Peter L. Berger's Blog, page 613

Rancor Remains as Germans Pass Greek Bailout

It’s all but done: The German parliament overwhelmingly voted to approve the Greek bailout today, clearing the final obstacle before the implementation of the €86 billion bailout package could start. Though dozens of MPs from Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservative Christian Democrats threatened to vote against the bill, it passed by a wide margin—454 to 113, with 18 abstentions. The final breakdown of the vote was not available at the time of writing, but the arguments of the formerly skeptical FM Wolfgang Schäuble almost certainly helped carry the day. :

Schaeuble, Germany’s toughest negotiator on the Greek bailout, led calls for a ‘yes’ vote in the parliamentary debate.

“Of course, after the experience of the last years and months there is no guarantee that everything will work and it is permissible to have doubts,” said Schaeuble.“But in view of the fact that the Greek parliament has already passed a large part of the measures it would be irresponsible to not use the opportunity for a new start in Greece,” he said, making the case for the government.

Similar measures supporting the bailout also passed in Austria, Estonia, and Spain, and are likely to pass later today in the Netherlands, where even hardline lawmakers have said they would rather not make empty gestures that would only serve to isolate the Dutch within Europe, especially in light of the German vote.

Though Europe’s elites appear to have closed ranks on the issue, the rancor unleashed by the Greek crisis will continue to percolate under the surface for quite some time. Bild’s editor-in-chief penned a lengthy editorial today that captures that mood well: “Bild is always a passionate supporter of a united Europe [and] an advocate of a single European currency, the euro… Therefore, Bild is more convinced than ever that today’s decision by the Bundestag for yet another extension of the so-called rescue of Greece with further billions is terribly wrong. This is because this policy is not bringing salvation, not for Greece, not for the euro and above all not for Europe. Quite the opposite: it is damaging the European concept because it is dividing Europe rather than uniting it.” The Greek crisis will have an afterlife.

Minsk II On The Brink?

Though the intensity of the fighting appeared to ease up earlier today, tensions remain high in eastern Ukraine, where the fragile Minsk II ceasefire seems on the verge of irreparably breaking down. Over the weekend, separatists in control of Horlivka (just outside of Donetsk) charged government forces with shelling the town center with heavy weapons and killing three, while Ukrainian forces reported at least two civilian deaths from rebel shelling outside of Mariupol. Vladimir Putin, speaking yesterday during a visit to Crimea, blamed the escalation firmly on the Ukrainian side, while Ukrainian leaders have been accusing Russian-backed separatists of using banned heavy artillery in the region for the better part of a week.

In response to all this, an emergency meeting between German, French and Ukrainian leaders has been called for next Monday in Berlin. Reuters:

“Its worrying,” [French Foreign Minister Laurent] Fabius told reporters ahead of the meeting between his president, Francois Hollande, President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

“Military operations must stop and arms be withdrawn… Secondly, we need to right conditions for elections in the Donbass (eastern Ukraine),” he said.“I hope Monday’s meeting will allow us to advance on both points. We hope to have a solution by December at the latest.”

It’s not perfectly clear from the reporting if the Europeans mean to press the Ukrainians on making further concessions to the Russian-backed separatists (as Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland notably did a few weeks back, when the Ukrainian parliament grudgingly passed amendments to the country’s constitution mandated by the Minsk II)—but it’s probably a reasonably safe bet to assume so. The FT noted earlier today that “most Western diplomats believe the Kremlin is genuinely seeking to de-escalate tensions”, and Fabius’ careful avoidance of assigning blame, and his allusion to December (a deadline set at Minsk by which Russia must return control over the border to Ukrainian forces) suggests that he wants to make sure that the Ukrainians fulfill all of their commitments, no matter how much the rebels may try to goad them into war.

But if recent history is any guide, “most Western diplomats” may soon find that they have misjudged the Kremlin’s strategy and intent yet again. And that can only mean one thing: expect more—and more serious—provocations from Putin’s proxies in the coming weeks and months.

Myths about Russia and Swedish Non-Alliance

In the current debate about Nordic security, it is sometimes claimed that if Sweden and Finland joined the NATO alliance, it would increase regional tensions and serve as a provocation to Russia. A steady flow of articles and official statements from Russia assures us that Moscow has only been reactive in recent years, and acted merely to correct some of the injustices it suffered when the West took advantage of its weakness in the 1990s. We should therefore accept that the West carries part of the blame for the current situation and its dynamic of action-reaction. Above all, we should not aggravate the situation further by taking steps that Russia finds menacing. It is quite striking what a powerful role this call to “understand the Russian point of view’’ plays among the arguments of the opponents of Swedish NATO membership. It is not only voiced by Russian sources but also echoed by veteran participants in the Swedish security debate. That is why we would like to set the record straight.

