Larry Hancock's Blog, page 16
December 22, 2019
JFK at Risk
As I begin working on the promised monograph about the JFK conspiracy I once again find that virtually all the names in play relating to the attack in Dallas that I find most viable can be traced to Cuban affairs. Not just Cuba in 1963, but all the way back to 1959 where names like Ruby, McWillie, Ferrie, Sturgis and McKewon first appear in conjunction with the overthrow of Batista and the rise to power of Fidel Castro. Of course those names that would be relatively unknown until after the attack in Dallas year’s later.
Then in 1960, a series of other names appear – names of CIA officers, contract employees and Cuban exile volunteers. Some familiar names from assassination research and other names new to virtually everyone. The following year, in 1961, as a result of the failed Cuba project and the disaster at the Bay of Pigs other names emerge – Bissell, Barnes, Esterline, Morales, Robertson, Harvey and even Angleton. The degree of hatred for JFK which resulted from that project, and the manner in which he hatred was intentionally orchestrated (not only with the media but to a very focused group of individuals) from Bissell down via Easterline through Robertson and Jenkins to a select group of highly skilled and trained Cuban exiles can only now be fully appreciated. David Boylan and I have explored that subject in our Wheaton Names research and that research became a critical part of several chapters in my new book – In Denial.
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B082MTQS2G/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i0
And in 1963 a handful of those individuals can be shown to have become privy to JFK’s decision to conduct back channel contacts and a potential settlement with Fidel Castro, pursuing what could be gained for the United States in moving Castro’s Cuba into a position of international neutrality. That initiative was highly secret and highly dangerous, RFK himself warned his brother it could lead to his impeachment. Yet it was compromised and communicated not only at the highest levels of the CIA but downwards to the CIA station in Miami and on to a series of Cuban exiles and fellow travelers – reaching as far as John Martino. There is little doubt that knowledge placed JFK at risk, and no doubt at all that he and his brother realized it – resulting in RFK’s immediate suspicion of CIA officer and Cuban exile involvement on the afternoon of the attack in Dallas.
However, at the highest level, while Cuba may have proved to be the trigger, it’s critical to remember that people at the highest levels of the Special Group, as well as in the CIA, were coming to understand – and fear – that Kennedy was far more dangerous to the established Cold War paradigms than simply in regard to Castro and Cuba. By 1963 JFK was in the process of breaking from the Truman/Eisenhower Cold War practices around the globe. Those practices had been based in the view that that nations had to choose sides; they were either with the Western Bloc or the Eastern Bloc.
That world view was even codified in the SIOP nuclear war plan that if the nation went to war, atomic strikes would be launched against not just Russia but against every nation considered part of the Eastern Bloc, including China. Kennedy came face to face with that reality during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, only then realizing how limited his strategic options were.
Kennedy was the first American president with the background to appreciate that the forces of nationalism and anti-colonialism were as much of a factor in the contemporary geopolitics as the ideology of communism. And he demonstrated that he was willing to at least attempt to advance American interest though neutrality; successfully in India and Indonesia but under extreme challenge in Laos. And his approach to both Laos and Vietnam was demonstrating that Kennedy was turning from away conventional military solutions to covert action. With “switchback” and a new NSAM he had already done so in Viet Nam and making preparations to shift covert action against Cuba to the Department of Defense.
Beyond that, in both Cuba and Vietnam, JFK was at least exploring the options for diplomatic outreach that might have led to compromise and some form of neutrality for both Cuba and North Vietnam, leaving regimes in place but ousting the growing Russian influence over each nation. Politically Kennedy had to find a solution for Cuba and for Vietnam; he had rejected a conventional military approach – coming to realize that even his Joint Chiefs could not come up with plans that met the basic sanity test for overt action. He was going to have to come up with a new approach – based on negotiation and neutrality. Both concepts which were nothing less than anathema to hard line CIA cold warriors who had been covertly fighting communism since 1947.
