Harry Rothmann's Blog, page 3
August 1, 2019
The War Was Won Myth
Here' s an article from my book submitted to a magazine on the Vietnam War....enjoy
The Vietnam War, 1969-1972 -- “The War Was Won Myth”
By Harry Rothmann (Colonel, Retired, USA)
(3160 words w/o footnotes and end notations)
In the history of the Vietnam War several participants and revisionist historians have claimed that though North Vietnam ultimately defeated South Vietnam in 1975, the US military and its South Vietnam Army Ally had won the war by 1972. Moreover, they argue that the final defeat of the South Vietnamese was due to the US Congress, which had seriously cut US military assistance to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces allowed under the 1973 Paris Peace Accords; thereby rendering them unable to resist a North Vietnamese invasion in 1975.
This article examines that claim and concludes that while the reduction of assistance funds was a significant factor in the South Vietnamese defeat in 1975, it was not the only reason for that defeat. Furthermore, a closer look at the historical evidence, especially newly released US National Security files, US Army Official Histories and Studies, and Communist Vietnamese documents, indicate that the war was hardly won by 1972; rather it was merely experiencing a pause during which the Communist military forces were reconstituting from their TET 1968 military defeat and the post TET gains of the American and South Vietnamese forces.
The origins of the “war was won” view can be quickly traced. With the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 and the failure of Nixon’s policies and actions in Vietnam, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were among the first to attempt to 'set the record straight’ on why the Paris Peace Accords apparently failed to keep the peace and South Vietnam fell to the North Vietnamese. Kissinger took the lead in the preservation of the Nixon Administration's historic legacy with the first volume of his memoirs, White House Years, in 1979 - just under four years after the fall of Saigon. He later followed this work with another book called Ending the War devoted to explaining his actions during the secret meetings in Paris with the North, and subsequent diplomatic dealings with the Chinese and Soviets.
In both works Kissinger claims that his negotiations with the North Vietnamese in Paris and the US military actions in Southeast Asia were constantly constrained by US domestic events and Congressional actions limiting funds and prohibiting the use of US military force in a way that drastically restricted his abilities to place pressure on the North to produce a favorable settlement for the US and South Vietnam. Kissinger further argues that the Congressional cutoff of aid after the accords severely limited the South Vietnam Armed Forces ability to defend its country and that “Watergate destroyed the last hopes for an honorable outcome” because it resulted in resignation of President Nixon who had pledged to punish the North through the use of US airpower if it violated the treaty.
Nixon soon followed Kissinger with a book of his own called No More Vietnams. In that work, the President writes that he felt obligated to explain why Vietnam fell after so much sacrifice. He then states “that after our fighting men had won the war, the United States Congress lost the peace by slashing aid to our South Vietnamese allies at the same time the Soviet Union was dramatically expanding its aid to the communists in the North.” Thus, both Nixon and Kissinger clearly argue that they were not at fault that their 'Peace with Honor’ policy failed; rather it was primarily an irresponsible Congress that prevented the proper employment of US forces to ensure a settlement that was in the favor of the South and then pulled the rug from under the South Vietnamese by not adequately funding their armed forces so that they could defend themselves from the North’s subsequent aggression.
Nixon and Kissinger were not the only ones who claim that the war was won in South Vietnam during this period and later lost due to the US Congress. In 1999, Lewis Sorley, a Vietnam War historian and veteran, published his work on the war called A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of American’s Last Years in Vietnam. Basing much of his conclusions on the newly transcribed General Creighton Abrams’ command tapes from 1969 to 1972, Sorley argues that “There came a time when the war was won. The fighting wasn’t over, but the war was won. This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970, after the Cambodian incursion in the spring of the year. By then the South Vietnamese countryside had been widely pacified.” Sorley further attributes this success to General Abrams' 'One War Strategy' approach, which he claims turned around the situation after General Westmoreland left because it focused on not only improving the Armed Forces of South Vietnam, but placed a priority on pacification and destroying the local Viet Cong forces that the former commander had neglected.
As for why the war was lost in 1975, Sorley implies that part of the reason was that Abrams’ efforts to improve the Armed Forces of South Vietnam were impeded by the lack of focus on them by his predecessor General Westmoreland that he just did not have the time necessary to make the full improvements that were needed. He further argues that the gains made under Abrams were later eroded by the Congressional prohibitions in the Lam Son 719 operations into Laos and the cutbacks after the General had left, which seriously undermined their ability to defend against the North Vietnam offensive in 1975. Thus, he agrees with the Nixon and Kissinger cause for the loss of the war, and in so doing reinforces the Nixon-Kissinger specter of a 'stab in the back' to the American military effort in Vietnam in the historical literature of the war.
The historical record supports the improvements in the Allied military situation in South Vietnam that occurred from 1969 to 1972 as Nixon, Kissinger, and Sorley claim. For example, the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) reported that “By the end of 1971, close to 95 percent of South Vietnam’s population lived in places rated relatively secure under the Hamlet Evaluation System, compared to 60 percent in February 1968 when the Hamlet Evaluation System criteria had been less stringent.” In addition, the South Vietnam security forces dramatically increased from 300,000 to 520,000 local forces and 74,000 to 121,000 police forces, with a corresponding increase in engagements of South Vietnamese troops with the enemy and a decrease in American operations. Further, the People’s Army of Vietnam official history confirms that the situation for the PAVN and VC in South Vietnam from 1969 to 1971 was dire at this time. As that history states, the communist “insurgent forces had been decimated and were unable to hold on to their territorial gains... In the meantime, US troops managed to drive PAVN troops back into isolated areas of the country… Pessimism about future prospects rose to dangerous levels within the ranks.”
Moreover, as Nixon, Kissinger, and Sorley also claim, the record shows that Congress passed several acts restricting the use of US military forces in Southeast Asia – such as the Cooper-Church Amendment – that affected the war. For example, when the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) attacked into Laos they did not have any direct support from US Army combat units and no US advisors. This void severely restricted their combat capabilities, and command and control operations. As a result, the ARVN could only temporarily cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and had to conduct a hasty retreat back to South Vietnam.
