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For most in the Union Army, the war was a campaign to save liberal democracy from a conspiracy to replant European-style aristocracy in America.
More true now than ever. The quintessential American dialectic.
Lee never indulged much hope for the future for slavery. “In this enlightened age, there are few I believe, but what will acknowledge, that slavery as an institution, is a moral & political evil in any Country,” Lee wrote in 1856. But in his mind, emancipation “will sooner result from the mild & melting influence of Christianity, than the storms & tempests of fiery controversy.” And so Lee deplored slavery—and still held slaves, rented slaves, and on one occasion whipped them. As the Union began to tear itself apart over slavery in the winter of 1860–61, Lee felt a similar ambivalence. His
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This was not the battle that Meade wanted, nor was it in the place he had wanted. But the 1st Corps was in serious trouble, and perhaps the 11th Corps as well. The unpredictable Sickles sent another dispatch, energetically informing Meade that Otis Howard had called on the 3rd Corps “to support him,” and Sickles was now on the road to Gettysburg, so for all Meade knew, almost half of his army was heading into some unknown maw sixteen miles to the north.
Meade paid no attention to Hancock’s scruples. He “must have a man who he knew and could trust,” someone who could make a politically reliable estimate of the situation, and not some wild-eyed call to an abolitionist suicide ride.
But even as Hancock was on his way, dispatches and wig-wags from the signalers continued to come in to Taneytown, and Meade’s mind slowly began revolving toward a decision to redirect the army toward Gettysburg.
Based on the pay and muster reports recorded on June 30th, Meade should have had an army of approximately 112,000 men on hand, either for Pipe Creek or for Gettysburg.
in terms of troops ready to engage in combat, the Army of the Potomac was probably ready to furnish somewhere between 83,000 and 85,000 men.
the best estimate Meade had of Lee’s strength pegged the Army of Northern Virginia at 109,000—“about 90,000 infantry, from 4,000 to 5,000 artillery, and about 10,000 cavalry.”
The Confederates had a humbler view of their numbers: Augustus Dickert in the 3rd South Carolina reckoned that “by the non-extension of all furloughs and the return of the slightly wounded,” Lee could count on “sixty-eight thousand,” and Lee’s adjutant, Walter Taylor, calculated that Lee had only 67,000, counting infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
In fact, Lee is likely to have had as many as 80,000 men in all three arms.
George Meade may not have been at all unjustified in believing “that General Lee was, as far as I could tell, about 10,000 or 15,000 my superior.”
“four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion,” but “four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.
did not take long before Lincoln’s anxieties began to rise. He was disturbed by “Meade’s slow movements since Gettysburg,” and he was particularly irritated at the phrase in Meade’s congratulatory order to the army on July 4th and its call to “drive the invaders from our soil.” Drive the invaders from our soil! Lincoln burst out in unrestrained dismay, My God! Is that all? He grumbled to Hay, “Will our Generals never get that idea out of their heads? The whole country is our soil.” And he added ominously, “This is a dreadful reminiscence of McClellan.”8
