Colin’s Comments (group member since Dec 16, 2012)

Colin’s comments from the THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP group.

Anyone else ever heard of this? News to me.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...

Thanks Jonny. The pointed details are in the final rebuttal package that is being submitted to several sources. As I was just the organizer of the information, I cannot put the specifics here pre-empting the release. First, it was proven that Weise never padded casualtyy figures. In fact, the post war research showed that his count was accurate with what he knew from the body count.

In fact Weise was not concerned about "keeping his job" because he had been fired because he would not push attacks due to lack of ammunition and supplies, but was reinstated on appeal after he made his argument.

There were a lot more casualties not located who were dead or died of wounds later as the enemy tried to drag away their dead. This was admitted by the NVA general interviewed years ago. We also recover our dead as a matter of course after battles, whenever possible.

Hastings had the order of battle wrong, specifics of coordinated actions mixed up, and improper distances to and between objectives. A couple of miles is a far different thing than "a few hundred yards" when you are charging into enemy fire.

The worst case was where he mentioned cowardice on the part of the 2/4 Marines, and that 2/4 was a destroyed unit incapable of operating afterward. That was also untrue, not a single Marine who survived saw any cowardice, and 2/4 was back into battle in support of Operation Scotland II soon afterward.

Hastings also makes the error of concluding that the 320th NVA Division had no intention of attacking Dong Ha Combat Base (DHCB), which is hilarious considering that 3 regiments did not spend months preparing fortified and reinforced bunkers and tunnels, staging supplies and troops (b/w 6000-10000) because they were bored. This is stated by the North Vietnamese sources who were interviewed by Weise and Livingston in the 1990's.

Dong Ha and the Cua Viet/Bo Dieu Rivers and terrain were their primary objective in support of the continued Tet Offensive. That was because this area was the only supply point for I Corps, and the most important support base in Vietnam.

They were also planing to take Khe Sanh and Da Nang as well, all in a coordinated series of attacks. Has 2/4 not stumbled upon them by accident, and won, all of Qaung Tri Province would have fallen, possible ending the war by Christmas at the earliest.

If any of those things had happened the propaganda victory for the communists would have been insurmountable, and the Marine would have never recovered.

Also Hastings fails to mention that bulldozer operators and intel types buried over 2,000 enemy KIA in a mass grave after the three day battle as verified by Gen. Harry Summers, US Army. The NVA general and VC chief after the war both admitted that one regiment virtually ceased to exist, and the other two had to be withdrawn and refitted as a result of casualties. All admissions from the enemy, but strangely missing from Hastings' book.

Whether Hastings had a predisposition and bias I do not know. What is known is that he made errors and assumptions, which to the average layman may not be that significant. But to the old men I know today who were young men fighting for their lives 50 years ago, it is unforgivable.

I knew some crewmen on U-505, and many participants on Schweinfurt-Regensburg in 1943, both missions.

I knew Greg Boyington, and my abbreviated interview with him was published in Aviation History many years ago. He was a different kind.

Marc wrote: "James Holland's latest just hit my desk:

Big Week: The Biggest Air Battle of World War Two"

I knew and interviewed many of the pilots on both sides of that event, should be interesting. It was due to Big Week that after the war Doolittle and Galland became friends and had great mutual respect for each other. Doolittle called Galland "the most dangerous enemy we had, glad there were not more like him" and Galland called Doolittle "a real genius at bombing and tactical organization."

Well, the erata list and rebuttal is 44 pages long, and only concerns less than 20 pages of his book. Too much to put here, but the highlights are that he disparaged BGEN (then LtCol) William Weise and Maj Gen (then Captain) James E. Livingston, got the facts and figures of the participants wrong, locations and distances wrong, order of battle wrong, order of march wrong, makes assumptions based upon one disgruntled marine's interview (Keith Nolan's book) failed to even ID the NVA's 320th Division as being the main enemy, wrote assumptions that cowardice was rampant (even proven untrue from the Viet Cong and NVA interviews conducted over the years), he got locations mixed up with each other, used material from Keith Nolan's 1994 book (good at the time) but did not use the updated corrected information available in the last decade. Hell, if he had just read the book Livingston and I wrote he would not have made those errors. The 2/4 Marines are about as pissed off as I have ever seen, and I know them all. I am glad I am not him right now, and the future will not get any better.

The Soviets did the same thing with their political prisoners and Axis POWs. The Germans also did the same with Soviet POWs.

I always admired Sir Max, and I enjoyed our emails to each other over the years. However, he is about to get excoriated over his new book on Vietnam, especially regarding his section from about pp. 490-515 regarding the 2/4 Marines and the battle at Dai Do/Dong Ha. Stand by for that one, it will be brutal, sad but true. He really should have done the research. I gave him access to the Marines involved who are mt friends, generals on down.

Ordinary Men was required reading for my students when I ran the Holocaust Studies program.

Not surprising. Of the more than 100 people I interviewed who either knew or just met and spoke with Hitler in varying degrees, all had some different, yet also many similar views about him.

I interviewed Traudl a few times, as well as Gerda Christian. Great chats. Booth women will be featured in a new book in the future.

I could tell by the canopy and wing shape that it was not a FW-190, I assumed a Texan.

I served in the 502nd, 101st in the 1980s, they carry that legacy.

Patton had his with Coco Channel, Eisenhower with Kay Summersbee, JFK with everyone, Clinton same (with rape). I could care less if my CO had an affair while married. I was only concerned that he cared enough to not risk our lives stupidly.

You would think that such intelligent men would make better decisions. Pershing was by all accounts an ass.

I interviewed many who knew Rommel, including von Luck and fellow Pour le Merite recipient Ernst Junger. Junger and Rommel had many discussions regarding Hitler and the NSDAP, none of it favorable. Junger believed that Rommel was just a naive soldier serving his country, very apolitical, and just wanting to be a good combat leader. Luck stated that Rommel's directive often countered Berlin's orders regarding treatment of captured enemy personnel. Jodl and Keitel were not Rommel's biggest fans to say the least, especially when Hitler gave Rommel his various upgrades to his Knight's Cross. Hitler stated, "Rommel may be many things, but undependable is not one of them."

I was at the 1984 D-Day ceremony with Gen. Matthew Ridgeway and Reagan, and many other dignitaries. Reagan's purpose was 1-Remind the Europeans (especially the French) that others gave their lives to secure their freedom, 2-Remind the Soviets that they would never hold a May Day parade in Paris, 3-Keep the free world united in the spirit of freedom, that we all have skin in the game.

Agreed

I plan on future Greman Aces Speak books, but right now working on an Americans Speak book series from those interviews. Later I hope to do my Uboat commanders, German Paratroopers, SS men, all in their own series.

Pamela Churchill Harriman told me some interesting stories about the conflicting "insider" viewpoints of the Allied consensus regarding their individual opinions of Stalin, de Gaulle, etc. Quite eye opening.