a “counter-revolutionary” and a “fascist.” To Mao, this was going too far. He criticized her for calling the meeting without consulting him and forbade her from sending out announcements reporting on the results of the meeting. On March 21, when the People's Daily asked whether the “person pursuing the capitalist road [Deng] who is trying to reverse verdicts … will have a genuine change of heart,” officials in Beijing understood: Mao, still hoping Deng might change, was giving him another chance.32 Deng, however, showed no signs of softening his stance. On April 5 it would become clear that the campaign to criticize Deng had not won the hearts and minds of the public.

Sufrió una campaña intensa pero no cedió, y el público tampoco se puso en su contra

Deng was interested in production, not consumption. He toured no shopping malls or private homes (except for a dinner at Brzezinski's home, with guests). In Atlanta, he visited one of Ford Motor Company's most modern plants, where he was guided by Henry Ford II, who had previously met with Deng in Beijing.

In Atlanta, Deng captivated President Carter's home state and dominated the media for days even though he stayed there only twenty-three hours. Addressing a luncheon of 1,400 people, he complimented the historic leaders of Atlanta who had reconstructed the city after the destruction of the Civil War.94 He related the city's past experiences to China's current challenges: The American South had been considered a relatively backward area, “but it now has become a pacesetter. We in China are faced with the task of transforming our backwardness. . . . Your great encouragement has . . . increased our confidence.”

Woodcock recalls that in Houston, when Deng entered a replica of a spacecraft at the LBJ Space Center, “Deng was fascinated. . . . In that simulated vehicle, apparently coming in for the landing, he was so gleeful—I think he would have been willing to stay there all day.”97 And at a rodeo in Simonton, thirty-seven miles west of the city, Orville Schell reported, “Surrounded by his aides, ministers, and interpreters, pumping hands like a small-town pol, Deng . . . approaches the rail . . . a young girl on horseback gallops up and presents him with a ten-gallon hat. . . . The whistling, cheering crowd watches with delight as Deng theatrically dons his new hat. And in this one simple gesture, Deng seems not only to end thirty years of acrimony between China and America, but to give his own people permission to join him in imbibing American life and culture . . . arresting China's historic resistance to the West.”98 All over the United States, the photograph of Deng smiling beneath his ten-gallon hat became the symbol of his visit. It signaled to the U.S. public that he was not only good-humored, but, after all, less like one of “those Communists” and more like “us.” The Houston Post headline read, “Deng avoids politics, goes Texan.”99

At the end of his tour, in Seattle, Deng said, “Our two countries are neighbors on opposite shores of an ocean. The Pacific, instead of being a barrier, should henceforth serve as a link.”

Just before departing, at a brief meeting held inside an airport terminal because of the cold drizzle outside, Deng, sniffling and with a fever, said, “We came to the United States with a message of friendship from the Chinese people, and we are going back laden with the warm sentiments of the American people.”102