Alexander Nehamas's Blog, page 7

Nehamas, Alexander : The Eternal Recurrence

In John Richardson & Brian Leiter (eds.), _Nietzsche_. Oxford University Press. 2001

Nehamas, Alexander : How One Becomes What One Is

In John Richardson & Brian Leiter (eds.), _Nietzsche_. Oxford University Press. 2001

Nehamas, Alexander : Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World

In Gail Fine (ed.), _Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology_. Oxford University Press. 1999

Nehamas, Alexander : Perspectivism and Falsification: A Reply to Maudemarie Clark

_Journal of Nietzsche Studies_ 49 (2):214. 2018 When and for how long did Nietzsche accept the “falsification thesis”—a view that “seems to amount to a denial that any human belief is, or could be, true”?1 I believe that the thesis is already absent from the first edition of GS.2 Maudemarie Clark argues that my interpretation of the relevant passages of GS as well as of the scope and nature of perspectivism is mistaken.3 I don’t agree.I begin with a few remarks on GS 110, where Nietzsche writes, “Over immense periods of time, the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of these proved to be useful and helped to preserve the species: those who hit upon or inherited these had better luck in their struggle for themselves and their progeny.” Toward the end of...(direct link)

Nehamas, : Perspectivism and Falsification: A Reply to Maudemarie Clark

_Journal of Nietzsche Studies_ 49 (2):214. 2018 (direct link)

Nehamas, Alexander : Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art

_Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism_ 66 (4):399-401. 2008

Nehamas, Alexander & Furley, David J. : Aristotle's "Rhetoric": Philosophical Essays

_Philosophy and Rhetoric_ 29 (4):441-444. 1996

Nehamas, Alexander : Nietzsche: Life as Literature

_Philosophy and Phenomenological Research_ 48 (3):567-569. 1988 (direct link)

Nehamas, Alexander : XII-The Good of Friendship

_Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_ 110 (3pt3):267-294. 2010 (direct link)

Nehamas, Alexander : Nietzsche, intention, action

_European Journal of Philosophy_. forthcoming Nietzsche sometimes writes as if we are not in control—at least not in conscious control—of our actions. He seems to suggest that what we actually do is independent of our intentions. It turns out, though, that his understanding of both intention and action differs radically from most contemporary treatments of the issue. In particular, he denies that our actions are caused by their intentions, whose role is hermeneutical in a sense that this essay develops. How then is responsibility to be assigned, since its moral variety, at least, depends, on several views, on the intention with which an action is performed? Nietzsche, of course, is not interested in making attributions of moral responsibility. Still, his views on the relationship between an individual action, its intention, other actions by its agent, and the agent's character, as this essay presents them, provide a reasonable account of action generally and a different, broader account of responsibility for oneself.(direct link)