Peter L. Berger's Blog, page 134

Five Priorities for Europe’s Transatlantic Strategy

Amidst periodic calls from the policy community (including some by me on these pages) for the United States to develop a new grand strategy for Europe, there is also a growing realization in key European capitals that the Transatlantic relationship requires more from Europe than the usual tactical “muddling through.” Security optics in Europe these days are arguably more regional than at any time since the end of the Cold War, with France, Italy, and, to an extent, Germany preoccupied with the Mediterranean and Africa, and the post-communist democracies in Central Europe and the Baltics consumed by Russia and the deteriorating security situation along NATO’s eastern flank. This bifurcation of priorities further complicates the task of crafting a larger European strategy to deepen and strengthen relations with the United States. Add to this the criticism of the election of Donald J. Trump as America’s 45th President one still hears frequently on the Continent, and the task of coming up with a list of strategic priorities toward which the Europeans—inside and outside NATO—could work with the United States going forward seems at times almost out of reach. And yet, today more than at any point since 1990, Europe needs to reach out to the United States with a clearly articulated set of strategic goals and to start talking about the means needed to achieve them.

There are five key issues that the Europeans must address in order to deepen Transatlantic security cooperation. First, there needs to be a closer alignment of threat perceptions in the United States and Europe. While regional security considerations related to Europe’s eastern flank are a well understood part of NATO’s threat assessment, Europe needs to further expand its commitment to fighting terrorism, responding to U.S. requests to become more relevant in light of American security policy objectives.

Next, Europe needs to work with the United States to articulate a coherent Russia strategy, one that will better align the interests of individual European states with American priorities on Russia. At present there has been precious little discussion of what a U.S.-European strategy toward Russia should look like beyond continuing the sanctions regime and strengthening deterrence. As a subset of U.S.-European strategy on Russia, Europe’s coordination with the United States on Ukraine should be of special importance going forward to ensure harmonized action as well as consistent messaging. The question of a shared Russia strategy is of particular importance not just from the point of view of Transatlantic security considerations but also as a means to revitalize multilateralism.

The third priority for the Europeans is to invest in NATO, especially when it comes to meeting the 2 percent GDP defense spending target. And yet, while the 2 percent commitment is an important indicator of intent, it is far more important for NATO to develop a shared threat assessment as the baseline for developing requisite plans and capabilities. This process was started at the Warsaw summit last year, but it needs to move further to address the multi-domain nature of the threats confronting the alliance and to increase the strategic coherence of its operational planning. As a legacy institution, NATO needs to adapt its command and force structures to address the multidimensional nature of the security environment. Since a number of key European states are not in NATO, building a network of networks with partners to increase coherence in how Europe looks at key security challenges is especially important.

The fourth priority is for Europeans to seriously reconsider their historic reluctance to use military force. This is especially urgent when it comes to Germany, which, though the largest economic power on the continent, has shied away from making military action an integral part of its statecraft. Rebuilding their armed forces should become the key priority for NATO members across Europe, starting with joint procurement. This particular aspect of Europe’s relations with the United States has been allowed to languish for too long, creating the perception that Europe is not willing to become a genuine security provider and partner of the United States in the military realm. To achieve meaningful change, governments need to move beyond the symbolism of the 2 percent of GDP spending target, setting instead genuine need-based targets that would be likely to require defense spending at levels of 3 percent of GDP or more. This strategic goal of creating real, usable military capabilities should drive the conversation among European governments, and it should be clearly and frequently communicated in Washington.

Asia is the most neglected aspect of Europe’s security relationship with the United States. Hence the fifth priority strategic objective for Europe, which follows naturally from the fourth, is to prepare itself to take a stand on the potential for conflict in Asia—both in the short-term with North Korea and in the long-term U.S. competition with China. The U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region is a critical and rapidly changing strategic priority, making Europe’s “strategic absence” a weakness in Transatlantic security relations. When it comes to the deteriorating security of Asia, European governments need to articulate a set of principles defining what they would be willing to do to support their American ally in the event of conflict escalation and, if it comes to it, war in the Pacific.

These five strategic priorities for Europe’s relations with the United States are by no means exhaustive, but they offer a solid starting point for deepening the Transatlantic strategic dialogue inside and outside of NATO. More importantly, a display of strategic initiative on the part of Europe aimed at strengthening its alliance with the United States and rebuilding its militaries would go a long way toward improving the situation. Europe has the potential to become a significant contributor to regional as well as global security. In the current deteriorating global security environment, what Europe needs is the political will to start thinking strategically—not just in terms of its own needs, but also in terms of the larger interests of the collective West.

The post Five Priorities for Europe’s Transatlantic Strategy appeared first on The American Interest.

Brussels Keeps Its Distance From Catalan Crackdown

Madrid is cracking down hard on preparations for a Catalan independence referendum on October 1. After levying charges against Catalonia’s President and over 700 mayors for supporting the unauthorized vote, authorities upped the ante on Wednesday, as national police raided regional government offices, arrested 14, and seized up to 10 million ballot papers. The heavy-handed tactics have triggered large street protests in Barcelona, deepening a standoff between Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Roy, who has accused Catalan authorities of defying the rule of law, and the separatists who accuse Madrid of suppressing democracy.

The showdown has also left the EU’s leadership in an awkward spot. Backing Madrid’s line but uneasy about the optics, Brussels is trying to keep its distance, reports Reuters:

The official European Union line is that Spanish democracy works and Spaniards should settle their affairs according to national laws. But the worsening standoff, with police arresting elected Catalan officials this week, is troubling officials and politicians abroad, who fear it may hurt Europe in various ways.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, through a spokesman, echoed that line when asked by Reuters if she had had recent contact on the matter with Rajoy, a fellow conservative. While stressing it was an “internal Spanish matter”, the spokesman also recalled that Merkel had in previous years told Rajoy that Berlin had “great interest in the maintenance of stability in Spain”.

Less constrained by diplomatic protocol, other Europeans are starting to speak out: “Rajoy has put a lot of oil on the fire, fuelling the independentist debate. He has made a huge mistake,” Ska Keller, the German co-leader of the Greens in the European Parliament, told Reuters. […]

[European Commission President] Juncker also said that rich “regional traditions” should not become “elements of separatism and fragmentation of Europe”.

The EU has a fine line to walk here. Brussels wants to avoid a full-blown secession crisis, and surely wishes that Madrid could put an end to the whole thing. But images of police jailing elected officials and confiscating ballot boxes naturally stirs unease. Europe’s leaders do not want to be tainted by association with such tactics, accused of stifling the will of the people, but they also do not want to encourage the aspirations of European regional separatists, whether in Spain or elsewhere.

The EU is thus staying largely silent, sticking to the occasional anodyne statement that the European Commission cannot intervene in an internal Spanish affair, all the while working quietly with Rajoy to defuse the crisis. This may not look like political bravery, but it could lead to a gradual de-escalation. After Wednesday’s police raids, the Spanish economy minister made a conciliatory gesture, saying that Madrid was open to granting Catalonia greater financial autonomy and funding reform if it dropped the independence bid. But such offers may fall on deaf ears given the heightened tensions and regional leaders’ determination to proceed with a vote, no matter the consequences.

At a time when the EU is already consumed with Brexit divorce talks, the Catalan crisis could cause a whole new series of headaches, while exacerbating existing schisms within the Union. Hungary, for instance, recently invoked “the will of the people” to justify respecting the independence vote, in an apparent swipe at Brussels. It is easy to imagine how countries like Hungary and Poland could use the Catalan referendum as a wedge issue to attack the EU for suppressing the popular will.

Commentators have cried wolf about Catalonia before, predicting full-blown constitutional crises when the region held a non-binding referendum in 2014 or elected a host of pro-independence lawmakers in 2015. But this time could be the real deal, unless cooler heads prevail soon.

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The Russian Interference Racket

“We have been attacked,” a voice gravely intones before the camera cuts in for a close-up. “We are at war.” The voice belongs to Morgan Freeman, and the dire warning he utters would not sound out of place in one of his cinematic forays into the presidency, perhaps a scene from Deep Impact or Olympus Has Fallen. But no, Freeman tells us, “this is no movie script.” Rather, it is the true story of an ex-KGB spy climbing his way to power in post-Soviet Russia, plotting “a course for revenge” to undermine American democracy through a combination of cyber warfare, disinformation, and fake news.