December 13, 2019
New Book
Deniable warfare is returning, there is simply no doubt about it. And today’s versions appear to be (at least initially) far more successful than those of the Cold War era. That include Putin’s immense tactical success in the Ukraine and Crimea, with indications that he is going to be able to fully claim victory for both in the near future – that story is going largely unmentioned in the media, overwhelmed by political news of events in the United States and Europe.
I’ll be posting about it shortly, but along with other recent events, such as the totally successful and deniable air and missile strike against Saudi Arabia this fall, it illustrates that new tactics and practices of deniablity are definitely in play – with Africa once again emerging as a venue for deniable military action.
It’s been several years since I started my own re-investigation of American’s deniable warfare practices, most particular as pertained to its largest and most obvious failure – Cuba. Its been a highly educational experience, and once again I found that it was far more complex than the history books and anniversary media retrospectives have presented. To my surprise I found there were actually two failures of the project, one after some six months under Eisenhower, another another some seven months later at the Bay of Pigs.
I also found that the projects explicitly ordered by both presidents were not at all what the CIA actually delivered – which led me into a longer study of deniable action in general, seeking to discover whether the Cuba experience was an aberration. It also led me to compare the Kennedy administration’s deniable warfare projects with those of other American presidents as well as today’s actions.
The results of that study, as well as what is a new view of the Cuba Project of 1960/61, appears in my new book – In Denial / Secret Wars with Tanks and Air Strikes? Among other things I think it is virtually unique in its level of detail presented in a military analysis of the Cuba Project and the failure at the Bay of Pigs. If anything the true picture of that failure is actually worse than what its been pictured to be over the decades.
In Denial will be available in both Kindle and Print in April, 2020. Its available on Amazon now for Kindle pre-order now and you can find it at:
December 2, 2019
JFK Assassination Research
Although it doesn’t seem that long ago, I began my own research into the assassination almost thirty years ago, in the early 1990’s – when research consisted of going to NARA for documents, or blindly ordering them and paying for 4 copies of the same FBI report. At that time collaboration consisted of personal travel or CompuServe forum exchanges – at 1200 and then 2400 bits per second speed (OK, so now it does sound like long ago).
Over the years I did manage to connect personally with a number of the first generation researchers, including Anna Marie Kuhns Walko, Connie Kritzberg, Mary Ferrell, Jim Marrs, Gary Shaw, Jerry Rose, Gary Murr and others both from the Dallas area and well beyond. And I have spoken with a number of people who were in the Plaza on November, 22, 1963 or who participated in the local investigations (official and otherwise).
There have definitely been “generations” involved in this work, at present we are well into the fourth generation of researchers – and have access to a body of information which would have amazed those of the first generation. In fact in reviewing may of the written works even into the early 1990’s, I find much in them that requires revision or is simply incorrect based on the historical finds and document releases of the last two decades. Much of what was mysterious then simply is not now; in its place we have new issues of evidence, new mysteries and new names.
I’ve tried to cover much of that in this blog, however I recently had an opportunity to chat for some two hours on the history of JFK research and the current state of the case with my friends Carmine and Chuck and you will find that conversation at the link below. I was very pleased with it and think it provides a good overview of this area of research as well as the current state of the case.
If you do listen and have questions, be sure to post them here and I’ll do my best to respond:
November 20, 2019
Ukraine and Security
To say that the geopolitical situation surrounding Ukraine is complex would be a gross understatement; it took me more than a year of constant reading and research to build the background to write about it in Creating Chaos. And much of that background had to come from Ukrainian and Russian journalists and historians, people on the ground for years who had worked at great risk to gain a true understanding of the situation.
At its core is a story of Russia and Ukraine which is reminiscent of America’s sovereignty efforts in both Cuba and Vietnam in the 1960’s….it has far more to do with projection of power and spheres of influence than the interests of the citizens of the nations involved. But that’s a long story, I think I did it justice in Creating Chaos and would be happy to discuss my analysis with anyone reading that work.
