Tyler ’s Comments (group member since May 09, 2008)

Tyler ’s comments from the Philosophy group.

Hi Everyman --

As you point out, a political sliding scale can justify any definition. Yet a “commonly understood” definition won’t get around that problem. Let’s say --

P1. Redistribution of wealth means government transfers to individuals.
P2. Government transfers to individuals are evil.
===
C.>>Therefore, redistribution of wealth is evil.

There is no way to refute this because the reasoning is circular. The conclusion C is embedded in the premises. The argument itself is valid, but it is unsound.. The same circularity would occur no matter what our politics. If we take the liberal notion of redistribution of wealth as meaning the transfer of wealth from the middle to the upper class, that argument would be equally unsound. It preaches to the choir. But don’t we want arguments to convince people who don’t already agree?

To say that all government spending redistributes wealth speaks to the reasoning itself, not the politics of the people involved. The all-inclusiveness is neutral, the broadest construal of the idea of redistribution. As such, it subsumes whatever liberals or conservatives can say about wealth transfer, without itself falling anywhere along the political spectrum.

A more persuasive argument is possible. So what I’m saying is that, if some people think government welfare payments are wrong, the inclusive definition would put their argument on a sound basis. An argument would be stronger if it avoids trying to restrict the concept of redistribution of wealth and concentrates instead on distinguishing among different kinds of wealth transfers.

Thus, when I said that the fact that all government activity redistributes wealth was trivial, it was the neutrality of this concept that I should have emphasized. It would not be a trivial definition by any means if it were employed in conjunction with propositions that evaluate the worth of various kinds of wealth transfers in order to build an argument against welfare payments.

Hi Robert --


I think the electorate is that way by their own fault...they SHOULD be able to see through it …

They should be, but they aren’t. So why is that? Perhaps just about everything in our culture favors emotional excitement over reason. Since this bias starts in childhood it is much harder to overcome than if it had started later. Some people do break out of it, but not enough can see their way through the smoke, and a considerable number aren’t even aware of it. Those who think clearly get dragged down by the others and have to suffer the consequences.

… you point out that people want to be rational and use reasoned analysis but then are so easily victimized by the likes of Fox news. Is it that you feel they WANT to be so, but are unable? How does that then fit into your evolutionary argument?

The early indoctrination of children by this culture masks a natural ability; adults are unable to get beyond their whims and desires and think about what’s reasonable. My speculation is that there is a natural balance between our rational and emotional thoughts, but modern media has its thumb on the scales. This requires an enormous, continual expenditure of effort on the part of the media, so I’m not sure how successful it will be in the long run. It doesn’t work on some of us. It could easily start failing to work on even more.


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…what was most interesting to me about the essay was the insight into the current phenomenon that is gained by drawing on intellectual history and the humanities…

Lilla mentions several philosophers. The Enlightenment brought about the idea of people acting as rational agents in the political system, and that idea is enfolded into various versions of the democratic process.

However, Enlightenment philosophy has come under attack from other philosophers. Max Stirner, author of The Ego and its Own, comes to mind, but Leo Strauss is more influential in modern political thinking. The reaction against the Enlightenment centers on the idea that liberalism makes a grave mistake by aiming for the equality of people who are manifestly unequal. An alternative to democracy, corporatism, is discussed in The Unconscious Civilization. It advocates group mediation as a replacement for individual participation in society. Another alternative is that of a ruling elite, a kind of natural aristocracy, and that idea is the one popularized by Strauss who, working at the University of Chicago, greatly influenced political thinking in the United States.

Setting that aside, though, I’ll ask you: What would it mean to you to apply the humanities to politics?

Hi Glen --

Your post brings out a couple of differences between Canada and the U.S. I, too, used to read several papers to try to get some objective perspective. But this goes back to selection. There are some things that never appear in the press to begin with. I have to question not just what appears in The New York Times but also what’s been left out.

