Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 208

Why do so many combat veterans turn to mountain climbing?

That's a photo of vets who climbed Grand
Teton on 9/11/11.

By Stacy Bare

Best Defense mountaineering correspondent

"Why do you climb?"
The question, in some form, was posed to George Mallory on a trip to New York
City in the 1920s, as to why he was interested in climbing Mt. Everest. At the
time, Mt. Everest remained the last great geographical unknown and great epic
adventure since the poles had been "conquered." His response was flippant:
"Because it's there." Myself an aspiring mountaineer, I used to love that
response, but I'm not sure if it tells the whole truth.

I routinely find
myself day-dreaming about snow and cold. I want to be in the ice floes.
Struggling up broken granite and route finding in blustering winds for an
opportunity to stand on top of a mountain for a few brief moments before the
elements and pesky possibilities like cerebral or pulmonary edema set in. I've
done it a few times in the United States with other veterans, and its always a
life-changing experience. But do I want these things simply because they are
there? Did Mallory really? Or was what drove Mallory and his colleagues at the
time the same thing that I think may be driving me, an OIF veteran, and a new
generation of adventurers and explorers outdoors and into what is left of our
global wilderness?

Do I, like Mallory
before me, and no doubt countless generations of warriors before him and after,
climb because, like the nameless 24 year old demobilized in March 1919 who
applied to be on the first Everest Expedition, "feel stifled" in civilian life
and following demobilization? Do we seek adventure to recapture the sense of
purpose, mission, and camaraderie we may have found in war?

Let's be honest,
there were parts of war that really kicked ass. It was fun. I've never had an
adrenalin rush, even in taking a 20 foot dinger off a rock face or hucking
myself off wind cornices in winter, like I did on a few days in Baghdad. I love
the way a mountain smells in the early morning after a big powder dump, staring
down into the silence and open canvas of unblemished runs. But how much better
the smell of cordite and silence following a successful combat operation? To be
fair, I think my war was also fun in a way that World War I most certainly was
not.

Still though, one
can hardly doubt the boredom and drollness of life post World War One when
veterans returned and the military was drawn down. Speaking to a crowded room
following the end of the War and trying to gain interest for the first Everest
expedition, Wade Davis, in his excellent book,  Into
the Silence, about why World War I vets became
mountain climbers, explains the scene:

But his eyes were drawn to those in khaki,
perhaps thirty or more scattered through the audience, soldiers like him who
had endured the slaughter, the coughing of guns, the bones and barbed wire, the
white faces of the dead. Only they could possibly know what the vision of
Everest had become, at least for him: a sentinel in the sky, a place and
destination of hope and redemption, a symbol of continuity in a world gone mad. (P. 87)

How to explain all
of that when someone asks why you climb? Or why you fish? Or why you go
outside? We've done enough for our country not to have to respond with anything
more than, "because it's there." Its there, and it's the best medicine for you
and as a warrior class, we've been doing it since World War One, and really,
we've been doing it as long as we've been coming home from war.

Life after war is
boring. And that's ok, but we can do something about it. We don't all have to
go to Everest, but Mallory and his generation painted a clear picture of what
we can do to overcome much of the paleness of life outside of uniform. Get outside
and just like you would not leave a warrior alone on the battlefield, make sure
you don't leave a warrior inside!

Slugging it out over the long-ago surge

I felt like Rodney King as I was
reading Michael Desch and Peter Feaver slug it out
in the pages of International Affairs
about the surge. I like both guys, even though they are political scientists,
that most oxymoronic of academic specialties. Maybe one day they can become
historians -- which is what both seem to be trying to be here. (I also aspire to
be one some day.)

My take: Feaver is too
Washington-centric in his views. President Bush's decision to fire General
Casey and go with Petraeus and a changed approach was key, but after that, what
happened in Iraq was more important than anything that happened in
Washington.  It was necessary (and
difficult) to understand what was going on in both capitals, but more important
to know what was going on in Baghdad, especially because Washington's consensus
generally seemed to lag reality by about six months.

Fyi, this poll says Iraqis don't
seem all
that impressed with the surge.

