Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict

by David McKittrick

The IRA’s killing rate had halved, from 280 in 1972 to 280 in the following two years, but it remained the major taker of life. Although Whitelaw had concluded in 1972 that his meeting with the IRA had been useless, Rees again put out feelers towards the republicans. In this he appears to have been encouraged by the NIO’s most senior civil servant, Sir Frank Cooper, who had a reputation for being both forceful and devious. In 1974 Rees legalised both Sinn Féin, the IRA’s political wing, and the UVF, partly to facilitate the business of talking to them. Republicans and loyalists were regularly invited to Laneside, a large government-owned house in a plush area of County Down, for informal chats with officials. The talks which ensued, there and elsewhere, helped lead to IRA ceasefires in 1974 and 1975. There are many conflicting accounts about what was conveyed and why, with allegations that the officials involved in the discussions led republicans to believe that their goal of British withdrawal was a distinct possibility. It was certainly an era of furtive contacts and murmured assurances: many mysteries persist about what was said and what was meant. There is no real evidence however that a British withdrawal was ever intended, whatever was discussed at Laneside.