Hegel: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions Book 49)

by Peter Singer

but if I am asked whether I consider it rational of Helen to want to be a movie star,

Kant says there can be. When we take away all particular desires, even the most basic ones, we are left with the bare, formal element of rationality, and this bare formal element is the universal form of the moral law itself.

reason is implicitly universal.

law of reasoning that tells us this is a universal law

There is nothing universal about this desire.

I, Peter Singer, should be rich. Very, very few people share this desire.) Because

If Kant is right, the only kind of action that is not the result of our innate or socially conditioned desires is action in accordance with the categorical imperative. Only action in accordance with the categorical imperative, therefore, can be free. Since only free action can have genuine moral worth, the categorical imperative must be not only the supreme imperative of reason, but also the supreme law of morality.

My motivation must simply be to act in accord with the universal law of reason and morality, for its own sake. I must do my duty because it is my duty – the Kantian ethic is sometimes summed up in the slogan: ‘Duty for duty’s sake.’

freedom consists in doing one’s duty.

To the modern reader this conclusion is paradoxical. The term ‘duty’ has come to be associated with obedience to the conventional rules of institutions like the army and the family.

‘Duty’ in this sense is the very opposite of freedom.

To put his point in a way that modern readers might be readier to accept: freedom consists in following one’s conscience.

it means a conscience based on a rational acceptance of the categorical imperative as the supreme moral law.

Hegel takes the Reformation as the dawning of the new age of freedom, because it proclaims the rights of the individual conscience.

For Hegel, then, doing our duty for its own sake is a notable advance on the negative idea of freedom as doing what we please.

Part II of the Philosophy of Right, entitled ‘Morality’, is in large part an attack on Kant’s ethical theory.

The first is that Kant’s theory never gets down to specifics about what we ought to do.

This universal form is, Hegel says, simply a principle of consistency or non-contradiction. If we have no point to start from, it cannot get us anywhere.

but we can deny that property gives rise to any rights and be perfectly consistent thieves.

In defence of Kant, it has been suggested that we should interpret him as allowing us to start from our desires, but requiring that we act upon them only if we are able to put them into a universal form, that is, to accept them as a suitable basis of action for anyone in a similar situation.

the requirement of universal form is powerless to prevent us justifying whatever immoral conduct takes our fancy.

Hegel’s second major objection to Kant is that the Kantian position divides man against himself, locks reason into an eternal conflict with desire, and denies the natural side of man any right to satisfaction.

Our natural desires are merely something to be suppressed, and Kant gives to reason the arduous, if not impos...

it offers no solution to the opposition between morality and self-interest.

Kant leaves unanswered, and for ever unanswerable, the question: ‘Why should I be moral?’

but this is no answer at all, just a refusal to allow the question to be raised.

Schiller had pointed back to a time when the question had simply not arisen, when morality had not been split off into something separate from customary ideals of the good life, when there was no Kantian conception of duty.

In any case, Hegel regarded the Kantian conception of duty as an advance that is not to be regretted, for it helps to make modern man free in a way the Greeks, embedded ...

united the natural satisfaction of the Greek form of life with the free conscience of the...

same time provide a remedy for the other chief defect of the Kantian theory, it...

Hegel finds the unity of individual satisfaction and freedom in conformity to the social ethos of an organic community.

Hegel’s idea of an organic community

but definitely surpassed him as a prose stylist.

basis of the harmony between private interest and communal values speak for Hegel.

The child … is born … into a living world … He does not even think of his separate self;

Bradley’s point, and Hegel’s, is that because our needs and desires are shaped by society, an organic community fosters those desires that most benefit the community;

Nor should we forget that the relationship between an organism and its parts is reciprocal. I need my left arm and my left arm needs me. The organic community will no more disregard the interests of its members than I would disregard an injury to my left arm.

organic model of a community,

it would end the ancient conflict between the interests of the individual and the in...

H. Bradley (1846–1924).

have the achievements of Rome, Christianity, and the Reformation as part of their intellectual heritage.

They are aware of their capacity for freedom

and their ability to make their own decisions in accordance wi...

Therefore the modern organic community, unlike the ancient ones, must be based on principles of reason.

The leaders of the French Revolution understood reason in a purely abstract and universal sense which would not tolerate the natural dispositions of the community.

The Revolution was the political embodiment of the mistake Kant made in his purely abstract and universal conception of duty, which would not tolerate the natural side of human beings.

In keeping with this pure rationalism the monarchy was abolished, and all other degrees of nobility as well. Christianity was replaced by the cult of Reason, and the old system of weights and measures abolished to make way for th...

The rational community is, Hegel says, a constitutional monarchy.

On the other hand, Hegel says, if the constitution is stable the monarch often has nothing to do but sign his name. Hence his personal make-up is unimportant, and his sovereignty is not the capricious rule of an oriental despot.

Hence the monarch retains the right to appoint the executive.