Peter L. Berger's Blog, page 487

After Ethnicity

My preferred cognitive style is free association—that’s how I remember so many jokes. One joke leads to another. I don’t really want to know whether this is due to some faulty electrical wiring in my brain. But this is the first time this has happened in writing for my blog: the last post dealt with ethnicity and Eastern Christian Orthodoxy in America; then I thought of American Lutheranism, which has had a very different history with ethnicity (mainly German and Scandinavian). I think the differences are interesting. [I am Lutheran myself, of a rather heterodox sort. But I don’t see why this should preclude my writing about this curious denomination in America.]

The first Lutheran church in America was founded in 1646 in Christina, a Swedish colony which we now know as Wilmington, Delaware. It was captured by the Dutch in 1655, as they pushed out from New Amsterdam (aka New York). The Dutch soon faded out of the Lutheran picture on the East Coast. Lutherans came in large numbers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The biggest group of Lutheran immigrants was German, with Scandinavians next in numbers. They came into a Protestant country where they did not have to face the deep religious prejudices which Catholics had to face, and they felt comfortable in America from early on. An early patriarch of American Lutheranism was Henry Melchior Muhlenberg (1711-1787), a highly educated man in the best tradition of German Lutheranism. (The American writer Paul Goodman has described the Lutheran Reformation as a conspiracy of junior faculty at a provincial university—the famous “castle door” on which Luther affixed his incendiary 95 Theses just happened to be the bulletin board of the recently founded University at Wittenberg,) Muhlenberg, who studied at the venerable University of Goettingen, was influenced by the Pietists, a movement similar to what was called “Evangelical” in the English-speaking world. He came to America in 1742 to minister to the growing number of German colonists in Pennsylvania; he was instrumental in founding the synod called the Ministerium of Pennsylvania. He dropped the Germanic Umlaut from his name. In the Lutheran Seminary at Philadelphia, which is still functioning, there is a big portrait of Muhlenberg, depicting  him in a scene that may or may not have really happened: While still on the pulpit on a Sunday morning, Muhlenberg is supposed to have taken off his robe to reveal what was underneath—the uniform of an officer in Washington’s Continental Army that he was about to join.World War I was a turning point in American Lutheranism. More than just an Umlaut was dropped: In deference to the strong anti-German feelings after the U.S. came into the war, German-language services became occasional or dropped entirely. By the middle of the twentieth century there was a collection of Lutheran synods, all of them de-ethnicized: The United Lutheran Church (a merger of several originally ethnic churches), the Lutheran Church in America (originally German), the Augustana Synod (originally Swedish), the Evangelical Lutheran Church (originally Norwegian), and a number of smaller synods (including Finnish and Slovak ones).Today there are two large Lutheran churches in the U.S., divided by their theology, not by their original ethnic roots. Whether this change is for the better cannot be discussed here (it can only be decided on theological grounds, and that is not my mandate here). The larger body is the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, ELCA (known by insiders as “Aunt Elka”, not always affectionately). Also founded by a merger of several synods, in 1988, it is by far the most liberal theologically. It has some more conservative members, especially in the Upper Midwest, where the Scandinavian heritage is still more felt (the only part of the country where the mention of Norwegians provokes humor—see Garrison Keeler). But most of the ELCA has become very much like mainline Protestantism. The ELCA must be the only religious group anywhere whose headquarters is in an airport, in this case just off Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport.Number 2, the smaller body, is the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, LCMS. It is much more conservative in theology and piety. It too has its roots in Germany, but that in no way defines it today. In 1838 a group of Lutherans from Saxony left for America, fearing that the so-called Prussian Church Union would spill over the border and becomes dominant in their provincial church (Landeskirche) as well. This issue has deep historical roots. The Hohenzollern, the Prussian royal dynasty, came from Switzerland and was originally Reformed (as Calvinists were called in continental Europe). The Hohenzollern were not known for their piety (Frederick the Great of Prussia once said with some contempt, “Let everyone be redeemed according to his own taste”).But they were strong believers in the formula of the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the devastating Thirty Years War between Protestants and Catholics in central Europe—“the ruler decides the religion of his state”. The ruler in Berlin, the Prussian capital, decided that  their state should be Protestant, but of one flavor only. The dynasty was Reformed, but most of the population was Lutheran. So the government forcefully merged the two into the so-called Prussian Church Union (an uniert state church). Some of the Lutherans didn’t like this.The aforementioned immigrants assembled in Chicago in 1847 and founded the Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio and Other States. The theological mentor of this new body was C.F.W. Walther (1811-1887). The LCMS (usually called “Missouri” for short) has its headquarters in St. Louis, as well as its most important theological school, Concordia Theological Seminary. A few years ago a fiercely conservative faction took over the denomination. There were some heresy trial and a large part of the seminary faculty left in protest. Missouri is self-consciously echt (genuinely) Lutheran (sort of like glatt kosher); needless to say, other Lutherans don’t agree. There can be no doubt that Missouri is strongly committed to its conservative theology.Incidentally, there is a much smaller Lutheran body, the Wisconsin Synod, with its headquarters in Milwaukee.  They think that even Missouri is not echt Lutheran. They also believe that the Pope is the anti-Christ. Their seminary is in Kenosha. A while back there arose the so-called Kenosha theology. I know nothing about this school of thought, but I resonate with the thought that for a few hundred thousand contemporary Americans the exciting intellectual action is not at Harvard or Princeton but in Kenosha, Wisconsin. (One must not underestimate the innovative capacity of provincial environments. Think of Nazareth, Tarsus, and indeed Wittenberg.)There are various differences between the Orthodox and Lutheran cases. An important difference is that there are no central Lutheran authorities, comparable to Moscow and Constantinople, to interfere in American religious developments. Nor are there European governments eager to interfere. I think the most important difference is that, unlike in the Orthodox case, ethnicity is no longer a real factor in American Lutheranism. An Episcopalian WASP wanting to join a Lutheran church will not have to become a quasi-German or a quasi-Swede to be accepted, not in either of the two large Lutheran bodies. He or she will have to decide whether ELCA or LCMS has the more acceptable view on same-sex marriage and modern Biblical scholarship (Aunt Elka is more flexible on the former, Missouri more skeptical of the latter).

