Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 89

Full text of Xinhua’s interview with Putin

Xinhua, 5/15/24

MOSCOW, May 15 (Xinhua) — On the eve of his two-day state visit to China, which starts on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin took a written interview with Xinhua.

The following is the full text of the interview.

Question: In March 2023, President Xi Jinping chose Russia as a destination for his first foreign visit after his re-election as President of the People’s Republic of China. This year, upon your re-election as President of the Russian Federation, you, in turn, have chosen China for your first foreign visit. We have noted that over the last decade or so, President Xi Jinping and you have met more than 40 times in various bilateral and multilateral settings. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Russia. What is your assessment of your contacts with Chinese President Xi Jinping? What do you expect from your upcoming visit to China? What is your forecast for the further development of Russia-China relations?

Answer: I am pleased to be able to address the multimillion audience of Xinhua, one of the world’s leading and most trusted news agencies and share my vision of the future Russia-China partnership. I would like to highlight that it has always relied on the principles of equality and trust, mutual respect for the sovereignty and consideration of each other’s interests. A special and prominent role in the development of our relations has belonged to wise and shrewd politicians and state leaders, such as Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China.

We first met back in March 2010, and we have been seeing and calling each other regularly ever since. President Xi maintains a respectful, friendly, open and at the same time business-like style of communication. Our every meeting is not just a dialogue between old friends, which is important, too, just like for everyone, – but also a fruitful exchange of views on the most topical issues on the bilateral and international agenda.

I have fond memories of the state visit of President Xi Jinping to Russia in March 2023, immediately after his re-election as President of the PRC. Just like in 2013, our country was the first one he visited as head of China. We had more than five hours of a face-to-face conversation, and the next day we followed an extensive and substantive official schedule.

This unprecedented level of strategic partnership between our countries determined my choice of China as the first state to be visited after the official inauguration as the president of the Russian Federation.

I have emphasized on many occasions that our peoples are bound by a long and strong tradition of friendship and cooperation. That is one of the most important pillars of bilateral relations. During World War II, Soviet and Chinese soldiers stood up together against Japanese militarism. We remember and value the contribution of the Chinese people to the common Victory. It was China that held back major forces of Japanese militarists, making it possible for the Soviet Union to focus on defeating Nazism in Europe. And, of course, we are grateful to our Chinese friends for their careful attitude to war memorials, to the memory of Soviet citizens who had fought for the liberation of China and supported the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, their righteous fight against the invaders. Today, Russia-China relations have reached the highest level ever, and despite the difficult global situation continue to get stronger.

This year is special for our countries. October 1 marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. The country is approaching this significant historical date with outstanding achievements, which we welcome as old, reliable and time-tested friends.

The USSR was the first to recognize the PRC on the second day of its existence. So in early October, we will also celebrate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Over the three quarters of a century, our countries have travelled a long and at times difficult way. We have learnt well the lessons of the history of our relationship at different stages of their development. Today, we know that the synergy of complementary strengths provides a powerful impetus for rapid comprehensive development.

It is important that Russia-China ties as they are today, are free from the influence of either ideology or political trends. Their multidimensional development is an informed strategic choice based on the wide convergence of core national interests, profound mutual trust, strong public support and sincere friendship between the peoples of the two countries. I am talking about our joint efforts to strengthen the sovereignty, protect the territorial integrity and security of our countries. In a broader sense, we are working to contribute to the development and prosperity of Russia and China by enhancing equal, mutually beneficial economic and humanitarian cooperation, and strengthen foreign policy coordination in the interests of building a just multipolar world order. All this is the key to a future success of our comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era.

Question: Today, practical trade and economic cooperation between China and Russia is constantly developing. Last year, the US$200 billion trade turnover target you had set together with Chinese President Xi Jinping was surpassed ahead of schedule. In your opinion, what are the new specific features and growth points of practical trade and economic cooperation between China and Russia? In which areas Chinese-Russian trade and economic cooperation is likely to achieve even greater breakthroughs in future?

Answer: Trade and economic relations between our countries are developing at a fast pace, showing strong immunity to external challenges and crises. Over the past five years, we have doubled the Russia-China turnover: it reached US$227.8 billion last year, against US$111 billion in 2019. More than 90% of settlements between our companies are made in national currencies. So it would be more accurate to say that bilateral trade currently totals about 20 trillion rubles, or nearly 1.6 trillion yuan. China has remained our key business partner for 13 years, and in 2023, Russia ranked 4th among the PRC’s major trading partners.

Our countries have made an informed choice in favour of equal and mutually beneficial economic ties a long time ago. We are systematically and consistently developing strategic cooperation in the energy sector, working on new large-scale energy projects. Supplies of Russian agricultural produce to the Chinese market are showing positive dynamics; investment and production initiatives are implemented, and transport and logistics corridors between our countries are smoothly functioning and expanding. Given global turbulence and economic issues in the West, such results prove yet again the strategic wisdom of our sovereign course and pursuit of national interests.

As for our plans, we will try to establish closer cooperation in industry and high-tech, outer space and peaceful atom, artificial intelligence, renewable energy and other innovative sectors. We will keep working to provide favourable legal and organizational conditions for that and develop transport and financial infrastructure. I believe that Russian-Chinese economic ties have great prospects.

Question: The friendship between China and Russia goes on for generations, and the cultures of the two countries are deeply intertwined. This year and next year, in line with the agreements reached between you and President Xi Jinping, the China-Russia Years of Culture will be held. What is the role of cultural exchanges in expanding cooperation and friendship between our countries, as you see it? What is your personal perception of Chinese culture and what is your experience of it?

Answer: I have said more than once and will say again: Russia and China have been inextricably linked for centuries, both by an extensive common border and by close cultural and people-to-people ties. In the distant past, only rare tidings of China reached our country with merchants. Later on, the first embassies appeared, and the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, which made a truly invaluable contribution to the collection and systematization of knowledge about China, was organized in Beijing. The 19th century saw the first students of the Chinese language in Russia, followed by the first university departments as well as the first attempts at compiling dictionaries.

During the reign of Catherine the Great, Chinese art came into fashion. For example, the interiors of the Chinese Room of the Catherine Palace, the Empress’s private chambers, were richly decorated with lacquer panels from China. Unfortunately, the interior was completely destroyed during the Great Patriotic War, but restoration is underway involving specialists from China.

Today, Chinese culture and art are also of great interest to the Russian public. There are about 90,000 students and schoolchildren who study Chinese in our country. Tours of Chinese performing companies and exhibitions featuring Chinese artists are always a great success. Since the quarantine restrictions were removed, the tourist flow has been growing dynamically. Last year, more than 730,000 Russians visited the PRC.

I know that people in China are also keen to get acquainted with Russian literature, art and traditions. Our eminent theatre groups and musicians regularly perform in China, museums organize their exhibitions, and Russian films are run in cinemas. We are most willing to introduce our Chinese friends to historical, artistic and cultural heritage of multi-ethnic Russia in all its diversity.

To this end, President of China Xi Jinping and I decided to declare 2024 and 2025 cross years of culture between Russia and China, so as to implement this large-scale project in conjunction with the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries. We expect the program of activities to be vibrant and abundant. A number of major events have already taken place. For example, in Moscow, for the first time, broad New Year celebrations were held according to the lunar calendar, while in Beijing and Xi’an, Chinese citizens got an opportunity to learn about the tradition of our holiday Maslenitsa at the Farewell to the Russian Winter festival.

Russia, just like China, firmly relies on the principles of multiculturalism, advocates the equality of cultures and the preservation of national identity. These and other important issues were in the focus of the 2023 St. Petersburg International Cultural Forum. A representative Chinese delegation most actively participated in the Forum. The free discussions held at the Forum are particularly important at this time, as they contribute to building a respectful dialogue between civilizations.

We intend to promote new formats of interaction, such as the Intervision International Popular Song Contest. China is the key partner in this project, which aims to spread and popularize national song schools.

As for my personal attitude to Chinese culture, I would like to emphasize that I am always eager to discover China’s unique and authentic traditions, especially during my visits to the PRC. I know quite a bit about your martial arts, including Wushu, which is very popular in our country. I also have respect for Chinese philosophy. My family members are also interested in China, and some of them are learning Chinese.

Question: This year, Russia has assumed the BRICS Chairmanship, and the current year is also the first year of “greater BRICS cooperation.” Please tell us about Russia’s priorities and plan of events as the BRICS Chair. What is to be done to facilitate harmonious integration of new members into the BRICS cooperation mechanism? How do you see the role of the BRICS mechanism in the global arena? What could be done to make “greater BRICS cooperation” even more fruitful?

Answer: Russia’s BRICS Chairmanship has gained a steady momentum. Full-scale work is underway on all three main pillars of cooperation – politics and security, the economy and finance, culture and people-to-people contacts.

One of the main goals of the Russian Chairmanship is undoubtedly the seamless integration of the BRICS new members. We are actively assisting them in joining the existing network of cooperation mechanisms.

As another priority, we seek to continue coordinated work to enhance the visibility of the association in global affairs and build its capacity to promote a more democratic, stable and fair architecture of international relations. I would like to particularly stress that cooperation within BRICS relies on the principles of mutual respect, equality, openness and consensus. That is why countries of the Global South and East, which see BRICS as a platform for their voices to be certainly heard and taken into account, find our association so attractive.

Russian agencies, business and public circles have prepared an extensive agenda for the Chairmanship. This includes a wide range of areas for enhancing interaction, including finance, agriculture, energy, intellectual property, healthcare, education and space exploration. Moreover, such niche and knowledge-intensive topics as nanotechnology, nuclear medicine and biotechnology are being discussed by experts in relevant fields.