This is the opening pitch launching the Committee to Investigate Russia, a new non-profit resource created to educate the American public about the dangers of Russia’s information warfare. The group’s funding is murky, but the message is clear: Moscow’s meddling in the 2016 elections was just one battle in an ongoing campaign to disrupt our democracy and sow doubt among our citizenry. The election of Donald Trump, it is implied, was the direct outgrowth of this influence campaign, which if left unchallenged could threaten the survival of American democracy itself.

This is a tellingly exaggerated statement of the problem, maximized for dramatic effect and click-worthiness. But it is also a fitting narrative for this political moment, when the real need to investigate and combat Russian interference has spawned a dubious cottage industry of new organizations and suspect “experts” who have put themselves on the Trump-Russia case.

The Committee to Investigate Russia, founded by an alliance of Hollywood celebrities like Rob Reiner and Never Trump conservatives like Max Boot, is just the latest example. The Trump-Russia scandal has also given birth to the Moscow Project, an initiative by the left-leaning Center for American Progress to investigate the President’s Russia connections. It has spawned breathless blogs like the Palmer Report, which daily stokes the Democratic base with unfounded speculations about Trump’s imminent impeachment. And it has boosted the careers of Twitter conspiracy-mongers like Louise Mensch, Eric Garland, and Scott Dworkin, along with self-proclaimed information warfare experts like Molly McKew.

These individuals and organizations exist on a spectrum: some of them housed in respectable think tanks, others thriving on the paranoid fringes of the Internet. But they have all been guilty, to varying degrees, of inflating the Russia threat and indulging in the worst tactics of their opponents. Russia’s 2016 election interference demands a serious and sober response. What we are getting instead is an uninformed hysteria, empowering partisans and posers alike.

Few embody this trend better than Molly McKew. A former advisor to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and consultant with experience in Moldova and the Baltics, McKew has lately styled herself as an expert at combatting Russia’s active measures. In a series of dire dispatches for Politico this year, McKew has been sounding the alarm, repeatedly warning that we are at war with Moscow and popularizing the notion of an ominous “Gerasimov Doctrine” aimed at winning a hybrid war against the West. (The original coiner of that phrase, the respected Russia analyst Mark Galeotti, has since disowned its opportunistic re-appropriation and misinterpretation by the likes of McKew.)

McKew herself has become a sought-after witness on such matters, most recently testifying before the Helsinki Commission about the threat of Russian disinformation. Her remarks before the Commission last week were characteristically hyperbolic: Russia is conducting “a fundamentally guerilla approach to total warfare,” she warns in one passage, where “information tools are the new superweapons.” Elsewhere, she misleadingly suggests that Russia’s disinformation campaign is mainly conducted in English, rather than in Russian with its nearest neighbors.

But perhaps the most telling exchange came during the Q&A, when McKew suggested that Western journalists and graduate students who specialize in Russia have become Kremlin pawns, contaminated by contact with the country:

You especially see it on social media, the sort of middle rank of sort of Western journalists hanging out in Moscow and others who propagate this narrative of, OK, Russia is bad, but America is worse, and America should know better, so it is much worse. And anything you do to respond to Putin means you’re a Russophobe and it just makes them stronger and proves his point. This is very effective in integrating its way into the American media environment, particularly in graduate students, it turns out, and we just need to be aware of that.

McKew’s warning about the perfidious influence of Russia-based journalists and graduate students rightly upset many in that field, who have more knowledge of the Russian language and more on-the-ground experience than she has. But her straw man logic is also symptomatic of larger and more troubling trend in Trump’s America. Those who profess to be fighting Putin most vigorously increasingly adhere to a playbook that would be familiar to him: smearing good-faith critics as members of a hostile “fifth column” under the sway of a foreign power. And those who place themselves on the frontline of the resistance to Trump are increasingly embracing the denigration of expertise and reckless conspiracy-mongering of their opponents.

This is a process that has been tacitly enabled by mainstream media outlets, pundits and politicians who should know better. Back in March, for instance, the New York Times gave column space to Louise Mensch, an infamous conspiracist who sees the malign hand of Putin behind everything from the death of Andrew Breitbart to the neo-Nazi rally in Charlottesville. Her specious speculations have been embraced at one time or another by influential cable pundits, Harvard law professors, and U.S. Senators. And whenever she faces criticism for her deceptions, the response is predictable: to charge the critic in question with being a Kremlin agent. (McKew employs such tactics more subtly, only implying that her critics are being paid off by Moscow).

Mensch and McKew may be extreme examples, but even more responsible members of the Russiagate brigade contribute to the credibility problem. Ostensibly independent organizations charged with probing Trump’s Russia connections typically lack the actual Russian experts whose contributions may be most valuable. And their backers seem to have already made up their minds in ways that undermine the impression of impartiality.

For example, an investigative entity like the Moscow Project—housed at a think tank that operates as the Democrats’ policy shop—may have sound methods and vetted sources, but its goals are plainly partisan. The same could be said of the new Committee to Investigate Russia, which despite its broad name seems to define its agenda solely around Trump. These are groups that exist to confirm the prior assumptions of their target audience, not to challenge or complicate them. Nor are they making an especially helpful contribution toward educating the public. The Committee to Investigate Russia website, for instance, is largely an aggregated assortment of English-language news stories about Trump and Russia, combined with a series of sketchy biographical profiles that was riddled with errors upon release.

At best, such efforts confuse rather than clarify, generating misleading expectations and contributing to misplaced paranoia about Putin’s all-powerful influence. At worst, they actively mislead the public and unintentionally reinforce President Trump’s self-serving complaints that the Russian investigations are a partisan witch hunt.

It need not be this way. Russia’s election interference should indeed be thoroughly investigated—by competent journalists and law enforcement professionals, rather than outside groups with transparent agendas. And we should take the threat of Russian propaganda seriously, while still keeping our heads about the real extent of its influence.

Consider, for instance, the current panic over social media networks that spread “fake news” and hosted Russian-made bot accounts during election season. Unquestionably, it is true that Moscow was up to such tricks: recent reports by the Daily Beast show that Russia spent at least $100,000 on Facebook ad buys and created fan pages to organize pro-Trump rallies in swing states like Florida and Iowa. But $100,000 is chump change compared to the vast sums expended on U.S. elections every year, and the Russia-created events only attracted a small handful of supporters. Do these meager returns really constitute an existential threat to American democracy?

In some quarters, even asking such questions has become proof of perfidy. In her recent testimony, for instance, McKew claimed that “some of the most effective Russian disinformation aims to make you believe Russia is weak and disorganized.” McKew offers little to back up that claim, which serves as a convenient crutch for her argument: anyone who questions her assessment of Moscow’s strength can be written off as a useful idiot. Anyone who argues that Moscow’s propaganda organs are less effective than they seem can be dismissed as a Kremlin stooge.

Ultimately, this kind of thinking only serves Putin’s interests, by inflating perceptions of the Russian threat, eroding the ability to have good-faith debates about Russia’s interference, and validating narratives that Moscow is trying to spread abroad. Loose talk of war with Russia reinforces the Russian narrative that the United States is full of bellicose Russophobes. Lazy partisan smears about Trump and Russia only further discredit legitimate revelations among Trump’s base, especially when the conspiracists are welcomed into the mainstream. And the whole racket generates a climate of paranoia, distrust, and suspicion that the most diehard information warriors claim Putin is trying to create in the first place.

Putin may not have intended any of this when he ordered covert meddling to damage Hillary Clinton’s likely presidency. But in the absence of meaningful detente with Trump—which looks less likely than ever—he could do worse than to see the U.S. consumed by Bircher paranoia, this time emanating not from the reaches of the far Right but from the supposedly respectable mainstream center.

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The Stumbling Block to Putin’s Asian Pivot

At the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok earlier this month, President Vladimir Putin proposed building a massive bridge from Russia’s Pacific Ocean island of Sakhalin to Japan’s Hokkaido. The idea is typical of Russia’s Asian Pivot. It is a grand plan that will never come to pass. It makes little sense economically. It presumes that long-standing political conflicts (Japan claims the Kuril Islands, which Russia controls) can be papered-over. And it was accompanied by a generous helping of empty rhetoric, with Putin declaring, “These are things of an absolutely global nature that could lead to significant changes in infrastructure, energy, and high technology.” Whatever that means.