My publisher was convinced enough of the significance of the work to actually send copies to all the members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees. I wish they had read the book, or had their staff do so – it would have served them well in the committee testimony they are taking this week.
Which leads me to something not being discussed nearly enough in that discourse – although the media have picked up on a bit of the story they don’t have sufficient history to expand it to showcase the incredible level of American naivety and security compromise that existed in our last couple of years in the Ukraine.
We have known for some time that the internal training for this administration’s staff has been far below the standards for recent administrations – ranging from ethics sessions to security briefings.
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/02/politics/white-house-ethics-training/index.html
I’ve commented in earlier on the fact that the president and his senior staff have not been participating in the types of emergency response planning – including military command and control practices – which have always been important but which were enhanced and taken seriously by all administrations following 9/11.
We have also known that at the very highest level, the president has compromised all standard communications protocols with the use of private cell phones, so have his family and apparently some of his senior appointees.
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/21/trump-phone-security-risk-hackers-601903
And now we know from the investigation of evens in the Ukraine, that both the president and his senior staff appear to be totally clueless in regard to security – not just in the United States but in a venue that in contemporary times has become a hub for intelligence wars, much as Berlin was after World War II or Mexico City became during the early 1960’s.
The fact that those in charge of our national security could be so ill informed and negligent in their diplomatic dealings in Ukraine is truly amazing – especially since Russia has successfully used phone intercepts from the Ukraine in political warfare against American diplomatic personnel there before – with one well known public example from 1964.
If you have Creating Chaos, you will find this on pages 288-290 where I discuss the fact that Russia helped install the very sophisticated phone monitoring network now existing in both Ukraine and Russia – the SORM system developed and fielded by the Russian FSB.
In 2014 the American Ambassador and another American diplomat conducted a non-encrypted call and the call was intercepted and recorded…actually ending up on a Russian internet propaganda channel – used in the new style political warfare in Ukrainian elections.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/leaked-u-s-phone-call-ukraine-draws-anger-russia-eu
Given the practice of targeting communications of both American diplomats and business people, it is would be safe to assume that all unsecured calls are scooped up and monitored by both Ukrainian and Russian security services. Diplomatic communications in Ukraine are equally, and likely more, compromised than they were in Mexico City circa 1963.
Of course we knew that then, and our intelligence community knows about Ukraine now. But once again it’s clear that few in the Trump administration are listening to them or showing any respect for their warnings.
November 8, 2019
Command Disconnects
While I’m very much still interested in and sill do some ongoing research on the political assassinations of the 1960’s, for the last decade or so my interests have become more oriented towards issues of national security and in particular the civilian command and oversight of military operations. My upcoming book In Denial will focus on those subjects – with extensive detail of how that process worked (or did not work) in the Cuba Project launched under Eisenhower and carried out by the CIA under JFK.
In Denial illustrates many of the command problems with covert/deniable action – as well as the extensive disconnects in command and control which occurred during the amphibious landings at the Bay of Pigs. One of the lessons that stands out most clearly in that disaster is the danger of “disconnection” between national policy, as directed by the Commander in Chief, and actual combat operations.
For three months in 1961, President Kennedy worked on defining the mission of the Cuba Project, even expressing it in a new national security memorandum. And throughout that time, the CIA’s senior officers largely ignored his direction in crafting their operational plans. Worse yet, they failed to elevate the issues raised by their own senior military commanders.
Unfortunately, decades later, we are seeing the same disconnections once again jeopardizing missions, and fragmenting our established national security strategies. This time the command and control problems are not within the chain of command; they are clearly with the Commander in Chief. We saw that first in the fiasco related to any structured military response to Iranian actions in the Gulf (and no, as CIC you don’t tweet to tell everyone you are planning and then calling off a major military action). Most recently we are seeing it in Syria. There is simply no evidence of a structured mission, nor of consultation between the CIA and the president’s intelligence or military community.
When the CIC’s spontaneous orders jeopardize an ISIS operation that has been in the works for months, forcing a risky last minute effort to carry out the mission – it’s a good thing when it still works, but a very bad sign in terms of strategy, command, and control.