Also, you mention the B.C. public calming down after the facts of a proposal became more widely known. That was true in American politics in the past, but it’s not the case anymore. The confusions, misunderstandings and lies surrounding political proposals or actions have become immortal, and the press no longer tries much to cut through it. Our reporters seem content to say that there are two sides to everything that appears out there, and it’s not their job to judge.

Hi Robert --

What stands out in Lilla's article is the logical weakness of the penultimate paragraph, which I mentioned before. I think one question about that has to do with whether the Tea Party represents anything new. As I said, I don't, and I suspect the author must know that, too. That's why I think paragraph leads us down a blind alley with its hint that something genuinely new is about to happen.

There is something new, as you mentioned, to the extraordinary mashup of libertarianism, populism, religion and anger in the Tea Party. But the libertarians of the past have eventually acquiesed in conservative policies, and I think it's just a matter of time before the Tea Party comes out as a faction of the Republican Party.

That explains why I disagree with the implication in the article that something new may be upon us. The Tea Party channels populars anger back into the very solutions that caused the problems that made its members so angry in the first place.


When you say, "the political system has changed since I first became aware of it back around 1970", I'd love to hear you expand on that - in what ways has it changed in your view?

One of the ways I've seen it change lies in this ability of the media and the political system to send voters down blind alleys.

This is connected with another change, the upsurge in the propensity of voters to believe lies and canards. I think that, far from its original promise of opening up public discourse, the Internet has had the effect undermining it.

For example, the story about Obama not being a citizen was circulated as part of the 2008 campaign. Its originators had no use for it once the campaign was over, but unlike in the past, the Internet has given it a baffling immortality.

That's a really new development. While a certain portion of voters, say 2%, were always susceptible to this kind of thinking, that number is now far higher due to the constant attention on the Internet, which then becomes mainstream news. The example here ...

http://hendrawanm.wordpress.com/2010/...

... I don't intend to single out Fox news, but to make a general point applicable to all mainstream news sources.

In general, what I've seen is that the government has simply become less and less responsive to people over time, functioning more and more in a separate world.

One especially noticeable change is the absence of long-term planning by the government. This used to be a given. Now all decisions appear to be ad hoc reactions to whatever emergencies pop up. The American government, in other worlds, has no plans anymore for the future, only for the immediate present.

Even so, I do think people want to be rational and learn to use reason better. I think so because the ability to use reason is a survival trait of the human species that has evolved naturally. We rely on reason to survive, and to the extent that we don't reason, we don't survive. So we have a natural affinity for it. The problem is that we're all born into a culture that acts against this human impulse in every way, starting at a young age. So as adults, we all have a huge bias toward emotionalism to overcome. Many people, sadly, never get out of this social matrix, but it's not necessarily an impossible task.

Hi Everyman --

... let's be sure we lay it out so we're all aware that your suggestion that the term is trivial because it applies to any economic activity at all quite intentionally distorts the implied meaning that virtually all users of the term intend.

You cannot say that I'm intentionally distorting the issue without explaining how you know what I'm thinking. You're supposing my intent from the idea that "virtually all users" of the term intend it a certain other way, and anyone who disagrees is distorting the concept.

But my point concerns consistency. People cannot, as I pointed out, twist a concept to their personal leanings, no matter how many other people agree. The definition of the concept is independent of popular vote. It remains that all spending redistributes wealth somehow. There is no way to avoid that fact. The only thing to do is to argue from it.

In light of that, your argument then follows that there are impersonal ways of spending government money that benefit you, and which you support, and other ways that benefit particular individuals, ways which you don't support. Your objection is that you don't benefit from the latter type of spending.

Your argument depends upon a distinction between the two kinds of spending, but I don't see how the distinction can be justified. Government spending is by definition for the public good, not private benefit. I can think of categories of spending I'd consider suspect myself, but the public good is independent of my wishes.