The only thing I would add is that
the older I get, the less I think that Samuel Huntington's Soldier and the State is an accurate portrayal of the way American
civil-military relations work, or even should work. I recently read a good
essay by Richard Kohn about the flaws of Huntington's book, carried in a volume
titled American
Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, edited by Suzanne Nielsen and Don
Snider. To complete the circle, I met the former in Baghdad during the Surge in
question. 

Back when bishops talked about warfare

I was reading an article on military affairs that appeared
in 1984 in the International Journal of
Applied Philosophy and was struck by a reference to the Bishops'
Pastoral Letter on nuclear warfare that was issued by American Catholic
leaders a year earlier.

It made me think-back then, the bishops were all over the
issue of warfare. They condemned offensive war. (Point 1.A.3: "Offensive war of any kind is not morally justifiable.") Yet
for the last 10 years, we have been at war, and I can't remember the bishops
weighing in particularly, not even when the world's most powerful country
launched a preemptive war on false premises. What up with that? Did they just
get bored? Was it just a
passing phase?

The military and the media: A Marine officer's report from rural Afghanistan

A Marine friend writes:

I
recall being taught something along the lines of "When it comes to talking to
the media, remember: the reporter is going to tell or write a story regardless
of what you do or don't say. It's on you to ensure that he or she understands
the context of what is being observed."

This
lesson was also running through my mind at the end of a patrol one day in
Garmsir. On this particular day, I went out with a squad from our 3rd
Platoon on a security patrol around a place called the Lakari Bazaar. This
bazaar, at the beginning of our deployment, was owned by the Taliban and
littered with IEDs. At this stage in the deployment, the ANA, the Afghan
people, and the Marines that I had the privilege to serve had joined forces to
eliminate the Taliban in the area. The Taliban mayor of the bazaar was turned over
to us. More than 40 IEDs located in the bazaar were pointed out to us. And,
nearly every enemy that attempted to go back active or to infiltrate back into
the area chose not to do so because the people, or the children, would almost
immediately pass the information to the ANA and/or Marines. Our new patrol
base, much like Fort Page in "Bing" West's The
Village, was right next to the main village and bazaar. This made
sharing information easy.

As I
walked back into friendly lines on this day, I noticed what appeared to be two
American women sitting down next to our terrain model. One reminded me of my
mother, and the other, to a degree, of my older sister. Curious as to what they
were doing in our area, I walked up to them and introduced myself, "Hi, I'm
____, is there anything I can help you with?" As best I recall, the exchange
proceeded, "Are you the commander here?" I responded, "I guess you could say
that. The Marines and ANA run the show, but ultimately, yes, I'm responsible
for everything in the AO." The woman responds, "Are you ____?" I respond,
"Yes, Ma'am, I am." She then says, "Oh, good, I've been looking for your unit
for about a week. I'm Elisabeth Bumiller from the New York Times, and this is Lynsey, she works with me. We're here
to cover the FET.
I've been told your Company employs FET teams all the time. We'd like to see
and write about what the FETs do."

Decision
point - hmmmn, what next? I've been told nothing about the New York Times coming to our AO (I had been away from our company
CP for a few days and we were all very busy). I have no clue who Elisabeth
Bumiller is, or Lynsey, the woman with the camera. And of all topics, FET? I'm
thinking to myself, "FET, Marines, grunts, Afghanistan, New York Times???" This one's going to be interesting...!

Sparing
too many details, after the patrol de-brief, I sat down with Elisabeth and
Lynsey for a little while, did my best to understand their mission, experience
in Afghanistan or Iraq, what accommodations they needed, etc. I was surprised
to hear Elisabeth say that she had never been to Iraq or Afghanistan, yet she
wanted to patrol at least once a day with an infantry unit and FET. Lynsey, on
the other hand, was an OEF veteran; she had previously done an embed tour in
the Korengal Valley.

After
learning of their desires, I thought it best that they spend the next few days
with two of our partnered rifle squads. Both squads were led by multi-tour,
tough as nails, highly respected, big, and previously wounded Sergeants. One of
the squad leaders had lost both of his parents just before the deployment (one
in the tsunami that hit American Samoa). He was given the option to go home to
help his family (this was his fourth deployment in 5 years); he refused. I
spoke with the squad leaders and platoon commanders. As best I recall, the
conversation went something like this, "Gentlemen, Elisabeth and Lynsey will be
staying here for a few days. They want to see how you guys have incorporated
FET into your patrols. They also just want to see what you and your Marines do
every day. How you interact with the people. How you partner with the Afghans. It's
on you to determine the patrol routes in your assigned AOs. You know our
mission and your tasks. Just be yourselves and take care of them. They're here
to tell America about what you do every day. Any questions?" There were none.