When that same impromptu command decision results in having your forces literally abandon their bases and equipment – as we just did in Syria, literally handing them over to the Russians, you are forced into extreme measures. In Syria that led to the last resort of bombing to at least minimize the impact of an unplanned retreat – and when you start bombing your own bases, clearly things are out of control.
Then when you announce a withdrawal, then begin sending in even heavier forces, matters get extremely complex – and risky – for the forces in the field.
At this point in time, it is truly unclear if the American forces on the ground know their mission, or whether or not it will change tomorrow. That is a very dangerous situation.
As a veteran myself, I feel quite strongly about our military forces being committed without clear missions, being forced to operate in a state of uncertainty, and constantly having their roles redefined – that increases the risk for them and in all honestly makes us look increasingly vulnerable to our adversaries. It also undermines the sacrifices we ask them to make. And if that sounds like my attitude is showing – it is.
November 4, 2019
Oswald “Tagged”
Given the recent discussion of domestic contacts with Lee Oswald, combined with both FBI and CIA records which appear to have been gone missing, I was asked a very good question as to when and how I feel Oswald was “tagged” to link the JFK assassination to Cuba and Castro. For context I should point out that the “missing” files related to Oswald would logically relate to CIA and FBI associations with him prior to the assassination, associations pertaining to their use of him as a source of intelligence and possibly his value as a propaganda asset (in programs that never jelled due to the assassination).
Any possible use of Oswald by conspirators planning to attack JFK occurring within the CIA (at any level including field officers) would never have been put into a document; it is anathema to create written records relating to any sort of assassination within the CIA (or at least it was after about 1955; up to that point we do find numerous reference to the practice).
Given that, my best answer as to where and when Oswald was tagged begins in New Orleans. By the time he arrived there he was a known figure to both the FBI and CIA and was a cooperative source for the FBI. He was also under consideration for CIA use in anti-Russian propaganda (reference his remarks in his unpublished manuscript of his time there). By the summer of 1963 he was also quite possibly a candidate for joint FBI/CIA use in the AMSANTA FPCC project. Both of those associations would explain why there are missing records in both agencies.
One of the risks both agencies always face is having their sources turned against them (whether knowingly doubled or patsied). Both have suffered from that repeatedly and we know they do damage control by destroying records…its just SOP.
But as far as being tagged for an action against JFK, I believe it was Oswald’s high profile media visibility as a Castro supporter in New Orleans that got him picked as someone who would point to Castro. We have good evidence that he was being used by conspirators in some fashion in regard to a planned incident in the DC area – his own letters – verify that and associate him not only with Castro but with CPUSA. His reference to going “underground” was especially damming in regards to a communist connection (something the Warren Commission studiously ignored).
It was in August/September that he was first “tagged” to point to Castro….but unfortunately we have no clear clue by who….Nagell tells us it was anti-Castro Cubans posing as Castro agents and there is some evidence to support that. Certainly there is evidence that the FBI was encouraging him to make those sorts of contacts. But for whatever reason the DC incident aborted and he ended up in Dallas.
We have some pretty good leads that in Dallas he was doing some strange things on his own, it certainly appears that that he was voluntarily being a dangle to a variety of groups, most likely for the FBI. That would make a lot of sense given the Cuban exile weapons buying efforts going on in the Dallas – which the FBI was all over and which led back to the House on Harlandale. That scenario is also corroborated by Hosty’s remarks about Oswald being under surveillance and meeting with subversives.
In Dallas – where his movements were being monitored – his use of aliases, post office boxes, fake names and fake ID’s suggest he was either playing at being a source on his own accord – or encouraged to do so. And that role was known to the people he was associating with – it was at that point he emerged as a definitive patsy, especially once he went to work at the TSBD.
Beyond that, the argument can be made against his being a knowing part the attack on the president because he continued search for other work, including applying for jobs outside downtown Dallas (that application is on record).