Even if we look at it more impersonally, it's not at all clear that welfare spending doesn't benefit you, even if the money goes to particular individuals. Further, it has to be considered that we are all citizens, and that even the neediest among us has a moral claim to government assistance as long as the individual is the basis of a political system.

Any objection to social spending appears inconsistent in the absence of objections to corporate subsidies. I would be interested in hearing a theory that justifies a wealth redistribution of 2.4 trillion dollars to banks that contribute nothing to economic growth or social progress, while arguing over other programs that do at least circulate money directly into the national economy.

Hi Glen --

The appeal of existentialism in philosophy remains its focus on the individual. I think it will keep its place in philosophy, but I'm not sure the status of the individual in democratic political systems is as secure as it ought to be.

I don't know about Canada, but the U.S. public is either poorly informed about relevant political issues or led to false conclusions by the media. The idea of a public good as a proper role for the media has been eclipsed by the idea that advoccacy of a public good is an infringement upon free enterprise. Again, I don't know how Canadians see the role of their media, or whether it has any obligation toward a public good.

Hi Everyman --

In one sense, any economic activity is redistribution of income. But that makes term essentially meaningless...

I agree. That's why talk of redistributing wealth boils down to rhetoric for a conservative audience. It sounds great, just like Patrice's "Taxation is theft," but it's a trivial statement.



I don't consider the criminal court system to be redistributing income. Nor the police. Nor the border patrol. Nor road and bridge maintenance. Nor New York City's construction of a new water tunnel. Do you consider these to be redistributive activities by your definition or usage of the term?

Yes, I do. Money is going from one place to another in each case. But this just shows why the statement is trivial. We can't pick and choose government activites we like and call them one thing, and the ones we don't like something else. That would make the application of the concept inconsistent.


Almost everything a modern American consumes was brought to them at some point by road.Surely you can consider that a benefit, even if they don't actually drive themselves?

Sure it's a benefit. But that doesn't mean the benefit is distributed fairly, or that the taxes were collected fairly.

Hi Robert --

The article raises questions about how the political system in the United States functions, and the direction politics is turning toward in other countries as well.

First Question: Is the political system moving in the direction you'd like to see it go?

Discourse in the mainstream media tends to drown out serious issues in a sea of words, and this article is an example. It introduces numerous issues that bear on political philosophy. So for now, I can only pick out a couple of general points.

One is the use of rhetoric versus reason in politics. The idea that politics can have a reasoned basis stems from the Enlightenment. But recently, that view, along with the general belief that the Enlightenment provides answers for modern society, has fallen out of favor.

The former view that politics is a matter of manipulating the public's passions is in vogue. So appealing to reason in a political campaign has fallen by the wayside.

So, Second Question: Is politics based on reason even possible?

****

Here are my comments on some specific points in the article.

It’s only when our passions get the better of us, when we are angry or fearful or exuberant, that we make bad decisions.

Most mainstream media programming appears designed to keep people in a constant state of alarm or fright about something or other, in order to keep us tuned in. This accounts in part for the kind of political messages the public receives. The rhetoric that best alarms the public is most likely to win votes. The idea of presenting a positive vision in a political campaign doesn't seem to work anymore. This represents a change in the political system.


...the art of politics must be the art of engaging the passions, first by exciting them, then by moderating and directing them to a worthy end

Of course, the end doesn't have to be a worthy one at all. Doesn't this approach breed cynicism as well?


If we look beyond the jockeying of interest groups, parties and politicians, it’s apparent that ...

But why should we look any further? Modern politics has little to do with the individual. It's about interest mediation among groups.


The Great Recession and the Tea Party’s ire, directed at Democrats and Republicans alike, suggest that this second political dispensation is coming to an end and that Americans’ passions are ready to be redirected once again.

Those two phenomena suggest no such thing. The author makes no sense in conflating the recession with the Tea Party. His inference that we're moving to something different is unjustified. The Tea Party does not represent anything new in politics, and Americans' passions about the recession have had little effect upon policy. The author has, in this paragraph, simply channeled readers' hopes down a blind alley.

