Peter L. Berger's Blog, page 572

Study Says Fatherlessness Contributes to Higher Ed Gender Gap

Social scientists might be getting closer to understanding a trend that has baffled policymakers and upended cultural debates for the past ten years: the widening higher education gender gap. The study’s not about the deficit of women in STEM fields (a gender gap the media is much more comfortable reporting on, and that universities are much more comfortable trying to address), but, rather, it delves into the increasingly acute deficit of men on college campuses in the first place. A new paper in a major academic journal argues that the decline in male educational attainment can be traced in part to the rise of fatherless homes. Growing up without a father, the authors claim, harms the educational prospects of boys more than it harms the prospects of their sisters. Anna Sutherland of the Institute for Family Studies summarizes the paper’s findings:

In a new article in Family Relations, William Doherty, Brian Willoughby, and Jason Wilde provide evidence for a thesis not many have considered: Changes in family structure have contributed to the growing gender gap in college enrollment. Growing up with stably married parents makes children of both sexes more likely to succeed at school, even controlling for socioeconomic status, but father absence seems to hurt boys more than it does girls. Thus, as father absence becomes more prevalent, girls gain a relative advantage in the classroom.

 As with all complicated social science studies going into uncharted terrain, there is surely more work to be done to show that the relationship is really a causal one, and more studies would be needed to confirm the findings. But if future research were to support this thesis, that would paint a rather grim picture. While other hypotheses for why men are being left in the dust when it comes to higher education point to somewhat straightforward fixes, like creating primary school classroom environments better suited to boys’ needs, the relationship highlighted in this study points to a deep-rooted vicious cycle: Fatherless homes lead to poorer educational outcomes for boys, which makes those boys less “marriageable” when they mature, which makes it more likely that their sons will also grow up in fatherless homes.

Regular readers know that we at Via Meadia want to see major reforms brought to the higher education system, but even in the current system the declining educational attainment of a large swathe of American men is clearly not a good sign, for the economy or for our social fabric. Addressing it would probably require a range of reforms, to our education system, to our tax structure, and to cultural mores. But for now, perhaps the best takeaway from the study is that the decline of the two-parent family may be a cause—and not only a consequence—of some of America’s most pressing social challenges.

Inadvisable—Even by His Own Advisors?

President Obama responds with contempt to advice from outside experts, Eliot Cohen wrote in his column on Tuesday, an unattractive and self-sabotaging habit. The same day, Politico came out with an exposé confirming the President’s unwillingness to listen on the issue of Syria—not only to outsiders, but also to those within his Administration, even at the highest levels. Here’s a damning paragraph:

Sources familiar with administration deliberations said that Obama’s West Wing inner circle serves as a brick wall against dissenting views. The president’s most senior advisers — including National Security Adviser Susan Rice and White House chief of staff Denis McDonough — reflect the president’s wariness of escalated U.S. action related to Syria or Russia and, officials fear, fail to push Obama to question his own deeply rooted assumptions. “Susan and Denis channel him,” says a former administration official who has witnessed the dynamic.

Obama’s top advisors have pushed for more, but the President hasn’t listened yet:

In senior meetings, some of Obama’s top national security officials have pressed for a bolder response to Putin’s muscle-flexing in Syria. They include Kerry, who has argued for establishing a no-fly zone in Syria, an option Obama recently suggested is “half-baked.”

A former Cold War nuclear deterrence expert, Defense Secretary Ash Carter has fretted that the U.S. isn’t standing up firmly to Putin’s provocations. And CIA Director John Brennan has complained that Putin is bombing Syrian rebel fighters covertly backed by his agency with seeming impunity.

Meanwhile, this lackadaisical policy has alienated Russia experts in the Administration:

Obama’s refusal to take firmer action against Moscow has increasingly isolated several of his administration’s Russia specialists, who almost uniformly take a harder line toward Putin than does the president himself. They include Victoria Nuland, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs; Celeste Wallander, the National Security Council’s senior director for Russia and Eurasia; and Evelyn Farkas, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia. Farkas’ recent announcement that she will exit the Obama administration this fall raised eyebrows among officials aware of her frustration that Obama hasn’t responded more forcefully to Putin’s annexation of Crimea and his support for pro-Russian separatists in the country’s east. (Farkas has told friends that she is not resigning over policy disputes.)