We have held quite a few specialized events: in total, the Chairmanship plan envisages more than 200 of them. In addition to expert and ministerial meetings, they include numerous cultural events and youth activities. The BRICS Sports Games will take place in Kazan in June, and in October, the city will host the BRICS Summit.

Question: Multilateral mechanisms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are currently working to bring countries of the Global South together in the spirit of equality, openness, transparency and inclusiveness, and are contributing to reforming the system of global governance. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that he is looking forward to working with Russia to strengthen strategic cooperation in multilateral settings and implement the principles of genuine multilateralism. How do you assess cooperation between China and Russia within BRICS, the SCO and other multilateral mechanisms? In your opinion, what is the role of the two countries’ interaction in the international arena in promoting a community with a shared future for mankind.

Answer: Earth is the cradle of humanity, our common home, and we are all equal as its inhabitants. I am convinced that this view is shared by most people on the planet. However, the countries that affiliate themselves with the so-called “golden billion” do not seem to think so. US-led Western elites refuse to respect civilizational and cultural diversity and reject centuries-old traditional values. Seeking to retain their global dominance, they have usurped the right to tell other nations whom they may, or must not, make friends and cooperate with, and to deny them the right to choose their own development models. They disregard other countries’ sovereign interests. They seek to ensure their well-being at the expense of other states, just like in the old days, and resort to neo-colonial methods to that end.

Needless to say, neither Russia nor its partners are happy with this state of affairs. We have actively contributed to launching multilateral associations and mechanisms that are independent of the West and are successfully operating. In their work they build on the principles of equality, justice, transparency, respect and consideration of each other’s interests.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, which have well established themselves as key pillars of the emerging multipolar world order, can be cited as vivid examples of such mutually beneficial cooperation. They have come to be reputable and dynamic international platforms whose participants build constructive political, security, economic and cultural and people-to-people interaction. Hence the ever increasing interest of other states in the work of these associations and the growing number of their participants.

Our countries have similar or coinciding positions on key issues on the international agenda. We advocate for the primacy of international law, equal, indivisible, comprehensive and sustainable security at both the global and regional level with the UN’s central coordinating role. We also reject Western attempts to impose an order based on lies and hypocrisy, on some mythical rules of no one knows whose making.

Question: From the outset of the Ukraine crisis, China has engaged in active efforts to find a political solution to it. During his meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on April 16, Chinese President Xi Jinping outlined four principles for the peaceful resolution of the crisis in Ukraine. On February 24, 2023, China published a position paper on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. What is your assessment of China’s stance and efforts on this issue?

Answer: We commend China’s approaches to resolving the crisis in Ukraine. Beijing is well aware of its root causes and global geopolitical significance, which is reflected in its 12-point plan entitled “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” published in February 2023. The ideas and proposals contained in the document show the genuine desire of our Chinese friends to help stabilize the situation.

As for the additional four principles of conflict resolution recently voiced by President Xi Jinping, they seamlessly fit in the above-mentioned plan. Beijing proposes practicable and constructive steps to achieve peace by refraining from pursuing vested interests and constant escalation of tensions, minimizing the negative impact of the conflict on the global economy and the stability of global value chains. The steps build on the idea that we need to forego the “Cold War mentality” and ensure indivisible security and respect for international law and the UN Charter in their entirety and interrelation. They could therefore lay the groundwork for a political and diplomatic process that would take into account Russia’s security concerns and contribute to achieving a long-term and sustainable peace.

Unfortunately, neither Ukraine nor its Western patrons support these initiatives. They are not ready to engage in an equal, honest and open dialogue based on mutual respect and consideration of each other’s interests. They are reluctant to discuss the underlying causes, the very origins of the global crisis, which has manifested itself, inter alia, in the dramatic situation around Ukraine. Why? Because today’s global shocks have been provoked precisely by their policies in the previous years and decades.

Instead, Western elites are stubbornly working to “punish” Russia, isolate and weaken it, supplying the Kiev authorities with money and arms. They have imposed almost 16,000 unilateral illegitimate sanctions against our country. They are threatening to dismember our country. They are illegally trying to appropriate our foreign assets. They are turning a blind eye to the resurgence of Nazism and to Ukraine-sponsored terrorist attacks in our territory.

We are seeking a comprehensive, sustainable and just settlement of this conflict through peaceful means. We are open to a dialogue on Ukraine, but such negotiations must take into account the interests of all countries involved in the conflict, including ours. They must also involve a substantive discussion on global stability and security guarantees for Russia’s opponents and, naturally, for Russia itself. Needless to say, these must be reliable guarantees. That is where the main problem is, since we are dealing with states whose ruling circles seek to substitute the world order based on international law with an “order based on certain rules,” which they keep talking about but which no one has ever seen, no one has agreed to, and which, apparently, tend to change depending on the current political situation and interests of those who invent these rules.

Russia stands ready for negotiations; moreover, we had engaged in such negotiations. On April 15, 2022, in Istanbul, together with the Ukrainian delegation, we drafted a peace agreement, taking into account the demands of the Ukrainian side, including those on future security guarantees for Ukraine. Moreover, the head of the Ukrainian delegation initialled the main provisions of the draft document. Our Western partners tried to convince us that in order to finalize and sign the agreement, it was necessary to provide conditions. The main point was that Russian troops be withdrawn away from Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. And so we did. But instead of signing the peace agreement, the Ukrainian side suddenly announced the cessation of negotiations. Later on, Ukrainian officials stated that they had done so, inter alia, because their Western allies had recommended that they continue hostilities and apply joint efforts to achieve Russia’s strategic defeat. We have never refused to negotiate.

Question: In your Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on February 29, 2024, you elaborated on Russia’s development goals for the next six years and relevant measures. On March 20, at a meeting with your election team, you called for building a new Russia, in order to make your country even stronger, more attractive and effective. What are your plans in state-building for this new term of office? How do you expect to achieve your goals?

Answer: The Address sets objective and essential goals pertaining to the development of all regions of the country, the economy, and the social sphere; they include addressing demographic problems, increasing the birth rate, providing support to families with children, fighting poverty and inequality. We recognize the scale of these challenges and can provide solutions. To do this we will rely on the consolidated will of our people, the necessary resources and capabilities, and the rich experience of interaction between the state, businesses and the civil society.

In addition, over the past few years, tremendous work has been done to establish an effective economic management system. The government and relevant agencies use big data sets, advanced digital platforms and computer networks spanning all sectors of the national economy throughout the country. We will continue with this work and seek to improve the efficiency of long-term planning and the implementation of programs and national projects.

Today, Russia is one of the world’s top five countries in terms of purchasing power parity. Now we are aiming for the top four largest economies on the planet. We prioritize such tasks as ensuring quality and the effective development across all spheres, as well as increasing our citizens’ well-being.

It is impossible to achieve quality economic changes without a sustained salary growth. To achieve this, we plan to increase labour productivity through the across-the-board adoption of scientific advances, new technologies and innovations, automation and robotization, and the creation of modern jobs. At the same time, we will engage in training competent, forward-thinking professionals who will implement greenfield projects and work in industry and the social sphere.

Our priorities certainly include training fresh talent for public and municipal government. We have a whole range of relevant programs, competitions and projects in place. We have also provided ample opportunities at the federal and regional levels to help talented people who love their homeland unlock their potential. These are people who are ready to assume responsibility, serve Russia honestly and faithfully, and, most importantly, who have proved it in deed, both in doing their work and going through the toughest hardships when defending our Fatherland and our people.

I am confident that we will implement all the strategic plans we have set. We are willing to work together with our partners worldwide, including China, our good neighbour and trusted friend.

Video of Putin, Xi signing documents on bilateral cooperation, holding press conference in Beijing

Rumble video link here.

An “Enlightened” Alternative After Putin? [re Mikhail Mishustin]

by Andrew C. Kuchins and Chris Monday, The National Interest, 4/23/24 (excerpt)

Chris Monday is an Associate Professor of Economics at Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea. Andy Kuchins is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and Adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

Editor’s Note: This article is the third installment in a series on the succession of Russian president Vladimir Putin. Read the first and second  here  and  here .

In our first article in this series exploring potential successors to Vladimir Putin, we examined one option: the semi-dynastic succession of Putin’s cousin, Anna Putina Tsivilyova. In our second article, we considered the possibility of a hardline succession featuring Putin’s Chairman of the National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, or his son Dmitri. In this article, we explore a third possibility: a reformer emerges from the ranks of the bureaucracy to become Russia’s next leader.

As renowned historian Vasily Kliuchevsky demonstrated, rather than hindering, war has necessitated reform multiple times in Russian history. Think of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Alexander II, and even Gorbachev. Their initiatives depended on a unique class, what historian Bruce Lincoln called “enlightened bureaucrats” who play critical roles in running the government but are virtually never tapped as top leaders. These administrators wield their power thanks to their unique, specialized knowledge. Their mandate was to fortify the economy for prolonged conflicts while avoiding any fundamental reform.

The hereditary monarchy of Tsarist Russia made it impossible for these reformers to “rise from the ranks.” Peter needed military modernization and financing, not Western liberal values. His modernizers were mainly foreigners, especially Germans, and their increased presence in the Russian elite raised tension with conservative nobility whose wealth greatly depended on maintaining and deepening serfdom. This model peaked for the Russian Empire with the defeat of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. As the nineteenth century wore on, it was increasingly clear that Russia’s considerable, illiterate, land-based serf population was a crimp on economic growth and technological development. However, as Tsar Nicholas I told his State Council in 1842, “Serfdom, in its present form, is an evil obvious to all; but to touch it now would of course be an even more ruinous evil.” Russian Tsars, Soviet General Secretaries, and Vladimir Putin have all faced this dilemma in some form or another: the system is inefficient and corrupt, but reforming it risks destroying the foundation of state power. Arguably, the only leader to attempt systemic reform was the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who was—and still is—vilified by modern Russian and Chinese propaganda.