Anti-GMO Nutjobbery Risks “Food Crisis” in the Philippines

Anti-GMO activists are on the verge of helping to set off a “food crisis” in the Philippines, after the country’s Supreme Court called for a new approach to the advanced crops and mandated farmers cease cultivating GM crops until new policies were set in place. Reuters reports:

Government agencies are scrambling to set new regulations on GMOs by Feb. 23 after the [Philippines’] top court late last year demanded an overhaul of existing rules, halting GM planting and issuance of new GM import permits until that was done.

The Supreme Court was acting on a petition by environmental activists led by Greenpeace, with the move likely to be closely watched by governments elsewhere as the Philippines is seen as a trailblazer for GMO. The country was the first in the region to allow planting and commercialization of GM corn, which it did in 2002, and has permitted GM crop imports for more than a decade.

The new GMO rules are expected to make it more difficult for modified crops to be given the green light by government regulators, and in a country where nearly three-quarters of all corn grown is genetically modified, that’s a big deal.

As the story notes, this changing perception of GMOs has been driven by Greenpeace (who else?), an organization that has a history of peddling its Luddite anti-science viewpoints in the developing world. Perhaps this sort of provincial viewpoint can be carried out by Whole Foods shoppers who feel some smug satisfaction about purchasing certified non-GMO foodstuffs, but most of the world can’t afford the luxury of such a baseless opinion. GM crops produce higher yields, which can mean all the difference for poor farmers in the developing world. On a larger scale, these crops allow countries to feed themselves, and by ignoring the science (which unequivocally says GMOs are safe for human consumption), clueless greens undermine the food security of millions of people.

Ghost of Iraq Still Haunts the GOP

Donald Trump has been accusing George W. Bush of lying about WMDs in Iraq, inspiring glee in liberals and shock among many establishment Republicans. Campaign watchers predict it won’t play well in South Carolina and beyond, and at Saturday night’s debate Trump was loudly booed for his remarks (by an audience he claimed was made up of Republican donors). In TIME, Joe Klein asks a question we’ve seen others echo: “Can he say absolutely anything at all and still win the Republican nomination?” That remains to be seen—but Trump’s Iraq tirade may not be as offensive to his core Jacksonian base as some pundits seem to think.