As one former advisor summed it up, “This is driven by one man, and one man only, and it is Barack Obama.”

The question is, what is that one man thinking? Eliot Cohen answers that question as best as one can outside of the President’s inner sanctum in that must-read column. As he says, just because the Administration probably won’t listen to the larger discussion of first-order problems that outside experts can and should conduct doesn’t mean those experts shouldn’t go forward with it. If nothing else, it will serve to prepare the next Administration, which one hopes will be more attentive. His contribution to that discussion is a great place to start.

White House Oscillates on Plans for South China Sea

When asked about reports that Washington had made a decision to send U.S. Navy ships through the 12-mile exclusion zone claimed by China around its reclaimed reefs in the South China Sea, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter sounded unequivocal: “Make no mistake, the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea will not be an exception. We will do that in the time and places of our choosing.”

However, despite reports circulating last week that the decision had been, or was soon to be, approved by the White House, an unnamed Administration official has now indicated that the final decision has not yet been made: “You know, doing the 12 nautical mile challenge is one among a variety of options that we’re considering. We’re waiting for an interagency decision that includes the White House.”We find ourselves a bit bewildered by this equivocation—or, rather, we would be bewildered if we weren’t so familiar with this Administration’s style. It seems to us that a more judicious White House would either signal its intention to send ships and then quickly send them, or stay silent. Unless the White House simply can’t control its own agency employees from chattering about undecided policy (which would itself be worrisome), it’s odd, to put it mildly, that this White House seems so comfortable sending mixed signals.

Reform Triumph, Italian Style

All over the web, news services are hailing Italian PM Matteo Renzi’s newest reform victory. In a piece that bears the jubilant headline, “Italy’s Senate Votes to Diminish Power in Boost for Renzi” the New York Times reports that:

The Italian Senate voted on Tuesday to curtail its powers in a victory for Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who has overcome determined opposition to push through the reform that he says will make the country more governable.

Renzi has attached considerable political capital to the bill, which looks to reduce the number of senators by two-thirds, strip the chamber of its ability to bring down a government and sharply limit its scope to block legislation […]

Most opposition parties abandoned the 320-seat chamber ahead of the vote, which Renzi’s coalition won by 178 to 17.

All very dramatic stuff to be sure. Looks like the Italians are finally getting their government shipshape, just like the Davos crowd and the Germans wanted them to.

Not quite:

Because it involves a change to the constitution, the reform will have to return to the Senate for another vote next year and will also have to pass twice through the lower house, giving its opponents ample opportunity to ambush the package.

Quick, what’s the Italian for, “are you kidding me?” And even if it does make it through these other stages and passes, the reform will go through the implementation process, which will doubtless water things down further. And here’s the real kicker: This is all over a technical governmental reform bill (shifting power from the Senate to the lower chamber, where Renzi has a surer hand), which is designed to make it easier, in time, for Renzi to pass other, more targeted reform measures that will actually declutter the regulatory sphere (which pesky bureaucrats oversee) and, it’s hoped, boost the economy. Got all that? Whew.

This is a very, very old game. As Walter Russell Mead noted in these pages in August:

Italian reform laws tend to be thought through poorly and drafted poorly, and they are then amended in a complicated legislative process that usually both weakens the intent of the law and complicates its execution. All of that provides plenty of grounds for the bureaucrats to “interpret” what’s left into something bland and ineffective.[..]

