The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power

by Daniel Yergin

As the crisis dragged on through the early months of 1952, Mossadegh’s government could not sell its oil, it was running out of money, economic conditions were deteriorating. But none of that seemed to count. The important thing was that he was the popular national leader who had achieved the historic objective of throwing the foreigners out and regaining the national heritage. He declared that, as far as he was concerned, the oil could remain in the ground for use by future generations. The U.S. ambassador to Tehran noted Mossadegh’s fundamental antipathy to the Shah, which he attributed to the “secret contempt” of a man of an old aristocratic family toward “the weakling son of an upstart tyrannical imposter.” But Mossadegh the constitutionalist was turning to extraconstitutional means to run the country, including the use of street mobs to manipulate politics. He was also assuming more dictatorial power. “I always considered this man to be unsuitable for high office,” one opposition leader said. “But I never imagined, even in my worst nightmares, that an old man of seventy would turn into a rabble rouser. A man who constantly surrounds the Majlis with thugs is nothing less than a public menace.” Mossadegh was also proving himself a notable political innovator; he was the first Middle Eastern leader to use the radio to arouse his followers. When he called, thousands and thousands—sometimes, it seemed, hundreds of thousands—would rush, frenzied, into the streets, chanting,...