The high-flown but empty rhetoric of the Vladisvostok Forum tells us something important about Putin’s Asia Pivot: It isn’t going very well. And Russia’s own policy on North Korea bears much of the blame.

The goal of the pivot is to broaden the base of Asian engagement so that Russia is not too reliant on China. This requires better ties with other Asian powers, above all Japan and South Korea. But Russia’s stance on North Korea—being equally critical of Washington and Pyongyang, protesting Japanese and South Korean efforts to boost missile defense capabilities, and declining to impose additional sanctions on North Korea—are precisely the opposite of what Seoul and Tokyo think is needed to deal with an existential threat.

Since annexing Crimea and ruining its relations with the West, Russia has sought to diversify its foreign policy by looking east. Putin has had a long series of productive and friendly meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The Russia-China relationship is as close as at any time since the days of Stalin and Mao.

Although the improved ties with China have given Russia diplomatic flexibility in its confrontation with the West, they have disappointed Russia in one major respect. Many Russians hoped that improved ties would unlock greater Chinese investment in Russia, thereby boosting the economy and providing new sources of investment at a time when sanctions have sharply curtailed Western business in Russia.

Russia had good reason to hope to gain more from new Chinese investment. For one, Chinese firms have historically invested heavily in natural resources, which Russia possesses in abundance. And Chinese businesses were revving up investment abroad at just the moment Russia was seeking to pivot east. China was also in the midst of launching new initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative, each of which promised to spread investments throughout Eurasia—and presumably Russia too.

Yet the Chinese investment boom some Russians hoped for never materialized. Private sector Chinese firms are still mostly staying away from Russia and pouring funds into many of China’s neighbors instead. Indeed, the initiative is boosting China’s economic influence in Central Asia, a region Russia considers part of its own sphere of influence.

This is the background against which Russia has launched its new effort to diversify its Asian relations. To be sure, Moscow now talks less about a “turn to the East” and more about the importance of “greater Eurasia”—a vision which includes China. Ties with China remain of crucial importance. But Moscow realizes it will have more leverage with respect to China and the West if it can make friends with other Asian powers. Chief among these potential allies are East Asia’s other two economic powerhouses, Japan and South Korea.

Russia’s pivot plans seemed feasible for a while—up until Kim Jong-un began his recent flurry of missile launches earlier this year. The crisis on the Korean Peninsula—with Pyongyang testing a nuclear device many times stronger than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, and with U.S. President Donald Trump threatening to unleash “fire and fury” on North Korea and its “rocket man”—has brought to the fore the contradictions inherent in Russia’s efforts to improve ties with Japan and South Korea. Tokyo and Seoul both recognize the benefits to themselves of better relations with Russia: Improved ties would give them more diplomatic flexibility in the context of China’s rise. Yet both countries also see North Korea as their most urgent security threat—and their priorities are very different than Russia’s.

Like Japan and South Korea, Russia believes that the Kim dynasty should give up its nuclear weapons. But agreement stops there. Russia views the North Korean nuclear program as unfortunate but entirely manageable problem. Russian experts think Kim Jong-un and the North Korean elite are rational calculators interested in self-preservation and thus would never launch a first strike. Moreover, Russia knows that it would not be the target of a North Korean strike (though a North Korean test missile did fall into the ocean troublingly close to Vladivostok earlier this year).

By contrast, Seoul and Tokyo want to see Kim disarmed immediately. True, they know he is unlikely to give up his nuclear program. But it may prove possible to limit it and prevent future tests. Seoul and Tokyo also want to limit Pyongyang’s missile development. Both countries believe that a larger U.S. presence in the region makes them more secure. Both countries have invested in U.S.-backed missile defense programs, with South Korea’s controversial THAAD deployment now operational. Both countries have swallowed Trump’s rhetoric (though not without misgivings) because they think that U.S. military posturing will boost their position in any future negotiations with Pyongyang.

These steps contradict Russia’s aims in East Asia. The Kremlin wants a smaller U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea. Russia sees Japanese and South Korean missile defense deployments as threats to its own security; Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov has even threatened a “response in military terms.” While Seoul and Tokyo want more economic pressure on Pyongyang, Putin has spoken out against additional sanctions, arguing that the North Koreans would rather “eat grass” than surrender their nukes. Russia thinks Japan and South Korea’s approach is fundamentally misguided.

Russia’s position is based partly on principle and partly on politics. Most Russian experts believe that Pyongyang is unlikely to strike its neighbors, and that Seoul and Tokyo have little reason to worry. Indeed, most Russian analysts think that Trump poses as big a risk as Kim Jong-un, both because he has threatened to strike North Korea first—a move that would result in retaliation against Japan and South Korea—and because Pyongyang might misinterpret Trump’s aggressive declarations, sparking an accidental war. Thus Russia argues that South Korea and Japan would be more secure if Washington would only dial down its rhetoric and military exercises in the region. Seoul and Tokyo don’t see it that way.

In addition to real disagreements about how to manage North Korea, the Kremlin’s decision to inject itself into the diplomacy over North Korea is part of its broader effort to force the United States to recognize it as a great power and to negotiate with it as an equal. Moscow believes that achieving this goal requires gaining leverage over the United States so that Washington has a reason to talk. Moscow senses in the current crisis an opportunity to demonstrate that it can be a productive partner to the United States, but only if Washington abandons talk of regime change and missile defense efforts, among other policies.

Even if Moscow achieves its aim of forcing Washington to work with it on the Korean Peninsula, this success will come at a cost. The Kremlin continues to talk about its Eurasian vocation and its growing relations with its Asian partners. But Moscow’s position on North Korea has undermined these efforts. Perhaps Russia has improved its position in Pyongyang, but has also reminded Tokyo and Seoul why they consider Russia as much a part of the problem as a partner.

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Germany Will Miss Another Green Goal

Berlin’s grand green energy transition is falling short of the lofty targets that inspired it. Earlier this month, the think tank Agora Energiewende released a report that projected Germany would fall well short of its goal to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—far shorter than was previously believed. Berlin had committed to cutting 40 percent of its GHG emissions by 2020 as compared to 1990 levels, but as that year looms large, the country has achieved a reduction of “just” 28 percent (a remarkable decrease, though nowhere close to the target), and it’s expected to only shave off another 2 or 3 percent over the next few years. Now, a new study from the BEE renewable energy group suggests that the country is going to fall short of its Brussels-set target of sourcing 18 percent of its energy production from renewables by 2020.

According to BEE, Germany’s green energy will amass “just” 16 percent (again, this is by itself a remarkable number, but it’s still off the targeted pace) of the country’s energy consumption by 2020, short of the 16.7 percent level that was previously forecasted, and shorter still of the 18 percent goal. BEE seems to lay the blame at the feet of “increased consumption in the heating, transport and electricity sector,” but that doesn’t tell the full story.

The only way Germany has been able to jumpstart its wind and solar power sectors so effectively has been through the use of feed-in tariffs—a form of government subsidization, in which Germany guarantees renewable power producers locked in, long-term, above-market rates for their supplies. These feed-in tariffs were wildly effective, but they were also costly, and they were ultimately paid by consumers in the form of a line item green surcharge on power bills that ended up making German electricity some of the most costly in Europe.

Expensive power is harmful for households and businesses alike, and its effects are most keenly felt by the poor, for whom the power bill represents a larger slice of the monthly budget. Acknowledging the problem of the country’s runaway power prices, the German government moved to rein in feed-in tariffs and replace them with a system of auctions for new renewables projects, hoping that competition might help bring costs down. (This auction system has been utilized to less than stellar effect in India, where in their race to underbid one another companies have ended up locked into rates for solar power below what’s needed to turn a profit.)

Since Berlin’s green success so far has been built on government subsidization, it makes sense that a move away from generous subsidies would be accompanied by a drop in projected renewable energy growth. Similarly, it makes sense that Germany’s emissions reductions are off the pace when you consider that the country is shuttering a fleet of zero emissions nuclear reactors, and having to up its consumption of über-dirty lignite coal as a result.

So how should we assess Germany’s green progress, then? On the one hand, the country is undoubtedly a global leader in renewable energy production, though it’s paying through the nose for that distinction. On the other, its perverse aversion to climate friendly nuclear power is undercutting those same climate goals that its fixation on renewables is meant to work towards. By pursuing such extreme energy policies, Berlin has given the rest of the world a chance to learn from its achievements and mistakes alike. And, when Germany misses its major milestones in 2020, hopefully Berlin will look critically at its energiewende and try to learn, as well.

