Gregory Koukl's Blog, page 126

Why Would a Good God Allow Natural Evil?

As a police officer and homicide detective, I’ve seen my fair share
of injustice and hardship. Every time I’m asked to defend the existence
of God in light of the evil we observe in our world, I take a deep
breath and try to separate the emotional nature of this issue from the
rational explanations I might offer. I recognize the impotence of my
rational response when trying to address to the emotional pain people
experience when they suffer evil. At the same time, I think it’s
important for us explore reasonable explanations. Natural evil is
perhaps the most difficult category of evil we, as Christians, can
address. It’s one thing to explain the presence of moral evil in our
world (the evil actions of humans); it’s another to explain the
existence of natural evil (earthquakes, tsunamis and other natural
disasters).  If an all-powerful and all-loving God exists, why does He
permit natural evil? If God exists, it is certainly within His power to
prevent such things. Why wouldn’t He?

The problem of natural evil
is irreconcilable unless there are necessary or good reasons for God to
permit such evil. If God exists, it is reasonable to believe that He would design a world in which free agency is possible
(this is a necessity for true love to be achievable). In order to
understand why God might allow natural evil, we have to do our best to
examine the nature of the world around us, the nature of humans and the desires of God:

Some “Natural Evil” May Be the Result of Necessity

God may tolerate some natural evil because it is the necessary
consequence of a free natural process that makes it possible for
freewill creatures to thrive. Scientist-theologian John Polkinghorne
suggests that God has created a universe with particular natural laws
that make life on earth possible so that humans with free will can exist
in the first place. As an example, the same weather systems that create
tornadoes that kill humans also create thunderstorms that provide our
environment with the water needed for human existence. The same plate
tectonics that kill humans (in earthquakes) are necessary for regulation
of soils and surface temperatures needed for human existence.

Some “Natural Evil” May Be the Result of the Nature of Free Agency

God may also tolerate some natural evil because it is the necessary
consequence of human free agency. Humans often rebuild along earthquake
fault lines and known hurricane pathways, and they frequently cut
corners on building guidelines in order to save money. Much of this
activity results in the catastrophic loss that we see in times of
‘natural’ disaster. There are times when ‘natural’ evil is either caused
or aggravated by free human choices.

Some “Natural Evil” May Be the Result of God’s Nudging

God may permit some natural evil because it challenges people to think
about God for the first time. For many people, the first prayers or
thoughts of God came as the result of some tragedy. When our present lives are in jeopardy or in question, we find ourselves thinking about the possibility of a future
life. If an eternal future life is a reality, God may use the temporary
suffering of this life to focus our thoughts and desires on eternity.

Some “Natural Evil” May Be the Result of God’s Nurturing

God may permit some natural evil because it provides humans with the
motivation and opportunity to develop Godly character. A world such as
this requires human beings to cooperate and peacefully co-exist in order
to successfully respond to its challenges. The best in humanity often
emerges as people respond in love and compassion to natural disaster.
It’s in the context of disaster that moral character has the opportunity
to form and develop. Good character (acts of love, compassion and
cooperation) must be freely chosen. God has provided us with a world
that provokes us to improve our situation, care for those who are in
need, and become better human beings in the process.

There are a
number of ‘necessary’ or ‘sufficient’ reasons why God might create a
world in which natural evil is occasionally permissible, particularly if
God chooses to provide, protect and preserve the freewill of His
children. 

[By the way, J. Warner’s book is on sale for less than $4.00 (Kindle and eBook) for a very limited time.]

What Is the Sine Qua Non of Human Nature? (Video)

What is the sine qua non of human nature?

Did a Concern for the Species Influence Our Moral Development?