I believe Oswald’s tagging was the culmination of his activities over several months. I also suspect if we could see the Joannides records we would have some support for that…which is why multiple judges have denied access to them. And if the FBI files in New Orleans had not been destroyed there would be more – ditto for all the FBI subversive division files in Dallas. And ditto for the Domestic Contact files.
Up to the day of the assassination it appears the FBI was watching Oswald and viewed him as a window into the subversive activities they were tasked to deal with, the CIA was monitoring his movements and very possibly had plans for him, most likely related to the FPCC.
And then someone who had seemed useful to both agencies turned into a terrible threat to each of them.
October 25, 2019
CIA Domestic Contacts
My last post raised the issue of why we appear to have found no CIA Domestic Contact reporting on Lee Harvey Oswald. We have solid indications that Domestic Contacts was interested in him following his return from Russia and initiated activity to monitor Lee and Marina within the White Russian community. Given that Oswald had not truly defected and had even been financially assisted in his return to the United States, he certainly would have been a subject of intelligence interest as to his Russian contacts and experiences. We do know that the FBI directly contacted him on his return and asked him to report suspicious contacts – and he agreed to do so, later going so far as to directly approach the FBI in New Orleans.
Given standard practices we should find CIA Domestic Contacts with Oswald. We find them with other individuals returning to the United States and having had contact with communist nations – including both Russia and Cuba. There are documents related to Domestic Contacts and Robert Webster, another American ostensibly “defecting” to Russia:
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=16785&search=Gleichauf#relPageId=2&tab=page
They maintained contacts with Americans doing international business – including those they found to be a waste of time (such as Mitch Werbell) and those that became long time CIA assets (William Pawley)
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docI
Anyone coming back to the U.S. from Russia or Cuba was routinely contacted (identified by the Support division at headquarters and referred to domestic contact field offices):
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=72673&search=%22manuel_chavez%22#relPageId=2&tab=page
In short, there is every reason to expect that Domestic Contact files should have existed on Oswald, in several locations including headquarters, Dallas and New Orleans. We should have Domestic Contact documents in his 201 file. I would encourage researchers to review there Oswald related documents to review them for any sign of routing to Domestic Contacts. That would include distributions to or from “DCD” Domestic Contacts Division, C/DC/CIA Chief/Headquarters Domestic Contacts.
An example of those being used can be found in the following Domestic Contact documents on Gerry Hemming after his return from Cuba – copied from Chief Contacts to CIA Security:
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=72673&search=%22manuel_chavez%22#relPageId=2&tab=page
And in this widely circulated inquiry by Domestic Contacts into Frank Fiorini aka Sturgis – Domestic Contacts was not at all bashful about circulating its information even to the highest level offices:
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=72673&search=%22manuel_chavez%22#relPageId=2&tab=page
Good hunting, either post here or email me if you find Oswald link to Domestic Contacts larryjoe@westok.net
October 13, 2019
CIA Domestic Operations
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There has always been a lot of incorrect information about what the CIA is and is not allowed to do domestically. I’ve seen some individuals write that it is illegal for them to operate inside the United States at all – which makes it hard to explain why there were telephone numbers for the CIA in all our major metropolitan cities. And if you think about their role in intelligence collection for a bit, you realize that essentially writing off contact with all American’s who travel overseas, who work inside the nation’s borders with foreign businesses, or are in contact with foreign diplomatic personnel would mean abandoning serious sources of information. The same would apply for choosing not to monitor known or suspected foreign agents – certainly the FBI would have a role in criminal actions by such individuals (as in espionage) but political action and various types of psychological warfare are not criminal, just dangerous (and informative).