The best historical analog to Vladimir Putin is Nicholas I, who served as Tsar from 1825 until his death in 1855. He was a conservative who sought to promote a newly branded state identity based on the troika of autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality while defending other conservative European monarchies. He and his fellow monarchs viewed the liberalism that felled the Bourbon dynasty in France as the most dangerous threat to their sacred status quo. Notoriously, Nicholas’s leadership concluded with the failure of the Crimean War.

However, Russia’s current technocracy takes its cues from Georg Kankrin, one of Nicholas I’s finance ministers. Kankrin, who some historians credit with assisting Russia’s victory over Napoleon, steeled the economy for war by economizing the budget and maintaining a rigid monetary policy. Kankrin, who met the Tsar on a daily basis, had a unique prerogative to speak his mind because of his personal relationship with the monarch. Other famous Tsarist and Soviet mandarins include Pyotr Stolypin, who, under Nicholas II, spearheaded partial privatization of the land; Sergei Witte, who made the ruble convertible and launched the Trans-Siberian Railroad; Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who pushed Brezhnev’s politburo to implement administrative optimization. For nearly a decade, Putin’s friend, the former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, a fan of Kankrin, epitomized this brand of “enlightened” bureaucrat. This article focuses on the inheritor of this Russian tradition, Mikhail Mishustin, Putin’s current prime minister.

It’s a journalistic stereotype to assume the KGB runs Russia. Indeed, Mishustin, Kudrin (former head of the Accounts Chamber, former Minister of Finance, and current executive at Yandex), and his successor as Finance Minister, Elvira Naibvuilina, along with other Putin technocrats, wield significant personal power. They maintain influential patronage networks. The necessities of crisis management have granted these “enlightened bureaucrats” even more clout. In particular, Covid shutdowns and wartime disruptions have meant that they dole out massive state subsidies. Increasingly, Russian businesses and the military depend on the whims of the Kremlin’s civilian ministries.

While Russia’s military leaders have clearly underperformed, Russia’s financial wizards can boast of unqualified successes. Despite the West’s harsh sanctions, Russian supermarkets remain full. In the meantime, Russian military production has been significantly ramped up. Western experts are dumbfounded by Russia’s success in mass-producing deadly UAVs such as the Lancet model. Moreover, Putin’s technocrats have been able to replace European trade with alternative partners. The ruble, which was supposed to crush Putin, has remained stable. Despite isolation from international finance, there have been no Russian bank runs.

Ultimately, Putin (along with the majority of the elite) has realized there are few potential replacements with the necessary managerial competency and discretion available. Without his “enlightened bureaucrats,” Putin’s economy would crash quickly. Understanding their irreplaceability within the system, these bureaucratic managers enjoy significant leeway and wide prerogatives. It’s an open secret that Kudrin, Mishustin, and Nabiullina quietly opposed the war in Ukraine. Unlike other functionaries, they do not feel compelled to trumpet bombastic nationalist slogans. Their disciplined monetary policies, such as double-digit interest rates, have been widely criticized in the press and by heavyweights such as Igor Sechin. Nonetheless, with the full support of Putin, they refuse to back down. Putin knows well that a “patriotic” economist like Sergei Glaziev, who advocates free-wheeling spending on industrialization, would quickly run the economy into the ground.

From Systems Engineer to Tax Man to Prime Minister

Imagining a scenario in which a reformist leader in Russia could emerge under the current conditions of repression and militarization requires considerable imagination. Nonetheless, before his death in 2022, the wily Far-Right politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky named Mishustin as the leading contender to succeed Putin. In addition, the Russian Constitution calls for the prime minister to assume office as acting president if the presidency is vacant until new elections within ninety days. Indeed, this was the path Vladimir Putin followed in 1999.

Putin has been mindful of limiting the scope and prerogatives of his own prime ministers. Putin’s first Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, was able and charismatic and enjoyed close ties to the Yeltsin family. Leery of a Westernizer, conservative forces mobilized a PR campaign to relegate Kasyanov to the margins. They branded him “Misha two percent” for his alleged standard take on government deals. After Kasyanov, Putin was mindful of selecting humorless men with limited ambitions.

In his first years in power, Putin’s greatest fear was the wealthy oligarchs and their ability to buy political power. Thus, Putin has been careful to prevent his officials from abusing their access to revenue flows. In particular, Prime Ministers Mikhail Fradkov and Viktor Zubkov both worked in the sensitive area of tax collection: both were connected to Russian intelligence. After serving as prime minister, Fradkov even became Director of Foreign Intelligence. But to the public, they were faceless placeholders.

Dmitri Medvedev, who served as Putin’s premier from 2012–2020, appears to be an exception among Putin’s prime ministers, given his legal training and lack of intelligence service background. His management of Putin’s “national projects” was judged as ineffective, and it is hard to identify a single, distinctive success in his eight years as prime minister. In a rare case of a public split among the Putin elite, Kudrin in 2011 called Medvedev incompetent in financial matters. Indeed, Medvedev’s principal virtue is his loyalty to Vladimir Putin.

Around this time, Putin sought to cement his legacy as a modern-day “Collector of the Russian lands” to cement his legacy in the pantheon of expansionist Russian rulers. Putin understood this entailed military aggression and possible international isolation. Consequently, he would need a far more competent prime minister than Dmitri Medvedev. Russia’s technological progress was an existential need for both military competition and societal control. While Medvedev cultivated the image of a posh trendsetter showing off his iPad on every imaginable occasion, Mikhail Mishustin presented a more compelling image as a former systems engineer with immense IT sector experience dating back to the 1980s.

Mishustin’s father, Vladimir Moiseyeich Mishustin, was a KGB officer who worked most of his career at Aeroflot, an airline company. Trained as a systems engineer in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mikhail joined the International Computer Club, established in 1988 during Perestroika as a central node for the nascent IT industry. There, he had the opportunity to network with international IT companies and Russian state enterprises. Mishustin rose quickly and eventually became a co-owner of the ICC and chairman of its board. KGB authorities were likely involved in the establishment of this club and certainly monitored it very closely. Selling used and new Western computers just before and after the collapse offered substantial profit opportunities. Notably, future Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky started his entrepreneurial career using siphoned Komsomol funds to buy and sell computers and other IT equipment….

A Man to Watch

Is there a chance for a relatively liberal figure to become the next Russian president? While we would like to conclude “never say never,” the practical chance is dim. After Putin’s persecution, is there even a liberal constituency left in Russia?

What are the chances of a modernizing reformer becoming the next leader of Russia? At least here, we have three examples of Russian leaders who fit this mold: Peter the Great, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin. Putin started in 2000 viewing himself as a modernizing reformer, but for a variety of reasons, he evolved into a reactionary autocrat.

After surveying the field, the only viable candidate we can identify is the current Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin. Ultimately, it’s not clear Mishustin would even be a moderating force. We know as much today about what Mishustin really thinks as we did about Vladimir Putin in 1999. They each keep their cards close to their chest, which is usually wise in a political snakepit. Those who know, or claim to know, Mishustin often remark that he is not politically ambitious. But frankly, it is difficult to believe anybody in any system who reaches the position of prime minister does not have a deep wellspring of ambition within them. In fact, this seems more the case for Mishustin than Putin, as there is a fairly clear history of networking and schmoozing mentors that have helped his rise. Perhaps when Putin was in the KGB and Mishustin at the International Computer Club before they became state officials, they were not politically ambitious, but not after.

It’s doubtful that it’s Mishustin’s time “to make a move.” He has served Putin effectively and loyally as Prime Minister for four years. Putin has shown that he values Mishustin’s work, as he has already strongly hinted that Mishustin will stay on as Prime Minister. What happens to the rest of the government as Putin enters his fifth term remains to be seen. What is clear is that no longer can anyone diminish Mishustin by describing him as merely a transitional figure.

Probably the most powerful Russian prime minister since Victor Chernomyrdin under Yeltsin in the 1990s, Mishustin is clearly a man to watch, and Western governments and analysts should invest more resources in getting to know him better. However, it is critical to understand that the West cannot help him politically, even if it wants to. By this time, we should know that even the perception of such support is the kiss of death for any Russian politician, reformist or otherwise.

Alexander Rubenstein: Antony Blinken Dines at Nazi Restaurant in Ukraine

YouTube link here.

Geoffrey Roberts – Putin’s Trump Card: Ukrainian Membership of NATO

What do readers think of this analysis and proposal? – Natylie

By Prof. Geoffrey Roberts, Brave New Europe, 4/22/24

President Vladimir Putin started the Ukraine war and he could – and should – end it by negotiating a peace deal that includes Ukraine’s membership of NATO.

Such a scenario is not as implausible as it might seem. While a Russian military victory in Ukraine is all-but assured, Putin needs to win the peace as well. He went to war to safeguard Russia’s security and to protect pro-Russian Ukrainians. The last thing he needs is a permanent confrontation with a militarised West abetted by a defeated but still dangerous Ukraine. He needs a stable European and international order that will facilitate Russia’s recovery from the war, not least the rebuilding and re-population of its newly acquired territories in Ukraine.

For Putin to contemplate such a radical concession, Ukraine and its Western backers would have to give cast-iron commitments to Ukraine’s permanent demilitarisation, albeit within the framework of NATO membership. Establishing Pan-European security structures that contain conflicts rather than incubate them would also be a crucial part of any peace package.

Russia has been railing against Ukraine joining NATO since the country was first slated for membership in 2008. There is no chance it will rub-out this red line in advance of any peace talks but a private signal that Putin might be prepared to allow Ukraine to join NATO under certain conditions is not so improbable.