Furthermore, after the US main combat forces left Southeast Asia, Congress also cut the military assistance funds for the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, which severely affected their capability to defend an invasion from Northern forces. Indeed, as chronicled in a US Army study From Ceasefire to Capitulation, for Fiscal Year 1974, Congress cut the operating funds of the South Vietnamese Army by nearly 50%. In many cases, this reduction resulted in South Vietnamese frontline soldiers having only fifty rounds of ammunition to shoot, as well as producing serious shortages and severe declines in readiness rates for major equipment items. When the North Vietnamese attacked in March 1975 the readiness and morale of the Army was at an all-time low, and the decline in US military assistance funding played a significant role in the dismal performance of the South's Armed Forces.
Several years after Nixon, Kissinger, and Sorley published their accounts, the availability of historical evidence on this period grew immensely. For example, the secret official records of the negotiations for the Paris Accords have become available for use by scholars. In addition, much of the Presidential Tape recordings from the Nixon era also became available. More of these documents and recordings have become available since, and are remarkable in what they reveal in general about the Nixon Administration's conduct of the Vietnam War and the making of the Paris Peace Accords. Historians using these sources have recently shown that the failure of the Paris Accords and the later defeat of South Vietnam was more complicated than the President and his National Security Advisor have claimed, and that they are more responsible for the outcome than they wanted to admit.
In addition, new documents from the North Vietnamese have also become available to a select group of American scholars. These have been translated and published, as well as several important historical monographs written. The newly released documents and the resultant histories are extraordinary in what they reveal not only on the negotiations for the Accords but the communist actions leading to the treaty and the capabilities and activities of the communist forces involved in the war from 1969 to 1975.
The views in the books on the negotiations and activities leading to the Accords are varied but fairly consistent in their arguments that both Nixon and Kissinger share the blame for the weaknesses in the Paris Accords that resulted in the ultimate defeat of South Vietnam in 1975. The consistencies in their views supported by the historical evidence mentioned are that both Nixon and Kissinger made concessions in secret from the South Vietnamese that placed the South Vietnam state in a dangerous military position vis a vis the North after the Paris Accords. These consisted of first, agreeing to a unilateral withdrawal of US combat ground forces from Vietnam. Second, allowing the North Vietnamese forces to stay in their post-1972 Easter offensive positions and their sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. Third, as evident in the secret transcripts of the meetings with the Soviet and Chinese leaders, indicating to the North Vietnam allies that the US would not again intervene militarily if the North agreed to the Paris Peace Accords and would not invade within a certain time interval after the signing of the Accords.
Finally, as indicated in their conversations in the Presidential Tapes, both Nixon and Kissinger knew that the negotiated peace settlement would result in the fall of South Vietnam. In short, as Robert Brigham summarizes in his most recent work, many scholars of the war for this period generally argue, as they interpret the released presidential tapes and secret transcripts of the negotiations, that the negotiated agreement resulting in the Paris Accords “amounted to a suicide pact for Saigon but was a face-saving defeat for the United States.”
Moreover, in the aftermath of Sorley’s book, which was highly praised by many Vietnam Veterans and revisionist scholars, several works have come out challenging the historical interpretations and conclusions in A Better War. One of the most prominent is Retired US Army Colonel Gregory Daddis’ book on the war during the Nixon years called Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (2017). Relying on more recent assessments of the war in US Army official studies that use actual battle reports and assessments of the commands involved during the Abram command years, and further utilizing research he had previously conducted in the aftermath of the TET 1968 offensive, Daddis concluded that though there were very real improvements in the aftermath of TET, the US still failed to produce a South Vietnam Armed Forces that could stand up to the North Vietnam Army without continued US support.
This author’s recently published book called Warriors and Fools: How America’s Leaders Lost the Vietnam War and Why It Still Matters supports Daddis’ conclusions. Relying heavily on Vietnamese sources and recently released National Security papers and Presidential recordings, as well as US command assessments found in the US Army and Marine Corps official histories and the JCS papers and studies, Warriors and Fools shows that Nixon, Kissinger and members of their inner circle from 1969 to 1972 countermanded, against his objections, General Abrams’ plans for Vietnamization that would have been more effective in producing a South Vietnamese military capable of defending its nation from a Northern offensive such as occurred in 1975.
For example, in 1969 Nixon approved the canceling of the General's plans to retain certain support units and advisors in South Vietnam after the US combat unit withdrawals to ensure that South Vietnamese units could operate effectively against the North's regular forces. Moreover, that same year the President acceded to his Secretary of Defense's changes to the General's strategic plans for offensive operations against enemy main force units to protect South Vietnam training and equipping activities and approved a stand-down in US combat operations against NVA main forces. Finally, in 1972 Nixon ordered the curtailing of close air operations in South Vietnam to bolster personally directed strategic bombing operations that Abrams had no control over.
In addition, by 1972 Nixon so disrupted the US command structure in Southeast Asia that it further undermined General Abrams' ability to effectively oversee operations to prepare the South Vietnamese military for its relief and takeover of US withdrawing units. In fact, the relationship between General Abrams and the President became so bad that Nixon threatened to relieve Abrams and replace him with his personal military advisor, Alexander Haig, an officer who never commanded at any senior general officer level and who held a rank two levels below Abrams. Nixon further told his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that he wanted to fire the entire Joint Chiefs during a critical stage of the Linebacker bombing campaign, and personally took charge of the direction of those attacks. All of these Presidential actions so disrupted the entire US military chain of command that his Defense Secretary thought the US military would be unable to conduct any coordinated, effective military operations in the Southeast Asia in 1972.
As a result of all of these actions and the above described unsettled relationships the entire Vietnamization program that Abrams had envisioned and carefully coordinated in 1968-9 was abandoned, as well as the effectiveness of his theater strategy and combined operations against the communist forces from late 1969 to 1972. These actions resulted in overall reduced military effectiveness against enemy forces in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos leading to up the Paris Peace Accords, as well as reduced efficiency in executing the Vietnamization program.
Though as stated above, there were dramatic security improvements in the South, assessing the actions of the US and South Vietnamese military and security forces alone do not give a true picture of what was going on in the war from 1969 to 1971. After all, there was another waring power involved – the Communist Vietnamese. Their documents, while admitting to the dire circumstances they found themselves in the post 1968 TET years, dramatically chronicle and demonstrate how during this period when Nixon, Kissinger and Sorley say the war was won, they were conducting operations to reconstitute their forces both in South Vietnam and in their surrounding base areas in Cambodia and Laos.
Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail at this time North Vietnam stepped up its already impressive infiltration to the South, first to fill the VC main force units decimated during TET with Northern replacements, and then to rebuild its PAVN units heavily decimated at Khe Sanh and Hue, and the Central Highlands Dak To campaign. Furthermore, when Abrams’ orders changed to place US forces on the defensive in 1969, the North was able to reverse some of the US advances made in such places as in the A Shau Valley and regain important base areas there.
Yet, what about the results of the 1972 Easter Offensive? Did not the defeat of the Communists on the ground in the South and the Linebacker bombing campaigns against the North win the war by pressuring the Communists to sign the Paris Peace Accords? Once again, militarily from the US perspective the Communists did take a beating. The PAVN forces in the South took horrendous losses – US air coordinated by American advisors along with ARVN ground defenses nearly destroyed their entire armored forces. And certainly, the Linebacker II campaign against the North placed the Communists in a precarious position - especially with the depletion of their air-to-air missile systems.
But once again the Communist sources show that neither the failure of their ground offensive in the South nor the horrific bombing in the North forced them to sign the Accords or placed them in a dire military situation. Rather their Soviet and Chinese Allies convinced them that by signing the Accords they could then take the US military pressure away and fight again another day. In fact, the provision of the 'cease fire in place' of the Accords afforded their forces in the South somewhat of a positional advantage they had not had there during the war to this point. North Vietnamese forces, despite their dramatic losses, now would have areas along the DMZ and along the border areas they had not controlled before 1972 – to include the entire A Shau Valley, areas in the Central Highlands around Dak To, and territories north and west of Saigon. Thus, the Communist military balance of power was, despite the failure of their 1972 offensive and the US strategic bombing campaigns, was actually better in 1972 than it had been in late 1968 through 1970.
To summarize and conclude, this article - using the most recent evidence from the US National Archives, the Communist Vietnamese side, and US military official histories and studies - has argued that the claim the "war was won" by 1970 and through 1972 is a 'myth.' Rather, the most recent evidence shows that the decisions and actions of Nixon and his main assistants gradually placed South Vietnam in a position that was militarily critically weakened when they signed the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. Moreover, the so-called 'US victory’ over the Communist forces was actually a North Vietnam operational pause from 1969 to 1972 to reconstitute from their 1968 TET setback; and an overall strategic pause from 1972 to 1975 to prepare for a final military offensive against South Vietnam. These two pauses allowed North Vietnam the time and opportunity to finally conquer South Vietnam in 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The author is a 1967 graduate of West Point who served as an infantry platoon leader and company commander in South Vietnam in 1969. He also served in infantry, airborne and ranger organizations in the US Army after Vietnam; as well as taught military history at West Point and military strategy and operations at the National War College.
2019 Harry Rothmann
With one time use rights to Vietnam Veterans For Factual History Magazine
Stephen Sherman, editor
The Vietnam War, 1969-1972 -- “The War Was Won Myth”
By Harry Rothmann (Colonel, Retired, USA)
(3160 words w/o footnotes and end notations)
In the history of the Vietnam War several participants and revisionist historians have claimed that though North Vietnam ultimately defeated South Vietnam in 1975, the US military and its South Vietnam Army Ally had won the war by 1972. Moreover, they argue that the final defeat of the South Vietnamese was due to the US Congress, which had seriously cut US military assistance to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces allowed under the 1973 Paris Peace Accords; thereby rendering them unable to resist a North Vietnamese invasion in 1975.
This article examines that claim and concludes that while the reduction of assistance funds was a significant factor in the South Vietnamese defeat in 1975, it was not the only reason for that defeat. Furthermore, a closer look at the historical evidence, especially newly released US National Security files, US Army Official Histories and Studies, and Communist Vietnamese documents, indicate that the war was hardly won by 1972; rather it was merely experiencing a pause during which the Communist military forces were reconstituting from their TET 1968 military defeat and the post TET gains of the American and South Vietnamese forces.
The origins of the “war was won” view can be quickly traced. With the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 and the failure of Nixon’s policies and actions in Vietnam, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were among the first to attempt to 'set the record straight’ on why the Paris Peace Accords apparently failed to keep the peace and South Vietnam fell to the North Vietnamese. Kissinger took the lead in the preservation of the Nixon Administration's historic legacy with the first volume of his memoirs, White House Years, in 1979 - just under four years after the fall of Saigon. He later followed this work with another book called Ending the War devoted to explaining his actions during the secret meetings in Paris with the North, and subsequent diplomatic dealings with the Chinese and Soviets.
In both works Kissinger claims that his negotiations with the North Vietnamese in Paris and the US military actions in Southeast Asia were constantly constrained by US domestic events and Congressional actions limiting funds and prohibiting the use of US military force in a way that drastically restricted his abilities to place pressure on the North to produce a favorable settlement for the US and South Vietnam. Kissinger further argues that the Congressional cutoff of aid after the accords severely limited the South Vietnam Armed Forces ability to defend its country and that “Watergate destroyed the last hopes for an honorable outcome” because it resulted in resignation of President Nixon who had pledged to punish the North through the use of US airpower if it violated the treaty.
Nixon soon followed Kissinger with a book of his own called No More Vietnams. In that work, the President writes that he felt obligated to explain why Vietnam fell after so much sacrifice. He then states “that after our fighting men had won the war, the United States Congress lost the peace by slashing aid to our South Vietnamese allies at the same time the Soviet Union was dramatically expanding its aid to the communists in the North.” Thus, both Nixon and Kissinger clearly argue that they were not at fault that their 'Peace with Honor’ policy failed; rather it was primarily an irresponsible Congress that prevented the proper employment of US forces to ensure a settlement that was in the favor of the South and then pulled the rug from under the South Vietnamese by not adequately funding their armed forces so that they could defend themselves from the North’s subsequent aggression.