Can sociocultural evolution
account for the formation of moral truth? I’ve heard this claim
repeatedly in discussions with non-believers, and I also accepted this
notion for many years: Ancient humans who accepted certain moral
behaviors and principles were far more likely to survive, and as a
result, those who were more inclined to accept certain principles
emerged through the process of Natural Selection. But this seems counter
intuitive given our present acceptance of many attributes we consider
virtuous. We humans recognize cowardice, selfishness, unfaithfulness,
and senseless cruelty as morally repugnant. Yet it can easily be argued
that these behaviors actually promoted the success and survival
of primitive people groups as they engaged the competing groups around
them. Sometimes cowardice (the simple act of running away) assures your survival. Selfish tribes (who think only of themselves) are often more likely to survive in a “dog eat dog” world. Unfaithfulness will lead to further propagation of a blood line with an even larger
number of children. And in the most primitive of times, vicious cruelty
(i.e. killing your enemy’s infants) would certainly guarantee fewer
enemies in the future. All of these moral “taboos” could easily be seen
as utilitarian virtues to primitive cultures, yet they are almost unanimously accepted as moral evils across cultural lines.

While
it may be true (although debatable) that actions such as these may have
a long term negative impact on the human race (even though they have a
short-term benefit for the particular group), why would we assume
primitive individuals would want to put the good of the species over the good of their own families? And more importantly, why
should they? When times got tough and ancient families found themselves
in desperate situations, do we really think these families submitted
sacrificially to some moral code benefitting the species rather than
their own family? Why should they want do this in the first place? Why should the long term survival of the species
matter at all to anyone? I have many friends who are childless. Why
should they care what happens to the species? Why should they make
sacrifices today for people they will never know in the next generation?

Even
if we accept a concern for the species as a virtuous moral objective,
where does this moral goal (of advancing the larger group even at the
expense of the individual) come from? It seems we have pushed the
“origin of morality” question back one level; now we have to account for
our transcendent desire to promote the species rather than ourselves or
our families. If we embrace an evolutionary explanation for moral development,
we must begin by accounting for the transcendent, counter intuitive,
often personally harmful importance of acting in a way that benefits our
species even as it may harm our personal chances of survival. We may
choose to affirm this over-arching, pre-existent moral goal, but there is no evidence we are the source
of this goal. Our own evolutionary struggle for survival is far more
personal than skeptics would like to admit. Those of us who decided to
act selfishly, procreate with liberty, behave cruelly and retreat when
necessary were often far more likely to survive in a brutal early
environment. The fact we eventually chose to embrace moral principles transcending our own personal wellbeing
is a significant piece of evidence. Our moral laws today are not a
matter of subjective opinion and personal utility. In fact, they are
often personally “inconvenient”. Moral truth transcends all of us and
calls us to submit our personal, human desires to a greater standard
that often seems unattainably sacrificial and unselfish. Transcendent,
objective moral truths such as these (including objective moral truths
about the survival of our species) require a Transcendent, Objective
Moral Truth Giver.

[By the way, J. Warner’s book is on sale for less than $4.00 (Kindle and eBook) for a very limited time.]

Challenge Response: Christianity Destroys Women's Self-Esteem

How would I answer this week's challenge?  Here's how: 

 

Is “Right” and “Wrong” Simply a Matter of “Human Flourishing”?

When it comes to moral truth,
where do we get our notions of right and wrong? Can we generate
binding, obligatory concepts without grounding them in the nature of a
Holy God? As an atheist, I thought so for many years. Like Sam Harris
(author of The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values),
I argued that we can establish the moral value of any particular action
by simply evaluating its impact on human well-being (something Harris
typically refers to as “human flourishing”). Harris, a committed and
vocal atheist, accepts the existence of objective moral truths but
likens the establishment of such truths to a game of chess. In any
particular game, each player must decide how to move based on the
resulting effect. If you are trying to win the game, some moves are
“good” and some moves are “bad”; some will lead you to victory and some
will lead you to defeat. “Good” and “bad” then, are evaluated based on
whether or not they accomplish the goal of winning the game. Harris
redefines “good” (in the context of human beings) as whatever supports
or encourages the well-being of conscious creatures; if an action
increases human well-being (human “flourishing”) it is “good”, if it
decreases well-being, it is “bad”.