Elisabeth
and Lynsey then spent a few days with these squads. Once back from spending
time with one of the squad leaders, and at our company headquarters, I asked
Elisabeth how she liked her time with the Sergeants. I recall her being amazed.
She couldn't believe how young, yet old, mature, and determined the Marines
were. She was particularly impressed with the one squad leader who had decided
to deploy again despite all of the losses to his family. Specific to FET, she
was also surprised to see how well the female Marines were received in the
villages.

Once at
our company position, Elisabeth and Lynsey went on patrol with different units
and interviewed numerous Marines and Sailors. My rules to the unit were simple:
"Be respectful, be honest, and take care of them." All I asked of Elisabeth and
Lynsey was that they not photograph, videotape, or write about a few very
specific things that I pointed out to them. They understood why for operational
security reasons and agreed immediately.

As the
days progressed, they patrolled with most of the company's squads, both of the
FET teams, observed a weapons cache discovery (based on a local information
tip), and watched a Taliban reconciliation from start-to-finish. As they were
about to fly out of Mian Poshteh, Elisabeth still wasn't 100 percent sure of what her
stories were going to be about. She said one would most likely cover FET teams
and another possibly about the reconciliation. She asked if it was okay to
e-mail if she had any last minute questions and then thanked us for taking care
of her and Lynsey. A few weeks later, she e-mailed to double check one detail
that she planned on writing about. A few days later, I read her first article
about the reconciliatioAlex Wong/Getty Images for Meet the Pressn in the NY
Times. Shortly thereafter, I read the other. I thought both
articles were honest, balanced, and accurate. I also thought they
explained to America what we had experienced during our deployment.  If we hadn't embraced Elisabeth and Lynsey's
mission, I have sometimes wondered what the stories would have described..."

A question to ask before attacking Iran

"How
does this end?" ask Elbridge Colby and Austin Long. Their answer: Not well.
They advocate instead a policy of containment. I think they are right.

Also, someone killed
another Iranian nuclear scientist. What do the little grasshoppers think of
this assassination program?  I'd be
interested in reading a history of targeted killings of weapons scientists and
dealers. As I recall, the French killed arms dealers who were supplying the
Algerian rebels during that war.

Things are getting interesting in Pakistan

The PM
fired the defense minister, a former general, earlier today. The charges: "gross
misconduct and illegal action which created misunderstanding."

Let's see how long the PM lasts.

Recently the def min stated publicly
that the civilian government does not control Pakistan's military intelligence
agency, the Icy Eye.

Gingrich likes auftragstaktik

Newt Gingrich is into
auftragstaktik,
Tim Murphy of Mother Jones points
out.  

That doesn't mean
that we should think mission-based
orders (and the command philosophy from which that approach is derived) are
bad. But it does make me a mite uneasy. Gingrich, someone who had worked
alongside him on a defense study panel once told me, is as close as you
will find to a modern version of Aaron Burr, by which he meant smart,
manipulative, and unethical.

I've only interviewed
Newt Gingrich a few times, so I can't say I know him well. That said, this
comment, by David Brooks, strikes me as the
best analysis I've ever seen of Gingrich:

the two main Republican contenders, we have one man, Romney, who seems to have
walked straight out of the 1950s, and another, Gingrich, who seems to have
walked straight out of the 1960s. He has every negative character trait that
conservatives associate with '60s excess: narcissism, self-righteousness,
self-indulgence and intemperance. He just has those traits in Republican form.

As nearly everyone who has ever worked
with him knows, he would severely damage conservatism and the Republican Party
if nominated. He would severely damage the Hamilton-Theodore Roosevelt strain
in American life.

Not persuaded? Here's more.
And more.
I think President Obama would love to
run against Mr. Gingrich.

(HT to Josh K.)

1/3rd of U.S. military aircraft are drones

So report the
dangerous guys at Danger Room. They
note that many of them are little model planes. Still, the move to remotely
piloted vehicles over the last decade is a major cultural and tactical shift
for the U.S. military.