Nixon and Kissinger were not the only ones who claim that the war was won in South Vietnam during this period and later lost due to the US Congress. In 1999, Lewis Sorley, a Vietnam War historian and veteran, published his work on the war called A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of American’s Last Years in Vietnam. Basing much of his conclusions on the newly transcribed General Creighton Abrams’ command tapes from 1969 to 1972, Sorley argues that “There came a time when the war was won. The fighting wasn’t over, but the war was won. This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970, after the Cambodian incursion in the spring of the year. By then the South Vietnamese countryside had been widely pacified.” Sorley further attributes this success to General Abrams' 'One War Strategy' approach, which he claims turned around the situation after General Westmoreland left because it focused on not only improving the Armed Forces of South Vietnam, but placed a priority on pacification and destroying the local Viet Cong forces that the former commander had neglected.
As for why the war was lost in 1975, Sorley implies that part of the reason was that Abrams’ efforts to improve the Armed Forces of South Vietnam were impeded by the lack of focus on them by his predecessor General Westmoreland that he just did not have the time necessary to make the full improvements that were needed. He further argues that the gains made under Abrams were later eroded by the Congressional prohibitions in the Lam Son 719 operations into Laos and the cutbacks after the General had left, which seriously undermined their ability to defend against the North Vietnam offensive in 1975. Thus, he agrees with the Nixon and Kissinger cause for the loss of the war, and in so doing reinforces the Nixon-Kissinger specter of a 'stab in the back' to the American military effort in Vietnam in the historical literature of the war.
The historical record supports the improvements in the Allied military situation in South Vietnam that occurred from 1969 to 1972 as Nixon, Kissinger, and Sorley claim. For example, the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) reported that “By the end of 1971, close to 95 percent of South Vietnam’s population lived in places rated relatively secure under the Hamlet Evaluation System, compared to 60 percent in February 1968 when the Hamlet Evaluation System criteria had been less stringent.” In addition, the South Vietnam security forces dramatically increased from 300,000 to 520,000 local forces and 74,000 to 121,000 police forces, with a corresponding increase in engagements of South Vietnamese troops with the enemy and a decrease in American operations. Further, the People’s Army of Vietnam official history confirms that the situation for the PAVN and VC in South Vietnam from 1969 to 1971 was dire at this time. As that history states, the communist “insurgent forces had been decimated and were unable to hold on to their territorial gains... In the meantime, US troops managed to drive PAVN troops back into isolated areas of the country… Pessimism about future prospects rose to dangerous levels within the ranks.”
Moreover, as Nixon, Kissinger, and Sorley also claim, the record shows that Congress passed several acts restricting the use of US military forces in Southeast Asia – such as the Cooper-Church Amendment – that affected the war. For example, when the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) attacked into Laos they did not have any direct support from US Army combat units and no US advisors. This void severely restricted their combat capabilities, and command and control operations. As a result, the ARVN could only temporarily cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and had to conduct a hasty retreat back to South Vietnam.
Furthermore, after the US main combat forces left Southeast Asia, Congress also cut the military assistance funds for the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, which severely affected their capability to defend an invasion from Northern forces. Indeed, as chronicled in a US Army study From Ceasefire to Capitulation, for Fiscal Year 1974, Congress cut the operating funds of the South Vietnamese Army by nearly 50%. In many cases, this reduction resulted in South Vietnamese frontline soldiers having only fifty rounds of ammunition to shoot, as well as producing serious shortages and severe declines in readiness rates for major equipment items. When the North Vietnamese attacked in March 1975 the readiness and morale of the Army was at an all-time low, and the decline in US military assistance funding played a significant role in the dismal performance of the South's Armed Forces.
Several years after Nixon, Kissinger, and Sorley published their accounts, the availability of historical evidence on this period grew immensely. For example, the secret official records of the negotiations for the Paris Accords have become available for use by scholars. In addition, much of the Presidential Tape recordings from the Nixon era also became available. More of these documents and recordings have become available since, and are remarkable in what they reveal in general about the Nixon Administration's conduct of the Vietnam War and the making of the Paris Peace Accords. Historians using these sources have recently shown that the failure of the Paris Accords and the later defeat of South Vietnam was more complicated than the President and his National Security Advisor have claimed, and that they are more responsible for the outcome than they wanted to admit.
In addition, new documents from the North Vietnamese have also become available to a select group of American scholars. These have been translated and published, as well as several important historical monographs written. The newly released documents and the resultant histories are extraordinary in what they reveal not only on the negotiations for the Accords but the communist actions leading to the treaty and the capabilities and activities of the communist forces involved in the war from 1969 to 1975.
The views in the books on the negotiations and activities leading to the Accords are varied but fairly consistent in their arguments that both Nixon and Kissinger share the blame for the weaknesses in the Paris Accords that resulted in the ultimate defeat of South Vietnam in 1975. The consistencies in their views supported by the historical evidence mentioned are that both Nixon and Kissinger made concessions in secret from the South Vietnamese that placed the South Vietnam state in a dangerous military position vis a vis the North after the Paris Accords. These consisted of first, agreeing to a unilateral withdrawal of US combat ground forces from Vietnam. Second, allowing the North Vietnamese forces to stay in their post-1972 Easter offensive positions and their sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. Third, as evident in the secret transcripts of the meetings with the Soviet and Chinese leaders, indicating to the North Vietnam allies that the US would not again intervene militarily if the North agreed to the Paris Peace Accords and would not invade within a certain time interval after the signing of the Accords.
Finally, as indicated in their conversations in the Presidential Tapes, both Nixon and Kissinger knew that the negotiated peace settlement would result in the fall of South Vietnam. In short, as Robert Brigham summarizes in his most recent work, many scholars of the war for this period generally argue, as they interpret the released presidential tapes and secret transcripts of the negotiations, that the negotiated agreement resulting in the Paris Accords “amounted to a suicide pact for Saigon but was a face-saving defeat for the United States.”
Moreover, in the aftermath of Sorley’s book, which was highly praised by many Vietnam Veterans and revisionist scholars, several works have come out challenging the historical interpretations and conclusions in A Better War. One of the most prominent is Retired US Army Colonel Gregory Daddis’ book on the war during the Nixon years called Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (2017). Relying on more recent assessments of the war in US Army official studies that use actual battle reports and assessments of the commands involved during the Abram command years, and further utilizing research he had previously conducted in the aftermath of the TET 1968 offensive, Daddis concluded that though there were very real improvements in the aftermath of TET, the US still failed to produce a South Vietnam Armed Forces that could stand up to the North Vietnam Army without continued US support.
