Tyler ’s Comments (group member since May 09, 2008)

Tyler ’s comments from the Philosophy group.

Hi Rob the Obscure --

The rationalist philosophers such as Leibniz were concerned with the deductive arguments that might be put forth to demonstrate a higher power. Eventually, anyone evaluating their argument will look at the premises, or assumptions, that support the deductive chain. The rationalist line of reasoning come into question here: if our assumptions lead to absolute truths in mathematics, why couldn't they model arguments of a non-mathematical nature as well?

This became a tricky analogy once later philosophers scrutinized it, which is why the modern religious philosophy I've seen does indeed, as you suggest, appeal to our subjective experiences. Specifically, Kierkegaard and the religious existentialists have avoided deduction as a means of "proving" God.

Because Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza were, and still are, so influential in philosophy, the rationalist method retains a certain popularity, especially among people exploring religious questions such as Theodicy.

Hi Chun Yin ---

I suppose the problem is that "reasonable" implies whether a belief in God is a reasonable and sensible judgement, whereas "rational" is about whether people are using the proper logic and/or reason in their belief of God, and that is what I would like to focus on.

Me: The answer to this is going to depend partly on what you accept as being rational. [...]

I confess that I don't really understand what you mean there, Tyler. My definition of "rational" so far is really just based on the dictionary meaning of the word. What other definitions/interpretations can there be?

Rationality in argumentation is a little different from the dictionary definition. Technically, people can be rational without making any sense. That might be why we sometimes say a person is "rationalizing" when he's grasping at straws.

For purposes of a philosphical proof of God, a rational argument would show God's existence deductively, using the kind of all-or-nothing reasoning that mathematics relies on.

But arguments don't have to be rational. They can be contingent as well, based on inductive reasoning, the way science works.

So we can have two kinds of truth, truths that are absolute facts (rational, or deductive) and truths that are contingent facts (inductive). Arguments about the existence of God could employ either strategy, so it's important to first distinguish between them in order to better understand how to assess various arguments about God or higher powers.

Hi Elizabeth --

From Leibniz: ...a proposition can’t be true and false at the same time,
so that A is A and can’t be not-A.
This principle is all we need to demonstrate every part of arithmetic and geometry, i.e. to demonstrate all mathematical principles.

But, as I pointed out in Theodicy, the move from mathematics to natural philosophy [here = ‘physics’] requires a further principle,
namely the principle of the need for a sufficient reason ...

What Leibniz is trying to do here is establish an absolute basis for a higher power. That would be possible through deductive reasoning, which is what mathematics uses to reach undisputable conclusions.

The problem with proving the existence of God in this way is that the universe is a contingent fact. This means no fact about it necessarily has to be true. When we say the sun will rise tomorrow, that fact, if it comes to pass, will only be contingently, not absolutely, true.

Where Leibniz says the move from mathematics to natural philosophy he's trying to eliminate contingency and show the absolute necessity of the universe. That would help establish the necessity of a higher power.

Two problems emerge. First, a causeless universe is a possibility. Second, a prime mover cannot be established in a causal universe unless the endless regress of causes (What caused the prime mover?) can be stopped.

I not familiar with any philosophers who have worked around this problem, but the philosophy of religion today, as far as I know, generally avoids trying to deduce the existence of God in this way. Besides the two problems I mentioned, the question of what premises are accepted to begin the line of deductions that would prove God leaves rationalist arguments logically vulnerable.

Hi Elizabeth --

I'm glad you've joined the group and the discussion here. You appear to be interested in Leibniz. You might also know a little about his Rationalist co-philosophers, Descartes and Spinoza.

Here Leibniz says --

It must be something that exists necessarily, carrying the reason for its existence within itself ...

It sounds like our mathematician is edging toward the Ontological Argument, in which God's proof is entailed within His very definition. The question is, can you apply the idea of necessity to something we already think of as existing?

Hi Rob the Obscure --

Moreover, to go back in a series of "whys" and then end at God accomplishes nothing, as L. implied, because one can then say, "why God? What 'caused' God?"

Existentially, Kirkegaard might answer the why's with a simple "why not?" I'm not sure I'd be satisfied with that, but your point about the why's is important. They would have to end somewhere, or we would have an endless regress that constitutes prima facie evidence that something is wrong with that line of reasoning.