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A Run on Liberalism?

The tide of illiberalism that has swept over American academia for the past few years isn’t just about a few rambunctious hecklers or a militant fringe. In fact, skepticism of the idea of free and open debate debate runs deep among America’s future educated classes, liberal and conservative alike, according to a new Brookings survey of college students. Catherine Rampbell relays the findings in the Washington Post:

Let’s say a public university hosts a “very controversial speaker,” one “known for making offensive and hurtful statements.” Would it be acceptable for a student group to disrupt the speech “by loudly and repeatedly shouting so that the audience cannot hear the speaker”?

Astonishingly, half said that snuffing out upsetting speech — rather than, presumably, rebutting or even ignoring it — would be appropriate. Democrats were more likely than Republicans to find this response acceptable (62 percent to 39 percent), and men were more likely than women (57 percent to 47 percent). Even so, sizable shares of all groups agreed.

It gets even worse.

Respondents were also asked if it would be acceptable for a student group to use violence to prevent that same controversial speaker from talking. Here, 19 percent said yes.

These results, as many have pointed out, obviously don’t bode well for the future of democratic self-governance. But looked at another way, they are not particularly surprising. Why should people allow the airing of ideas they disagree with? That idea is a very recent one, and it is alien to fundamental human impulses. As Andrew Sullivan notes in his recent essay on the deep and enduring power of illiberal group attachments, tribalism “is not one aspect of human experience. It’s the default human experience. It comes more naturally to us than any other way of life.” For most of human history, “the idea of people within a tribe believing in different gods was incomprehensible.”

Getting around tribalism is partly a practice of collective self-improvement—of acculturating people to be more tolerant and open-minded. Most of the response to the disheartening Brookings data has focused on this approach: On the need to do a better job educating students about the American constitution and the Western liberal tradition it inherited and expanded upon.

But “liberalism”—that peculiar social order where we don’t shout down or attack speakers with opposing views—only gets some of its power from the abstract arguments of Mill and Madison. Abstract ideas on their own are not enough to overcome the powerful forces pulling us toward our default state of illiberalism and forced conformity. It’s also about taking a long view of our own self-interests—that is, recognizing that if we agree not to suppress the other tribe, then the other tribe just might agree, as a general rule, to not suppress us. If adhered to, it can be positive sum transaction—the free exchange of ideas ultimately makes life richer and more prosperous for everyone. Liberalism is a bargain between elites to set up institutions that allow this positive-sum process to take place despite all the forces working against it.

The bargain stops working, though, if the trust between different tribes breaks down—if you no longer trust the other tribe to honor your rights when it is in power, why should you honor theirs? The “idea” of tolerance isn’t enough. At its core, the institution of free expression depends on reciprocity over time.

What we may be experiencing now, more than a crisis of liberalism in the abstract, is a cascading crisis of public trust—a “run on the bank,” where each side, skeptical that its own deposits will be honored, is rushing to pull its own deposits. In 1962, the sociologist Talcott Parsons used the analogy of a financial panic to describe the McCarthy period: “A downward spin can only be checked by a restoration of ‘confidence,’ which means willingness to accept payment other than ‘hard’ cash—the return to credit. In short, there has to be a foundation of trust for the credit system to operate.” Letting a speaker with different views from your own speak when you have the power to stop them is a “credit”-based transaction. You allow it, at least in part, on the expectation that your money will be paid back in the future—that is, that your side will also be extended the freedom to dissent when you are in the minority.

On college campuses, this system is failing. One major reason is the much-discussed lack of ideological diversity among faculty and administrators. If liberal students never live under conservative authorities, how should they know whether their own rights will be honored? They can only imagine that rightists would stomp all over them if they had the chance. Meanwhile, conservative students have seen various “offensive” (usually right-leaning) speakers shouted down over the past few years. Why would they support allowing a liberal speaker to speak if he offends their sensibilities?

The bank run is evident in the rest of the country too. Donald Trump has spouted illiberal and authoritarian threats since the beginning of his campaign. And as Jack Goldsmith ably explained out in the Atlantic, the “resistance” has flouted important constitutional norms since his election, as well. Both tribes in America are increasingly anxious about the security of their trust deposits, and rushing to withdraw them.

Our challenge, then, is not only to teach students liberal ideals. It’s to make sure that we have strong institutional safeguards that trust deposits will be guaranteed—that our “trust FDIC” is fully operational and funded. So far, as Goldsmith points out, our institutional safeguards are holding under strain. But if they start to malfunction—if their integrity and solvency is called into question—the jitters we are currently experiencing could turn into a financial panic, and the liberal system could come crashing down all at once.

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The Deceptive Contentment of the German Electorate

As Germans prepare to head to the polls this Sunday, the forecast for Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats is still holding strong, with the Chancellor’s party currently on track to win a comfortable plurality of 37 percent. And a recent Pew survey suggests why: despite the populist winds sweeping Europe, the German public seems overwhelmingly satisfied with the ruling establishment and the status quo. A few choice data points:

An overwhelming 86% of Germans believe their economy is doing well, up from 75% last year, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted in spring. […]

On the political front, Germany’s mainstream parties enjoy widespread support. A 58% majority have a favorable opinion of Merkel’s center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and a 68% majority like the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). […]

The right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD), on the other hand, is extremely unpopular. More than eight-in-ten Germans have an unfavorable opinion of the AfD, with 55% saying their view of the party is very unfavorable. […]

As Germany expands its international role, the vast majority of the public (81%) is also feeling good about Merkel’s capacity to do the right thing on the world stage.

Those sunny numbers are sure to provide comfort to Merkel’s allies in Germany and abroad. Even before the election takes place, a reassuring narrative is understandably emerging: that Germany will remain a bastion of stability with Merkel at the helm, as Europe turns a corner after the populist shocks of Brexit and Trump.

But that narrative, however comforting, provides at best a partial picture. The same election that is supposed to reassure us about the future of Europe is also poised to see the far-Right Alternative for Germany (AfD) come in third place and enter the Bundestag for the first time. AfD won’t get a seat at the table in the government; Merkel will either form another coalition with the Social Democrats or with smaller mainstream parties like the Free Democrats and Greens. But the party’s long-term appeal should not be understated. Populist parties tend to grow stronger in opposition, and a major electoral mandate for Merkel will only provide her AfD rivals with a clearer foil to play against.

And many of the problems facing Germany in the coming years could provide fodder for the AfD. Chief among them is the long-term challenge of integrating the many migrants that Merkel welcomed in 2015. As Leonid Bershidsky recently noted at Bloomberg, that process is not going smoothly:

Though asylum seekers must attend integration courses, German is an exceedingly tough language to learn, so when the German Federal Office for Migration conducted a large-scale survey of the recent refugees in late 2016, only 18 percent reported their command of the language was “good,” while 47 percent confessed it was “bad.”

The job market situation is dismal: According to official data from August 2017, 497,000 refugees were registered as job-seekers with the country’s job centers, and 196,000 of them — 43,000 more than a year ago — were currently unemployed. The rest of the refugees aren’t even entitled to work because their applications were still pending or they were still in their initial three-month waiting period meant for integration courses, not work.

If Merkel and her mainstream allies in government prove unable to assimilate these migrants, the appeal of populist alternatives—or more extreme forces within her own party—will only increase. AfD has already proven it has legs in economically depressed regions of eastern Germany, even in areas with comparatively few asylum-seekers. But it also stands to gain in regions where there are refugees aplenty. A recent FT analysis of distribution patterns showed that refugees in Germany, especially in the country’s west, were disproportionately located in poorer regions with high unemployment and below-average job prospects. That combination of large foreign populations and bleak economic prospects plays right into the AfD’s hands.

This is not to say that Germany is inevitably set for a populist backlash in the long term. Merkel has proven adept and adaptable in responding to shifting political winds in the past, and may be able to steer a steady course for the future. But changes are surely coming that will challenge her skills, and leave her much more vulnerable than she is now. A Eurozone reform bargain with French President Emmanuel Macron could force Merkel to sell the public on unpopular fiscal burden-sharing, which is the bane of the German electorate. Political pressures to curb the German trade surplus could weaken a key source of Berlin’s export-driven economic might. If the EU falls out with Turkey or Italy’s border controls break down, new migrants could show up on Germany’s doorstep, reawakening an issue that has largely lain dormant during this election season.