What, however, do we mean when
we talk about “flourishing”? It’s one thing to evaluate a behavior in
terms of its impact on survival, and if we are honest with one another,
this is really what drives Natural Selection. But Harris recognizes
survival, as a singular goal, can lead to all kinds of morally
condemnable misbehavior. History is replete with examples of actions
that secured the survival of one group at the immoral expense of
another. Harris suggests the goal is something more; the goal is
“flourishing”. Human well-being involves more than simply living, it
involves living a particular way. Human flourishing comprises a particular quality of life; one in which we honor the rights of others and seek a certain kind of character in order to become a particular kind of human group that has maximized its potential. See the problem here?

Harris has already imported moral values
into his model, even as he seeks to explain where these values come
from in the first place. One can hardly define the “maximization” of
human wellbeing without asserting a number of moral values. What, beyond
mere survival, achieves our “maximization” as humans? What does this
even mean? The minute we move from mere survival to a particular kind of
“worthy” survival, we have to employ moral principles and ideas.
Concepts of sacrifice, nobility and honor must be assumed
foundationally, but these are not morally neutral notions. Human
“flourishing” assumes a number of virtues and priorities (depending on
who is defining it), and these values and characteristics precede
the enterprise Harris seeks to describe. Harris cannot articulate the
formation of moral truths without first assuming some of these truths to
establish his definition of “flourishing”. He’s borrowing pre-existent,
objective moral notions about worth, value and purpose, while holding a
worldview that argues against any pre-existing moral notions.

If,
as a police officer, if I was watching Harris’ chess game and observed
one of the players make a “bad” move, could I arrest the player? No. the
definitions of “good” and “bad” Harris offers here are morally neutral.
On the other hand, if one of the players was able to successfully cheat
(without detection) and managed to win the game in this manner, could
we call this behavior bad? He did, after all accomplish the goal of
winning the game. We can only call this behavior “bad” if we begin with a
notion about winning that identifies undetected cheating as a
prohibited act; a moral truth that pre-exists the “chess game” and ought
to govern its moves. Even though there are times when cheating can help
us win (or survive) without any physical or emotional consequence, we
theists recognize we’ve done something that “damages our soul” and
offends the Holy nature of God (even if our behavior goes undetected by
our peers). When the atheist recognizes human flourishing as something
more than mere physical or emotional survival, he too acknowledges the
spiritual and moral nature of our existence, as he borrows from our
theistic view to construct his own.

[By the way, J. Warner’s book is on sale for less than $4.00 (Kindle and eBook) for a very limited time.]

Challenge: Christianity Destroys Women's Self-Esteem

A contributor to a collection of “Why I Am an Atheist” testimonies
on an atheist website says the Bible’s view of women is one of her biggest objections
against Christianity:

I feel that self-esteem is very
important for young women. I have noticed that women tend to lose their
self-esteem when they become teen-agers. This carries on into adulthood and is
very destructive. I think part of the root cause in America is Christianity.
The Bible treats women as secondary. We are to obey our husbands.

. . .the head of every women is
the man . . . (1 Cor. 11:3)

What is really scary about this is
that this verse is being used even to this day… I don’t know about you, but I
certainly feel that I have a good head on my shoulders. I am smart and can do
things on my own. Why do I need to have a husband tell me every thing to do?

If a friend said this to you (and it’s likely you will hear it at some point), how would
you respond? What’s the biblical view of women? This is definitely a
conversation that requires some tact, so let’s see your knowledge, wisdom, and
character in action. Leave a comment with your answer, and then we’ll hear
Brett’s response on Thursday.  

Is Being Homosexual No More Morally Significant Than Being Left Handed? (Video)

Is being homosexual no more morally significant than being left handed?

Does Disagreement Prove There Are No Objective Moral Truths?

On Wednesday I had the privilege of teaching a large group of high school students attending the Hume Lake Christian Camp. In one of my three sessions, I talked about the nature of truth and the distinction between objective and subjective truth claims.
This included a discussion related to the nature of moral truth. While
most people readily accept the self-evident nature of objective truth
when it comes to material claims (i.e. “Jim’s car is a Hyundai”), larger
metaphysical claims about immaterial realities (i.e. “God exists”) or
moral claims (“Premarital sex is morally wrong”) are sometimes thought
to be entirely subjective (a matter of personal opinion). I took some
time to demonstrate the reality of objective moral truth to these students, and we talked about several examples of objective moral truth claims.