I like the discussions of modern physics and indeterminacy. That certainly seems to lend a hand to the idea of a causeless universe. On the other hand, I've been warned by physicists I've dealt with not to use higher level physics in arguments unrelated to the field -- we mere mortals are simply too prone to misconstrue it.

I think physics is still in too much flux to offer evidence one way or the other about the possibility of a god or higher power. As an example, I understood that time is a function of our universe, and since laws of physics as the operate for us break down at the Big Bang, it's meaningless to ask what came before the singularity.

I like that as a philosophical way to put and end to endless regress arguments. But now I've heard a new hypothesis called "quantum tunneling," that would allow information and presumably at least some of our familiar law of physics to have preceded the Big Bang. If it's viable, I'm back to square on that simple point. Whew! Now they're talking about the universe/multiverse being "eternal," but that's not as good from my perspective as causelessness. But at the same time, new hypotheses in physics don't rule out causelessness.

Conclusion: Our human powers of reason remain our best tools for deciding the whether belief in God is rational or reasonable.

Hi Chun Yin --

I'm using "rational" in the context of whether it is still rational to believe in God, given the state and progression of modern society and changes in viewpoints.

I see the context, but I wonder if you're using "rational" where "reasonable" would have been a better choice of words.

Elizabeth quoted Leibniz who, along with Spinoza and Descartes, claimed to have a rational basis for the existence of God, or at least of a metaphysical entity reaching beyond the real.

So there may be a valid basis for belief in supernatural entities. Whether it's a sound one is another matter. It is helpful in philosophical argumentation (I hate that word) to keep in mind the distinction between a line of reasoning that's logically valid and one that's sound.

The books you mentioned in your first post show that you're looking at both sides of the issue. I think that's good. If you want to look at the pro side a little deeper than Karen Armstrong, the Rationalist philosophers of the 17th century are a good place to go. They will help show how religious attitudes in Western philosophy changed over the centuries.

I'm interested in the question of being, too, so I'll be interested in hearing what you think about B&T and on what points you disagree with Heidegger. Do you think he over-emphasized the importance of language and words?

Hi Chun Yin --

I want to do some research on whether belief in God is rational ...

The answer to this is going to depend partly on what you accept as being rational. Before you get into this research, think first about what definition of rationality is best suited to your purposes. Maintaining conceptual clarity about key terms is necessary to the soundness of the conclusions you will eventually reach.

Hi Rhonda --

Your remarks remind me that without Being and Time, Being and Nothingness could not have been written. I didn’t give due consideration to the second point, the contemporary popularity of the Vienna Circle and Logical Positivism. I read one of Carnap’s positivist essays some time back and noticed an afterword in which he greatly modified the implied claims. I wondered at the time what criticisms had brought that about.


the subject of consciousness can be understood as a process of one's own sense of personal growth

There’s a nicely concise point to help understand the thrust of Being and Time.

Thanks for your excellent and helpful remarks on Heidegger’s work.

Hi Patrice --

I repeated your question in the Literature folder as well. Many members of the group must have read this book and I'd like to find out what they think about it.

Hi Rhonda --

His later path [...]focuses more on the manner in which our consciousness of being is revealed. It is then less about structure and more about language, history and poetry.

Is it this that you think is the most enduring part of Heidegger's legacy? If so, what do you see as the most interesting aspect of Being and Time?

Yes, I think people confuse skepticism used as a tool with the notion of total skepticism about everything. In the case of the flat-earthers and so on there's only contempt for truth disguised as something else.

Hi Jimmy --

I agree with Dan. For someone who claimed to know nothing, Socrates obviously had a point to make with each of his interlocutors. What Socrates was emphasizing was the the need to approach a subject, moral reasoning in his case, from an objective standpoint. That means holding no bias at the beginning.

Socrates was able to establish 2400 years ago that this skepticism about our own knowledge was the only way to separate a true insight from doxa, the world of opinion. That had been philosophy's greatest challenge at the time. In fact, one of the enduring dangers today in both scientific and philosophical reasoning is "confirmation bias," the tendency to look for things that support our own opinion while unfairly discounting evidence to the contrary.