The high support for Merkel’s party is in part a sign of public confidence in her ability to guide Germany through such challenges. But the public’s contentment with her also rests on the enjoyment of a fragile status quo—one that she may not be able to sustain indefinitely, no matter how large her victory come Sunday.

The post The Deceptive Contentment of the German Electorate appeared first on The American Interest.

Hope in the North Sea

Don’t look now, but there’s actually some good news coming out of the North Sea. The region helped make the UK a net oil exporter in the 1980s, but in the intervening years its offshore fields have matured and production has declined dramatically. To make matters worse, companies operating in the decreasingly profitable region are facing decommissioning costs that one industry group predicts will add up to £17 billion over the next decade. When you factor in the bearish turn oil markets have taken in recent years, you get a perfect storm for one of the UK’s most important energy resources.

But London will be heartened by what it’s seen in the North Sea in 2017. Operating costs have fallen nearly 50 percent, an industry reaction to today’s low-price environment, and that’s allowing firms to keep more existing projects in operation. In March, a new field was discovered off the coast of the Shetland Islands that has been hailed as “the biggest new oil discovery beneath UK waters this century.” Then, this summer, the British oil company Enquest started production in its ominously named “Kraken” oil field—a project that could save the firm from insolvency.

The WSJ reports that investors are piling on to this party in the North Sea:

Investors have sunk more than $16 billion so far this year into European deals for assets mostly located in the North Sea, a flurry that far outstrips energy deal activity in all but American shale country and Canada’s oil sands.

This is a major change from the outlook the industry faced even just last year, when it seemed that the North Sea was locked into an inexorable slide into irrelevance. BP’s CEO now says he sees the North Sea “turning things around,” and that sentiment is shared by the numerous other oil majors that are now looking to the region not only as a source of legacy operations, but as a place of potential growth now.

This is the new oil reality in which we live. The North Sea’s second wind came about because producers drastically slashed costs in order to stay competitive with global oil prices, and as a result they’ll be able to increase their supplies. Any resultant rise in output will help keep the market (over)supplied, which will in turn keep prices relatively low. There’s hope again in the North Sea, and as encouraging as that is for the UK, it’s yet another blow to the world’s beleaguered petrostates who are still desperately hoping for a return to $100+ crude.

The post Hope in the North Sea appeared first on The American Interest.

Hope In the North Sea

Don’t look now, but there’s actually some good news coming out of the North Sea. The region helped make the UK a net oil exporter in the 1980s, but in the intervening years its offshore fields have matured and production has declined dramatically. To make matters worse, companies operating in the decreasingly profitable region are facing decommissioning costs that one industry group predicts will add up to £17 billion over the next decade. When you factor in the bearish turn oil markets have taken in recent years, you get a perfect storm for one of the UK’s most important energy resources.

But London will be heartened by what it’s seen in the North Sea in 2017. Operating costs have fallen nearly 50 percent, an industry reaction to today’s low-price environment, and that’s allowing firms to keep more existing projects in operation. In March, a new field was discovered off the coast of the Shetland Islands that has been hailed as “the biggest new oil discovery beneath UK waters this century.” Then, this summer, the British oil company Enquest started production in its ominously named “Kraken” oil field—a project that could save the firm from insolvency.

The WSJ reports that investors are piling on to this party in the North Sea:

Investors have sunk more than $16 billion so far this year into European deals for assets mostly located in the North Sea, a flurry that far outstrips energy deal activity in all but American shale country and Canada’s oil sands.

This is a major change from the outlook the industry faced even just last year, when it seemed that the North Sea was locked into an inexorable slide into irrelevance. BP’s CEO now says he sees the North Sea “turning things around,” and that sentiment is shared by the numerous other oil majors that are now looking to the region not only as a source of legacy operations, but as a place of potential growth now.

This is the new oil reality in which we live. The North Sea’s second wind came about because producers drastically slashed costs in order to stay competitive with global oil prices, and as a result they’ll be able to increase their supplies. Any resultant rise in output will help keep the market (over)supplied, which will in turn keep prices relatively low. There’s hope again in the North Sea, and as encouraging as that is for the UK, it’s yet another blow to the world’s beleaguered petrostates who are still desperately hoping for a return to $100+ crude.

The post Hope In the North Sea appeared first on The American Interest.

The Next Hizballah-Israel Conflict

The recapture by pro-Assad regime forces—including Lebanese Hizballah—of rebel-held Aleppo (December 2016) and of IS-held Deir al-Zur (ongoing as of September 2017) may not just mark the denouement of Syria’s tragic civil conflict, but may also pave the way for the next Hizballah-Israel war. Buoyed by these successes, Hizballah leaders have increased the frequency and volume of their war talk. Thus, in February, Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah warned (as he has in the past) that there would be “no red lines” in a future war with Israel. In April, Hizballah held a press conference along the border to highlight Israeli defensive preparations and to declare its readiness for war. And in June, Nasrallah pledged that Hizballah would be joined in a future war by “tens…or even hundreds of thousands” of Shi‘a fighters from Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

These statements and activities were likely motivated by Hizballah’s desire to restore its image as a “resistance” organization whose principal raison d’etre is fighting Israel, which has been tarnished by its role in fighting Arab-Muslim rebels in Syria. Had Israel wanted to attack Hizballah, any time during the past six years would have been better than now, with the Syrian war winding down. So it is unlikely that these statements were prompted by a change in Hizballah’s assessment of the threat posed by Israel. Israel has responded to Hizballah’s operations in Syria and to what it sees as growing Hizballah military capabilities with its own talk and actions. In September 2017 it held what was billed as the largest military exercise in decades in a rehearsal of a war with Hizballah. The rhetoric and actions on both sides have focused renewed attention on the possibility of another Hizballah-Israel war.

It may seem unlikely that Hizballah would start such a war while thousands of its fighters remain dispersed throughout Syria, but it should be recalled that its last war with Israel in 2006 as well as Hamas-Israel conflicts in Gaza in 2008–09, 2012, and 2014 were the unintended outcomes of miscalculations by both parties. So the possibility of war, at least in the near-term, cannot be dismissed. In the long run, however, another Hizballah-Israel war seems likely, as the “axis of resistance” (whose core members are Hizballah, Iran, and Syria)—emboldened by their apparent success in Syria and perhaps by the Russian military presence there—may be tempted to provoke Israel. However such a conflict starts, one thing is clear: The next Hizballah-Israel war will likely be the most destructive Arab-Israeli war yet.

“Resistance” and Hizballah’s “Forever War” with Israel

Nasrallah has generally shown himself to be a careful, prudent decision-maker, despite his frequent resort to provocative rhetoric. Yet the potential for miscalculation and escalation is inherent in Hizballah’s doctrine of “resistance” (muqawama), which shapes its approach to Israel. The concept of resistance was adopted as a slogan by the Palestinians in the 1960s, fashioned into a quasi-religious doctrine of armed struggle by Hizballah during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in the 1980s, and subsequently appropriated by Iran and Syria. The concept resonates with many Lebanese Shi‘a, with its evocation of the “resistance” and martyrdom of the Shi‘a Imam Hussein at Karbala in 680 CE at the hands of the Caliph Yazid’s army. Even though the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 was ratified by the UN, Hizballah claims that Israel continues to occupy Lebanese territory (Sheba Farms in the Golan and the ruins of seven Shi‘a villages in northern Israel), providing a pretext for continuing its armed struggle against Israel.

The resistance doctrine exhorts its adherents to stand fast in the face of threats, to push boundaries, and to eschew compromise on matters of principle. It posits that victory is achieved by imposing costs and by demoralizing the enemy—by relentless psychological warfare, terrorizing and bleeding the enemy’s population and military, and denying it battlefield victories. The purported success of various arms of the “Islamic resistance” in pushing Israeli forces out of Lebanon (2000) and Gaza (2005) and U.S. forces out of Iraq (2011), and in thwarting alleged U.S., Saudi, and Israeli conspiracies to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria (since 2011) has convinced its adherents that they have hit on a formula for defeating their enemies.