In truth, this is how things stand. The current crisis in Russian-Western relations has its roots in internal developments in Russia. Russia’s tragic failure to democratize and implement the economic reform agenda of the 1990s had many causes, but none of them can be blamed on the West. Simply put, the basic reason for its failure was that its desire for reform was not sufficient; there was never any radical break with the past within the powerful Soviet state and its security apparatus. The roots of the authoritarian, nationalistic, and corrupt Soviet system run so much deeper than we could understand in the 1990s.President Vladimir Putin, the incarnation of the ambitions of these vested, deep-state interests to regain political control, has dominated Russia during the past 15 years, recentralizing control of the country’s economy for his and their purposes. The “colored revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia, the consequences of the so-called Arab Spring and, not least, the widespread protests in major Russian cities in 2011–12 all contributed to the sharp turn of Putin’s third term as President. We have witnessed the acceleration of two distinct processes: authoritarian mobilization internally and confrontation with the West externally. These two processes complement and reinforce each other, and serve the over-all purpose of preserving control over gigantic economic resources for the current Russian leadership. Intensified rearmament, and the strangulation of both independent media and political activity are part of these policies, combined with skillful state propaganda conveying the message that Russia has been provoked and insulted and therefore has legitimate grounds for seeking a readjustment of the existing international order. According to this version, Russia did not lose the Cold War, but should be given credit for having done away with Communist rule. The blame must be placed on the West, which has treated Russia as a loser and exploited the country’s weakness, more or less like the Versailles peace treaty handled the defeated Germany. Such is the refrain, with ominous hints at possible fatal consequences, if due account is not taken of Russia’s legitimate interests.Like most people who have spent many years studying Russian affairs, we do not in the least share this view of the situation. Russia’s principal problem today is the fact that the country has not broken away from its Soviet past in any decisive way, and that the national leadership lacks both the capacity and the desire to adapt to the conditions of democracy and the market economy. The Kremlin rejects globalization and instead takes refuge in a 19th-century system of ideas and attitudes, including cultural conservatism, the restoration of spheres of interest, and the creation a zone around its borders made up of countries that feel unsafe, vulnerable, and dependent upon Moscow. In these efforts, information, money, and the penetration of open societies play as significant a role as military threats.This image of a Russia encircled by hostile forces, including an aggressive and growing NATO and European Union, was created to legitimize the regime’s actions. The specter of an outside threat keeps domestic support high for a leadership that oppresses and eliminates political opposition and free media, renationalizes major Russian businesses and, by means of rampant corruption, reserves the profits of Russia’s raw material exports for a small and loyal elite. Russia is one of the most unequal societies in the world.In the absence of high oil prices, the Kremlin cannot count on the loyalty that steadily improving living conditions for the people once brought it. Now that loyalty must be secured in some other way. The country’s revanchist and revisionist foreign policy is therefore much more linked to internal political conditions and to the Kremlin’s policy of safeguarding its interests than to any dim century-old traditions, although these traditions partially explain why the regime’s propaganda has such resonance for the people.That Russia’s aggressive policy towards its neighbors is a result of the country’s dysfunctional internal system is a more or less banal conclusion, but it has some consequences for the security of our immediate surrounding region. As a small neighboring country, we cannot afford wishful thinking, or to close our eyes to the nature of existing risks.However, several prominent opponents to a Swedish NATO membership have surprisingly little to say on this point. For them the vital thing remains that Sweden’s security policies do not challenge or annoy Russia as it is. But under present conditions it is difficult to identify any possibilities for a dialogue with Putin’s Russia on a revision of the security order in Europe. This order does not need readjustment; it needs to be respected.Most probably, however, appeasement or adaptation would not reduce tension either. Conflict with the West simply serves a vital function for the current Russian leadership. Unfortunately, the EU, Sweden, and NATO as well may have to rebuild their capacity to handle a drawn-out confrontation. In the ongoing test of strength, that capacity will generate respect and have a restraining effect on Russia, whereas attempts to see the conflict from the point of view of the opposite side and to