Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era

by James M. McPherson

Studying the Union defenses through his field glasses on the evening of July 1 and again next morning, Longstreet concluded that this line was too strong for an attack to succeed. He urged Lee to turn its south flank and get between the Union army and Washington. This would compel Meade to attack the Army of Northern Virginia in its chosen position. Longstreet liked best the tactical defensive; the model he had in mind was Fredericksburg where Yankee divisions had battered themselves to pieces while the Confederates had suffered minimal casualties. Longstreet had not been present at Chancellorsville nor had he arrived at Gettysburg on July 1 until after the whooping rebels had driven the enemy pell-mell through the town. These were the models that Lee had in mind. He had not accomplished the hoped-for “destruction” of the enemy in the Seven Days’ or at Chancellorsville. Gettysburg presented him with a third chance.42 The morale of his veteran troops had never been higher; they would regard such a maneuver as Longstreet suggested as a retreat, Lee thought, and lose their fighting edge. According to a British military observer accompanying the Confederates, the men were eager to attack an enemy “they had beaten so constantly” and for whose fighting capacity they felt “profound contempt.” Lee intended to unleash [Page 656] them. Pointing to Cemetery Hill, he said to Longstreet: “The enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there,” Longstreet replied: “If he is there, it w...