For Hizballah, resistance is a way: to forge a proud, confident Shi‘a identity; to build resilience by inculcating a culture of “resistance, jihad, and martyrdom;” and to advance its goal of destroying the Jewish state. Israel is portrayed in Hizballah propaganda as a fragile, artificial entity whose continued existence is, as Nasrallah famously claimed in a speech following its May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, as tenuous as “a spider’s web.” These premises raise the possibility that Hizballah might overreach or miscalculate in the future, as it has done in the past. Indeed, the resistance doctrine has propelled Hizballah and the Palestinian Hamas (an occasional member of the “axis of resistance”) into several destructive conflicts with Israel in Lebanon and Gaza that have imposed heavy tolls on their societies. Israel, however, has proven more resilient than anticipated. Indeed, a propensity to overreach seems to be woven into the DNA of “axis of resistance” members.

Since its withdrawal from Lebanon, Israel’s main preoccupation has been ensuring quiet on its northern frontier, by deterring Hizballah activities against Israeli military personnel and civilian residents. The standoff with Hizballah, however, has implications that go far beyond the security of Israel’s northern border. Hizballah’s past military successes against it, amplified by a prodigious propaganda machine, have undermined Israel’s deterrence image, emboldened some of its most implacable enemies (such as Hamas), popularized the resistance “brand” in the Arab world (at least prior to Hizballah’s intervention in Syria), and served as a model and inspiration for radical Shi‘a throughout the region. Hizballah, moreover, is Iran’s main proxy in its long war with Israel. Iranian leaders frequently proclaim that “Israel should be wiped off the map” and have facilitated Hizballah military operations and terrorism against Israel and Jewish targets. Hizballah’s massive rocket/missile arsenal (larger than that of most states) is part of Iran’s strategic deterrent, and would probably be used for retaliation in the event of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

From War to War

For these reasons, both Hizballah and Israel have prepared intensively for the next round of fighting. In recent years, Hizballah has expanded greatly the size and range of its rocket/missile inventory (in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which defined the terms of the cease fire ending the last round of fighting, and which prohibits arms transfers to Hizballah). It has enhanced its antiarmor capabilities with additional antitank weapons, and improved its air and coastal defense capabilities with modern systems acquired from or through Syria. It has improved its defensive dispositions in southern Lebanon, deeply embedding its forces in towns and villages throughout the region. In addition, the group claims to have developed a capability to undertake offensive ground operations into northern Israel. Indeed, Nasrallah has threatened to do so in a future war, and its offensive military operations in Syria have given it the experience and capabilities to do so.

Hizballah’s strategic situation has changed as a result of its commitment, starting in 2012, of significant forces to Syria, where 6,000-8,000 personnel (out of perhaps 25,000) serve at any given time. On the one hand, this has reduced Hizballah’s readiness for a conflict with Israel. On the other hand, Hizballah has kept many of its anti-tank teams and rocket/missile crews in Lebanon—as these are crucial for any war with Israel—and it has gained operational experience in Syria that could make it more effective in a ground war. Moreover, in a future war, Hizballah might open a second front against Israel on Syria’s Golan—an option it did not have in the past.

Israel’s military has also greatly improved its capabilities since 2006. Israel now has a multilayered defense against Hizballah’s short-, medium-, and long-range rocket/missile threats, and its civil defense system has been tested and upgraded as a result of the 2006 Lebanon war and conflicts with Hamas. No defense is “airtight,” however, and Israel will also have to rely on offensive air and ground operations to deal with the Hizballah rocket/missile threat. Israel has also dramatically increased its ability to locate and hit targets by improving its intelligence, air, and artillery capabilities. It has enhanced its ground maneuver capabilities by deploying more advanced and capable tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (the Merkava IV and Namer, respectively) and by equipping key armored units with active defenses, to counter anti-tank weapons. Since 2006, Israeli training has emphasized operations against hybrid opponents like Hizballah, and major conflicts with Hamas in 2008–09 and 2014 resulted in improvements to equipment, training, and doctrine.

Lessons from Syria

Hizballah has undoubtedly gained experience and learned important lessons from its involvement in Syria’s civil war. Since 2012, Hizballah has sent advisors and fighters to Syria where they have fought against rebel forces with Syrian, Iranian, and Russian troops, and Shi‘a militiamen from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Hizballah fighters rotate through on deployments lasting from several weeks to several months duration. The experience of participating in sustained combat will build confidence, and improve the ability of Hizballah’s fighters to shoot, move, and communicate under fire. Moreover, their involvement in the planning and execution of complex, combined arms operations alongside Russian troops has undoubtedly taught them many important lessons regarding the employment of advanced weapons and tactics—including armor, fire support, unmanned aerial vehicles for ISR and attack missions, electronic warfare, and special forces.

On the other hand, as the U.S. military discovered after more than a decade in Afghanistan and Iraq, prolonged combat deployments often produce a decline in readiness for the full range of mission sets that units must prepare for. Hizballah is unlikely to escape this paradox as well. Moreover, Hizballah is engaged in combat in Syria against lightly armed irregular ground forces, which is not the kind of fighting it would engage in with Israel—an advanced military power that wages combined arms combat on the sea, air, land, and in the cyber domain. Thus, combat in Syria, while providing invaluable experience, will not prepare it for the full range of challenges it could face in a war with Israel—just as five years of fighting the second Palestinian intifada did not prepare the Israeli military for the 2006 war against Hizballah. Finally, reports that recent Hizballah recruits are less ideologically committed than previous generations of fighters and are often joining because they could not otherwise find work raise questions about the motivation and morale of Hizballah fighters. It likewise raises the possibility that Israeli intelligence may have many more collection opportunities than in the past. These factors could have an important impact on the conduct of a future war.

Political and Military Objectives

Recognizing that Hizballah cannot be destroyed by military means, Israel would nonetheless try to impose as much damage as possible on Hizballah as a military organization and on the infrastructure that facilitates its military operations—including the infrastructure of the Lebanese state. The principle goal would be to ensure the maximum period of quiet following a war, though Israel might also hope to further sully Hizballah’s image as Lebanon’s defender, and to engender a domestic political backlash against it. Israel may also hope that weakening Hizballah militarily could alter the domestic balance of power in Lebanon, emboldening Shi‘a critics of Hizballah and exposing it to attacks by Sunni extremists in Lebanon and Syria.

Critics within and outside Israel will undoubtedly protest the collateral damage caused by such a campaign. And a protracted conflict that leads to significant civilian casualties in Israel could increase pressure on the Israeli government to expand the mission. But as in 2006, Israel would be supported overtly by the U.S. administration, and tacitly by many Arab states, which will be rooting for Israel to strike a painful blow against Hizballah, and thus against Iranian regional ambitions.

A major conflict would also have important implications for Syria. Fighting could spread to the Golan frontier and bring Assad regime forces under Israeli fire. Hizballah could be forced to withdraw troops from Syria in order to meet an Israeli offensive in southern Lebanon, reducing its ability to support Damascus. If the group suffers major losses, its ability to render support to Iran’s policy in the region could likewise be compromised. This could encourage Syrian rebels to seize the moment and to launch a new wave of attacks on the Assad regime in the hope of regaining the initiative.

Escalation Dynamics

A number of factors inherent to the Hizballah-Israel conflict make rapid escalation likely. There are advantages to escalating faster than one’s opponent in order to seize the initiative and dictate the scope and pace of operations. Triggers could include high-casualty incidents, snowballing violence as each side ups its commitment, or domestic pressure to achieve victory. Moreover, Hizballah (and its allies in the “resistance axis,” Iran and Syria) may be encouraged by past successes against Israel (2000 and 2006) and Syria’s rebels (2011–present) to be steadfast and to take risks, believing that this has paid off in the past.

Several countervailing factors may limit escalation. Neither side seems particularly eager to risk the extensive casualties and damage that a major conflict could bring—especially Hizballah, after incurring more than 1,700 killed and several thousand wounded in Syria. Moreover, Hizballah’s ongoing Syrian commitment makes it less capable of sustained conflict with Israel. Pressure from allies could steer each belligerent away from escalation, even if it does not cause either party to end a conflict prior to achieving their military objectives.

Russia: Constraint or Enabler?