Putin did not invade Ukraine to prevent it becoming a member of NATO. By the time he launched the so-called Special Military Operation (SMO) in February 2022, Ukraine was de facto a NATO member and rapidly developing into a highly threatening Western military bridgehead on Russia’s border. In Putin’s eyes, Ukraine had become an anti-Russia – an ultra-nationalist state intent on using NATO as a shield to re-gain by force Crimea and rebel Donbass. The SMO was a preventative action to nip that danger in the bud and to force the West to negotiate a security treaty that would preclude further NATO deployments along Russia’s borders.

Putin’s gambit almost succeeded. In spring 2022 there were Russo-Ukrainian peace talks in Istanbul that resulted in a number of draft agreements under which Russia would withdraw its troops in exchange for Ukraine’s neutralisation and disarmament. But many details remained unresolved, above all the nature of an international security guarantee of Ukraine’s future territoriality, sovereignty and independence.

Kiev walked away from these talks and it may well have been the West’s refusal to underwrite the proposed security guarantee that prompted Zelensky to withdraw from the negotiations. Certainly, the West proved more than willing to continue its extensive military support of Ukraine as part of a proxy war to topple the Putin regime.

Two years into the Western proxy war on Russia, Ukraine’s integration into NATO is infinitely greater. Co-operation and co-ordination of Ukrainian and Western militaries could hardly be closer. Ukraine’s war effort is sustained by Western arms, money and intelligence, not to speak of special forces, mercenaries and sabotage groups. Cutting Kiev’s connections with NATO would require Ukraine’s complete capitulation, or its wholesale occupation by Russia.

Ukraine’s rapidly approaching military defeat means that ending the war as soon as possible is Kiev’s and the West’s most rational course of action. The longer the war goes on, the greater will be Ukraine’s defeat. The sooner it ends, the more salvageable will be Ukraine’s sovereignty and the more viable its independent statehood.

The problem is that Western and Ukrainian politicians don’t how to extricate themselves from the conflict without a catastrophic loss of political face.

John Mearsheimer has suggested the United States could cut the Gordian Knot by severing all its security connections with Ukraine. But, as he himself says, this is most unlikely, given Western leaders’ immense economic, ideological, political and psychological investment in defeating Russia in Ukraine

Signalling that Ukraine might be able to join NATO could help open the door to serious peace negotiations. Ukrainian membership of NATO would be spun as success for the West, but PR is far less important than the achievement of Putin’s prime goal – neutering the NATO-Ukraine threat to Russia’s security.

Ukraine’s military collapse in the coming weeks and months seems increasingly likely but that would not necessarily terminate the war. Kiev’s remaining forces may be able to retreat to the Western banks of the Dnieper and hold out in big cities like Kharkov and Odessa. Such respite might be temporary, but it could be enough to prolong the war into 2025 and beyond. In a worst-case scenario, the Kiev government could flee abroad and continue the fight from exile, much like many European governments did during World War II.

Russian hardliners are sanguine about such prospects. They believe neither Ukraine nor NATO can be trusted to honour any commitments they might make to Russia and that the only lasting victory is Russia’s occupation of the whole of Ukraine.

Western hardliners are equally keen to ‘fight to the last Ukrainian’ – seen as a way to weaken Putin’s regime and buy time to prepare for a direct war with Russia in the not too-distant future.

Western publics were never enthusiastic about NATO’s dangerous proxy war with Russia, and this scepticism has been reinforced by an avalanche of media reports detailing Russia’s military advances and Ukraine’s huge losses of men and materiel.

Support for continuing the war is also crumbling within Ukraine as more people embrace the detested but realistic outcome of trading territory for peace.

In Russia, public support for Putin’s war remains strong but a majority want to see the conflict resolved as soon as possible, even if that means a compromise peace.

A peace settlement that included Ukraine’s membership of NATO would be anathema to a substantial minority of Russians, but Putin’s overwhelming victory in the presidential election shows he has the power and popularity to face down such opposition.

In the West, the current chatter about a possible Ukraine peace deal centres on the idea of reviving the Istanbul peace talks – of updating the draft agreements of spring 2022, notably to take account of the formal incorporation of the provinces of Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhe into the Russian Federation in October 2022.

Recent comments by Putin have lent credence to the possibility of an Istanbul+ peace agreement. Everyone assumes Ukraine’s non-membership of NATO and its neutrality will remain key Russian demands. But the decisive tilt of the war in Russia’s favour has radically changed the strategic situation.

Russia demanded Ukraine’s neutrality to keep NATO at bay. That goal has now been achieved by other means – Russia’s military expansion into Ukraine. How far Putin intends to go remains unclear. Occupation of the whole of eastern and southern Ukraine is one possibility, but more likely is the establishment of a demilitarised zone as a security buffer between Russia and a rump Ukraine. In any event, Ukraine’s formal neutrality would be of little practical importance.

Crucially, there is the unresolved issue of a security guarantee for unoccupied Ukraine. Without some kind of guarantee there can be no negotiated peace settlement. By far the simplest solution is for NATO to provide this by virtue of Ukraine’s membership of the organisation. Arguably, NATO, with its diverse membership and its collective decision-making, would be a far more stable container of Ukrainian revanchism than any ad hoc security guarantee.

In the 1950s the Soviets feared re-armed West Germany’s entry into NATO would revive German militarism and aggression. Actually, membership of NATO (and the EU) helped pacify Germany.

Conceivably, Putin could agree to such a step, provided Ukraine remains disarmed and NATO’s commitment to its security purely defensive. While there is no guarantee NATO and Ukraine would stick to their commitments, the hard-line alternative of seeking total victory and a dictated peace has its own drawbacks, notably the cost in lost Russian and Ukrainian lives.

A grand gesture by Putin that conceded Ukraine’s membership of NATO as part of an overall peace settlement would be an act of true statesmanship, not least in the eyes of his many friends and allies in the Global South.

Benjamin Abelow: My Message to an American Father About the Ukraine War

By Benjamin Abelow, Antiwar.com, 5/15/24

A friend recently sent me an article that was published in The Atlantic by a Ukrainian journalist. The title and subtitle read as follows:

UKRAINE HAS CHANGED TOO MUCH TO COMPROMISE WITH RUSSIA

My generation has tasted freedom and experienced a competitive, vibrant political life. We can’t be made a part of what Russia has become.

— By Illia Ponomarenko

I don’t particularly recommend this article, but it you want to read it, try this link.

My friend asked me what I thought of the article. From his wording, I inferred that he was impressed and was inclined to accept the article’s conclusions, as well as the unstated policy implications for Americans: Keep supporting this war!

When I wrote back to my friend, I had only glanced at the article, but I’ve since read it, and it does exactly what the title leads you to expect.

I can empathize with the person who wrote the article. She experienced an attack on her country and her community, and no doubt has friends and loved ones who have been wounded or killed in this war. But she believes that the continuation of the war will help her country, her community, her loved ones, and herself. It will not. It will only lead to more destruction.

With the permission of my friend, I’ve removed his name, made a few minor edits, and am copying here what I sent him:

Dear _______,

My patience is very low at this moment, so forgive me if I’m more direct, even blunt, than I might otherwise be.

I’ll take a quick look at the article, but really, based just on the title and subtitle, I want to say: you’re missing the big picture and buying far too readily into a highly propagandized narrative.

The US created this war for no reason other than to expand NATO right up to a 1200 mile border with Russia. The US broke up peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia during the first days of the war — negotiations that likely would have brought Ukraine back to its pre-invasion borders. And as a result of these American actions, the war continued and roughly 500,000 Ukrainians have died or been seriously injured or maimed, and 8 million have fled the country.

The Ukrainian far right, acting in accord with the Kyiv government, has now created what is in important respects a terror state — no free press, no elections, people are being grabbed off the street, beaten, and sent to the front to serve. Ukrainian men who fled to Poland and Lithuania may now be forced back into Ukraine — where they don’t want to be — to serve and quite possibly to die.

The next step is for US allies, and then perhaps NATO itself, to send in troops to directly engage with Russia — on its border, in a conflict that Russia perceives to be existential yet is not at all significant to the West or, frankly, to you, in any direct, meaningful, skin-in-the-game way.

Whether or not the article is explicitly arguing for direct NATO engagement, that is where it will lead and that is where The Atlantic’s neocon editor, Jeffrey Goldberg, may want it to lead — to a direct NATO-Russia war. Because there is no way that Ukraine can win with just western weapons — which weapons, in fact, the West does not have to give anyway. We’re largely tapped out. (By the way, you can read about Jeffrey Goldberg here. See especially the final section, which pertains to the role he played in promoting the American war in Iraq.)

I assume you know that Russia just announced that it is going to undertake a practice exercise in the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This was announced in response to French statements about possible troop entry into Ukraine, and also in response to recent British statements that Ukraine can use its Storm Shadow missiles to attack targets inside Russia. If you think Russian consideration about the use of tactical nukes in response to NATO involvement is a sheer bluff — as our media like to report without any basis — you need to think again.

There are plenty of people in Ukraine who would want peace now — but most are afraid to speak. And even if that were not the case, which it is, you need to think about your own family. I’m not joking. If NATO goes in, tactical nukes may be used; if nukes are used, it will be impossible to reliably contain escalation; if escalation occurs, you, your wife, and your daughters may be killed.

There is no reason for any of this to continue — no reason for the US, none for Ukraine.

Please forgive the sharp edge, my friend.

Ben

So, what was I telling my friend? I have long emphasized that the interests of the Ukrainian people are aligned with the interests of the American people — that the best thing for everyone is that the war be ended now through a negotiated settlement. I have emphasized that to be compassionate to the Ukrainian people means to end the war, not to support its continuation. Many Ukrainians understand that. If you doubt this, read this article in the Daily Beast. The title is “Frontline Ukrainians Fear New Aid From U.S. Will Be a Disaster.”