Getting serious about video games

By Peter Bacon


Best Defense department of video reality

Video games have somewhat of a bad
reputation today: individuals have attacked games for their supposed
contribution to obscenity
and their debilitation
of male virtue. Despite these fears, scientists have identified some
benefits from gaming, ranging from improved
self-worth to augmented
surgical skills. In the foreign policy arena, video games can and should
serve as a powerful tool for educating civilian and military personnel about
war and foreign affairs.

Video games can serve to help bolster America's glaring
deficiency in one crucial discipline: history. Video games focused on war
and IR provide refreshing bursts of information about often-overlooked leaders
and wars. These games can offer descriptive backgrounds of leaders or events
(e.g. Age of Empires' description
of Genghis Khan or the Crusades). These methods can sometimes provide a deeper
and more-engaging understanding of history than just a textbook or lecture.

A subgenre of games, so-called "serious" games, goes further
by explicitly trying to educate gamers about historical or political issues.
For example, Niall Ferguson in 2007 played the World War II serious game Making
History and played out some of his WWII counterfactual scenarios, such
as war breaking out over German seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1938. His
experience led him to conclude that his counterfactual historical scenarios "weren't
as robust as [he] thought." As a result, Ferguson ended up advising this
series. This episode, forcing critical re-examinations of events, anecdotally
illustrates the range of useful educational experiences gleaned from games like
Making History or other, current
games such as Global Conflicts: Palestine
or the future-themed Fate of the World: Tipping
Point that can help civilians better understand history and
policymaking, thereby making better choices when voting or arguing politics.

All of the above is great for civilians, but what about
actual warfighters and policymakers? Games cannot finely simulate actual combat
or crises, yet can provide training related to the planning and responses
needed for tactical and strategic decisions. Indeed, military officers have
engaged in a modern form of Kriegsspiel
by using tactical warfare games for their training: for example, the Close Combat series proved so popular
that in 2004 the developer released Close
Combat: Marines explicitly for military training. Other games, such as the
tank-simulator Steel Beasts or
the situational training tools of WILL
interactive, have been used by the military for realistic simulations of
warfighting and decision-making.

Civilian practitioners, however, have not embraced gaming as
readily as the military: while think tankers or civilian politicians outside
the Pentagon may play games in an unofficial capacity, official efforts like
the Woodrow Wilson Center's Serious
Games Initiative have petered out. In stark contrast, DOD policy
practitioners embrace video games even in non-kinetic planning: Michael
Peck's article on a DOD budgeting game shows how policymakers can prepare
for things as prosaic as the budget with games. Hopefully civilian policymakers
in the future will use games, both serious, educational games and fun strategy
games, to prepare for the decision-making necessary during times of crisis.

Iraq, the unraveling (Part LXVII): The difference between Sen. McCain and me

Sen. John McCain said yesterday
on Face the Nation that:

Iraq is unraveling. It's unraveling because we didn't keep a residual force there because the president of the United States pledged to get out of Iraq. And we could have kept a residual force there and kept some stability. Instead, it's unraveling, and Iran's influence is increasing, and there's every possibility you could see a very chaotic situation there.… The vice president of Iraq is now hiding out in Irbil. There is militias and death squads operating. There is a breakdown in the Iraqi government, and there will be increased tensions on the border between the Kurdish areas and Iraq.

The difference between me and Sen. McCain is that I think it
is possible that the unraveling was inevitable, from the moment the U.S.
military entered Iraq in the spring of 2003. We untied the knot that was Iraq.

I admit it: When I was writing The Gamble I thought for a while that such a residual force was the
way to go. But with the passage of the years since then I increasingly have
come to believe that the Iraqis were simply sitting around keeping their powder dry
and waiting for Uncle Sam to get out of the way, so they could sort themselves
out. Remember, the surge was half a war ago -- it began five years ago, in January
2007. Iraq was given a lot of time. I do not see what keeping 15,000 troops
there for another year or two would do that it did not do in 2009 or 2010.
Plus, President Obama was not elected to keep us in Iraq; he was elected, in
part, to get us out. So it would be pretty hard to keep troops there without a
clear indication that it would do any good. Especially since Iraqis seemed to
want us out.