Italy has a long history of using that strategy. The Goths conquered Rome and did a lot of damage—but they didn’t change Italy much. German emperors strutted through the halls of Italy’s palaces and issued decrees to both princes and popes—and Italy kept on being Italian all the same. The idealists of the Risorgimento who fought for Italian unification in the 19th century dreamed that a united Italy would become a modern great power, but what they got instead was more of the same. Mussolini tried to make Italy organized, disciplined, and modern, but his efforts made little difference in the end. The Italian Communist Party became steadily more Italian and less Communist over time; the mani pulitescandal was supposed to provoke a wholesale shake-up of the Italian political class. The scandal ended, and with a few minor changes the political system rolls on.

And, as this story indicates, so it rolls on today.

Smile North, Kick South?

Even as China fortifies its artificial islands in support of its nine-dash line ambitions in the south, it is smoothing out relations in the north. The Wall Street Journal reports:

Japan and China confirmed Wednesday that they would hold a trilateral summit including South Korea, in the latest sign of improving ties between Tokyo and Beijing.

The summit among Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and South Korean President Park Geun-hye is expected to take place in Seoul later this month or early next month.The meeting was discussed during talks Wednesday between Mr. Abe and visiting Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, a senior official in charge of diplomatic policy.

Why the detente? The economic slowdown has China worried, and Japanese investment is a major factor in China’s economy. Continued hostility between the two countries would drive more of that investment to other nations. Another cause of this move towards some sort of rapprochement is that China moved too quickly in Asia, assuming that the financial crisis of 2008-2009 was a geopolitical earthquake that had permanently reduced American power. And, finally, China was blinded by its own success, assuming that its economic growth would continue to transform it rapidly into an irresistible force in Asia.

China got ahead of itself, and Beijing found that it had both ignited a furious reaction in Japan and frightened its southern neighbors. China’s assertiveness inadvertently provoked the development of an anti-Chinese coalition stretching from Japan to India, backed by the U.S. Now, the country appears to be taking a more realistic view of its powers and limits. Beijing is looking to cool the most damaging tensions in Asia, and perhaps to weaken the links among the maritime powers. A softer approach to Japan will appeal to Japanese businesses worried about their own problems with slow growth, and perhaps also undercut the more militaristic foreign policy pursued by Prime Minister Abe.But that is not quite the same as a return to the “peaceful rise” policy of Deng Xiaoping. China continues to pressure its weaker southern neighbors by developing its military positions in international waters (claimed by China) in the South China Sea. And in reality, as Tokyo certainly understands, this is also a major threat to Japan. The South China Sea includes trade routes on which Japan depends for access to both markets and raw materials (like Middle Eastern oil). Chinese control over this waterway would be a foot on Japan’s throat.Despite that, it will be harder for Abe and those around him to continue to push against Japan’s still-strong pacifist tradition when the bilateral relationship looks warm—and yet from Abe’s point of view also that thaw is actually welcome. Not only does he need improved ties to help Japan’s struggling economy; he also benefits from the reality that Japan has faced China down and lived to tell the tale. Japan made no concessions to China, strengthened U.S. ties in defense and trade, and raised its regional profile—and China is now seeking warmer relations. An example of China’s new approach: Plans for the trilateral summit are moving forward even after a four-day trip to Tokyo by Tsai Ing-wen, the likely next president of Taiwan and the chairwoman of the pro-independence, anti-Beijing DPP. All of this helps Abe.China could transform the nature of Pacific politics if it took steps in the south similar to the ones it is taking in the north, but so far there is not much sign of this happening. And however this plays out, don’t forget: A more cooperative China makes Asia less desperate for U.S. assistance.

The Reality of Sectarian Conflict

Amnesty International has accused Kurdish forces fighting in northeast Syria of war crimes, charging the Kurdish YPG militia of targeting civilians in Hasakah and Raqqa provinces. The human rights watchdog spoke with residents of Syria’s Kurdish-controlled Rojava region and heard consistent tales of forced eviction at gunpoint. One woman’s representative story recalls the destruction of her village in the north of Syria:

They [the YPG] said, ‘Stay in your homes. We won’t bother you. We have come to liberate you [from Isis]. We just want the names of the people that are wanted’. But then they wouldn’t even let us take our clothes out of the house. They pulled us out of our homes and began burning them. Then they brought the bulldozers.

