The Mysterious Case of Rudolf Diesel: Genius, Power, and Deception on the Eve of World War I

by Douglas Brunt

Because of Germany’s limited coastal access, the enormous size of the Dreadnought gave the Admiralty an additional advantage in shipyard construction over Germany: time. The fast, big-gun battleship, commissioned December 1906, was 527 feet in length and weighed more than twenty thousand tons. Critically, the draft (depth of water required) of this new castle-at-sea was nearly thirty feet. As Tirpitz knew, this was too deep for the Kiel Canal, the route used by the German fleet to travel between the North Sea and the Baltic. Germany faced a near-paralyzing decision. Many of the German admirals didn’t value the big ships enough to alter existing construction plans. But Tirpitz understood the significant role the bigger ships would play, and that Germany needed to acquire ships to match Britain’s new seaborne monster. He halted construction at the German yards, and at the expense of millions of marks and more than a year of effort, he dredged the Kiel Canal to fit dreadnought-class ships of his own. While advances in naval technology were a factor in Germany’s budget and policy decisions, so was Wilhelm’s behavior. Starting in 1906, Wilhelm ran a gauntlet of personal and diplomatic troubles that reflected his aggressive and unpredictable nature, weakening his standing even within his own government. With diminished influence, Wilhelm was unable to continue to win the Reichstag support needed to keep up with Great Britain in the dreadnought race. This change in strategic dire...