At this point the fact that the article appeared in the New York Times becomes relevant, because that paper is part of the mainstream press. The mainstream press largely reflects the interests of those in power, so what we're reading is a roundabout endorsement of the status quo.

I think people generally are or would like to become rational thinkers. However, the percentage of people with adequate critical thinking skills is low, and even then, they must contend with a modern culture for which reasoned thinking has little value.

The political system has changed since I first became aware of it back around 1970. I don't think that change is for the good, but I'm open to any argument that it is.

Hi John --

Robert did not plagarize anything. He attributed the article to the correct author and made no claim that it was his own.

I believe you work in the field of education somehow and you know what a serious accusation you've made. Many of your posts are ad hominems against a single member; a philosophy group is the wrong place for rhetorical license of that nature.

You've got a good idea, but if the article is copyrighted, it must be acknowledged on Goodreads.

Interestingly, the sheer fact that an article has been selected for publication often implies what we should think, even if its tone is neutral. Yet if people are suspicious of something because it appeared in the New York Times, then they for their part must give and perhaps defend their reasons for being suspicious.

The essay raises controversial issues about the nature and function of modern political systems.
I'd like to hear everyone's ideas, but first let me give a link to the article in question, because the source is also important.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/mag...

You're welcome -- I enjoy these discussions.

I think if he had said something like "metaphysics is dead" he would have been closer to the mark. But if he has said something like Dawkins did, that "religion is dead" (in terms of metaphysical explanations), his book would have created a storm.

Hi Robert --

The entire approach of science to understanding the world is founded strongly in the scientific method, which is an application of a particular theory of knowledge. As long as philosophy attempts to address these kinds of questions from a perspective that is not founded in that theory of knowledge, scientists will continue to find it wanting.

Because epistemology is properly a philosophical endeavor, scientists have their contention backward. It is the business of philosophy to evaluate the scientific method, not the other way round. That in fact is what happens when philosophy, such as the philosophy of science, establishes modifications to the epistemological aspects of the scientific method.

My question to such scientists is how they think a contingent method designed to explore material entities can be used to evaluate concepts, and why they reject logic and reason in favor of
method as the gold standard philosophy must aspire to.

Because the dismissal of philosophy amounts to a dismissal of established logic and reason which science itself uses, I cannot believe more than a few scientists actually think this.

Hi Robert --

If philosophy cannot answer "ultimate questions," neither can physics. So they're in no postion to cast aspersions, as I said. But I'm unclear as to what you mean by ultimate questions.

If we want to pick up the question of epistemology again, that is a question for philosophy, not science. I know of no scientific research possible into the subject of epistemology unless we're talking about social sciences. But to the extent that they meet the criteria of science, their research is trivial and tentative. Same with neurobiology. It tells us practically nothing in answer to the question,"How do we know what we know?" When it comes to that question, philosophy is where it's at; in fact, it's one of the hottest areas of philosophical investigation right now.

What they are questioning is: does philosophy understand the same thing about its speculation? If so, how do philosopher's think they will test THEIR ideas for usefulness?

It's important to recall that science was until recently a branch of philosophy, and the methods of both might not be so different. But we have to keep in mind that we wouldn't explain philosophy in terms of science any more then we would evaluate chemistry in terms of the principles of biology.

Too many concepts apply best only within their fields. Yet too many people will make a philosophical point by saying, "Well, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle shows us that ...", without realizing that UP may not be the best approach to a philosophical problem.

In philosophy, the "test" of a proposition is logic and reasoning. That was the case when science separated from philosophy, and it's still true. But logic takes different forms in both instances because they study different questions. So falsifiabilty is an issue in philosophy, as I said earlier, although it doesn't go by that name.

Philosophy deals primarily with ideas and science deals mostly with the physical world. An idea that's not falsifiable in philosophy is held in similar regard as an experiment that's not falsifiable in science.