search for compromises will be interpreted as signs of weakness and only arouse a greater appetite for confrontation.The same is true in the military sphere: only demonstrated military capability and increased defense spending and exercises, conducted jointly with NATO and NATO member countries, can have a restraining effect on Russian military pressure.A NATO membership for Sweden would of course not relieve us of the need to invest more in defense. It would hardly increase the risk of attack, since in practice our country is already considered to be on NATO’s side in the case of a potential conflict. But a Swedish NATO membership would most probably trigger severe Russian criticism, as well as new threats and counter-reactions (and would therefore be a discomfort for Swedish politicians). Indeed, Swedish membership in NATO would mean a considerable political defeat for Russia’s strategy of dividing its neighbors (in order to keep them “independent”). Swedish membership would also substantially facilitate the aid promised by the alliance to the Baltic countries and Poland, thereby enhancing the credibility of NATO. And conversely, a Swedish “no” to the Host Nation Support agreement already approved by the government—something that has become a key demand by leading critics of a Swedish NATO membership—would be a serious setback for regional solidarity, and a major success for the Russian policy.The principal Russian foreign policy objectives in Europe are to undermine NATO’s as well as the EU’s credibility, to divide and weaken member countries, and most importantly to create a breach between European and transatlantic members. A Swedish membership in NATO would render the commitments of the alliance in the Baltic region more credible, and therefore not only strengthen the security and stability of our immediate region, but also deal a significant setback to Russia’s global aspirations. It would therefore promote most of the objectives, including equal rights and equal dignity of all individuals, democracy, peace and stability, and respect for international law, which usually adorn Swedish foreign policy declarations, irrespective of their party color.In the current debate about Nordic security, it is sometimes claimed that if Sweden and Finland joined the NATO alliance, it would increase regional tensions and serve as a provocation to Russia. A steady flow of articles and official statements from Russia assures us that Moscow has only been reactive in recent years, and acted merely to correct some of the injustices it suffered when the West took advantage of its weakness in the 1990s. We should therefore accept that the West carries part of the blame for the current situation and its dynamic of action-reaction. Above all, we should not aggravate the situation further by taking steps that Russia finds menacing. It is quite striking what a powerful role this call to “understand the Russian point of view’’ plays among the arguments of the opponents of Swedish NATO membership. It is not only voiced by Russian sources but also echoed by veteran participants in the Swedish security debate. That is why we would like to set the record straight.In truth, this is how things stand. The current crisis in Russian-Western relations has its roots in internal developments in Russia. Russia’s tragic failure to democratize and implement the economic reform agenda of the 1990s had many causes, but none of them can be blamed on the West. Simply put, the basic reason for its failure was that its desire for reform was not sufficient; there was never any radical break with the past within the powerful Soviet state and its security apparatus. The roots of the authoritarian, nationalistic, and corrupt Soviet system run so much deeper than we could understand in the 1990s.President Vladimir Putin, the incarnation of the ambitions of these vested, deep-state interests to regain political control, has dominated Russia during the past 15 years, recentralizing control of the country’s economy for his and their purposes. The “colored revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia, the consequences of the so-called Arab Spring and, not least, the widespread protests in major Russian cities in 2011–12 all contributed to the sharp turn of Putin’s third term as President. We have witnessed the acceleration of two distinct processes: authoritarian mobilization internally and confrontation with the West externally. These two processes complement and reinforce each other, and serve the over-all purpose of preserving control over gigantic economic resources for the current Russian leadership. Intensified rearmament, and the strangulation of both independent media and political activity are part of these policies, combined with skillful state propaganda conveying the message that Russia has been provoked and insulted and therefore has legitimate grounds for seeking a readjustment of the existing international order. According to this version, Russia did not lose the Cold War, but should be given credit for having done away with Communist rule. The blame must be placed on the West, which has treated Russia as a loser and exploited the country’s weakness, more or less like the Versailles peace treaty handled the defeated Germany. Such is the refrain, with ominous hints at possible fatal consequences, if due account