Ethnic (and religious) cleansing is an inevitable element of identity wars like the ones raging in Syria today. Tens of millions in Europe and Turkey went through the anguish and agony of being driven from their homes—or fleeing in panic from them—over the last 150 years. The only way to stop these terrible cruelties and crimes is to prevent them: to maintain international order and to prevent the state meltdowns that leave ethnic and religious communities in a state of nature. The so-called “international community” and the world’s community organizer-in-chief have failed in that; now the grim consequences are appearing one by one.

Syria and Iraq are becoming Greater Lebanon as their inhabitants turn on one another. The law of the jungle is the only law left when communities are fighting, or believe they are fighting, for their survival. Shi’a against Sunni, Kurd against Arab, perhaps soon Kurd against Turk…once these wars get going, they rarely end quickly. The bitterness and above all the fear—existential fear for the survival of your kind—remain, ready to flare into new rounds of hideous violence.These are the demons that have been unleashed in the Middle East; it is hard to see now how they can be tamed.

Easy Come, Easy Go

In case you missed it, the latest bad news for the Affordable Care Act came via the New York Times this past weekend: Americans who signed up for coverage through the law are dropping their insurance at least in part because the plans are too expensive.

About 9.9 million people were enrolled in the federal and state marketplaces at the end of June, a drop of about 15 percent from the 11.7 million who the Obama administration said selected plans during the open enrollment period that ended in February.

Though there is no comprehensive data on why people drop or lose their marketplace coverage, enrollment counselors, health care providers and consumers say cost is a factor. In some cases, people lost jobs or their income dropped after they enrolled. Other people signed up for coverage only to decide later that they could not afford it. Still others dropped their insurance after their federal subsidies — intended to help pay premiums — were reduced or eliminated because the government could not verify their incomes or concluded that they were earning more than they had reported on their applications.

If only someone had predicted that the initial sign-up numbers celebrated by ACA employees might drop because of retention problems:

One point we’ve emphasized about this enrollment number is that it doesn’t tell us how many of those signing up were previously uninsured. The law was supposed to expand access to the previously uninsured, not kick people off their current plans and on to the exchanges. And there’s another way this announcement could be misleading. We don’t know how many of those seven million will pay their premiums. If Americans sign up now only to miss payments later, the initial enrollment figures will wind up telling us little about how successful Obamacare has been.

Parts of Obamacare, like its attempt to loosen the tight link between employment and insurance, are good, and Americans do not simply want to return to the pre-ACA reality. But the law is also nowhere near as successful as some of its supporters claim. Before the ACA, health care was too expensive for many Americans individually and for the nation as a whole. The ACA has not changed that fundamental reality, and this attrition is just one sign of that. America needs health care reform that brings down costs—we’ve suggested some policies toward that end many times—and until we get it, coverage numbers are not likely to prove very stable.

The Danger of Not Competing

When two great powers jostle, their allies watch. Not out of enjoyment for the spectacle but out of selfish interest, they monitor the development of that rivalry to decide how to align themselves. Alliances often change following the outcome, real or perceived, of a great power skirmish because small states are averse to seeking protection from a weakened or unwilling patron. Great powers, that is, have to prove that their protection is real, their word trustworthy, and their willingness to be in the arena strong. Withdrawing from a contest is not cost free: the watching allies take note.