This author’s recently published book called Warriors and Fools: How America’s Leaders Lost the Vietnam War and Why It Still Matters supports Daddis’ conclusions. Relying heavily on Vietnamese sources and recently released National Security papers and Presidential recordings, as well as US command assessments found in the US Army and Marine Corps official histories and the JCS papers and studies, Warriors and Fools shows that Nixon, Kissinger and members of their inner circle from 1969 to 1972 countermanded, against his objections, General Abrams’ plans for Vietnamization that would have been more effective in producing a South Vietnamese military capable of defending its nation from a Northern offensive such as occurred in 1975.
For example, in 1969 Nixon approved the canceling of the General's plans to retain certain support units and advisors in South Vietnam after the US combat unit withdrawals to ensure that South Vietnamese units could operate effectively against the North's regular forces. Moreover, that same year the President acceded to his Secretary of Defense's changes to the General's strategic plans for offensive operations against enemy main force units to protect South Vietnam training and equipping activities and approved a stand-down in US combat operations against NVA main forces. Finally, in 1972 Nixon ordered the curtailing of close air operations in South Vietnam to bolster personally directed strategic bombing operations that Abrams had no control over.
In addition, by 1972 Nixon so disrupted the US command structure in Southeast Asia that it further undermined General Abrams' ability to effectively oversee operations to prepare the South Vietnamese military for its relief and takeover of US withdrawing units. In fact, the relationship between General Abrams and the President became so bad that Nixon threatened to relieve Abrams and replace him with his personal military advisor, Alexander Haig, an officer who never commanded at any senior general officer level and who held a rank two levels below Abrams. Nixon further told his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that he wanted to fire the entire Joint Chiefs during a critical stage of the Linebacker bombing campaign, and personally took charge of the direction of those attacks. All of these Presidential actions so disrupted the entire US military chain of command that his Defense Secretary thought the US military would be unable to conduct any coordinated, effective military operations in the Southeast Asia in 1972.
As a result of all of these actions and the above described unsettled relationships the entire Vietnamization program that Abrams had envisioned and carefully coordinated in 1968-9 was abandoned, as well as the effectiveness of his theater strategy and combined operations against the communist forces from late 1969 to 1972. These actions resulted in overall reduced military effectiveness against enemy forces in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos leading to up the Paris Peace Accords, as well as reduced efficiency in executing the Vietnamization program.
Though as stated above, there were dramatic security improvements in the South, assessing the actions of the US and South Vietnamese military and security forces alone do not give a true picture of what was going on in the war from 1969 to 1971. After all, there was another waring power involved – the Communist Vietnamese. Their documents, while admitting to the dire circumstances they found themselves in the post 1968 TET years, dramatically chronicle and demonstrate how during this period when Nixon, Kissinger and Sorley say the war was won, they were conducting operations to reconstitute their forces both in South Vietnam and in their surrounding base areas in Cambodia and Laos.
Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail at this time North Vietnam stepped up its already impressive infiltration to the South, first to fill the VC main force units decimated during TET with Northern replacements, and then to rebuild its PAVN units heavily decimated at Khe Sanh and Hue, and the Central Highlands Dak To campaign. Furthermore, when Abrams’ orders changed to place US forces on the defensive in 1969, the North was able to reverse some of the US advances made in such places as in the A Shau Valley and regain important base areas there.
Yet, what about the results of the 1972 Easter Offensive? Did not the defeat of the Communists on the ground in the South and the Linebacker bombing campaigns against the North win the war by pressuring the Communists to sign the Paris Peace Accords? Once again, militarily from the US perspective the Communists did take a beating. The PAVN forces in the South took horrendous losses – US air coordinated by American advisors along with ARVN ground defenses nearly destroyed their entire armored forces. And certainly, the Linebacker II campaign against the North placed the Communists in a precarious position - especially with the depletion of their air-to-air missile systems.
But once again the Communist sources show that neither the failure of their ground offensive in the South nor the horrific bombing in the North forced them to sign the Accords or placed them in a dire military situation. Rather their Soviet and Chinese Allies convinced them that by signing the Accords they could then take the US military pressure away and fight again another day. In fact, the provision of the 'cease fire in place' of the Accords afforded their forces in the South somewhat of a positional advantage they had not had there during the war to this point. North Vietnamese forces, despite their dramatic losses, now would have areas along the DMZ and along the border areas they had not controlled before 1972 – to include the entire A Shau Valley, areas in the Central Highlands around Dak To, and territories north and west of Saigon. Thus, the Communist military balance of power was, despite the failure of their 1972 offensive and the US strategic bombing campaigns, was actually better in 1972 than it had been in late 1968 through 1970.
To summarize and conclude, this article - using the most recent evidence from the US National Archives, the Communist Vietnamese side, and US military official histories and studies - has argued that the claim the "war was won" by 1970 and through 1972 is a 'myth.' Rather, the most recent evidence shows that the decisions and actions of Nixon and his main assistants gradually placed South Vietnam in a position that was militarily critically weakened when they signed the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. Moreover, the so-called 'US victory’ over the Communist forces was actually a North Vietnam operational pause from 1969 to 1972 to reconstitute from their 1968 TET setback; and an overall strategic pause from 1972 to 1975 to prepare for a final military offensive against South Vietnam. These two pauses allowed North Vietnam the time and opportunity to finally conquer South Vietnam in 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The author is a 1967 graduate of West Point who served as an infantry platoon leader and company commander in South Vietnam in 1969. He also served in infantry, airborne and ranger organizations in the US Army after Vietnam; as well as taught military history at West Point and military strategy and operations at the National War College.
2019 Harry Rothmann
With one time use rights to Vietnam Veterans For Factual History Magazine
Stephen Sherman, editor
June 23, 2019
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Amazon – https://www.amazon.com/Harry-Rothmann...
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“We’re looking back at books we believe have the potential to sell far more than they have to date and deserve another push!....Because your book, WARRIORS AND FOOLS, received an exceptionally positive review from Kirkus, we are reaching out with an exclusive promotional opportunity to advertise your book in a unique way that includes a listing under the sponsored title “Great Indie Books Worth Discovering.”