As WRM has written, Trump’s ultra-nationalist rhetoric is calculated to appeal to Jacksonian America, and that’s as true here as it is on immigration or ISIS or entitlements or trade. Republican leaders have taken heat on Iraq from Michael Moore-style liberals and Rand Paul-style libertarians, but they haven’t yet contended with Jacksonian America’s specific qualms with the war.Jacksonians were strong early supporters of the Bush administration and the war in Iraq—both because they felt more of a cultural affinity with Bush’s patriotic message than that of his shrieking liberal critics, and because they believed that, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, Iraq’s WMD program posed a direct threat to the American people. But unlike most of the GOP’s foreign policy leadership, Jacksonians are skeptical of state-building projects and U.S.-driven democratization in the Middle East. Jacksonian America’s support for the Iraq war was motivated by its sense of honor and patriotism—its willingness to deal out overwhelming force against America’s enemies—not by abstract ideals of democracy and human rights.After 9/11, Jacksonians rushed to their nation’s defense. They joined the army in large numbers, they unflinchingly supported the War on Terror, and they stood by the Bush administration told the world that Iraq had WMDs. But after U.S. troops deposed Saddam Hussein and enriched uranium and chemical weapons were nowhere to be found, the justification for the war that had resonated most with the Jacksonian worldview fell apart—even as the war’s architects continued to defend it on the grounds that America was obligated to enforce U.N. resolutions, or that the Iraqi people deserved to be liberated, or that the war favored America’s long-term strategic interests in the Middle East. Such arguments surely appeal to the Hamiltonians and Wilsonians in the party, but they likely felt like a betrayal in at least some quarters of the party’s Jacksonian base. So even if they don’t agree with Trump’s ravings about WMDs—or his more radical conspiracy theories about the Bush administration—Jacksonian America might be drawn to Trump’s willingness to say what has previously been unsayable in GOP circles when it comes to foreign policy.One can argue about the merits of the Iraq War forever, and it’s certainly clear that President Obama’s Jeffersonian foreign policy isn’t a compelling alternative. But Obama’s failures—which are likely to help the GOP in the general election—make it easier for Republicans to overlook that it wasn’t just liberals and libertarians who have serious misgivings about Iraq.Trump has opened up a painful wound within the GOP, one that establishment Republicans will need to reckon with more thoroughly, lest it come back to bite them the next time they control the levers of American foreign policy.

Eastern Europe Puts Pressure on Athens, Berlin

Eastern Europe has had enough of Berlin’s refugee plans, and it isn’t going to take it anymore. Open Europe reports:

The Visegrad Group of Prime Ministers from Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and The Czech Republic have called on the EU to prepare a “plan B” to stem the migration crisis if current EU plans fail to deliver results by mid-March, with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico accusing “certain European politicians” of making “big mistakes in the migrant crisis.” Following a summit in Prague, the leaders said they were ready to help Bulgaria and Macedonia seal off the Balkan Route if other measures failed, with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban announcing that he has already sent personnel to assist border guards in Macedonia. German Chancellor Angela Merkel told Stuttgarter Zeitung, however, that she is opposed to the idea, “Simply building a fence in Macedonia, which is not an EU member…would not solve our problems,” she said. The EU yesterday approved an additional €10m to help Macedonia deal with the crisis.

This kind of piecemeal effort would have the effect of dividing Europe against itself on immigration, geographically as well as politically (some would say it’s already there on the latter, but things could certainly get worse.) The “Plan B” would likely put immense pressure on Greece—and other southern countries such as Italy—which would be caught between the refugees flowing from Syria, Libya, and elsewhere, on the one hand, and the newly fortified north, on the other.

But the Visegrad countries are signaling they’re fed up with, and don’t trust, the current approach. While Angela Merkel and Germany have made some hesitant movements in a restrictionist direction recently, Berlin hasn’t signaled nearly the kind of dramatic changes in policy that would restore Continent-wide trust in a pan-EU policy. Until it does, expect to see more proposals like this—and, perhaps, once the weather gets warm again and migrant flows increase, more than just proposals.

Moldova: Where Putin Could Score Next

Since Russia seized Crimea and stoked war in eastern Ukraine, most of the scenario-building as to where Russia might push next has focused on the Baltics. The buildup of Russian anti-access area denial (A2AD) assets in the Kaliningrad District has made the northeastern flank an almost obvious area for Russia to pressure the West. But the focus on NATO’s redline has deflected attention from an area where Russia could easily push next, and whose collapsed economy, government failure, and shifting public mood has created conditions ripe for another exercise of Russian hybrid conflict.