is not taken of Russia’s legitimate interests.Like most people who have spent many years studying Russian affairs, we do not in the least share this view of the situation. Russia’s principal problem today is the fact that the country has not broken away from its Soviet past in any decisive way, and that the national leadership lacks both the capacity and the desire to adapt to the conditions of democracy and the market economy. The Kremlin rejects globalization and instead takes refuge in a 19th-century system of ideas and attitudes, including cultural conservatism, the restoration of spheres of interest, and the creation a zone around its borders made up of countries that feel unsafe, vulnerable, and dependent upon Moscow. In these efforts, information, money, and the penetration of open societies play as significant a role as military threats.This image of a Russia encircled by hostile forces, including an aggressive and growing NATO and European Union, was created to legitimize the regime’s actions. The specter of an outside threat keeps domestic support high for a leadership that oppresses and eliminates political opposition and free media, renationalizes major Russian businesses and, by means of rampant corruption, reserves the profits of Russia’s raw material exports for a small and loyal elite. Russia is one of the most unequal societies in the world.In the absence of high oil prices, the Kremlin cannot count on the loyalty that steadily improving living conditions for the people once brought it. Now that loyalty must be secured in some other way. The country’s revanchist and revisionist foreign policy is therefore much more linked to internal political conditions and to the Kremlin’s policy of safeguarding its interests than to any dim century-old traditions, although these traditions partially explain why the regime’s propaganda has such resonance for the people.That Russia’s aggressive policy towards its neighbors is a result of the country’s dysfunctional internal system is a more or less banal conclusion, but it has some consequences for the security of our immediate surrounding region. As a small neighboring country, we cannot afford wishful thinking, or to close our eyes to the nature of existing risks.However, several prominent opponents to a Swedish NATO membership have surprisingly little to say on this point. For them the vital thing remains that Sweden’s security policies do not challenge or annoy Russia as it is. But under present conditions it is difficult to identify any possibilities for a dialogue with Putin’s Russia on a revision of the security order in Europe. This order does not need readjustment; it needs to be respected.Most probably, however, appeasement or adaptation would not reduce tension either. Conflict with the West simply serves a vital function for the current Russian leadership. Unfortunately, the EU, Sweden, and NATO as well may have to rebuild their capacity to handle a drawn-out confrontation. In the ongoing test of strength, that capacity will generate respect and have a restraining effect on Russia, whereas attempts to see the conflict from the point of view of the opposite side and to search for compromises will be interpreted as signs of weakness and only arouse a greater appetite for confrontation.The same is true in the military sphere: only demonstrated military capability and increased defense spending and exercises, conducted jointly with NATO and NATO member countries, can have a restraining effect on Russian military pressure.A NATO membership for Sweden would of course not relieve us of the need to invest more in defense. It would hardly increase the risk of attack, since in practice our country is already considered to be on NATO’s side in the case of a potential conflict. But a Swedish NATO membership would most probably trigger severe Russian criticism, as well as new threats and counter-reactions (and would therefore be a discomfort for Swedish politicians). Indeed, Swedish membership in NATO would mean a considerable political defeat for Russia’s strategy of dividing its neighbors (in order to keep them “independent”). Swedish membership would also substantially facilitate the aid promised by the alliance to the Baltic countries and Poland, thereby enhancing the credibility of NATO. And conversely, a Swedish “no” to the Host Nation Support agreement already approved by the government—something that has become a key demand by leading critics of a Swedish NATO membership—would be a serious setback for regional solidarity, and a major success for the Russian policy.The principal Russian foreign policy objectives in Europe are to undermine NATO’s as well as the EU’s credibility, to divide and weaken member countries, and most importantly to create a breach between European and transatlantic members. A Swedish membership in NATO would render the commitments of the alliance in the Baltic region more credible, and therefore not only strengthen the security and stability of our immediate region, but also deal a significant setback to Russia’s global aspirations. It would therefore promote most of the objectives, including equal rights and equal dignity of all individuals, democracy, peace and stability, and respect for international law, which usually adorn Swedish foreign policy declarations, irrespective of their party color.