But even if every Ukrainian wanted the war to continue, and believed that continuing the war would lead to Ukraine’s salvation, it would not make it true. People closest to a conflict have a detailed knowledge of events that they witness first hand, and they may have certain insights that outsiders lack. But they also may be blinded by passion, or they may see the events in granular (and often traumatic) fashion, and fail to understand the context of how things reached that point. Their grasp of the big picture may be obstructed by the painful quotidian experiences they are enduring. The expression, “Not seeing the forrest, for the trees,” can readily apply. They may be subject to domestic war propaganda. And they may be afraid to speak out and say what they really believe.

So, I have always emphasized that what is good for Ukraine is good for America — and what is good for everyone is the exact opposite of the policies that American, Ukrainian, and European governments are pursuing.

But that is not the only thing I was saying to my friend. I also was strongly emphasizing to my friend that as a father and husband, as an American citizen, and as a self-responsible person who also should value his own life and safety, he has an obligation to protect things closer to home. And this is true regardless what he might think about those in other lands. Yes, there is a balancing act here — one must not be indifferent to the suffering of others — but one also must have a clear grasp about the dangers closer to home and take everything in to consideration when deciding what to do.

At times, viewing one’s own situation clearly can lead to real moral quandaries. It can lead to difficult and painful decisions in which one trades one’s own safety for the safety of others, or the safety of others for the safety of oneself. Fortunately, this is not the case with respect to the American and European role in the conflict in Ukraine. In this situation, thankfully, to end the war helps Americans, Europeans, and, above all, the Ukrainian people.

In my book on the Ukraine war, I emphasized that a desire to do good can lead to great harms — the classic story of the messianic do-gooder who travels to a remote land to save the day but ends up creating a disaster for himself and everyone else. It is said that the road to hell is paved with good intentions — and that certainly applies to the misguided beneficence of both Americans and Europeans with respect to the Ukraine war. In my book, I said that America’s claimed generosity to Ukraine was destroying the alleged beneficiary:

Even from a blinkered American perspective, the whole Western plan was a dangerous game of bluff, enacted for reasons that are hard to fathom. Ukraine is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a vital security interest of the United States. In fact, Ukraine hardly matters at all. From an American perspective — and I say this with no disrespect for the Ukrainian people — Ukraine is irrelevant. Ukraine is no more important to the citizens of the United States than any one of fifty other countries that most Americans, for perfectly understandable reasons, couldn’t find on a map without a lot of random searching. So yes, Ukraine is irrelevant to America. And if the leaders of the United States and NATO had acknowledged that obvious fact, none of this would be happening.

If you haven’t read my book yet, you can read it here on Medium, free of charge, in essay format. Or if you want to buy it, here’s the Amazon link. You can also order it from your independent bookstore, or other large chains. Or you can read about it on the book’s website. The book is now out in seven translations — German, French, Italian, Polish, Danish, Dutch, and Slovenian — and has sold a total of 50,000 copies.

Since I wrote to my friend, two important things have happened.

First, Russia called in both the French and British ambassadors to Moscow for immediate consultation. The exact things said were not disclosed, but it is known that the Russians issued a warning to the British, and told them that if British Storm Shadow missiles were used as Britain had suggested — to attack targets inside Russia — Russia would consider British military forces anywhere in the world, including in Britain itself, legitimate targets for missile attacks by Russia.

Second, as I understand it, the British, French, and also the Americans — notwithstanding their public bluster — have taken these Russian threats seriously and have backed away from their more bellicose postures. For an update on all this, the first half of this episode of the excellent geopolitics podcast, The Duran, is worth hearing:

The sequence of events that just occurred is of great importance to all of us. It involved the risk of a major escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons — but, to my knowledge, no mainstream western media reported it adequately.

Yet again our media are failing us.

This is one more indication that — instead of remaining independent and fulfilling their societal responsibilities — our media have become, in effect, a propaganda wing of the state, continuing to serve as cheerleaders for a war that should have ended long ago.

Ben

Kit Klarenberg: How CIA and MI6 Created ISIS

By Kit Klarenberg, Substack, 4/4/24

Within just 24 hours of the horrific mass shooting in Moscow’s Crocus City Hall on March 22nd, which left at least 137 innocent people dead and 60 more critically wounded, US officials blamed the slaughter on ISIS-K, Daesh’s South-Central Asian branch. For many, the attribution’s celerity raised suspicions Washington was seeking to decisively shift Western public and Russian government focus away from the actual culprits – be that Ukraine, and/or Britain, Kiev’s foremost proxy sponsor.

Full details of how the four shooters were recruited, directed, armed, and financed, and who by, are yet to emerge. The Kremlin claims to have unearthed evidence that Kiev’s SBU were the ultimate architects, which the agency denies, charging that Russian authorities knew about the attack and permitted it to happen, in order to ramp up its assault on Ukraine. It has been reported that the killers received funds from a cryptocurrency wallet belonging to ISIS’ Tajikistan wing.

Whatever the truth of the matter, it is certain that the four individuals responsible had no clue who or what truly sponsored their monstrous actions. Contrary to the group’s mainstream portrayal, as inspired by fanatic, extreme religious fundamentalism, ISIS are primarily guns for hire. At any given time, they act at the behest of an array of international donors, bound by common interests. Funding, weapons, and orders reach its fighters circuitously, and opaquely. There is almost invariably layer upon layer of cutouts between the perpetrators of an attack claimed by the group, and its ultimate orchestrators and financiers.

Given ISIS-K is currently arrayed against China, Iran, and Russia – in other words, the US Empire’s primary adversaries – it is incumbent to revisit their “parent” group’s origins. Emerging seemingly out of nowhere just over a decade ago, before dominating mainstream media headlines and Western public consciousness for several years before vanishing again, at one stage the group occupied vast swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory, declaring an “Islamic State”, which issued its own currency, passports, and vehicle registration plates.

Devastating military interventions independently launched by the US and Russia wiped out that demonic construct in 2017. The CIA and MI6 were no doubt immensely relieved. After all, extremely awkward questions about how precisely ISIS came to be were comprehensively extinguished. As we shall see, the terror group and its caliphate did not emerge in the manner of lightning on a dark night, but due to dedicated, determined policy hatched in London and Washington, implemented by their spying agencies.

‘Continuingly Hostile’

RAND is a highly influential, Washington DC-headquartered “think tank”. Bankrolled to the tune of almost $100 million annually by the Pentagon and other US government entities, it regularly disseminates recommendations on national security, foreign affairs, military strategy, and covert and overt actions overseas. These pronouncements are more often than not subsequently adopted as policy. 

For example, a July 2016 RAND paper on the prospect of “war with China” forecast a need to fill Eastern Europe with US soldiers in advance of a “hot” conflict with Beijing, as Russia would undoubtedly side with its neighbour and ally in such a dispute. It was therefore considered necessary to tie down Moscow’s forces at its borders. Six months later, scores of NATO troops duly arrived in the region, ostensibly to counter “Russian aggression”. 

Similarly, in April 2019 RAND published Extending Russia. It set out “a range of possible means” to “bait Russia into overextending itself,” so as to “undermine the regime’s stability.” These methods included; providing “lethal aid” to Ukraine; increasing US support for the Syrian rebels; promoting “regime change in Belarus”; exploiting “tensions” in the Caucasus; neutralising “Russian influence in Central Asia” and Moldova. Most of that came to pass thereafter.

In this context, RAND’s November 2008 Unfolding The Long War makes for disquieting reading. It explored ways the US Global War on Terror could be prosecuted once coalition forces formally left Iraq, under the terms of a withdrawal agreement inked by Baghdad and Washington that same month. This development by definition threatened Anglo dominion over Persian Gulf oil and gas resources, which would remain “a strategic priority” when the occupation was officially over.

“This priority will interact strongly with that of prosecuting the long war,” RAND declared. The think tank went on to propose a “divide and rule” strategy to maintain US hegemony in Iraq, despite the power vacuum created by withdrawal. Under its auspices, Washington would exploit “fault lines between [Iraq’s] various Salafi-jihadist groups to turn them against each other and dissipate their energy on internal conflicts”, while “supporting authoritative Sunni governments against a continuingly hostile Iran”:

“This strategy relies heavily on covert action, information operations, unconventional warfare, and support to indigenous security forces…The US and its local allies could use nationalist jihadists to launch proxy campaigns to discredit transnational jihadists in the eyes of the local populace…This would be an inexpensive way of buying time…until the US can return its full attention to the [region]. US leaders could also choose to capitalize on the sustained Shia-Sunni Conflict…by taking the side of conservative Sunni regimes against Shiite empowerment movements in the Muslim world.”

An incomprehensible graphic from the RAND report

‘Great Danger’

So it was that the CIA and MI6 began supporting Sunni “nationalist jihadists” throughout West Asia. The next year, Bashar Assad rejected a Qatari proposal to route Doha’s vast gas reserves directly to Europe, via a $10 billion, 1,500 kilometre-long pipeline spanning Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Turkey. As extensively documented by WikiLeaks-released diplomatic cables, US, Israeli and Saudi intelligence immediately decided to overthrow Assad by fomenting a local Sunni rebellion, and started financing opposition groups for the purpose.

This effort became turbocharged in October 2011, with MI6 redirecting weapons and extremist fighters from Libya to Syria, in the wake of Muammar Gaddafi’s televised murder. The CIA oversaw that operation, using the British as an arm’s length cutout to avoid notifying Congress of its machinations. Only in June 2013, with then-President Barack Obama’s official authorisation, did the Agency’s cloak-and-dagger connivances in Damascus become formalised – and later admitted – under the title “Timber Sycamore”.