Enter Moldova, a post-Soviet state, home to an ongoing frozen conflict in Russian-controlled Transnistria, where Moscow has already shown that it can easily pull the strings at will. Furthermore, a gigantic corruption scandal, driven by the theft of a billion dollars through an elaborate bank scheme, has brought the country to the verge of systemic collapse. The deepening crisis in Moldova has led to street demonstrations and demands that corrupt oligarchs be removed from power, accompanied by a growing public willingness to shift the country back into Russia’s orbit, as well as an eerie Soviet nostalgia.Because much of the corruption unveiled was found among the avowedly Europe-oriented elites, the banking scandal has tarnished, perhaps irretrievably, the pro-EU narrative. Last October, former Prime Minister Vlad Filat, who was in office from 2009-13, was arrested and charged with accepting $260 million in bribes. The public mood is explosive, with citizenry storming the parliament in the capital of Chisinau last month right after the new government of Pavel Filip, ostensibly a leader of a pro-European coalition, was approved. Filip remains deeply mistrusted and considered by the thousands who protested his appointment as another manifestation of the country’s systemic corruption. The attendant public anger is more reminiscent of revolution than of the reformist hopes that marked the country’s path to closer association with the EU only a year ago. The levels of theft and oligarchic influence brought to light by the banking scandal have revealed a larger systemic problem in the country: namely, Moldova has become a conduit for money laundering, with an estimated $20 billion of Russian money having passed through the country’s banking system over the past four years. To appreciate the scope of these numbers, consider that Moldova’s GDP last year was about $8 billion.Human misery aside, the story of Moldova’s unraveling is particularly disheartening because of the country’s geostrategic position along the southern flank of NATO, directly bordering on Romania and sandwiched between NATO and Ukraine, not far from the Black Sea littoral. As things stand, Moldova could shift ever-deeper into Moscow’s political orbit, and eventually become Russia’s “new Kaliningrad”— first a political base from which to exert pressure in southeastern Europe at will, then the host of Russian military installations to further complicate and U.S. and NATO efforts to secure allies in Europe. If unaddressed, Moldova’s downward spiral carries the seeds of another crisis along Europe’s flank, this time closer to the southern theater with potentially even graver consequences for Europe’s security than the deteriorating conditions in eastern Ukraine, especially if Russia increases its military presence in Transnistria and continues to consolidate its political and economic influence in Moldova itself.Today protesters in Chisinau are calling for the dissolution of the parliament and early elections. Thus far the government has resisted such calls, but it’s anyone’s guess how much longer the imploding state and government can hold on. In the next electoral cycle, the pro-Russian forces may get enough votes to swing the parliament decisively towards Russia, all but ending Moldova’s increasingly futile efforts to remain connected to the West. Not that the European Union, increasingly paralyzed by its own crises, is likely to focus on a small country outside its periphery. So when the next Moldovan election comes—whether soon or in a year’s time—Putin should be well positioned to expand his grip on the country, in the process opening an even deeper fault line along NATO’s southeastern flank. This raises the question of what Russia is prepared to do to ensure direct access to its installations in Transnistria. The question was already a thorny one in the wake of Russia’s seizure of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine. Now there is an even greater risk of a Russian military campaign against Ukraine along the Black Sea littoral.Unless the West begins to reach out to Chisinau, especially to help alleviate the deepening economic crisis in the country and to begin addressing its systemic corruption, Russia will be in a strong position to score a political victory there, making the next Moldovan government part of the growing sphere of influence along its periphery and putting more pressure on NATO’s southeastern flank.

Why a Russia-Saudi Output Freeze Isn’t Sending Oil Prices Up

Oil ministers from Saudi Arabia and Russia were joined by their Qatari and Venezuelan counterparts in Doha this week for a meeting that produced an agreement to freeze their oil output at current levels. This sort of coordination comes as the petrostates are looking for ways to cope with bargain crude prices that are some $80 cheaper now than they were 20 months ago. Yet, oil prices have responded by falling yet again in trading today. Why? Well, the deal isn’t doing much to erase the global glut.

First, the Saudis and Russians say that they’ll only be willing to freeze output at current levels, leaving out (for now) the possibility of significant cuts. Both countries have been pumping at full capacity recently, with the Russians setting a post-Soviet record for production last month and the Saudis keeping their own output up in an attempt to fight for their market share. Freezing production at current levels won’t do much to erase the oversupply that’s depressed prices.But the agreement is also contingent on the world’s other big producers also agreeing to freeze output at current levels. With Iran set to ramp up its own production now that Western sanctions have been lifted, that’s a very shaky condition. The FT reports:

In a bid to bring the most reluctant Opec members onboard, Venezuela oil minister Eulogio del Pino, who has led the diplomatic push for a deal, will travel to Tehran on Wednesday to meet officials from Iran and Iraq. […]

Iran has repeatedly said it plans to revive its oil exports after the lifting of sanctions against its oil industry last month. This week it loaded the first three tankers with crude for Europe since 2012.