Some ideas in philosophy cannot be assessed logically, so they're speculative. But most philosophy certainly can be. The logical evaluation of another person's ideas is, in a sense, what philosophy is all about. If more people only knew how much fun it is to engage in rational thinking, they'd never want to do anything else. And the world would be a vastly better place to live in.

Because both philosophy and science operate upon a contingent universe, neither can give absolute proof of anything. If that's what scientists are asking for, they're holding philosophy to an arbitrary standard they themselves could never meet, so their demand is inconsistent.

Hi Robert --

I think physics has to turn to some branch of philosophy. None of the cutting edge models of advanced physics can be falsified, yet one or more of those models may nevertheless be true representations of reality. The only way to evaluate the various models would have to rely on the kind of reasoning and logic first established by philosophy and still subject to it. The most advanced physics is largely speculative, so perhaps there already is a philosophy of physics concerning it. I don't know the answer, though, and I plead Socratic ignorance.

Yes, that was the test. You're only in trouble if your score on any category pegs one way or the other.

I don't mean to conflate "the examined life" with introspection. Such a life involves a healthy degree of Socratic skepticism apart from personality.

Hi Robert --

I don't think we are far apart at all from reading your post above. Rather, I think it is more a point of emphasis.

Yes, there's a different emphasis in regard to epistemology. Science, or perhaps some scientists, may see it as belonging to their field.

This might stem from the Enlightenment, which is when science and religion spun off from philosophy to become distinct areas of inquiry. Like a bad divorce, everyone wants custody of the children, in this case epistemology.

Physicists can have strange ideas about this. I know one who insists philosophy died back then because David Hume killed it. With a cutoff date like that, they don't take into account subsequent developments in philosophy concerning epistemology, including ideas about the mind, identity, and epistemic realism.

Someone said earlier on the thread (I can't find the quote) that maybe it was science that hadn't kept up with philosophy, not the other way round. They may not realize that philosophy seldom deals with teleology or metaphysics (as opposed to ontology) anymore -- those two childern religion got custody of. Such a position would be attacking a straw man.

In any case, the epistemological problem of "how do we know what we know" may, as you point out, be the crux of the problem, at least for some scientists. Apparently, they're maintaining that the philosophy of science is science, not philosophy.

Hi Robert --

Science's advances are based on the scientific method, which is an epistemologically grounded method. Here is where Popper's criterion for "falsifiability" comes in.

Hawking's book is aimed at a general readership, and his paragraph on philosophy is very broad, which makes it vulnerable in many ways. Because of this generality, I don't think Hawking meant to press any narrower point about epistemology.

But if we poke at it (ourselves) and try to think what a sounder argument in Hawking's favor might look like, science leads us to epistemology as you say. Here we have Karl Popper's falsifiability criterion as an example. The problem is this: Did Popper derive this modification to the scientific method based on science, or based on philosophy? What that boils down to is what status the philosophy of science possesses.

I contend Popper's falsifiablity is based in philosophy because methodology is one of the areas of concern in the philosophy of science, and also because I don't see how science can develop itself entirely from within, free from outside input.

The confusion is that each field has its philosophy, and all these evaluative branches of philosophy tie together into the general enterprise of philosophy. Yet on the other hand, is there any clear point about which we can say that we're no longer dealing with science as such, but rather the philosophy of science?

In the case of falsifiability I think Popper was thinking philosophically when he introduced the concept because up to that point it wasn't a clear scientific principle. On the other hand, there was something like it in philosophy: We're entitled to ask someone we're arguing with, "What would it take for me to prove your wrong?" And we consider that our interlocutor's point is unsound if his answer amounts to "Nothing can." Popper seems to have translated that into a scientific principle.

I don't know how Hawking would respond to that because falsifiability is so recent an innovation in science, hardly older than I am (okay, maybe not that recent). That newness indicates that philosophy must still have something to say, even to scientists. It would then be an error to peremptorily dismiss its efficacy as Hawking did.