This Indie Books Worth Discovering promotion is exclusively available to a small selection of authors - the top 10 percent of positively reviewed books from 2018.”
Kirkus Review Magazine is one of the most prestigious magazines in the publishing world and is used by hundreds of Universities and Libraries to purchase books for their courses and collections. I have included in this post a copy of their review of our book as well as other info on Kirkus.
See Book Trailer - https://youtu.be/cPK3y5iF9Ag
Buy hardcover, paperback, iBook, Kindle or Nook now at:
Apple - http://itunes.apple.com/us/book/id137...
Amazon – https://www.amazon.com/Harry-Rothmann...
Barnes and Noble - https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/warr...…Harry Rothmann
June 5, 2019
75th Anniversary of D-Day
In recognition of the 75th Anniversary of D-Day RCI Publications Facebook Page ( https://www.facebook.com/RCIPUBS/) is providing several posts intended to inform its readers of the tremendous planning, preparation, controversy, bravery, determination, sacrifice, and fortune that made the invasion of Normandy in June 1944 a success, and 6 June 1944 “a day of days” that constituted one of the major events defining how that war was fought and ended. These posts will include not just information about that day, its events and the heroism of those who fought and died, but will include maps, photos, film, and clips of famous motion picture recreations, as well as histories of the times, events and people.
Please visit the RCIPUBS Facebook page to read these posts and learn more about D-Day the 6th of June 1944 and its importance and its celebration of the 75th Anniversary. Harry Rothmann
Please visit the RCIPUBS Facebook page to read these posts and learn more about D-Day the 6th of June 1944 and its importance and its celebration of the 75th Anniversary. Harry Rothmann
May 25, 2019
Memorial Day
Another Memorial Day comes by.....in tribute to my fallen classmates killed in action in the Vietnam War here is a memoriam....there were 29 of them. I always think of those young men and others who fell elsewhere later and still built a new Army in the aftermath of a war when the American public ranked its military amongst the lowest desired professions. Here's the tribute:https://youtu.be/EXkvy8jgaGA.
The lives, sacrifices and losses of the West Point Class of 1967, and its service to rebuild the Army to its triumph in the First Gulf War can be found in the book NONE WILL SURPASS in hardbound, paperback and Kindle at Amazon.None Will Surpass.
The lives, sacrifices and losses of the West Point Class of 1967, and its service to rebuild the Army to its triumph in the First Gulf War can be found in the book NONE WILL SURPASS in hardbound, paperback and Kindle at Amazon.None Will Surpass.
May 13, 2019
50 Year Anniversary of the Battle of Hamburger Hill
My Facebook Page RCIPUBS (https://www.facebook.com/RCIPUBS/ ) is honoring the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Hamburger Hill (10-20 May 69) by posting reports, stories and oral histories of the battle. Please visit if interested. Here's one book about the battle written by a soldier who was there.
The Crouching Beast: A United States Army Lieutenant's Account of the Battle for Hamburger Hill, May 1969
The Crouching Beast: A United States Army Lieutenant's Account of the Battle for Hamburger Hill, May 1969
April 17, 2019
50 Year Anniversary
In remembrance of the 50th anniversary of my deployment to Vietnam, which has dominated my life and led to my two books, I posted this video to the fallen soldiers I knew in my unit (Company D, 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division) and my West Point Class (1967). May they rest in peace. Here's the link to the video: https://youtu.be/imzo3izWSrI
January 10, 2019
Book Review of Max Hastings’ “Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945-1975.”
Max Hastings, a noted British Journalist of military affairs who covered the Vietnam War during the LBJ years and is a New York Times best-selling Author, has written a new book on that war. True to its title, his history portrays Vietnam as a “tragedy.” Hastings narrative of over 700 pages further depicts this tragedy as truly ‘epic’ - mainly from the view of and its impact on the Vietnamese people. Indeed, from the start, it is clear that author’s intent is to convey “something of the enormity of the experience that the Vietnamese people endured over three generations, from the consequences of which they remain unliberated to this day.” To make his point to those who see the war from an American prism, he reminds his readers that “this was predominantly an Asian tragedy, upon which a US nightmare was overlaid [and in which] around forty Vietnamese perished for every American.”
In focusing on the war as largely a Vietnamese tragedy, Hastings’ book does much to fill a void in some notable histories of the war. For example, several popular histories such as Halberstam’s “The Best and the Brightest,” Sheehan’s “A Bright Shining Lie,” and Karnow’s “Vietnam: A History”focus primarily on the US actors and actions; and do not cover in much depth the role of the Vietnamese played in the conflict - other than South Vietnam and its Army was corrupt and inefficient, and North Vietnam, its Army and supporting southerners, determined and driven. Now we have a history that rightfully pays much more attention, especially as seen from the years 1945 to 1975, to what the conflict meant to the Vietnamese as a whole, to include its leaders, soldiers, and people - both in the North and South.
In doing so, Hastings’ book also does a service in dispelling several popular and orthodox lingering myths about the conflict. For example, using more extensive and broader interviews than the Ken Burns TV series, he shows that the North Vietnamese did not hold a monopoly over the nationalist aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Rather, he demonstrates that many in the south had similar aspirations; and they fought equally as hard and bravely for their vision of a Vietnam state free from the yoke and what would turn out to be the horrors of communism. The great tragedy for those Southern Vietnamese, Hastings argues, is that their leaders were too focused on themselves, rather than resolving national issues; and in the end were sold out for political expediency by their US supporters.
Other myths the author dispels is that the war was initially fought primarily over Southern Vietnamese domestic discontent of an illegally formed political entity that did not represent or honor the heritage of the Vietnamese people; and begun and mainly fought by Southern communist nationalists supported by their Northern brethren. While he holds no punches in criticizing the corruptness and ineptitude of the various Southern Vietnamese governments and their senior military officials, he convincingly shows that the Northern Communist leaders and its Army dominated both the nature and conduct of the war; that Northern leaders, to include Ho Chi Minh, ruthlessly imposed at great human costs their views of what the future of the Vietnamese peoples must be; and that, in the end, the North betrayed the aspirations of its Southern communists.