Threefold Increase in Illegal Migrants to Europe Since Last Summer

New figures put Europe’s immigration crisis in stark relief. As Reuters reports:

Frontex said it recorded some 107,500 people arriving outside regular channels in July, after a previous record in June of over 70,000, and more than three times as many as July last year.

The most active frontiers were those of the Greek islands in the Aegean off Turkey, where nearly 50,000 people were recorded arriving by sea, mainly on Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Kos.[..]Nearly 340,000 such migrants were seen so far this year arriving in the EU, mainly in Italy, Greece and Hungary. That was a 175 percent rise on the same period last year and much more than the 280,000 registered arrivals in all of 2014.

Of course, illegal immigration figures, in Europe and elsewhere, are hard to pin down. So there are other figures, too—none of them particularly encouraging:

Other EU data shows 625,920 people claimed asylum in the bloc last year. Frontex officials were not immediately available to comment on how far the increase in numbers being detected may be a result of increased monitoring of the frontiers.

In Germany alone, which recorded 203,000 claims last year, officials said on Tuesday they expect to register some 750,000 refugees this year.

For a continent that doesn’t have a long history of successful accommodation of mass immigration, nor a functioning legal and policy framework with which to confront this crisis, these are big numbers. To make matters worse, the points where this crisis are most acute—Italy, Hungary, and Greece in particular—are some of the members of the Union least able to handle it right now. Meanwhile, as we wrote yesterday, many of the migrants are fleeing Western policy failures (Syria, Libya), and their plight is one that should weigh on our consciences.

The biggest take-away from the new numbers, meanwhile, is probably this: the crisis is growing, in both relative and absolute terms, and the longer Europe delays finding a workable solution (which would likely include elements of redistribution but also serious border enforcement and foreign aid), the bigger and more difficult the challenge will be.

When the Government is the Only Game in Town

The centralized complexity of the NHS is making it hard for would-be health care start-ups to find a market for their products in the UK. That’s the upshot of a Bloomberg piece that delves into the UK’s regulatory environment; compared even to other European countries, the NHS is especially comprehensive in the services it covers, meaning there’s little place to pitch a new innovation if you aren’t going through the government. Unfortunately, the government makes it difficult for new products or services to get approved:

To sell to the NHS, a vendor must first become an approved supplier by getting on one of the lists the government maintains. The lists, called frameworks, cover everything from pacemakers to office shelves to ambulances, and can expire after three to five years. Figuring out how to get on them can be baffling for startups, particularly those with technologies that don’t fit into neat categories. Once approved, a supplier must convince buyers at each of the NHS’s 209 regional units or one of dozens of other groups that control health-care spending.

“The complexity is massive,” said Mark Doorbar, chief executive officer of Safe Patient Systems Ltd., a company outside Birmingham that makes software for monitoring vital signs via mobile devices.

For at least one entrepreneur quoted in the story, who moved his company to the United States, it appeared easier to switch countries than attempt to make it in the UK. One of America’s greatest strengths is the openness to innovation that characterizes our economy, politics, and culture. Decentralized competition means that there are multiple players one can pitch an idea to or sell a product to, and that greases the wheels of innovation. New medical technology that reduces the cost of care will be crucial in the coming decades, as countries around the world struggle more and more with mounting health care costs. Thanks to our more open entrepreneurial environment, America appears to have an advantage in the race for a better health care system.

Scotland’s GMO Ban a Setback for Science

Last week Scotland banned GMOs to protect its “clean and green brand”, according to Rural Affairs Secretary Richard Lochhead. But that image-conscious decision looks like it might, well, backfire, as Edinburgh comes out looking distinctly Luddite. The BBC reports that Scottish scientists believe the ban will hurt the country’s contributions to scientific research:

Almost 30 organisations have signed an open letter seeking an urgent meeting with… Lochhead to discuss their concerns […]

The letter – whose signatories include the National Farmers’ Union, the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the Roslin Institute and the European Academies Science Advisory Council – said they were “extremely concerned” about the “negative impact” a ban could have.It highlighted ongoing research on things which “might benefit Scotland’s farmers, consumers and environment” including potatoes that can reduce fungicide use and omega-3 enriched oilseeds that may offer a more sustainable source of feed for salmon farming.

The signatories further say that the ban “risks constraining Scotland’s contribution to research and leaving Scotland without access to agricultural innovations which are making farming more sustainable elsewhere in the world.”

The GMO ban was a capitulation to the groans and moans of misguided greens who apparently find the technological advancement “unnatural” enough to ignore the wealth of evidence that shows it to be safe. Anti-GMO environmentalists will claim the ban as a victory, but the opposition of the country’s scientists to the policy underlines the selective empiricism of the environmental movement. Greens assume the mantle of science at convenient times, falling back on scientific arguments whenever their policy prescriptions are challenged. But at other times, as here, they shed it unceremoniously.This way of using science is especially hypocritical when you consider how useful GMOS are. If the future is going to be as crowded, hot, and ravaged by extreme weather as environmentalists say it will be, then crops capable of producing higher yields in smaller acreage and more unfavorable conditions will only become more important as time goes on. GMOs are a vital component of future human flourishing; Scotland’s decision is a step in the wrong direction.