The observing small state may be the prize of the particular clash between great powers. It has a direct interest in the outcome of that conflict: the winner keeps it, or acquires it, as an ally. But the spectators of the confrontation are not merely those directly affected by it. Other, more distant states also observe the confrontation to assess how much risk a great power is willing to take—and a risk-averse great power makes for a poor security backer.Take, for instance, Russia in Syria. The unexpected scuffle between the United States and Russia isn’t just about Syria and the Middle East. It is part of a wider competition for the allegiance of states. Putin made this abundantly clear, suggesting a larger coalition led by Moscow, not by Washington, to oppose ISIS. But the main purpose is not the defeat of ISIS or even the momentary backing of the Assad regime; those are merely means toward a bigger end for Russia—namely, to break from the relative isolation imposed upon it after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.The United States so far seems reluctant to compete with Russia in this new geographic theater (as it is also in Ukraine). The risks are deemed high, the payoff is unknown, and the temptation to vacate a messy region is big. Why not leave the field to Russia?But there are costs to not competing. And they transcend the immediate geographic boundaries of the particular contest.A small episode of the Peloponnesian War illustrates the challenge of leaving the arena to a rival.Eight years into their escalating confrontation, Athens and Sparta stared each other down in front of the city of Megara. Located on the thin land connecting Attica with the Peloponnesus, Megara had a strong dislike—no, hatred—for Athens. Athens after all imposed on it a trade embargo, through the famous Megarian Decree, that was a contributing cause of the larger war and that resulted in the impoverishment of the city (Aristophanes in his comedy, Acharnians , describes a destitute Megarian trying to sell his daughters disguised as piglets because he could no longer afford to feed them). The annual Spartan sorties into Attica did not improve Megara’s condition over the course of the war: unable to trade, with its territory at the crossroads of marching armies and raiding parties.For eight years Megara remained on Sparta’s side. But at a certain point a group of Megarians more sympathetic to the Athenian democracy saw an opportunity to turn the city to Athens, improving in the process the economic welfare of their city.Athens initially seized the occasion. Stealing an ally from Sparta, and one located in a key strategic position, was a big prize. Led by an imaginative general, Demosthenes, the Athenians managed to defeat a small Spartan garrison in Nisaea put there in order to keep an eye on Megara. The next step was to persuade Megara to surrender to Athenian troops.The resourceful Demosthenes, however, was met by a bold and cunning Spartan, Brasidas. Hearing about the Athenian pressure on Megara, Brasidas quickly gathered a small army and double-timed to the city. Sparta was an ally of Megara, so Brasidas naturally asked the Megarians to admit him and his small army. But, to his surprise, they did not: The Megarians shut down the gates in front of him. The various factions in the city simply did not trust that their Spartan patron would win. Allies became interested spectators.Fearful to take a clear stand, the Megarians watched. As Thucydides puts it: “Both parties [in the city] electing to remain quiet and await the event; each expecting a battle between the Athenians and the relieving [Spartan] army, and thinking it safer to see their friends victorious before declaring in their favor.” (4.71)The Athenians and the Spartans stood in front of Megara, facing each other. Neither attacked, trusting in the validity of their own logic. The Athenians had avoided a direct confrontation with Sparta for several years, afraid of losing precious hoplites and focused on keeping their maritime empire, as Pericles had suggested early in the war. Moreover, despite their attempt to take Megara on the cheap, they were not willing to take big risks to sway this city to their side. A victory would have meant Megara; a defeat, a large loss of life.The Spartans on the other hand thought that they could keep Megara simply by waiting their Athenian enemies out. Brasidas calculated that, merely by showing his willingness to engage in battle, he was demonstrating to the watching Megarians his prowess and commitment to them. And were the Athenians to avoid the battle, he would have won in the most efficient way possible: his “object would be attained without fighting.” (4.73)Brasidas was correct. The Athenians did not fight.Afraid of a hoplite clash, the Athenians withdrew. The risk of combat, according to them, was not worth the potential gain. But the Spartans won the contest for reputation, and with it, Megara. As Thucydides recounts, the Megarian party leaning toward Sparta “threw aside their hesitation, and opened the gates to Brasidas . . . looking upon him as the victor and upon the Athenians as having declined the battle—and, receiving them into the city, proceeded to discuss matters with them; the party in correspondence with the Athenians being paralyzed by the turn things had taken.” (4.73).The Athenian cost for not competing in front of Megara was higher than the loss of one potential ally, however. In the succeeding months, the Spartan Brasidas roamed in the northern regions of Greece, successfully, and without too much effort, prying a few cities out of the Athenian empire (including Amphipolis, the fall of which led to the exile of the Athenian general, Thucydides). These cities believed that Athens was no longer in the game in part because, as Brasidas told them, the Athenians did not “venture to engage his small army at Nisaea” (near Megara). The rebellious cities were “confident [that] no Athenian force would be sent against them.” (4.108) The Athenian allies were, first, spectators of a contest rather than partners in it. Then, seeing that their patron was avoiding risk and not competing in Megara, they shed the obligations of alliance. From allies to spectators to enemies.Refusing to compete is not always the pragmatic, low-risk choice it seems to be. It carries costs that are not immediately visible. Avoiding risk weakens the reputation of the great power, which then has to expend ever-greater resources and efforts to rebuild it. Reputation is thus a risky thing to lose. Athens cut costs in Megara only to pay the price elsewhere. What will be the costs of the U.S. withdrawal from the arena in the Middle East?