One of the chief consequences of Syria’s civil war has been the return of a major Russian military presence in the region, for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Russia now has several thousand troops in Syria, including infantry, armor, artillery, and special forces. It has between forty and fifty combat aircraft (including Su-24, Su-25, Su-30, and Su-34 strike fighters and Mi-28 and Ka-52 attack helicopters), located at Hmeimin Air Base and several forward operating bases and dispersal airfields. It also maintains a small naval presence off the coast of Syria which has, at various times, included a diesel submarine, one or two corvettes and frigates, several amphibious landing ships, and various fleet auxiliaries. Finally, Russia has created an anti-access bubble in Syria consisting of SSC-5 coastal anti-ship missiles, SS-26 Iskander ballistic missiles, and SA-22, S-300, and S-400 SAMs. All of these (except for the SA-22) are long-range systems that can cover northern Israel.

Thus far, Russia has not interfered with Israeli strikes on arm depots and convoys transporting arms from Syria to Hizballah. But given Russia’s reliance on Hizballah to prop up the Assad regime (Russian advisors reportedly respect Hizballah fighters, while holding Syrian and Iranian forces and other Shi‘a militias fighting for the regime in low regard), it might try to constrain Israel to prevent the defeat of an organization that it depends on to ensure the Assad regime’s survival. Russia would likely use diplomatic action and perhaps threats to limit Israeli operations in Syria, and it might use force if their troops were endangered or if Israeli actions threatened the stability of the Assad regime. This could lead to tensions with the United States, which will likely encourage Israel to inflict maximum damage on Hizballah. Russia would also replace Syrian (and via Syria, some Hizballah) war losses.

Missile versus Missile

Hizballah’s 150,000 rockets and missiles pose the greatest military threat to Israel. Most of these are short-range Katyusha-type rockets. But Hizballah probably has thousands of medium- and long-range rockets, such as the Iranian Fajr-3 and -5 (with claimed ranges of forty kilometers and seventy kilometers, respectively), the Syrian Khaybar-1 (100 kilometers), and the Iranian Zelzal-3 (250 kilometers), as well as missiles such as the Syrian M600—based on Iran’s Fateh-110 (250 kilometers), and SCUD-B/C/D missiles (300-700 kilometers). Israel’s military estimates that in a future war, Hizballah will be able to launch 1,500 rockets and missiles a day against it. Hizballah will likely target military facilities (such as headquarters, airfields, mobilization bases), critical infrastructure (such as power plants and petroleum storage facilities), and civilian population centers. Indeed, Nasrallah has warned Israel that Hizballah will hit critical infrastructure in a future war, including an ammonia storage facility in Haifa (whose destruction, he boasted, would lead to the death of thousands) and the nuclear reactor at Dimona, though he has generally couched these threats as a “tit-for-tat”-type response to possible Israeli actions. Thus, he has warned

I’d like to say to the Israelis today: Not only if you attack al-Dahiya, we will attack Tel Aviv, but if you attack Beirut’s Rafiq al-Hariri Airport, we will attack Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv. If you attack our ports, we will shell your ports. If you attack our oil refineries, we will shell your oil refineries. If you attack our factories, we will shell your factories. If you shell our electricity plants, we will shell your electricity plants.

For these reasons, Israel will try to destroy Hizballah’s more capable rocket/missile systems at the outset of a war, just as it did in 2006. And while Israel has rocket/missile defenses capable of dealing with the full range of threats (some 12 Iron Dome missile batteries, three Arrow-2 and -3 missile batteries, and one David’s Sling battery), Hizballah’s large rocket and missile force is likely to overwhelm Israeli defenses—at least in the early days of a conflict, if not for its duration. Hizballah might also use rockets and attack drones to suppress Israeli missile defenses, so that its M-600 and SCUD missiles (or Iranian SCUD missiles) can get through—a tactic the Houthis have used in their war with the Saudi-led coalition.

Finally, Israel’s extensive natural gas production infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean is also likely to be targeted. Hizballah’s acquisition of P-800 Oniks (Yakhont) anti-ship cruise missiles with a 300-kilometer range provides it with the means of hitting Israel’s offshore natural gas production facilities, as well as coastal targets such as the Hadera power plant south of Haifa.

Ground and Air Operations

Hizbollah will conduct both offensive and defensive operations. The former will include a rocket and missile blitz throughout the depth of Israel. According to Israeli intelligence estimates, Hizballah will launch up to 1,500 rockets and missiles per day against airfields, military headquarters, and critical infrastructure, dwarfing numbers fired in previous wars and saturating Israeli defenses. Hizballah cross-border attacks by means of tunnels or aerial infiltration using ultralight aircraft could also be a central feature of a future war, especially in its early days, before Israeli forces had gained ground in southern Lebanon. Hizballah will probably try to capture (temporarily) military outposts and villages in northern Israel and take prisoners and hostages in order to undermine the Israeli public’s confidence in their government and military, and to create an “image of victory.”

Hizballah will attempt to blunt the effectiveness of Israel’s air force by dispersing its massive rocket and missile forces in subterranean, one-time-use launch positions, dispersing its ground forces in civilian population centers and underground bunker complexes, and by deploying new or improved types of man-portable surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-18, and vehicle-mounted systems such as the SA-17 and SA-22. It will try to blunt any Israeli ground operations by anchoring its defenses in built-up areas along likely Israeli axes of advance, by using fortifications and underground bunker complexes, and employing camouflaged and concealed antitank missiles (like the AT-14 Kornet) and indirect fire systems (such as mortars and rocket artillery) in large numbers.

Israel offensive actions will likely consist of two major components: 1) an air campaign against Hizballah’s rocket and missile forces and supporting infrastructure throughout Lebanon (to include hardened and buried production facilities), and against anti-ship missiles along the coast; 2) a multi-division ground operation in southern Lebanon, supported by airmobile insertions, to attack Hizballah ground, rocket, and missile forces in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. There might also be a supporting operation against Hizballah forces in the Golan that could be followed by a flanking movement into eastern Lebanon via the Beirut-Damascus highway, to isolate Hizballah forces south of the highway. The limitations of airpower to effectively suppress and root out a camouflaged, concealed, and hardened rocket and missile threat (demonstrated in Lebanon in 2006 and in several Gaza operations since) make major ground operations a necessity. Israeli operations will aim to comprehensively destroy Hizballah combat forces.

Israel will likewise rely on active and passive defenses (anti-rocket/missile systems and civil defenses, respectively) to reduce the impact of Hizballah rocket and missile strikes. It will also have to be prepared to fight on its own soil in the event of cross-border penetrations. In a recent large scale exercise Israel practiced defending its border communities and evacuating civilians to a depth of nine kilometers inside its own territory. For the first time since the 1948 war, Israel may evacuate tens of thousands of residents from border communities in the north (and perhaps elsewhere), to facilitate operations to repel such penetrations, and to protect populations within range of short-range rockets.

A Cyber Dimension?

Cyber operations could figure prominently in a future Hizballah-Israel war. Israel is a global cyber power, as demonstrated by its cyberattacks (reportedly in conjunction with the United States) against Iran’s nuclear program. It is likely to integrate offensive and defensive cyber into both its battlefield activities and its efforts to disrupt those elements of Lebanon’s infrastructure used by Hizballah—although a desire to conceal the actual scope and nature of its cyber capabilities may predispose it to restraint.

Hizballah and Iran have conducted sporadic cyberattacks on Israeli critical infrastructure in recent years, usually in times of tension, such as the Israel-Hamas war in 2014. These attacks were apparently intended to harass and to warn Israel that both sides can play this game; indeed, none of these attacks disrupted or damaged Israeli critical infrastructure or govern­ment operations. Iran has shared cyber tools and know-how with Hizballah, transferring certain capabili­ties within two to four years of their introduction in the Islamic Republic.

Given Israel’s heavy reliance on information technology, Hizballah is almost certainly examining the use of cyber to disrupt Israeli rocket and missile defenses, unmanned aerial and naval systems, and critical infrastructure. Given the likelihood that Israel will strike Lebanese infrastructure that facilitate Hizballah military operations (roads, power grids, communications), Hizballah will likely try to respond in kind, in both the physical and cyber domains.

Unreliable Coalition Partners

Hizballah has proven itself an invaluable ally to Syria and Iran—helping ensure the survival of the Assad regime. But both Syria and Iran will likely limit their involvement in any future Hizballah-Israel war. Syria might facilitate the transfer of arms and the passage of Shi‘a fighters and Iranian military personnel through its territory to Lebanon, and allow Hizballah and Iran to use the Syrian Golan as a springboard for operations against Israel. But with barely enough forces to hold onto its rump state, Syria is unlikely to participate directly in such a war, though it will likely be targeted by Israel for facilitating Hizballah’s war effort.