The Criminal Justice Tradeoff

The Golden State was among the first to enact a draconian three-strikes law when the tough-on-crime mood swept the country in the 1990s. Today, support for criminal justice reform is swelling, and California is once again surfing the wave of a new national mood—this time by relaxing criminal penalties (as mandated by Prop 47, a 2014 ballot measure) and cutting its state prison population (as part of its “realignment” policy designed to reduce overcrowding). The result, according to a piece by the San Francisco Chronicle‘s Debra Saunders, may be a new crime wave:

In San Francisco, theft from cars is up 47 percent this year over the same period in 2014. Auto theft is up by 17 percent. Robberies are up 23 percent. And aggravated assaults are up 2 percent, according to San Francisco police spokesman Carlos Manfredi. Burglaries are down 5 percent.

The City of Angeles saw a 12.7 percent increase in overall crime this year, according to the Los Angeles Times; violent offenses rose 20.6 percent, while property crime rose by 11 percent. Mayor Eric Garcetti says Prop 47 may explain Los Angeles’ change in course from crime reduction to crime increases.

We should be careful not to overstate the link between the crime jump and California policy. Crime is up not just in San Francisco and Los Angeles, but in urban centers across the country—perhaps as a result of the backlash against police violence that has taken place over the last year. And it is too soon to evaluate whether California’s reforms may contribute to any long-term elevation of the crime rate. But Saunders is right that California’s decision to roll back elements of its notoriously harsh criminal justice system may carry risks as well as benefits:

In March, after three years of realignment and five months of Prop 47, the state prison population was down to 112,300. That’s more than 50,000 fewer state inmates. A change that big cannot come without consequences — and those consequences most likely are not safer neighborhoods.

As the nation’s experiment with criminal justice reform moves forward, it is likely to become increasingly clear that there is a real tradeoff involved in many proposals. The nationwide crime crackdown that began in the 1970s dramatically increased the number of Americans behind bars, exploded state prison budgets (crowding out more productive expenses), and needlessly destroyed the lives of countless people (disproportionately, the lives of young black men). At the same time, there is strong evidence that it really did help restrain the crime wave ravaging America’s cities.

Easing sentences will probably reverse some of the corrosive effects of America’s generation-long crime crackdown, but it is quite possible that it will also lead to an overall rate of crime—violent and nonviolent—somewhat higher than the record lows the nation currently enjoys. As with the drug war, the nation faces two rather grim choices when it comes to its criminal justice system—either double-down on a ruinous policy, or else enact reforms that could themselves bring about ugly consequences.This means that it’s not enough for sentencing reform advocates to simply state that easing sentences could save money and rightly give many people second chances. They will need to convince voters that these benefits are important enough that they outweigh the risk of an elevated crime rate—because that risk, as the California situation may be starting to demonstrate, cannot be ignored. On the other hand, it’s not enough for opponents of sentencing reform to simply state that releasing convicts earlier could cause the crime rate to spike. For their part, they need to explain why it is worth it for the government to contain that risk at the cost of tens of billions of dollars from state and federal coffers, decimated communities, and many ruined lives.At Via Meadia, we believe that reform experiments, like those underway in Utah and New Jersey, are laudable and worthwhile. But nobody should be under the illusion that downsizing the carceral state will always and everywhere be cost-free.

A Stasis in Europe

Today Europe is adrift, its politics mired in a reactive mode—a political stasis that at times looks more like “anticipatory paralysis” than leadership and governance. Its exhausted elites seem unable to offer much beyond crisis management. And with key elections in Europe upcoming, including a referendum in the United Kingdom slated for 2017 (as well as the U.S. presidential election in 2016), there is little appetite on the Continent for bold strategic thinking. And so Europe is poised for a year-plus of political drift at a time when the pressures rapidly building up along its southern and eastern flanks require a strategic rethinking of how Europe will ensure its security going forward. Needless to say, this is not an encouraging prospect for Washington as it looks for allies and partners to shoulder more of the security burden.