Playboy Nudes Go Bust

It’s the newest example of an old trend: Playboy is ditching nude photos, making it the latest 20th-century corporation forced to radically change its business model in response to 21st-century digital upstarts. The New York Times reports on how the leadership of Hugh Hefner’s magazine decided it could no longer compete for eyeballs with even more raunchy online porn outfits:

As part of a redesign that will be unveiled next March, the print edition of Playboy will still feature women in provocative poses. But they will no longer be fully nude.

Its executives admit that Playboy has been overtaken by the changes it pioneered. “That battle has been fought and won,” said Scott Flanders, the company’s chief executive. “You’re now one click away from every sex act imaginable for free. And so it’s just passé at this juncture.”

For a generation of American men, reading Playboy was a cultural rite, an illicit thrill consumed by flashlight. Now every teenage boy has an Internet-connected phone instead. Pornographic magazines, even those as storied as Playboy, have lost their shock value, their commercial value and their cultural relevance.

This is partly a cultural story—as Rich Cromwell says, Playboy‘s version of erotica, which “used to rely on imagination and a modicum of restraint”, is no longer appealing in the 21st-century sexual landscape, which increasingly values neither. But it’s also an economic one. The wave of creative destruction unleashed by the Internet has left no segment of the economy untouched, including, or perhaps especially, the pornography industry. Legacy products with strong brands are often no match for their digital competitors, which cater even more precisely to their clients’ demands at lower costs. Whether it’s taxi cabs facing Uber or Playboy facing digital pornography, it may not be possible for the companies that offer 20th-century products to keep up in the current environment without making making radical changes to their business model.

Japan To Be a Permanent Participant in Naval Exercises

The United States, Japan, and India kicked off their Malabar maritime exercises today, the first such trilateral undertaking. Even before the exercises started, Japan had already announced that it would become a permanent participant in the annual event, the Business Standard reports:

In a major shift for New Delhi, Exercise Malabar, a hitherto bilateral US-India annual event, albeit with foreign invitees, will now be permanently designated a trilateral US-Japan-India exercise. Defence Ministry sources tell Business Standard a formal case has been taken up in New Delhi and an announcement will soon be made.

This will be another overt Indian step towards the western Pacific, one that New Delhi has so far hesitated to take. In 2007, after a five-nation Exercise Malabar, with Japan, Australia and Singapore as invitees to what strategists dubbed a “concert of democracies”, Beijing went on a diplomatic offensive. New Delhi quickly backed off, soothing Chinese feelings by reverting to a bilateral format.

The news comes amid a growing chorus of reports that the United States will maneuver ships within twelve nautical miles of Beijing’s disputed outposts in the South China Sea. If Chinese President Xi Jinping is concerned about any of this, however, he isn’t showing it with his actions. Beijing professes to be “severely concerned” about the prospect of American ships in what it considers its territory, but it remains unclear how the Chinese would actually respond.

Elsewhere, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to help the United States relocate its Marine base hit another snag after the governor of Okinawa revoked permission. That’s just the latest domestic hurdle for Japanese political leaders eager to strengthen military cooperation and oppose an assertive China.