Strategy: A History

by Lawrence Freedman

Now their ability to follow conciliatory, restrained strategies was circumscribed.

tried to mitigate the effects of the harder line by presenting it in its most restrained version.

Pericles did not see the possibility of inflicting a decisive blow against Sparta, so instead he sought a stalemate. His calculation was that Athens had the reserves to outlast Sparta even if the war dragged on for a number of years.

he sought victory through enemy exhaustion rather than annihilation.

There were annual Spartan attacks on Attica—a source of produce near Athens—to which no response was made other than to send raiding parties around the Peloponnesus. The regular loss of crops from Attica drained the treasury’s ability to import essential produce from elsewhere. It also left Athens looking helpless in the face of Spartan aggression. Then came a calamity. A plague in 430 BCE, aggravated by the overcrowding in Athens caused by displaced Atticans, resulted in immense distress. For once Pericles lacked good

The strategy had a limited coercive effect on Sparta, was excessively costly to Athens, and encouraged the colonies to become rebellious.

After Pericles died, Athens adopted a more aggressive strategy. This reaped some rewards, and even peace terms from Sparta, but it was then the Athenians’ turn to overextend themselves.

Pericles

showed how it was possible to make a weak argument stronger through careful construction, and taught his art to willing pupils. He saw words as equivalent to physical force. They could cause pain and joy: “Some strike fear, some stir the audience to boldness, some benumb and bewitch the soul with evil persuasion.

Protagoras,

Pericles’s success lay in his authority and ability to convince the people to follow strategies developed with care and foresight.

ability to describe a future that could be achieved if his advice was followed.

This concept of the future was drawn from existing reality but moved beyond it.

The rulers must have supreme power to decide what was wise and just.

would-be philosopher-kings

totalitar...

Plato

truth that was not merely empirical but also moral, an insight into the higher virtues.

Not everyone could have this sort of insight ...

responsibilities when dealing with lesser minds, the lower classes whose grasp of the world was always bo...

The noble lie was therefore one for good purpose, introduced by Socrates as charter myths for his ideal city. These must be lies ...

The noble lie was a white lie on a grand scale.

The spirit of an enemy, however, could only be truly suppressed by “open hand-to-hand combat in a just and righteous war,” rather than by “craft or accident.

stratagems

(effectively persuading one part of your force to attack on the grounds—not necessarily true—that another part was advancing effectively);

a false refugee (such as Sinon) who corrupts the enemy from within;

included elements of trickery and deception,

more practical matters and efforts to sustain the morale of troops.

Chinese term zhi

The individual who demonstrated zhi appeared as a sage general, whose mastery of the art of deception allowed him to prevail over an opponent of stronger physical force, just like those with mētis.4 Winning against a weak opponent required nothing special. Real skill was shown by getting into positions that did not allow for defeat and would ensure victory over enemies. Deception was crucial: conveying confusion when there was order, cowardice instead of courage, weakness instead of strength. It also required the ability to determine when the enemy was attempting to deceive.

“

enemy’s political relationships could also be a

target.

deceptions could lead to no decision at all or else an unexpected collision that caught them both unaware.

outsmarting the opponent rather than overwhelming him with brute force.

They saw the advantages in decisive action that brought both war and argument to a quick close, thereby avoiding the expense and frustrations of prolonged confrontation.

The generals were capable of deception and understood the advantages of surprise, but they did not want to waste time in games of dodging and harassment.

There could therefore be decisive arguments as there were decisive battles.

that affected attitudes to any confrontation.

Western way of war were set in

“Few believed either in the inevitability or the unconditional desirability of battle.”

But after the Roman defeat at Cannae in 17 BCE, the wisdom of the approach was acknowledged. For some thirteen years thereafter, the Romans avoided pitched battles, while harassing Hannibal’s supply lines, until he finally gave up and left Italy.

De Re Militari

battle was the “last extremity” and should only be followed when all other plans had been considered and expedients tried.

Better to employ “stratagem and finesse” to destroy the enemy as much as possible in detai...

Byzantine emperor Maurice’s Strategikon

“[I]t is well to hurt the enemy by deceit, by raids or by hunger, and never be enticed to a pitched battle, which is a demonstration more of luck than of bravery.

The English made the most of their local allies in France just as the French sought to encourage the Scots to distract the English at home.

“metaphysical mystique” surrounding battle, for it reflected a view of war as litigation with God as the judge and battle as decisive as a divine judgment.

anyone with a talent for manipulation and an inclination to deceit in the pursuit of personal gain, fascinated with power for its own sake rather than with the virtuous and noble things power allows one to do.