At this time, Western officials universally referred to their Syrian proxies as “moderate rebels”. Yet, Washington was well-aware its surrogates were dangerous extremists, seeking to carve a fundamentalist caliphate out of the territory they occupied. An August 2012 US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report released under Freedom of Information laws observes that events in Baghdad were “taking a clear sectarian direction,” with radical Salafist groups “the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.”

These factions included Al Qaeda’s Iraqi wing (AQI), and its umbrella offshoot, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The pair went on to form ISIS, a prospect the DIA report not only predicted, but seemingly endorsed:

“If the situation unravels, there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in eastern Syria…This is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want in order to isolate the Syrian regime…ISI could also  declare an Islamic state  through its union with other terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria, which will create great danger.”

Despite such grave concerns, the CIA continued to dispatch unaccountably vast shipments of weapons and money to Syria’s “moderate rebels”, well-knowing this “aid” would almost inevitably end up in ISIS hands. Moreover, Britain concurrently ran secret programs costing millions to train opposition paramilitaries in the art of killing, while providing medical assistance to wounded jihadis. London also donated multiple ambulances, purchased from Qatar, to armed groups in the country.

Leaked documents indicate the risk of equipment and personnel from these efforts being lost to Al-Nusra, ISIS, and other extremist groups in West Asia was judged unavoidably “high” by British intelligence. Yet, there was no concomitant strategy for countering this hazard at all, and the operations continued apace. Almost as if training and arming ISIS was precisely the desired outcome.

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Tarik Cyril Amar: Poke the bear and find out

by Tarik Cyril Amar, RT, 5/10/24

We have been through an intense, if muffled crisis in the ongoing political-military confrontation between Russia and the West by way of Ukraine. The essence of this crisis is simple: Kiev and its Western supporters have lost the initiative in the Ukraine proxy war and may be on the verge of defeat, as high Western officials increasingly admit.

In response to this self-inflicted quandary, several important Western players have threatened further escalation. Most prominently, Great Britain’s Foreign Secretary David Cameron publicly encouraged Kiev to use British Storm Shadow missiles to strike inside Russia. French President Emmanuel Macron continued to threaten a direct – not covert, as at present – intervention by French, that is, NATO, troops (In addition, an intriguing and much-discussed article reported that a deployment of 1,500 troops from France’s Foreign Legion had already begun. While its sources were hard to assess, its claims appeared too plausible for easy dismissal.)

Moscow, in return, issued a set of stark warnings, laying down – or highlighting – red lines. It announced drills with tactical nuclear weapons. Belarus did the same; in Minsk’s case, the weapons in question are, of course, also Russian. In addition, the British and French ambassadors received extremely straight talk about the risks their respective governments were running.

Addressing London, Moscow made clear that Kiev striking inside Russia with British missiles would expose Britain to “catastrophic consequences,” in particular, Russian retaliation against British forces anywhere. Regarding France, Moscow blasted its “belligerent” and “provocative” conduct and defied as futile French attempts to produce “strategic ambiguity.”

For now, this particular crisis seems to have abated. There are some signs that the West got the message. NATO figurehead Jens Stoltenberg, for instance, has insisted that NATO is not planning to send troops – openly, that is – into Ukraine.

Yet it would be wrong to feel too reassured. For this crisis was, at its core, a clash between, on one side, a Western problem that has by no means gone away and, on the other side, a persistent Russian policy that, it seems, all too many in the West refuse to take seriously enough.

The Western problem is that a defeat at Russia’s hands would be worse by orders of magnitude than the fiasco of the rout-like retreat from Afghanistan in 2021. Ironically, that is so because the West itself has charged its needless confrontation with Russia with the power to do unprecedented damage to NATO and the EU:

First, by insisting on treating Ukraine as a de facto almost-NATO-member, which means that by defeating it, Moscow will also defeat Washington’s key alliance. Second, by investing large and growing sums of money and quantities of supplies into this proxy war, which means that the West has weakened itself and, perhaps even more importantly, revealed its own weakness. Third, by trying to ruin both Russia’s economy and its international standing; the failure of both attempts has resulted in a stronger Russia across these two domains and, once again, revealed more limits of Western power. Fourth, by radically subordinating the EU to NATO and Washington, the geopolitical damage has been, as it were, leveraged.

In short, when the Ukraine crisis started in 2013/14 and then greatly escalated in 2022, Russia had vital security interests at stake; the West did not. By now, however, the West has made choices that have charged this conflict and its outcome with the capacity to do great, strategic harm to its own credibility, cohesion, and power: Overreach has consequences. That, briefly, is why the West is at an impasse and remains there after this crisis.

On the other side, we have that persistent policy of Moscow, namely its nuclear doctrine. Much Western commentary tends to overlook or downplay this factor, caricaturing Russia’s repeated warnings about nuclear weapons as “saber-rattling.” Yet, in reality, these warnings are consistent expressions of a policy that has been developed since the early 2000s, that is, for almost a quarter-century.

A key feature of this doctrine is that Russia explicitly retains the option of using nuclear weapons at a relatively early stage in a major conflict and before an adversary has had recourse to them. Many Western analysts have described the purpose of this posture as facilitating a strategy of “escalating to deescalate” (sometimes abbreviated as E2DE), here meaning specifically to end a conventional conflict on favorable terms through a limited use of nuclear weapons to deter the adversary from continuing.

The term “escalate to de-escalate” emerged in the West, not Russia, and this Western interpretation of Russian policy has played an important role in Western politics and debates and, thus, has its critics as well. In addition – but this is a separate question – some analysts point out that the idea of E2DE is less of any country’s national property than something inherent in the logic of nuclear strategy, that other nuclear powers have had similar policies, and that the whole idea, whoever adopts it, may not work.

In addition, Russia’s nuclear doctrine is, as you would expect, complex. And, while France’s President Emmanuel Macron has made a habit of strutting a constant inconstancy he calls “strategic ambiguity,” Moscow is capable of inflicting some genuine calculated uncertainty on its adversaries, with less bragging but more effectively. Thus, one side of its nuclear doctrine stresses that nuclear weapons could only be used if the existence of the Russian state was in danger, as has just been underlined again by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov. But to misunderstand this as a promise that Moscow would only use nukes if Moscow were under siege and half of Russia’s territory or population gone already, would be foolish.

In reality, there also is room in its nuclear doctrine for treating the “unconditional territorial integrity and sovereignty” of Russia as critical thresholds. How do we know? From multiple Russian documents, which need not be cited here because Ryabkov has reminded us of this facet of Moscow’s policy, too. In the same statement in which he emphasized the criterion of “state existence.” Take that, Emmanuel.

A final point, it seems, needs highlighting as well: Russia has never restricted its option of using nuclear weapons, indeed any type of weapons, to the area of a specific local conflict, for instance, Ukraine. The opposite is the case. Moscow is explicitly reserving the right to strike beyond the confines of such a battlefield. That is something that President Vladimir Putin has made crystal clear in his address to Russia’s Federal Assembly in February of this year. It is exactly that message that Britain has received as well in the recent crisis.

Whichever way you parse it, official Russian nuclear doctrine has specific messages for potential adversaries. Moscow has consistently applied this doctrine throughout the Ukraine War and in its recent warnings – by drill and by diplomatic demarche – to its Western opponents.

But there is the rub: The West has a history of obstinately not hearing Russian messages. That is how we ended up in this war in the first place. Russia had warned the West repeatedly since, at the latest, President Vladimir Putin’s well-known speech at the Munich Security Conference in – wait for it – 2007. The last major warning came in late 2021, when Russia – with Sergey Ryabkov, incidentally, in the forefront – offered the West what turned out to be a last chance to abandon its unilateralism and specifically NATO expansion and, instead, negotiate a new security framework. The West brushed this offer off. With nuclear weapons in play, it is time that Western elites learn to, finally, listen when Russia sends a serious warning.

The Bell: The shadow of the 90s haunts the Russian opposition

To learn more about what life was like for many Russians during the 1990s, you can read my interview with a cross-section of Russian people here about their experiences and memories of that time. As long as the liberal opposition in Russia wants to view the 90’s era in Russia as primarily about new-found freedom and democracy (which only a few privileged Russians really experienced during that time) rather than the massive poverty, appalling mortality crisis, violent crime, and chaos that many were forced to endure, they will continue to have no traction among the Russian masses. They will just continue to be obnoxiously out-of-touch. – Natylie

The Bell, 4/22/24

Team Navalny film about 1990s oligarchs divides Russia’s opposition

The 1990s were a turbulent period following the collapse of the Soviet Union — and 30 years later it remains the most controversial era in modern Russian history. The rapid democratization of society and the switch from a planned to a market economy was accompanied by poverty, rampant crime and the wholesale redistribution of state property into the hands of a few oligarchs close to power. In Russian society, the lingering sense of the “wild 90s” as a national trauma has been exploited by Putin-era propaganda, threatening a return to those chaotic times unless Russians staunchly support the “stability” of the current regime. At the same time, there is another widespread point of view of the era: one of an age of liberty, when people could speak and think freely after having thrown off the shackles of Soviet-era censorship. 

What happened during this pivotal decade — the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union — is directly linked to the state of modern Russia today. Many prominent businessmen and active government officials cemented their positions at that time. Shortly before his death, Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny accused the liberal elite of the era of paving the way for Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Last week, his team released a documentary further developing that idea. The main narrator and ideologist was Maria Pevchikh, one of the leading figures in Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation. Her narrative, while containing no new revelations, annoyed many members of the opposition.