In focusing this history on the struggle and plight of the Vietnamese, Mr. Hastings sometimes relegates or neglects certain important aspects the role and nature of the American involvement. The result is a lack of balance in his observations and conclusions on the relationships between the US conduct of the war with the South Vietnamese civil and military aspects. Thus, the author buys in to the common, but misrepresented, view that the US military neglected the importance of civil affairs and security and focused too much on the shooting war. Moreover, the authors predominate focus on what was indeed an epic tragedy to the Vietnamese people, often leads to a scant, brief, and underrepresented explanation of important decisions and mistakes of US civilian and military leaders that often affecting the Vietnamese, as well as how the war also was a tragedy for Americans.
Nevertheless, Mr. Hastings’ book is an important contribution to an understanding of the Vietnam War. It corrects many past and current misperceptions, and brings to focus the plight, cost, and present situation of the Vietnamese people. This is a must read for anyone who seeks to understand the immense tragedy of the war, not just from the American perspective.
In focusing on the war as largely a Vietnamese tragedy, Hastings’ book does much to fill a void in some notable histories of the war. For example, several popular histories such as Halberstam’s “The Best and the Brightest,” Sheehan’s “A Bright Shining Lie,” and Karnow’s “Vietnam: A History”focus primarily on the US actors and actions; and do not cover in much depth the role of the Vietnamese played in the conflict - other than South Vietnam and its Army was corrupt and inefficient, and North Vietnam, its Army and supporting southerners, determined and driven. Now we have a history that rightfully pays much more attention, especially as seen from the years 1945 to 1975, to what the conflict meant to the Vietnamese as a whole, to include its leaders, soldiers, and people - both in the North and South.
In doing so, Hastings’ book also does a service in dispelling several popular and orthodox lingering myths about the conflict. For example, using more extensive and broader interviews than the Ken Burns TV series, he shows that the North Vietnamese did not hold a monopoly over the nationalist aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Rather, he demonstrates that many in the south had similar aspirations; and they fought equally as hard and bravely for their vision of a Vietnam state free from the yoke and what would turn out to be the horrors of communism. The great tragedy for those Southern Vietnamese, Hastings argues, is that their leaders were too focused on themselves, rather than resolving national issues; and in the end were sold out for political expediency by their US supporters.
Other myths the author dispels is that the war was initially fought primarily over Southern Vietnamese domestic discontent of an illegally formed political entity that did not represent or honor the heritage of the Vietnamese people; and begun and mainly fought by Southern communist nationalists supported by their Northern brethren. While he holds no punches in criticizing the corruptness and ineptitude of the various Southern Vietnamese governments and their senior military officials, he convincingly shows that the Northern Communist leaders and its Army dominated both the nature and conduct of the war; that Northern leaders, to include Ho Chi Minh, ruthlessly imposed at great human costs their views of what the future of the Vietnamese peoples must be; and that, in the end, the North betrayed the aspirations of its Southern communists.
In focusing this history on the struggle and plight of the Vietnamese, Mr. Hastings sometimes relegates or neglects certain important aspects the role and nature of the American involvement. The result is a lack of balance in his observations and conclusions on the relationships between the US conduct of the war with the South Vietnamese civil and military aspects. Thus, the author buys in to the common, but misrepresented, view that the US military neglected the importance of civil affairs and security and focused too much on the shooting war. Moreover, the authors predominate focus on what was indeed an epic tragedy to the Vietnamese people, often leads to a scant, brief, and underrepresented explanation of important decisions and mistakes of US civilian and military leaders that often affecting the Vietnamese, as well as how the war also was a tragedy for Americans.
Nevertheless, Mr. Hastings’ book is an important contribution to an understanding of the Vietnam War. It corrects many past and current misperceptions, and brings to focus the plight, cost, and present situation of the Vietnamese people. This is a must read for anyone who seeks to understand the immense tragedy of the war, not just from the American perspective.
December 7, 2018
Review of Brian VanDeMark's Road to Disaster: A New History of America's Descent into Vietnam
Histories of the Vietnam War are abundant. As these proliferate, as is now the case with over fifty years past America's initial combat unit involvement in 1965, historians begin to gather and lump similar views into groups. For the Vietnam War these groups have evolved into two main genres - the orthodox and revisionist views.
The orthodox - represented by such works as David Halberstam's "Best and Brightest," Neil Sheehan's "A Bright and Shining Star," Stanley Karnow's "Vietnam: A History," and George Herring's "America's Longest War" - generally portrays the war as an immoral conflict fought with no primary US national interest at stake. In so doing, the US supported a hopelessly corrupt and illegally formed South Vietnam State, and opposed a foe who rightfully represented the nationalistic aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Moreover, the war, because of the above, was unwinnable and resulted in the needless loss of over 58,000 American and millions of Vietnamese lives.
On the other hand, the revisionist view sees the war as, what former President Ronald Reagan called, "a noble cause." It was intended rightfully to stop the flow of communism in Asia, as the US had successfully done in Europe. The US failed to do that because American civilian leaders did not provide the means and ways that its military needed to accomplish its mission.
Professor Brian VanDeMark writes what he calls "A New History" of the war, indicating perhaps that this latest rendition is different from those that had come before, i.e., neither orthodox or revisionist. But is this so? And how is it different?
Certainly, for this reviewer at least, a book by this author on the Vietnam War could be newsworthy. Professor VanDeMark after all assisted Robert McNamara in the Secretary's writing of his memoirs - the now infamous "In Retrospect." And in this regard his book could be something new and perhaps revealing if he would provide some additional insights on McNamara's role in the war.
Here the author does not entirely disappoint, at least in the number of times he provides new quotes from McNamara on his role in the war revealed to him as he assisted in the writing of the Secretary’s memoirs. Unfortunately, many of these ‘new’ revelations from McNamara are not really new because they repeat the same “In Retrospect” apologies. The only new points of view offered are the depth of the architect of the Vietnam War’s remorse for his mistakes, and the author’s sympathies for them.