Iran has also limited its involvement in past wars. During the 2006 war in Lebanon and the 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014 conflicts in Gaza, Iran neither intervened nor permitted Iranian volunteers to leave for the front. After Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Ali Khamenei, warned Israel in January 2013 that an attack on Syria would be considered an attack on Iran, the Islamic Republic did nothing in response to the nearly hundred subsequent Israeli strikes on weapons shipments destined for Hizballah. When Syria reportedly asked Iran to retaliate against Israel in response to an Israeli strike in February 2013, Iran reportedly refused to do so. Finally, throughout its intervention in Syria, Iran has tried to limit its own exposure by offloading risks and burdens on its proxies, using them as cannon fodder, and fighting to the last non-Iranian Shi‘a proxy whenever possible.

Yet, Iran—emboldened by its success in securing the survival of the Assad regime—might take chances in a future war that it was loath to take in the past, facilitating Hizballah operations in Lebanon and the Syrian Golan, transporting Shi‘a militiamen to the front, and perhaps allowing IRGC advisors to participate in combat. Thus, there is a greater potential for a clash involving Iran and Israel than in previous wars. (Indeed, an IRGC general was killed in an Israeli air strike during a tour of the Syrian Golan with Hizballah personnel in January 2015.)

Hizballah might be reinforced by militias belonging to Iran’s Shi‘a legion. For instance, a pro-Tehran Iraqi militia, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujuba, recently created a group dedicated to the “liberation” of the Golan Heights from Israel. Israeli intelligence assesses that Iran controls perhaps 40,000 Syrian, Iraqi, Afghani, and Pakistani militiamen, some of which might be dispatched to support Hizballah in wartime. The military utility of these forces, however, would likely be limited: most are not well trained, and the Afghans and Pakistanis don’t speak Arabic. They would probably backfill positions vacated by Hizballah fighters mobilized to fight at the front, or fulfill rear area security and civil defense tasks. And because they would have to travel a ways to get to Lebanon, their convoys could be interdicted en route.

Finally, there is always the possibility of a Gaza “excursion” during a Hizballah-Israel war. In the past, Hamas has exploited tensions between Hizballah and Israel to take pot shots against Israel, and it is likely to do so again in the future. During past conflicts with Israel, Hamas has also asked Hizballah to open a second front, to relieve pressure on Gaza. Each time, however, Hizballah refused. In light of the recent ascendancy of a hard-line Hamas military leadership and the subsequent mending of ties between Hamas and Iran, a greater degree of coordination between the two may be possible, though each will act in accordance with their own interests.

Implications: The Wages of War

A war will produce significant military and civilian losses and widespread destruction on both sides. Ground combat in southern Lebanon and perhaps northern Israel will probably produce the most military casualties, with air and rocket/missile strikes accounting for the majority of civilian losses. Hizballah has created an extensive military infrastructure that is integrated with the civilian infrastructure in Shi‘a-majority regions, making heavy civilian losses almost inevitable. Israeli commanders have already indicated that operations against Hizballah will not be constrained by the presence of civilians. In an October 2008 interview, the chief of Israel’s Northern Command (now Chief of Staff of the armed forces) Major General Gadi Eisenkot announced what subsequently became known as the “Dahiya Doctrine,” stating that in a future war:

What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on…. We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great damage and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases…. This is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it has been approved.

Shi‘a civilians will be unable to flee in large numbers because they will be unwelcome elsewhere (unlike in 2006) due to Lebanon’s sectarian polarization, and will suffer heavy losses. Moreover, Israel will probably target Lebanon’s critical infrastructure—roads, bridges, and communications facilities that could contribute to Hizballah’s war effort—as well as the Lebanese Armed Forces, which cooperates with Hizballah and shares intelligence with it.

Such a war will cause widespread social and economic dislocation in both Lebanon and Israel. This could greatly complicate Hizballah’s domestic political standing, as many Lebanese will blame it for the war and its consequences. In such circumstances, it will be difficult for Hizballah to proclaim a “divine victory” as it did in 2006, regardless of its military achievements, and efforts to create an “image of victory.” It is not too difficult to imagine Nasrallah having to once again admit, as he did in a post-2006 war interview, that war with Israel was a mistake:

You ask me, if I had known…there was one percent chance that the kidnapping [of the Israeli soldiers] would lead to such a war, would I have done it? I say ‘no, absolutely not’, for humanitarian, moral, social, security, military and political reasons.

An enfeebled Hizballah, moreover, will be less capable of helping prop up the Assad regime, and Russia and Iran will have to take up the slack to ensure the regime’s survival. As for Israel, should it once again prove incapable of dealing Hizballah a decisive blow, it is likely to experience political recriminations and turmoil, as have occurred after past wars.

For Israel, a war of this magnitude and intensity will have major political, economic, and social consequences well beyond any military outcomes. It would mark the first time since the War of Independence that Israel, throughout its territory, would be a major battleground, with the population and infrastructure exposed to direct, and likely sustained, attack. Even given likely Israeli successes against Hizballah and improvements in civil defense, this would be a true test of the country’s resilience.

Policy Recommendations

It remains to be seen whether Hizballah and Israel can avoid another war; hopes the parties would do so prior to the 2006 Lebanon war and the 2009 and 2014 Gaza conflicts proved wrong. Moreover, the next Hizballah-Israel war will be much more intense and destructive than their 2006 conflict; much of Lebanon and all of Israel will likely be targeted. This will create pressure on both parties to escalate in order to achieve a decisive outcome; to prolong the fighting in order to exhaust the enemy; or to achieve symbolic successes that could permit a cease fire on honorable terms.

Clearly, the overwhelming imperative for Washington is to prevent such a war in the first place. Yet, U.S. policy in recent years may have made such a war more likely; by not providing more robust support to the non-Salafist opposition in Syria, the United States made the success of the Assad regime and its allies more likely. This may embolden them to build on their military successes and overreach—just as Hizballah’s success in forcing Israel out of Lebanon in 2000, and Hamas’s success in forcing Israel from Gaza in 2005, caused Hizballah and Hamas to engage in provocations that led to additional wars. Accordingly, Washington should quietly warn Hizballah, Iran, and Syria against actions that could lead to war, and signal that it will not restrain Israel if Hizballah acts recklessly or provocatively.

Efforts to prevent another Hizballah-Israel war should be nested within a broader U.S. policy of pushing back against and imposing costs on Iran for its destabilizing regional policies. Washington no longer seems interested in training and equipping the remnants of the non-Salafist Arab opposition. However, a revived train and equip program—not to overthrow the Assad regime but to deter pro-regime forces and keep them tied down in Syria—might ensure the success of the de-escalation zones and help avert another Hizballah-Israel war.

Specifically, such a program should strive to create a military balance between the remaining rebel enclaves and the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, to shore up shaky cease fires, prevent new mass refugee flows, and forestall shifts in the military balance—as the regime and its allies rearm—that could encourage pro-regime forces to renew attacks on rebel-held areas. Tying down pro-regime forces (including Hizballah) in Syria will also limit their ability to make trouble elsewhere in the region, and thereby reduce the prospects for a ruinous Hizballah-Israel war. Washington seems averse to such a renewed train and equip effort, but the result of such diffidence might be the very outcome it is trying to avoid.

In the event of war, the U.S. should provide Israel political cover and buy for it the time needed to strike a decisive blow against Hizballah—Iran’s foremost regional proxy. The United States should continue to provide Israel with the military means to sustain an intense and perhaps prolonged war against Hizballah. The United States should work to ensure that Israeli targeting minimizes civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure in Lebanon—even if Hizballah’s modus operandi makes such collateral damage inevitable. It should quietly warn Syria and Iran to avoid provocations that could further escalate a conflict—such as opening a second front on the Syrian Golan, the deployment of Shi‘a militias and Iranian “advisers” there, or the launch of Iranian missiles—and it should indicate that it will assist Israeli efforts to disrupt or counter these actions.

Finally, the United States should support termination of the conflict only when conditions for an enduring cease-fire have been met. Making clear to Hizballah that the United States will not seek a premature halt to a war that could make Hizballah—and the Assad regime—more vulnerable to their local Arab rivals and enemies (some of whom the United States should be arming for its own reasons—per above), may be the best way to prevent such a war in the first place.

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