Team Navalny released the first episode of a new documentary series, titled “Traitors” last week (another two episodes should soon be released), in which they explain how oligarch Boris Berezovsky won control of the main Russian TV channel — at the time known as ORT, now Channel One. Berezovsky could not have taken control of such a key asset without money provided by fellow oligarch Roman Abramovich, best known as the owner of Chelsea Football Club. Abramovich, in turn, was vying to bring together two state-owned oil extraction and refinement enterprises. In exchange for the funding, Berezovsky persuaded Boris Yeltsin to approve Abramovich’s deal by threatening to use the power of ORT to sink his 1996 presidential election campaign if he did not agree. Yeltsin won the election, and within less than four years had named Putin as his successor.It is believed that Valentin Yumashev played an important role in Putin’s rise to power. He started out as a journalist and then got to know Yeltsin in the late 1980s. Yumashev was Yeltsin’s literary aide and worked in the presidential administration, heading it for a time. In 2001, after Yeltsin had left office, Yumashev married Yeltsin’s daughter (now Tatyana Yumasheva). The pair were Yeltsin’s closest advisors before he resigned, a unit collectively known as “the Family”. Yumashev repeatedly told Yeltsin that Putin, his former subordinate and at the time head of the FSB, was the most suitable successor. Although as journalist Ilya Zhegulev wrote in his book, there wasn’t much competition at the time. “Here we have Putin — out of desperation,” a source in the presidential administration told Zhegulev. After Putin became president, Yumashev worked for him as an adviser on a voluntary basis. The Pevchikh film provides no new detail or revelations about this period. It is based largely on the memoirs of Alexander Korzhakov, Yeltsin’s security chief, as well as transcripts of court hearings in the Berezovsky vs. Abramovich case. The oligarchs famously clashed in a London court in the early 1990s, with the court filings revealing the ins and outs of doing business in Russia at that time. Berezovsky had demanded $5.6 billion in compensation from Abramovich, who he claimed had forced him to sell his stake in two Russian companies at a cut-down price. The court threw out Berezovsky’s claims and ordered him to pay Abramovich’s costs. Less than a year after the verdict, Berezovsky committed suicide.As soon as it was released, the film faced almost unanimous criticism from Russia’s scattered opposition. It was accused of “smoothing over” a complex story, turning a blind eye to the historical context, sympathizing with the leftist agenda (in 1996, Yeltsin’s most dangerous opponent was Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov), rewriting history, producing propaganda and marginalizing the Russian opposition. Disgraced Russian oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who made his fortune in the period, said that the film left him “ideologically bewildered.” According to him, Pevchikh could have focused on more important issues of the era, such as the war against Chechen separatists or the internal political conflict of 1993 that led to tanks firing on the parliament building in Moscow.Few would disagree that it is necessary to dredge through difficult events of the past. Reviewing controversial historical periods is a generally accepted way of working through collective trauma, one that helps foster a consensus of what happened, and reduces the risk of a repeat. However, both the film and the reaction to it suggests that even in a part of society that is genuinely interested in having this conversation, common ground is still far away.

Why the world should care:

On the day the film was released, Time magazine ran an interview with Yulia Navalnaya, who it named one of the 100 most influential people in the world. Following the death of her husband, Navalnaya is trying to take his place as the overall leader of the Russian opposition. The interview was headlined: “Putin is my enemy. The Revolution of Yulia Navalnaya.” One of her key beliefs is that Russian antiwar and opposition movements exist — and that they can be brought together. “As for uniting the opposition, the last demonstrations showed that it’s not hard to unite around a good, collective action. That is the main source of unity,” she said. The reaction of opposition bloggers to Pevchikh (who Navalnaya sees as the curator of effective international sanctions) once again casts doubt on that belief.

RT: Ukrainian children ‘kidnapped’ by Moscow found in Germany

RT, 4/18/24

Over 160 Ukrainian children allegedly “kidnapped by Russia” have been discovered living in Germany, the country’s Federal Criminal Police (BKA) has confirmed.

The head of Ukrainian national police, Ivan Vygovsky, on Wednesday hailed the discovery, telling national media that he had discussed the issue with Holger Munch, president of the BKA, during a meeting earlier in this week.

Allegations by Kiev that Moscow kidnapped Ukrainian children en masse have been exposed as a lie after some of the purported victims have been found in the EU, according to Russian children’s rights commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova. She is among the officials to have been accused of abducting youngsters from Ukraine amid the conflict between Moscow and Kiev.

When asked for clarification by RT Deutsch, the BKA said its officers had identified the children after they were flagged as “kidnapping” victims by Kiev. Their personal details were checked against German records.

The majority of the youngsters had entered Germany as refugees accompanied by their parents or legal guardians, the police said. In a handful of cases, suspicion of “unlawful transfer” remained, the statement added, without offering further details.

Responding to the revelations, Lvova-Belova said Moscow has “long been drawing the attention of the international community to the fact that Ukraine has created a systemic myth regarding the children, who it claims had been ‘deported’ to Russia.”

Last year, Lvova-Belova was named alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the key suspects in its investigation into the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of minors during the Ukraine conflict. Moscow dismissed the claim as politically motivated, arguing that Kiev had lied to the court about what in reality was an evacuation of civilians from areas affected by the hostilities.

In her remarks about the German discoveries, Lvova-Belova said her office had identified multiple cases in which children described by Kiev as abductees were actually residing with their parents at home or in other nations, “never having been separated from their families.”

She expressed hope that the Ukrainian “global disinformation campaign” would eventually stop and that the truth would prevail.

Matt Bivens: Child Snatcher! (re ICC Arrest Warrant Against Putin)

By Matt Bivens, Substack, 4/22/24

A year into the invasion of Ukraine, an arrest warrant was issued for Vladimir Putin. The crime: Kidnapping!

Prosecutors with the International Criminal Court accused the Russian president, under cover of war, of having stolen “hundreds” of Ukrainian children. Government officials in Ukraine went further and spoke of more than 16,000 (!) stolen children. Still others spoke of hundreds of thousands, and suggested this could meet criteria as a form of “genocide.”

“The charges carry a potential life sentence,” The Wall Street Journal reported, adding helpfully, “the ICC doesn’t impose the death penalty.” (A contributing author of that Wall Street Journal report, Evan Gershkovich, would himself be arrested two weeks later by Russian security services, and charged with espionage.)

The New York Times reported that Ukraine’s children had been treated as “the spoils of war,” and other headlines were more lurid. “Moscow grabs Ukrainian kids and makes them Russians,” reported Associated Press (where I used to work). “Russia snatches Ukrainian children,” said The Moscow Times (which I used to edit). “Russian ‘child snatcher’ admits taking 700,000 children,” shrieked Britain’s The Telegraph.

This was all a little confusing. Had “hundreds” been kidnapped? Or 16,000, or 700,000? One was hesitant to ask; even a single stolen child would be a terrible wrong.

Then again, the basic facts of an alleged serious crime ought to matter. Especially if we’re going to talk loosely about throwing the Russian president into a UN-run dungeon, even as we complain that they won’t let us just blindfold and shoot him.

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Yet in March 2023 the basic facts were scarce, and they remain so today. The ICC says the details are classified: “The warrants are secret in order to protect victims and witnesses and also to safeguard the investigation.”

More context and information was provided by human rights NGOs and journalists. The American media in particular offered detailed anecdotes of family separations, which well illustrated the horror and chaos of war. And yet, in most of these anecdotal accounts, the Russians ended up reuniting Ukrainian families separated in the war zone. (If, out of a spirit of skeptical contradiction, you want to ask: “Don’t you mean, ‘in the war zone Putin created’?” — fair enough, agreed!)

We’ll return to the specific kidnapping allegations. But this is Part III of a history that focuses on the war’s potential to spin out of control, and scorch lands far beyond poor Ukraine’s. In that regard, March 2023 was an exciting new spin of the revolver cylinder in our ongoing game of world-wide Russian Roulette. An arrest warrant had been issued personally for Vladimir Putin — over a viscerally emotive and disgusting accusation. He’s stealing children.

U.S. President Joe Biden, asked his reaction to the ICC arrest warrant, approved. “Well, I think it’s justified,” he said. “I think it makes a very strong point.”

This was the same Joe Biden who in the first year of the war (see Part I and Part II) had only gingerly offered small arms, ammunition and shoulder-fired missiles, for fear of — his words — “Armageddon.” (Yes, that is the President referencing the Bible’s predicted battle that ends all life on Earth.) Biden back then had famously warned Democrats in Congress that “the idea that we’re gonna send in offensive equipment, and have planes and tanks and trains going in … don’t kid yourself — no matter what y’all say — that’s called World War Three. Okay?”

His White House had frantically shushed its own security officials after they’d anonymously bragged to the media about how we’d helped to assassinate at least 12 Russian generals, and to sink Russia’s Black Sea flagship. When Russia’s undersea Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline had exploded — months after Biden had warned, “If Russia invades” Ukraine, “there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2” because “we will bring an end to it” — his White House had shrugged with nervous “who, me?” innocence. Soon after, the White House had pulled aside The New York Times to underline that we not only disapproved of and had nothing to do with a Ukrainian-planted car bomb in Moscow that had killed a Russian journalist — we also really had no idea what the Ukrainians might do next:

“American officials have been frustrated with Ukraine’s lack of transparency about its military and covert plans, especially on Russian soil,” The New York Times reported then. “While the Pentagon and spy agencies have shared sensitive battlefield intelligence with the Ukrainians, helping them zero in on Russian command posts, supply lines and other key targets, the Ukrainians have not always told American officials what they plan to do. … [S]ome American officials believe it is crucial to curb what they see as dangerous adventurism, particularly political assassinations.”

True, Washington was also filled with talk of how we were supporting the coming glorious Ukrainian counteroffensive. (Delusional talk? Cynical talk?) But Biden was still refusing to share F-16 fighter jets or long-range missiles, and had recently told a group of his political fundraiser friends, “We’re trying to figure out: What is Putin’s off-ramp?”