Authenticity is one of the unique contributions this book makes to existentialism.

I understand what work it takes to re-read a book like Being and Time because I had the same experience with Sartre. The thing to said in favor of re-reading these books is that the concepts and the world view laid out in them are simply so compelling they are impossible to resist. When you read books like this you're aware, even while reading them, of the unprecedented beauty of the exposition. The authors leave no stone unturned in their quest for a complete philosophy. The feeling of reading such a book is not easy to describe to someone who hasn't read one.

I'm impressed at your professor's approach to Heidegger. I think he was right, and it's logically important to separate the idea from the personality that created it. Celine wrote Journey to the End of the Night, a brilliant book I would never have read if I had known he later became a hard line fascist. Levy thinks that happened because Celine lost the razor sense of good and evil that drove his writing, but the book remains excellent.

Along the same line, people blame philosophers of the 19th century for laying the ground for 20th century totalitarianism. But I don't think a philosopher can be held responsible for every conceivable use to which his work might one day be put, especially since politicians tend to cut and paste only the parts they like from philosophers.

Justin's last remark points to a fundamental error: Argument from Authority. While Hawking is an expert in physics and his opinion carries weight in that field, readers of his book will tend to think he has the same authority on subjects unrelated to physics. That is seldom the case, and experts in one field should avoid grand statements about the investigations taking place in other areas.

Science was once rooted in philosophy and was called natural philosophy. Eventually, once the absolute base of human knowledge was sufficiently large, the systematic study of reality became science and separated from philosophy, although there remains a "philosophy of science" dedicated to uncertainties such as proper methodology.

In any case, Dan is right to bring up Socrates. The Socratic method -- that is, professing first not to have any knowledge -- is critical to both philosophy and science. I think what Socrates said was, "The only thing I know is that I know nothing." That remains a sound starting point, and I think the later development of skepticism builds on it. Socrates was insightful not to focus on what conclusions we might reach, but rather on what assumptions we're starting from.

Dan raises an interesting point: If philosophy were dead, by what means would we be expected to properly assess meaning?

I'm glad you've gotten through the book and can talk about it. We've needed someone in the discussion who's had that exposure and knows more about what Heidegger is saying in the text.

The idea of "throwness" comes up with Sartre, too. It's a fascinating way to look at the human condition. I remember reading also that one of Heidegger's original points was how human reality is "covered" by a veneer of distraction, and that it's an important task for humans to try to pull back this covering of everyday existence to get at the authentic conditions of human life. At least, I hope I've got that right.

BTW, when you say "all facts are contingent", are you not "claiming the point as an absolute fact, not as a contingent one"?

No, that's contingently true. So is the fact that the sun rises every day. There are just some things we don't dispute much about unless there's some positive reason why we should.

My position is not that facts are contingent upon human opinion. It is that they are contingent, period. It's also important to keep in mind the difference between an epistemological and an ontological fact. Facts about the sun fall in the latter category.

I've deliberately left the notion of "equality" undefined in order to make a general point. You're right that the next thing we have to do is ask what the term means and how it applies. Equality as a concept must be brought within the realm of true/false conditions. Otherwise, the concept is arbitrary and bears no relationship to reality one way or the other.

Hi Nemo --

There are parts of society that don't recognize the principle. For now it appears embedded in law and in practice, so as a general precept it's a fact of life in the United States.

In a contingent universe, all facts are contingent. This is why moral thinkers cannot claim that men in a "state of nature" would be equal. That would be claiming the point as an absolute fact, not as a contingent one. Furthermore, an epistemological fact adds human subjectivity to the context in which facts are established. So the fact that we generally treat people as equals in the United States is subject to falsification if enough people change their minds on the idea.

Hi Nemo --

So the question remains whether or not the concept of equality among men is true, i.e., based on reality.

If we accept the correspondence theory of truth, it must be based on reality and true from that standpoint. The reality, in this case, would be the reality of human affairs.

Equality among men is real to the extent that people recognize it. That recognition can come in the form of one's personal attitude toward fellow citizens, or it can come in the form of a political document such as a constitution. Either way, it's quite real as long as humans treat it as such.

Hi Dan --

I agree with your perspective. I don't know of another subject that values meaning the way philosophy does.