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Kindle Notes & Highlights
by
Eric Ries
Read between
September 10 - October 11, 2022
To read the graph, you need to understand something called cohort analysis. This is one of the most important tools of startup analytics. Although it sounds complex, it is based on a simple premise. Instead of looking at cumulative totals or gross numbers such as total revenue and total number of customers, one looks at the performance of each group of customers that comes into contact with the product independently. Each group is called a cohort.
Once our efforts were aligned with what customers really wanted, our experiments were much more likely to change their behavior for the better.
This pattern would repeat time and again, from the days when we were making less than a thousand dollars in revenue per month all the way up to the time we were making millions. In fact, this is the sign of a successful pivot: the new experiments you run are overall more productive than the experiments you were running before.
Each time we repeat this simple rhythm: establish the baseline, tune the engine, and make a decision to pivot or persevere.
The innovation accounting framework makes it clear when the company is stuck and needs to change direction.
I call the traditional numbers used to judge startups “vanity metrics,” and innovation accounting requires us to avoid the temptation to use them.
Instead of looking at gross metrics, Grockit switched to cohort-based metrics, and instead of looking for cause-and-effect relationships after the fact, Grockit would launch each new feature as a true split-test experiment.
Work on A begins. D and E are in development. F awaits validation. F is validated. D and E await validation. G, H, I are new tasks to be undertaken. B and C are being built. A completes development.
Most important, teams working in this system begin to measure their productivity according to validated learning, not in terms of the production of new features.
Vanity metrics wreak havoc because they prey on a weakness of the human mind. In my experience, when the numbers go up, people think the improvement was caused by their actions, by whatever they were working on at the time. That is why it’s so common to have a meeting in which marketing thinks the numbers went up because of a new PR or marketing effort and engineering thinks the better numbers are the result of the new features it added.
Everything that has been discussed so far is a prelude to a seemingly simple question: are we making sufficient progress to believe that our original strategic hypothesis is correct, or do we need to make a major change? That change is called a pivot: a structured course correction designed to test a new fundamental hypothesis about the product, strategy, and engine of growth.
The heart of the scientific method is the realization that although human judgment may be faulty, we can improve our judgment by subjecting our theories to repeated testing.
Measuring runway through the lens of pivots rather than that of time suggests another way to extend that runway: get to each pivot faster. In other words, the startup has to find ways to achieve the same amount of validated learning at lower cost or in a shorter time. All the techniques in the Lean Startup model that have been discussed so far have this as their overarching goal.
(Many entrepreneurs fail to launch because they are afraid of this kind of reaction, worrying that it will harm the morale of the entire company. The allure of positive press, especially in our “home” industry, is quite strong.)
This is also common with pivots; it is not necessary to throw out everything that came before and start over. Instead, it’s about repurposing what has been built and what has been learned to find a more positive direction.
Remember that the rationale for building low-quality MVPs is that developing any features beyond what early adopters require is a form of waste. However, the logic of this takes you only so far. Once you have found success with early adopters, you want to sell to mainstream customers. Mainstream customers have different requirements and are much more demanding.
We had gotten really good at optimizing, tuning, and iterating, but in the process we had lost sight of the purpose of those activities: testing a clear hypothesis in the service of the company’s vision.
A pivot is a special kind of change designed to test a new fundamental hypothesis about the product, business model, and engine of growth.
Customer Segment Pivot In this pivot, the company realizes that the product it is building solves a real problem for real customers but that they are not the type of customers it originally planned to serve. In other words, the product hypothesis is partially confirmed, solving the right problem, but for a different customer than originally anticipated.
a concept from Geoffrey Moore, who observed that companies generally follow one of two major business architectures: high margin, low volume (complex systems model) or low margin, high volume (volume operations model).
Startups need organizational structures that combat the extreme uncertainty that is a startup’s chief enemy.
Recall from Chapter 3 that value in a startup is not the creation of stuff, but rather validated learning about how to build a sustainable business. What products do customers really want? How will our business grow? Who is our customer? Which customers should we listen to and which should we ignore? These are the questions that need answering as quickly as possible to maximize a startup’s chances of success. That is what creates value for a startup.