“Where does [Putin] find a way out? Where does he find himself in a position that he does not — not only lose face, but lose significant power within Russia?”

Great question! In reporting it, The New York Times also paraphrased an anonymous European diplomat who said that “when the history of this era is written, many will be shocked” at how frantically officials were working behind the scenes to prevent a nuclear war. The Times said that national security elites were keeping quiet about how much danger of that we were all in “for fear of inducing public panic or market sell-offs.” (!).

Biden’s Armageddon / off-ramp remarks were spun at the time as another Uncle Joe campfire story, just the President making things up again on the fly.

Last month, however, The New York Times — citing 18 months of interviews with top U.S. insiders “who recounted the depth of their fear (my emphasis)” in the fall of 2022 — revealed that in fact the President was sharing our exact intelligence assessments: If Ukraine ever did somehow “start winning,” then Russia really would use battlefield nuclear weapons. Or as Biden told his richest friends (but not us): “It’s part of Russian doctrine … [I]f the Motherland is threatened, they’ll use whatever force they need, including nuclear weapons.”

In that light, how did the looming Ukrainian counteroffensive even make sense? The Ukrainians would be vaporized by battlefield nukes if they started to succeed — the Russians would risk a world war, even a nuclear war, before they’d accept being pushed out of Donetsk or Crimea. In other words, thousands of young Ukrainians would accomplish nothing while dying — and the only question was whether their useless deaths would be brought about by nuclear weapons, or conventional.

Red is the Russian-held territory Ukraine was gearing up in 2023 to try to win back.

We were nevertheless hellbent on proceeding with this counteroffensive — we had rejected direct peace overtures to Washington from the Russians, we had scuttled successful bilateral Russian-Ukrainian peace talks, and we were instead egging the Ukrainians on, demanding that they hurry up and attack already — apparently because we were confident they could not definitively succeed; and thus were reasonably confident they would not cause a wider nuclear war. (See Part II). So … what was the point? Our exact goals were murky: Keep the fight going, so as not to admit defeat before the U.S. presidential election? Fatten our defense contractors? “Weaken Russia?” Whatever one’s goal, it would be sought at the price of tens of thousands of young Ukrainian and Russian lives.

For that matter, where’s the logic in talking about how Putin needs an off-ramp, a way to save face — even as we cheerfully applaud a plan to arrest him for child theft?

Let the evil Slav die in chains

The American political class gleefully celebrated the ICC arrest warrant. It was a chance to fantasize about Putin being clapped into handcuffs — for example, if he were to visit Europe. A CNN commentary crowed that “Putin’s world just got a lot smaller,” and recalled with satisfaction how former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević had spent years in a jail cell — in fact, had died in that cell, in 2006, reportedly from heart failure — while his long-running UN war crimes trial crept slowly onward.

The example of Milošević’s arrest, imprisonment and trial is crucial context. Once you consider that startling history, it becomes clear what issuing a similar arrest order for Putin meant: It was a giant stride forward towards a wrecked world. In fact, the ICC arrest warrant was the greatest escalation of the Ukraine war to date — certainly greater than, say, providing 31 Abrams tanks to a war zone flooded with thousands of tanks (see Part II).

Milošević was the only other sitting world leader in history before Putin to face a UN arrest warrant. He was also a fellow Slav who had defied the West, been targeted by NATO, and ultimately been forcibly dragged, by NATO, out of his capital city to die abroad years later in a UN detention center.

When Yugoslavia disintegrated in the early 1990s, its separate republics — Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia — became independent states, and then started fighting over borders. Serbia, the largest, formed a “new Yugoslavia” with Montenegro, and often the wars involved Milošević’s Serbia claiming to be defending “Yugoslavia.” A decade of waxing and waning violence killed more than 100,000 people, in events oft-lamented at the time as “the worst war in Europe since World War II.” (Today, the far-briefer Ukraine war has already claimed that sad title. So far, more than 200,000 people in Ukraine — soldiers and civilians — have been killed.)

Map taken from the UN War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia.

The last major Yugoslav war, in 1998, involved an independence bid by the Serbian region of Kosovo — an ethnically Albanian and predominantly Muslim region inside an Orthodox Christian, Slavic country. It was put down harshly by Milošević. His Yugoslav (Serbian) forces drove hundreds of thousands of civilians from the province. NATO demanded he desist, and in 1999 launched a 78-day aerial bombardment of Serbia. Milošević backed down, Kosovo was put under UN administration, and displaced Albanian civilians returned home — at which point 100,000 ethnic Serbian civilians in Kosovo, fearing reprisals, then fled their homes.

The UN authorized a peacekeeping force, and it’s worth remembering how Russian soldiers (on orders from a younger Vladimir Putin) worked side-by-side in Kosovo with NATO soldiers:

From a NATO press release on the history of U.S.-Russian cooperation in Kosovo.

Even so, ordinary Russians had been furious about that 78-day NATO bombardment. The U.S. bombs destroyed military targets — but also killed hundreds of Serbian civilians, and also destroyed power plants, water treatment facilities, factories, bridges and the state-run Serbian radio and television station. (We also bombed the Chinese embassy, which was officially an accident). I lived in Moscow then, as editor of The Moscow Times, and the rage of the street protesters outside the U.S. Embassy was eye-opening. Not that the Russians enjoyed much moral high ground: For years, they had been busily pulverizing their own Kosovo-like enclave of independence-minded Muslims: Chechnya. Perhaps 160,000 people were eventually killed in the Chechen wars. Today, Kosovo is an independent nation (even Serbia recognizes that); but Chechnya remains a Russian province, and the legendary Chechen fighting spirit has been harnessed by the Kremlin and directed against Ukraine.

Another map, to help keep us oriented.Even if peace dawns tomorrow, Putin’s jail cell still awaits him

The Kosovo war marked a downward turn in U.S.-Russian relations, which had been mostly warm until then. Overnight, the Russians were also far more suspicious of NATO; we had always assured them it was purely defensive in nature, but now here it was, unmasked, raining war and death down from the skies upon Serbia — a nation that had not attacked any NATO member.

The Serbian television station bombing in particular had killed 16 civilians in what Amnesty International called a war crime; NATO replied that journalists were fair game if they supported the wrong side. Needless to say, no one at the UN war crimes bureaucracy ever spoke up with an opinion on that. (Why bother? The United States does not recognize their jurisdiction over our government or citizens.) But the UN tribunal did hand down the Milošević indictment. He and four lieutenants were accused of the murder of 340, and deportation of 740,000, Kosovo Albanians. The case relied heavily on “highly classified” U.S. intelligence files that CNN noted had been “crucial in bringing about the indictments.”

Two years later, in 2001, Milošević had lost re-election and was out of office. Now he was vulnerable. The United States and Great Britain renewed calls to have him extradited. The Serbs balked, but Washington set a deadline. We had no particular jurisdiction — but this was our ongoing crusade, started under Bill Clinton and continued under George W. Bush, and we declared that until citizen Milošević was delivered up to The Hague, we would delay all manner of international aide for war-mangled Yugoslavia. With nearly $1 billion at stake, competing political factions in Yugoslavia (Serbia) quarreled viciously, and soon Milošević was arrested by his own people. They did not charge him; they said he was just going to be brought before a Belgrade judge “for questioning,” about “abuse of power” and “financial corruption.”

But would he be extradited to the West? No, said Vojislav Koštunica, the man who’d just defeated Milošević to take over the Yugoslav presidency. Koštunica strongly opposed his foe’s extradition. The Supreme Court of Yugoslavia also asserted this fell within its purview, and stated it would take two weeks to consider. Russia also voiced concern. Like America, Russia had no particular jurisdiction, but Russians and Serbs have a longstanding political and cultural fellow-feeling. Nearly every major Russian political figure spoke out against the West’s pressure on Yugoslavia (Serbia) to turn over its ex-president.

In the end, no one had any say in it. The Russian government and the Yugoslav president roared in outrage as Milošević was abruptly whisked out of a Belgrade prison (by whom?), flown by helicopter to a U.S.-run airbase in Bosnia, and put on a NATO plane to The Hague. We might have heard a lot more about this, but two months later the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. overshadowed everything else. (Putin, famously, was the first world leader to call President Bush with condolences. Over the objection of his Russian security officials, Putin also offered support to the war in Afghanistan, including access to air bases in Central Asia).

Milošević would sit in a UN detention center for nearly five more years as his trial crept along. He was a thuggish, murderous opportunist — but it’s incredible to think he was imprisoned for so many years just based on charges — charges based in large part on information from the U.S. intelligence services! — without ever being convicted of anything. When Milošević was found dead in his prison cot in 2006, it was noted his recent requests for medical care had been refused; his brother and wife were both in exile in a sympathetic Moscow; and the UN court had yet to rule on his request to subpoena former President Clinton as a hostile witness.

That’s a lot of back story. Many of us have forgotten it, or never knew it. But I can promise you this: The Russians remember it. All of it.

It’s been barely a year since we declared that we were preparing a cozy jail cell in the Netherlands for the Russian president. Here’s a photo essay from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty of The Hague detention center accommodations that await Putin. There’s no internet access allowed, but the photos show there’s a foosball table, so that’s nice.

Putin might even get Milošević’s old cell; heck, they could even force him to sleep in the same cot in which Milošević had died.

Again: The expectation — the legal precedent — is that even if a peace deal were struck tomorrow in Ukraine, Putin would still be expected to go sit in jail at The Hague, to await his trial on kidnapping. Did we even understand the enormity of what we’d done?

Next time: In Part IV of “The Thrill of Russian Roulette,” terrorist attacks bring the war home to Russia, the violence escalates, we unpack the kidnapping case further — all while our American leaders keep confusing Russia’s crimes against humanity with their own.

Part I.

Part II.