It’s very difficult to see how Tehran might agree to go back on its stated plan to ramp up output by as much as one million barrels per day in the coming months. And so, Brent crude is down more than 3 percent today while America’s WTI continues to linger around $29 per barrel. The market hasn’t responded to this agreement because it doesn’t appear to amount to much.

However, consider: If the world’s petrostates are able to put aside their differences sometime in the future and find a way to trust one another to reduce production, and prices do go up, it will be American shale producers that benefit the most. And with a flood of “fracklogged” wells just waiting for such a rebound, it’s unlikely we’re going to see oversupply concerns erased anytime soon.

How Different Are Millennials?

Since at least 2008, some commentators have proclaimed Millennials to be a transformative generation—more diverse, economically stressed, and progressive than their predecessors, less attracted to faith and patriotism, and likely to dramatically reshape American political and social life. We’ve always been skeptical of this theory, arguing in particular that the Baby Boomers who came of age in the 1970s had many of the same qualities that some pundits now say will make Millennials unique.

A new post from the Pew Research Center provides some support for our wait-and-see approach, noting that Millennials’ much-vaunted pessimism about the future of the country was also exhibited by both Gen Xers and Boomers when they were young:

Two decades ago, Gen Xers, then in their teens and 20s, stood out for their lack of confidence in the nation’s future. In 1994, just 30% of Gen Xers said they had quite a lot of confidence in the future of the U.S. Among older generations at the time – Boomers and Silents – half or more had a lot of confidence in the nation’s future.

And two decades before that, Boomers were less bullish than their elders in assessing the nation’s future. In 1975, when Boomers were the youngest generation, 49% had a great deal of confidence in the future of the U.S., compared with 62% of Silents and 67% of the Greatest Generation.

The Pew post only covers Millennial attitudes on one relatively narrow question. But it’s worth noting that the conventional wisdom about Millennial distinctiveness along other dimensions has also been challenged in recent years. Often described as individualists skeptical of marriage and the nuclear family, many Millennials are in fact opting for relatively traditional family structures. Often described as peaceniks skeptical of America’s international role, Millennials turn out to be hawkish when it comes to fighting ISIS. And for all the commentary about a Millennial-powered Emerging Democratic Majority, young Americans’ loyalty to the Democratic party may be attenuating.

None of this is to say that there aren’t important demographic and economic differences between Millennials and earlier cohorts of young people—there are. But it may be too early to say how those differences will affect the Millennial worldview a generation from now, once today’s young people have children, get promotions, and are entrusted with real influence.

Don’t Look Now, but Club Med Is Still in Trouble

Austerity fights and political uncertainty are back on the menu in southern Europe, starting with Spain. The Financial Times reports:

The name of the next Spanish prime minister will remain unknown for at least several more weeks. The first challenge facing the new leader, however, is clear: a yawning hole in the government budget that will force Madrid to seek emergency talks with Brussels on day one.

According to the latest European Commission forecast, Spain will report a budget deficit of 4.8 per cent of gross domestic product for last year and 3.6 per cent this year. Both numbers are well above the budget targets set by Brussels, and suggest a shortfall of at least €8bn this year alone.

And Brussels isn’t interested in granting leniency or exceptions right now, the FT notes. That ought to interest Spain’s Mediterranean neighbor, Italy, which suddenly finds its own fiscal situation worse than expected. The Local.it:

[Italy’s national statistics body] Istat said GDP expanded by only 0.1 percent from the third to the fourth quarter of last year.

That produced an annualised rate of one percent in the final three months of the year, significantly below most analysts’ predictions of quarterly growth around 0.3 percent and an annual rate closer to 1.2 percent.[..]

Slower-than-anticipated growth could threaten Italy’s pledge to start reducing its €2.2 trillion debt mountain this year and exacerbate festering tensions with Brussels over economic policy.

Renzi has been using a series of media appearances and diplomatic meetings since December to put pressure on Brussels—and Berlin—to grant Italy an exception to the EU’s budgetary rules. That will now likely be a harder “get.” In light of the Spanish news, the EU will worry that if it goes easy on Italy, Madrid would be in an uproar, and that if it goes easy on both, such a double accommodation would signal open season on the EU’s austerity rules.