Germany, in particular, increasingly looks like a dimming star in the European firmament in terms of leadership (notwithstanding its hardball negotiating position on the Greek crisis). Berlin is now retreating rapidly into the comfort of its traditional political modus operandi, even as its leaders continue to insist that it is in fact “leading from the middle.” Notwithstanding punditry in Europe and the U.S. on how the Germans are leading the Continent, the best Berlin seems able to offer are managerial moves. Saying “no” to Greece’s Tsipras and hanging tough is one thing; offering a strategic vision for Europe for the coming decade that goes beyond the mantra of “more Europe” is quite another.Perhaps it is unfair to blame the Germans and Europe’s elites overall for seeking some respite. In a short time-span, Germany was thrust into the lead on the Ukrainian crisis as the Obama Administration chose the step back, and all of this came on top of Berlin’s quarterbacking of the Greek bailout. The frenzy of late 2013–14, when the story of the Euromaidan, Crimea, and the Ukrainian crisis first unfolded, has since been replaced by the Eurozone anxiety, with a near-Grexit having drained whatever precious adrenaline there was in Brussels and in the majority of European capitals, especially Berlin. Now that immigrant waves from the Middle East and North Africa have begun crashing on Europe’s shores, fatigue has yielded to a mix of resignation interspersed with occasional flare-ups of anger, as when the Channel Tunnel was besieged by migrants seeking entry into the UK.Today it seems to matter less and less that bloodshed along the Donbas demarcation line has continued unabated, that there is little confidence that the current Greek bailout deal will hold, or that boats and trucks continue to ferry immigrants from MENA (along with the accompanying and all-too-frequent human tragedies). Europe’s “watchful waiting” is now the signature formula in Germany and beyond. European politics is treading water in part because Vladimir Putin crashed what was supposed to be a rules-based security environment, in part because the Eurozone project, as conceived by the original Franco-German tandem, has proved no match for the politics of indebted Greece, and finally because throughout the years of the Obama presidency the United States has been pulled away from Europe by internal and external forces unlike any since the heydays of the Vietnam war.Germany has no strategy for dealing with Russia beyond sanctions and efforts to “freeze” the conflict in Ukraine. The Merkel government seems to have no idea what to do next if Putin moves yet again, exposing the vacuity of the mantra that “there is no military solution in Ukraine.” The war in Ukraine has forced upon Berlin the tough task of reevaluating the tenets of its Russia strategy. If it accommodates Moscow’s demands for special security prerogatives in Eastern Europe, Berlin risks losing ground in post-communist Central Europe. Each time Berlin acts in line with Moscow’s expectations in the region, the prospects for deepening cooperation with Poland and those of a “second grand reconciliation in Europe” become more remote. Hard as it may be for diplomats to stomach, Vladimir Putin has forced an “either/or” proposition on German Ostpolitik in the 21st century.Europe’s default response—looking to the Americans to backfill in a security crisis—has yielded mixed results. The United States faces a growing threat of a larger conflict in three distinct yet interlinked theaters: MENA, Asia (China), and Eastern Europe, for the cycle of accelerated Russian military exercises continues to test NATO’s response time and the decision-making processes of the alliance. These are threats that register with different levels of intensity in Europe, but in Washington they are acutely felt. ISIL makes the headlines by virtue of the sheer ferocity and human misery it has unleashed in the region. China has become a perennial staple of policy and academic discourse as the “other superpower rising over the horizon.” Russia, however, increasingly registers with the U.S. as a rapidly escalating threat. What often escapes the Europeans as they watch these debates is that a robust response on their part is a sine qua non if America is to effectively reinforce NATO’s northeastern and southeastern flanks. The Obama Administration has shown that it will engage in shoring up Europe’s security, but there are limits to what the United States can do if the Europeans fail to take up more of the burden. It is borderline naive to expect, as I often hear when I am in Europe, that somehow the arrival of a new U.S. administration will herald a massive reorientation of U.S. policy and recommitment of resources to Europe. Rather, changes to U.S. deployments in Europe will occur in an environment of constrained resources and multiple concerns. Once again, the United States will help, but only if Europe is ready to step up on its security.A couple of years ago I pressed a senior German diplomat on how his country would respond to the deteriorating situation in Europe. He said that Berlin’s approach was to hold on and work the crises. Arguably, not much has changed since then, whether in Germany or in Europe as a whole. Tactics substitute for strategy, and muddling through is touted as vision. The problem is that crisis management is not enough in the face of the devolving security environment along Europe’s peripheries and, increasingly, in Europe itself.

Shell Gets the Green Light for Arctic Drilling

Yesterday afternoon America’s offshore regulator (the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, or BSEE) approved a permit for Royal Dutch Shell to drill in the Arctic, off the coast of Alaska. A rig has already been drilling at the site for the past three weeks, but the BSEE’s final approval will give Shell the go-ahead to plumb depths where oil resides. The LA Times reports:

The most recent [challenge for the company] came last month, when damage to a Shell icebreaker prompted the administration to limit Shell to drilling only preliminary top holes to wells, without entering potential oil-bearing zones, until the vessel was repaired. The icebreaker, the MSV Fennica, was transporting a capping stack, a mandatory piece of equipment used to contain a well in the event of a spill.