What if it turns out that the customer doesn’t want the product we’re building? Although this is never good news for an entrepreneur, finding out sooner is much better than finding out later. Working in small batches ensures that a startup can minimize the expenditure of time, money, and effort that ultimately turns out to have been wasted.
The essential lesson is not that everyone should be shipping fifty times per day but that by reducing batch size, we can get through the Build-Measure-Learn feedback loop more quickly than our competitors can. The ability to learn faster from customers is the essential competitive advantage that startups must possess.
This assumes that customers could tell us what products to build and that this would act as the pull signal to product development to make them.9 As was mentioned earlier, this is not the way the Lean Startup model works, because customers often don’t know what they want.
Sustainable growth is characterized by one simple rule: New customers come from the actions of past customers
Engines of growth are designed to give startups a relatively small set of metrics on which to focus their energies. As one of my mentors, the venture capital investor Shawn Carolan, put it, “Startups don’t starve; they drown.” There are always a zillion new ideas about how to make the product better floating around, but the hard truth is that most of those ideas make a difference only at the margins. They are mere optimizations. Startups have to focus on the big experiments that lead to validated learning. The engines of growth framework helps them stay focused on the metrics that matter.
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The Sticky Engine of Growth
The Viral Engine of Growth
The Paid Engine of Growth
However, in my experience, successful startups usually focus on just one engine of growth, specializing in everything that is required to make it work.
coined the term product/market fit to describe the moment when a startup finally finds a widespread set of customers that resonate with its product:
In a great market—a market with lots of real potential customers—the market pulls product out of the startup. This is the story of search keyword advertising, Internet auctions, and TCP/IP routers. Conversely, in a terrible market, you can have the best product in the world and an absolutely killer team, and it doesn’t matter—you’re going to fail.
This is the same problem that established companies experience. Their past successes were built on a finely tuned engine of growth. If that engine runs its course and growth slows or stops, there can be a crisis if the company does not have new startups incubating within its ranks that can provide new sources of growth.
I call this building an adaptive organization, one that automatically adjusts its process and performance to current conditions.
The key to the andon cord is that it brings work to a stop as soon as an uncorrectable quality problem surfaces—which forces it to be investigated.
The core idea of Five Whys is to tie investments directly to the prevention of the most problematic symptoms.
Repeating “why” five times, like this, can help uncover the root problem and correct it. If this procedure were not carried through, one might simply replace the fuse or the pump shaft. In that case, the problem would recur within a few months.
With startups in particular, there is a danger that teams will work too fast, trading quality for time in a way that causes sloppy mistakes. Five Whys prevents that, allowing teams to find their optimal pace.
Startup teams should go through the Five Whys whenever they encounter any kind of failure, including technical faults, failures to achieve business results, or unexpected changes in customer behavior.
Although it’s human nature to assume that when we see a mistake, it’s due to defects in someone else’s department, knowledge, or character, the goal of the Five Whys is to help us see the objective truth that chronic problems are caused by bad process, not bad people, and remedy them accordingly.
Intuit uses a tracking survey called the Net Promoter Score2 to evaluate customer satisfaction with its many products. This is a great source of actionable metrics about what customers really think about a product. In fact, I used it at IMVU, too.
As Lean Startups grow, they can use adaptive techniques to develop more complex processes without giving up their core advantage: speed through the Build-Measure-Learn feedback loop.
Both successful startups and established companies alike must learn to juggle multiple kinds of work at the same time, pursuing operational excellence and disruptive innovation.
Internal or external, in my experience startup teams require three structural attributes: scarce but secure resources, independent authority to develop their business, and a personal stake in the outcome.
The challenge here is to create a mechanism for empowering innovation teams out in the open. This is the path toward a sustainable culture of innovation over time as companies face repeated existential threats. My suggested solution is to create a sandbox for innovation that will contain the impact of the new innovation but not constrain the methods of the startup team.
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Depending on the types of products the company makes, the size of the sandbox can be defined in different ways. For example, an online service might restrict it to certain pages or user flows. A retail operation might restrict it to certain stores or geographic areas. Companies trying to bring an entirely new product to market might build the restriction around customers in certain segments.
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