The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America's Invasion of Iraq

by Steve Coll

Saddam had no apparent sense of his vulnerability to false accusations about his own responsibility for the attacks. He took no steps to assuage the Bush administration or American public opinion or to create any record of public statements that might get him off the hook—as he had done quickly and even obsequiously in 1987 after an Iraqi jet struck the U.S.S. Stark. Saddam had never met Osama bin Laden and considered him “no different than the many zealots that came before him.” Iraq had nothing to do with the September 11 plot, as the C.I.A. quickly concluded after the attacks, and as subsequent investigations have made indisputable. But Saddam did not explicitly distance himself from al-Qaeda or bin Laden. He initially seemed uncertain about whether to believe America’s claim that bin Laden was responsible. More importantly, the September 11 attacks realized a scenario that Saddam had talked about with visitors for years—suicide bombers on American soil, and payback for the humiliation of Iraqis and Palestinians. Saddam identified with the attackers—their strike was like his own bold decision to launch Scud missiles against Israeli cities in 1991.[6]

He had nothing to do with the attacks, but he empathized with tbe attackers.