For a better idea of what the CIA was did domestically during the Cold War, and some insight on where they crossed the lines, I would suggest a reading of the Rockefeller Committee findings on the subject:
https://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/rockcomm/pdf/RockComm_Chap15_Domestic.pdf
What is of most interest to those interested in the JFK Assassination has to do with the CIA’s legitimate role in collection of foreign intelligence inside the United States – specifically in regard to what should reasonably have been its interest in Lee Harvey Oswald. Given Oswald’s time inside Russia, he would have been a valuable source for insight on a variety of Russian protocols and practices, not to mention the basic open source information he would have picked up living in Russian and working in a Russian factory. Sources on such things were not all readily available in the early 1960’s.
Certainly it would be reasonable to find a Domestic Operations file on Oswald, with material collected by that division and also material copied from other groups – for example, pertaining to his travel to Mexico and his contacts with the Cuban and Russian embassies in Mexico City, valuable information given those two embassies were major CIA intelligence targets. Yet as far as I can tell, after contacting some very knowledgeable researchers, we find no Domestic Operations file on Oswald and no obvious circulation of Oswald documents to that group. In fact one of the mysteries that emerges is that we appear to have paid so little attention to Domestic Operations that it is not quite clear that we even know what that distribution code should be…still working on that one.
What we do know, and if you have SWHT 2010 you will find it in Chapter 20: Loose Ends, is that a Domestic Operations officer in Dallas, J.Walton Moore, contacted a voluntary source, Goerge D. Mohrenschildt, who was well embedded within the Dallas Russian expatriate community in regard to a couple coming to Dallas from Russia – Lee and Marina Oswald. We know that D Mohrenschildt did so, became friends with the Oswald’s and apparently encouraged – and likely funded – Oswald’s hiring of a secretary to prepare a journal of his time in Russia. In one aspect that journal (never fully completed nor published) served as a very effective and extended debriefing document on Oswald’s time in Russia. Certainly the sort of thing valued by the CIA. However apart from that we find no direct contact by Domestic Operations with Oswald (we do find several FBI contacts) and as noted above, apparently no Domestic Operations documents on Oswald at all.
Did Domestic Operations pass up on a source which would have been fully within their authority and part of their standard tasking? Did they not even attempt a contact? Or for some strange reason did they have to obtain the information they would normally ask for via a cut out? For that matter, did the HSCA or the ARRB not even make an inquiry about Domestic Operations files on Oswald?
We often discuss the significance of “holes” in the record – if it is true that there was no Domestic Operations file or documents on Lee Oswald, and they were never copied on any of his activities during his return from Russia, his contacts with the Russian and Cuban embassies, or his time in Mexico, it certainly raises some questions – including whether the research community should be spending time looking at a group within the CIA we know about but have largely ignored.
I suppose – based on one of my more recent posts – I should also note that circa 1962/62, the senior CIA officer in charge of Domestic Operations was Tracy Barnes.
September 28, 2019
CIA Health Alteration Committee
In the long ago research for my book NEXUS, I first came across anecdotal remarks, made during the Church Committee inquiry into CIA and assassination, that during the Eisenhower era assassination was actually such a standard practice that there was a structured process for projects intended to neutralize or eliminate political targets – organized to the extent that there was a “Health Alteration Committee”.
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-jul-22-oe-wise22-story.html
Actually, in spite of what you might read in the popular media, there is no indication that such a committee ever existed. It’s not that the CIA didn’t frequently pursue assassination, it was just never that well organized, or managed. That has become more clear as new research has revealed more detailed about specific assassination efforts of the 1950’s and early 1960s.
I’ve been doing a bit more research into CIA assassinations as it relates to multiple CIA attempts against Fidel Castro during the first Cuba Project – efforts which were so poorly managed that the individuals in charge (Richard Bissell and Tracy Barnes) appear to have thought they were going to be successful right up to the time of the actual amphibious landings in Cuba. John Newman is also publishing new work on Cuba, as well as producing extreme detail about the CIA’s assassination efforts against Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.
It was John’s recent work that led me to realize how deeply Richard Bissell was involved in a whole series of assassination efforts during 1960 and 1961. I’ve wondered why he appears to have done such a poor job with the Cuba Project, but one of the factors was that he was also juggling two different (highly challenging) assassination projects, both using resources which were new to the CIA. It’s not that the CIA had not worked assassinations before, but they normally took advantage of indigenous regime opponents, simply enabling them with poison or weapons.