As
an unbeliever, I rejected the existence of objective moral truth
because I recognized the implication. If there are objective moral
truths transcending time, location and culture, how would these truths
arise? What kind of transcendent, objective source could adequately
explain their existence? For many years I simply refused to accept moral
laws as anything other than functional, commonly accepted social conventions.
In addition, I pointed to moral disagreements between like-minded
social groups as evidence for the non-existence of transcendent moral
truth. I’ve discussed this with many atheists over the years (some very
recently). If we were to poll any group of people embracing the same
“objective” moral standard, I bet we would come away with a number of
contradictory responses related to how these objective laws ought to be
employed or expressed. In fact, we might even discover large
disagreements related to the nature or identity of the objective laws
themselves. If like-minded groups who accept the existence of
transcendent, objective moral laws can’t agree on the identity or nature
of these laws, isn’t this good evidence against their existence?

No.
Over the years, I’ve investigated literally hundreds of crimes in which
multiple witnesses have been asked to describe the same suspect. I
seldom get witnesses who agree on their descriptions. In one particular
case, after four witnesses observed a “purse snatch” street robbery, I
interviewed them in an effort to reconcile the apparently contradictory
statements they gave the responding officers. When separated from one
another and interviewed at the scene, all four witnesses gave a
different description of the suspect’s clothing and one of them
described the suspect’s race differently. Interestingly, all four
witnesses seemed to be in a similarly sufficient geographic position
related to the robbery; all four should have been able to get a clear,
unobstructed view. Why were their descriptions so different? As it
turned out, much of the difference could be attributed to their personal
response to the violent nature of the crime committed in their
presence. Some of the witnesses were so disturbed by the offense they
simply could not pay attention to the details related to the suspect.
Some were more accustomed to this level of violence, and, as a result,
were much calmer in their response and more attentive to details. Some
witnesses had never seen such a crime or thought about what might be
important to remember. Other witnesses possessed a bit more “street
savvy” and made the effort to remember important details. In addition to
all of this, one witness was a victim of a similar crime and repeatedly
misidentified the race of the suspect; her description was influenced
by her own experience as a victim.

The fact four people could not
agree on the objective truth related to the suspect in this case did not
refute the objective nature of the suspect, and their disagreement was
not evidence against his existence. All were certain a suspect existed,
and all would readily admit his existence was not a matter of personal
opinion. In spite of this, none of them could agree entirely on his
description (his nature). In a similar way, theists who acknowledge the
existence of objective, transcendent moral truths may disagree on their
identity and (more likely) how these objective laws ought to be employed
or expressed. This disagreement is not evidence against the existence
of transcendent moral truth; it is merely a reflection of the nature of
humans who are trying to be good witnesses. Some of us have thought more
deeply about this than others. Some of us allow our own personal moral
history to color our observations and descriptions. My purse snatch
witnesses couldn’t agree on the nature of the suspect. In spite of this,
one objective suspect existed and his identity was not dependent on the
witness’ opinions. Theists often disagree on moral issues. In spite of
this, objective (transcendent) moral truths exist and their identity is
not dependent on the opinions of theists.

[By the way, J. Warner’s book is on sale for less than $4.00 (Kindle and eBook) for a very limited time.]

No Stable Rights without Intrinsic Human Value

Kelsey Hazzard, the president of Secular Pro-Life, is not
religious, so in her response
to a pro-choice rabbi’s article pleading with pro-lifers to not impose their
religion on the country, she counters that the rabbi is actually insisting that
pro-lifers not “impose their science”
on the country. An excerpt (the rabbi’s remarks are indented):

You possess a (not THE) definition
of what constitutes life

The Princess Bride was
wrong; there is no such thing as mostly dead and slightly alive. You are one or
the other. It is a scientific question with a right or wrong answer. The “many
truths” approach does not work when the issue is one of
objective fact.

and you won’t back down from
trying to defend it. There is much integrity to that consistency.