So expect austerity politics and north-south fights to be back on the agenda in Spain, Italy, and the EU as a whole. As if the Continent didn’t have enough else to worry about. . .

Wealthy Chinese Send Their Money Elsewhere

People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan came out on Sunday to say, basically, that despite what you may be hearing, everything is fundamentally under control in China. Bloomberg:

The nation’s balance of payments is good, capital outflows are normal and the exchange rate is basically stable against a basket of currencies, Zhou said in an interview published Saturday in Caixin magazine. That’s an escalation in verbal support after such comments have been left in recent months to deputies and the central bank research department’s chief economist.

Many wealthy Chinese citizens don’t seem to agree, and it’s led, for example, to the proliferation of a practice called “smurfing.” According to The New York Times, smurfing is the name for one of the ways that people are using to get money out of the China. Since there is a $50,000 limit to how much money any one person can take out of the country per year, wealthy Chinese citizens often ask their friends or others to carry money out of the country for them. The practice isn’t new, but it’s becoming a bigger problem because of China’s economic troubles—and capital flight will in turn likely make those troubles worse:

If the government cannot keep citizens from rushing to the financial exits, China’s outlook could darken. The swell of outflows is a destabilizing force in China’s slowing economy, threatening to undermine confidence and hurt a banking system that is struggling to deal with a decade-long lending binge [. . .]

China is also trying to put the brakes on outflows, by tightening its grip on the country’s links to the global financial system. The government, for example, just started to clamp down on people’s use of bank cards to buy overseas life insurance policies.

Accelerating capital flight puts pressure on the economy and especially the yuan. Although Zhou says there’s no scheme in the works to make capital controls more strict, we wouldn’t be surprised to see an already-anxious government take more extreme measures to clamp down on its people in order to keep them from taking money out of the country. As we’ve noted, the biggest reason to worry about China is not the economic problems the country faces per se. The most troubling indicator is that the government may be losing confidence in both the country’s future and the loyalty of its citizens. We expect capital flight to exacerbate tensions between officials in Beijing and many of the country’s more well-heeled citizens—which means it’s becoming easier to imagine how things could get uglier in China sooner rather than later.

Investors Are (Rightfully) Wary of US Solar Industry

Oil isn’t the only energy source whose industry has been on the skids lately. Stock prices of a number of solar industries started 2016 off in dismal form, with one solar stock index plummeting 16 percent in the first two weeks of January. Those woes continued last week as the stock price of America’s biggest solar company hit its lowest level since March 2013. As Richard Martin writes for the MIT Technology Review, investors are clearly concerned about the heavy reliance the American solar industry has on support from subsidies:

This week shares of U.S. solar leader SolarCity tumbled to a new low, while several other solar companies also took a pounding. Last month Nevada introduced sharp cutbacks in its program for net metering—the fees paid to homeowners with rooftop solar installations for excess power they send back to the grid. California and Hawaii, two of the biggest solar markets, have introduced changes to their net metering schemes as well. Across the country, as many as 20 other states are considering such changes, which would dramatically alter the economics of rooftop solar.

The uncertainty has cast the solar providers’ business models into doubt. Without net metering payments, residential solar “makes no financial sense for a consumer,” SolarCity CEO Lyndon Rive recently admitted to the New York Times. […]Without subsidies, the [solar] picture looks a lot bleaker. If each state added a $50 per month fixed charge to solar owners’ bills—a change that many big utilities are fighting for—solar would be at grid parity in only two states. Critics of government subsidies for renewable energy have called the solar boom “an artifical market” that will evaporate the minute government handouts dry up.

This isn’t a controversial opinion, either. Solar companies themselves fight tooth and nail for extensions of the tax credits that have allowed them to gain traction in certain markets because they know that their industry isn’t capable of competing with other energy options on its own merit.

Martin thinks the future is still bright for U.S. solar, but people have been saying that for decades. Our current method of incentivizing renewable energy—following Germany’s lead and subsidizing the current generation of wind and solar technologies on offer—carries with it an important opportunity cost (on top of the more tangible cost taxpayers end up paying): valuable government dollars and political capital, two commodities environmentalists have to know are awfully scarce, are being diverted away from the research and development of breakthroughs capable of muscling out dirtier alternatives without being propped up.