Going after Castro was tough enough, Bissell actually had to read several people into the effort just to get money out of the Cuba Project budget, under operational control of Jake Esterline. And the sniper attack plans against Castro aborted simply because the CIA had such poor maritime resources for the project that the privately owned boat being used to infiltrate the shooter suffered engine problems and was taken out of action.
In the Congo, Bissell ended up going to Staff D to look for foreign assets and both the officers he approached turned him down, saying assassination was not part of their job. He ended up almost entirely relying on the Congo Chief of Station, who was less than enthusiastic about the plan to poison Lumumba using CIA assets sent in from Europe. He was much more inclined towards the traditional approach of encouraging local surrogates to kill Lumumba themselves, which in the end was what actually happened.
All of which tends to explain something some of us have wondered about for some time – why William Harvey was called in and asked to create a new Executive Action program for international political assassinations. And why it was put under Staff D. The basic answer is that up to that point it time CIA assassination efforts had been individually crafted, largely personalized under the direction of Richard Bissell and Tracy Barnes. Harvey was ordered to create something which would be much more professional, more structured, more covert, and with global reach. As we know from his own notes, he was not all that excited about the concept even though he did pursue it as directed. Of course in the end he did no better against Fidel Castro than Bissell had done – even as a committee of only one.
September 11, 2019
Actionable Intelligence
Actionable Intelligence
This seemed like a good time to write on an issue that was key to the failure to protect America from the attacks of 2001, an issue that has once again come to the fore in an alarming fashion.
I’ve written about this here and in other places at length so I won’t belabor the point aside from pointing out that the actual foreign intelligence collection in 2000/2001 was actually quite good, and could very well be better today than it was then – emphasis on “could”.
In the period of late 1999 through the summer of 2001 the CIA, working with other governments, had managed to build a reasonably good network around a truly challenging adversary, al Qaeda. In the fall of 1999 the Agency and the Clinton Administration counter terrorism director went to the president’s national security advisor with warnings about Millennium attacks. As always, threat intelligence is only of value when it becomes “actionable”, which means someone at an executive level forces the nation’s security system to respond to it. President Clinton accepted his national security directors (and the CIA’s) concerns and did just that. The result was that a variety of so called “millennium attacks” were interdicted and aborted – but for many reasons, including political ones, you hear nothing about that these days (nor about the aborting of the Bojinka airline attack plot).
Virtually the same warnings were issued beginning in the late summer of 2001, but there was no significant executive response, the intelligence did not become actionable and it stayed down within the system – within the CIA and more importantly within the FBI. Regardless of warnings from the intelligence community and special briefs to the president from the CIA, special action would have had to been directed towards the FBI and agencies such as the FAA to deal with the threat. That did not happen, the attacks did.
The point being that in 1999 the president trusted the intelligence community and acted. In 2001 for a variety of reasons, the president did not act. Now, in 2019 we have an American president largely divorced from his national intelligence community, clearly not trusting them, and indeed appearing to trust foreign sources more than what is arguably the best threat intelligence capability on the planet.
Worse yet, due to his disclosures of national security information, the intelligence community does not trust the president – his violations range from exposing details of foreign intelligence collections capability to sharing information which could very well expose foreign assets.
And yes, the CIA did pull an asset out of Russia, it would be insane for them to publicly admit that – and if you buy the Secretary of State’s denial you are probably willing to think the Taliban can be trusted to honor their agreements in Afghanistan (attitude disclosure statement). As to the national security director as a backup, that’s not working out all that well these days.
Possibly even worse than all that – if possible – at this point in time any allied nation intelligence agency who would have previously shared highly security information with the United States has to pull back to save themselves and their sources – which undermines literally decades of trusted relationships.
Bottom line – not acting on intelligence can have terrible consequences. Handling it in a compromising fashion can be equally bad.