But, like all things religious, it is also potentially dangerous.

How is it “religious” when there
are millions of pro-lifers in the United States with no religion?
It can’t just be because there are religious folks who agree with us; most
religious people also agree that human trafficking is immoral, but we don’t
call human trafficking a religious issue.

Hazzard is right about being able to scientifically pinpoint
exactly when a human being begins to exist as a live, whole organism. It always
amazes me that pro-choicers who take the more mystical approach, saying that
life is infused into a human organism at some date after the beginning of its
existence, accuse pro-lifers of making an inappropriately religious determination on the beginning of life.

But of course, most pro-choicers know that the fetal human
being is scientifically alive. What
they’re really
objecting to is the idea of intrinsic human value—i.e., the idea that every
member of the Homo sapiens species is
valuable, regardless of his or her individual characteristics and abilities, because
every human being shares the same valuable human nature (which reflects the
objective value of God). And usually, it’s this idea of intrinsic human value and
its corresponding universal equality
and human rights that they’re dismissing as being “religious” (which to them
means “not part of objective reality”).

Hazzard recognizes that human value and rights are
objectively real, and she can argue for them by appealing to our moral
intuition (see here, for
example), but not by appealing to science. Universal human rights depend on a
shared human nature and intrinsic human value, which can’t be verified
scientifically because the scientific method is not capable of detecting things
like intrinsic value. Unfortunately, in a society infected by scientism, people have all
the wiggle room they need to illegitimately dismiss a scientifically
unmeasurable idea they disagree with from the public square by labeling it
“religious,” since they can count on our culture interpreting that to mean “a subjective
matter of preference.”

I found Hazzard’s comment, “[W]e don’t call human
trafficking a religious issue,” to be particularly instructive as an
illustration of how unstable rights are when the idea of objective, intrinsic
human value is rejected. For of course, human trafficking was labeled a subjective religious issue when it suited the
purposes of those who wished to traffic in African slaves.

From Chuck Colson’s preface to William Wilberforce’s A Practical View of Christianity:

Pitt moved that a resolution be
passed binding the House to discuss the slave trade in the next session. The
motion was passed. But then another of Wilberforce’s friends, Sir William
Dolben, introduced a one-year experimental bill to regulate the number of
slaves that could be transported per ship.

Now sensing a threat, the West
Indian bloc rose up in opposition. Tales of cruelty in the slave trade were
mere fiction, they said. Besides, warned Lord Penrhyn ominously, the proposed
measure would abolish the trade upon which “two thirds of the commerce of this
country depends.” Angered by Penrhyn’s hyperbole, Pitt pushed Dolben’s
regulation through both houses in June of 1788.

By the time a recovered Wilberforce
returned to the legislative scene, the slave traders were furious and ready to
fight, shocked that politicians had the audacity to press for morally based
reforms in the political arena. “Humanity
is a private feeling, not a public principle to act upon,” sniffed the
Earl of Abingdon. Lord Melborne angrily agreed. “Things have come to a pretty pass when religion is allowed to invade
public life,” he thundered.

The time and place may change, but the objections never
change. “There is no real harm! Our quality of life depends on it! A belief
in universal human rights is religious and has no place in politics!”

Thankfully, in terms of the pro-life fight in this country,
our legal system is already built on the foundation of universal, unalienable
human rights, so we don’t have to fight for legal recognition of their existence.
And happily, since atheists are capable of apprehending moral truths, many
accept unalienable human rights, even though objective rights and
value—grounded in a standard above human beings, and not dependent on our
preferences—are inconsistent
with their worldview. What we must do is clarify the indisputable fact that the
unborn are members of the human race (as Hazzard does in her article),
and then hold
people to our nation’s established ideals.

No Live Webcast Today

Sorry - Greg is on vacation and the others busy with teaching events.