Monday’s decision came after Shell completed the repairs late last month in Portland, Ore., and the Fennica then reached the drilling site in the Chukchi Sea, off the western coast of Alaska.Shell must cease its Arctic operations by the end of September, before sea ice further complicates conditions in the remote and hazardous area.

This moment has been a long time coming for Shell, which has spent $7 billion over the past decade on Arctic drilling ambitions without finishing a well. That persistence may be about to pay off, as shale spokesperson Curtis Smith sounded cautiously optimistic about this new development. “It’s possible we will complete a well this summer but we’re not attaching a timeline to the number of feet drilled”, said Curtis.

Regulatory hurdles and the region’s harsh climate have kept the oil major from realizing its goal of being a trailblazer in tapping Arctic hydrocarbons, and the stakes here are high—the area where Shell was just approved to drill is estimated to contain more than 4 billion barrels of crude. Unsurprisingly the BSEE permit drew the ire of environmental groups, prompting the executive director of Greenpeace USA to comment “[t]he Obama administration should know better than to bend over backwards to approve such a reckless plan.”Polar ice will melt as surface temperatures rise, and for all the problems that will entail, it will also produce some new opportunities. New trans-Arctic shipping lanes will open up, making the remote region suddenly strategically important, and companies will be eager to tap its hydrocarbons (the USGS estimates the area contains 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its gas).It looks like we’re off to the races in the Arctic.

The Tony Soprano Enabling Act

Labor gangsterism—mob-run labor unions that loot pension funds, make back-room deals with both politicians and companies that favor union management over workers, and support crooked big city machines as part of a strategy to keep law enforcement at bay—is one of America’s oldest union traditions. How important has the mob been in labor history? Ask Jimmy Hoffa, if you can find him.

Now, a recent rash of minimum wage laws have created a huge new opportunity for mafia enrichment: laws that hike the minimum wage to utterly unrealistic levels, but allow companies to pay less than the minimum wage—if the low wages are part of a collective bargaining agreement with a labor union. WSJ :

More than 20 U.S. cities and counties, recently including Los Angeles and Kansas City, Mo., have set minimum wages above state and federal levels. Some will eventually reach more than twice the federal rate of $7.25 an hour.

In at least a half-dozen of those communities, the pay-floor ordinances include a provision allowing unions to waive the wage mandates as part of a collective-bargaining agreement.

Why, you might ask, would a labor union that is supposedly dedicated to increasing the wages of its members be willing to sign a deal that allows workers to earn less than the minimum wage the union has campaigned to pass into law? The unions have said it gives them more flexibility in negotiations and shields employers and cities against lawsuits. But the real answer, silly, is the exemptions create an incentive to force companies like hotels and fast food chains to recognize labor unions precisely so they can keep labor costs down:

For instance, business groups say, unions could advise companies that if they agree to labor representation, they can avoid paying the minimum wage, spending less on wages overall. The strategy could let unions bolster their ranks at a time when union membership is falling, business groups say.

The unions get more members, more dues, and a greater ability to extort sweetheart deals from employers, the workers “get” lower wages along with the “right” to pay union dues, and the companies save money overall by agreeing to pay off the Jimmy Hoffas and Tony Sopranos who will “represent” the workers and offer management deals that it cannot refuse.

In other words, empowering labor unions to strike sweetheart deals with employers is a way to divert money from workers to union bosses. Some of the unions backing these measures are run by well-meaning people who are looking for ways to build labor’s institutional power at a time when globalization, immigration, and automation have made traditional unions less relevant than ever in the private sector. But these measures will attract the wrong people back into the union business and create incentives that make unions attractive targets for mob power. (Not that anything like this could ever happen, say, to the casino workers’ unions in Las Vegas.)Minimum wage laws like the ones adopted by so many financially challenged blue cities recently are job killers that force ordinary working people into dependency, creating a large group of people who can’t get work at the artificially inflated pay rate and so depend more and more on politicians to give them the handouts without which they cannot survive. For their part, businesses need exemptions from regulations and taxes that would otherwise kill them, and under these labor loopholes, are forced to cut deals with union bosses to stay in business at all.It’s a recipe for civic suicide, but it helps a parasitic class of union bosses and political bosses and crooked single party political machines stay in power.One way to stop that would be for state governments to intervene and outlaw minimum wage laws that offer labor loopholes. There should not be two classes of workers in American states, and private organizations like labor unions should not be able to grant exemptions to public laws.