Despite this ‘nothing really new’ portion of the book, Professor VAnDeMark does offer a new approach throughout his work in his description and analyses of the US decision making interactions and processes during the war. Here he successfully uses the works of several social psychologists to explain “How and why did such intelligent and patriotic men not only make such unwise decisions but continue to make them despite circumstances and their previous professional accomplishments.” All of this is done quite convincingly in examining and providing useful insights into the pitfalls of assumption making, the influence of previous experiences and education, and the dangers of human arrogance and shortsightedness.
Beyond these pitfalls, Professor VanDeMark's greatest contribution in this work to the overall history of the war is to avoid the judgments and second-guessing of both the orthodox and revisionist viewpoints and focus on what is relevant as a lesson of the war - how to create more effective decision-making in wartime. Here he concludes, “Dealing with immensely complex problems like Vietnam demands a disciplined routine in which decision-makers acknowledge their fallibility, talk frankly with one another—most especially, share their apprehensions (which Johnson, McNamara, and the chiefs never really did)—and adopt methodical teamwork to catch problems and increase the probability that they have the critical information they need when they need it in order to craft solutions to the problems facing them”
All in all then this work is a refreshing look at what matters in looking at the American experience in the Vietnam War - how and why did US leaders make such terrible decisions that led to disaster and defeat, and how can we learn from their mistakes.
The orthodox - represented by such works as David Halberstam's "Best and Brightest," Neil Sheehan's "A Bright and Shining Star," Stanley Karnow's "Vietnam: A History," and George Herring's "America's Longest War" - generally portrays the war as an immoral conflict fought with no primary US national interest at stake. In so doing, the US supported a hopelessly corrupt and illegally formed South Vietnam State, and opposed a foe who rightfully represented the nationalistic aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Moreover, the war, because of the above, was unwinnable and resulted in the needless loss of over 58,000 American and millions of Vietnamese lives.
On the other hand, the revisionist view sees the war as, what former President Ronald Reagan called, "a noble cause." It was intended rightfully to stop the flow of communism in Asia, as the US had successfully done in Europe. The US failed to do that because American civilian leaders did not provide the means and ways that its military needed to accomplish its mission.
Professor Brian VanDeMark writes what he calls "A New History" of the war, indicating perhaps that this latest rendition is different from those that had come before, i.e., neither orthodox or revisionist. But is this so? And how is it different?
Certainly, for this reviewer at least, a book by this author on the Vietnam War could be newsworthy. Professor VanDeMark after all assisted Robert McNamara in the Secretary's writing of his memoirs - the now infamous "In Retrospect." And in this regard his book could be something new and perhaps revealing if he would provide some additional insights on McNamara's role in the war.
Here the author does not entirely disappoint, at least in the number of times he provides new quotes from McNamara on his role in the war revealed to him as he assisted in the writing of the Secretary’s memoirs. Unfortunately, many of these ‘new’ revelations from McNamara are not really new because they repeat the same “In Retrospect” apologies. The only new points of view offered are the depth of the architect of the Vietnam War’s remorse for his mistakes, and the author’s sympathies for them.
Despite this ‘nothing really new’ portion of the book, Professor VAnDeMark does offer a new approach throughout his work in his description and analyses of the US decision making interactions and processes during the war. Here he successfully uses the works of several social psychologists to explain “How and why did such intelligent and patriotic men not only make such unwise decisions but continue to make them despite circumstances and their previous professional accomplishments.” All of this is done quite convincingly in examining and providing useful insights into the pitfalls of assumption making, the influence of previous experiences and education, and the dangers of human arrogance and shortsightedness.
Beyond these pitfalls, Professor VanDeMark's greatest contribution in this work to the overall history of the war is to avoid the judgments and second-guessing of both the orthodox and revisionist viewpoints and focus on what is relevant as a lesson of the war - how to create more effective decision-making in wartime. Here he concludes, “Dealing with immensely complex problems like Vietnam demands a disciplined routine in which decision-makers acknowledge their fallibility, talk frankly with one another—most especially, share their apprehensions (which Johnson, McNamara, and the chiefs never really did)—and adopt methodical teamwork to catch problems and increase the probability that they have the critical information they need when they need it in order to craft solutions to the problems facing them”
All in all then this work is a refreshing look at what matters in looking at the American experience in the Vietnam War - how and why did US leaders make such terrible decisions that led to disaster and defeat, and how can we learn from their mistakes.
November 9, 2018
Veterans Day
For all veterans and their families, and those looking for a thanksgiving or Xmas gift for them, and in celebration of Veterans Day Weekend, these two books tell of the service and sacrifice of men at war, and give insights on why and how they fought and died on the battlefields they were sent to. On sale on Apple and Amazon at: http://itunes.apple.com/us/book/id137...
Amazon – https://www.amazon.com/Harry-Rothmann....
Amazon – https://www.amazon.com/Harry-Rothmann....
October 31, 2018
Site for Veterans to "Tell Their Stories"
With over 20 veterans committing suicide every month, there is a serious problem trying to get these warriors the care and treatment they need to avoid such a catastrophe. My business, RCI Publications, has set up a Facebook Page to provide the knowledge to veterans and their families where they can both seek help and care, and ways that they can "tell their stories" to assist in relieving their anxieties.
The later is particularly important. Treatment for veteran PTSD is finally getting away from drugs and focusing on other ways to deal with the trauma of their experiences. One such way is "Exposure Theory." This is a method to get more veterans to confront their experiences instead of trying to forget them. One way to do that is for them to tell their stories through writing, talking and revisiting sites, friends, and memories. Thus my page, because of my experience [and relief from my traumas of combat] in writing shows veterans how they can both write out their stories and tell them to others.
If you are a veteran, or a family member of one, or a friend of one, or know of one, please consider visiting my site athttps://www.facebook.com/RCIPUBS/.
The later is particularly important. Treatment for veteran PTSD is finally getting away from drugs and focusing on other ways to deal with the trauma of their experiences. One such way is "Exposure Theory." This is a method to get more veterans to confront their experiences instead of trying to forget them. One way to do that is for them to tell their stories through writing, talking and revisiting sites, friends, and memories. Thus my page, because of my experience [and relief from my traumas of combat] in writing shows veterans how they can both write out their stories and tell them to others.
If you are a veteran, or a family member of one, or a friend of one, or know of one, please consider visiting my site athttps://www.facebook.com/RCIPUBS/.
